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Abstract
Within the study of European integration, the questions of the existence of "social Europe* and the 
possible impact of European integration on national welfare policies continue to be most disputed. 
The present study aims to contribute to this scholarly discussion, questioning to what extent the 
European Union has institutionalised social security rights, how, and with what impact on national 
welfare policies. Whereas existing research either tends to investigate a process of European 
integration in its own right or focuses on the impact of European integration, this study employs a 
two-step research agenda. It attempts to bridge two layers of institutionalisation by, first, analysing 
the gradual development of Community Regulation 1408/71, which entitles the migrant 
worker/person to equal and exportable social security rights within the European Union, and, 
subsequently, by examining how that specific integration process has impacted on Danish and 
German social security policies and the organising principles behind them. In order to examine the 
two separate -  and intertwined - layers of institutionalisation, a diachronic, process-tracing study is 
carried out on the basis of the argument that the effective reach, meaning and impact of Community 
law and policy unfolds gradually over time and through subtle steps at two levels of decision­
making. The analysis brings into focus institutionalisation through the interaction of law and 
politics. The European Court of Justice has continuously interpreted the scope and content of the 
Regulation, and has appeared to act when politics has been absent. Judicial activism, furthering 
cross-border social security, has been seconded by the European Commission’s persistent attempts 
to set the agenda. However, the research also finds that institutionalisation has not been 
progressively driven towards "more Europe', but that politics at times responds, either through 
collective reactions or through the subsequent national implementation of supranational decision­
making. The research findings, however, also suggest that such political response may not be the 
last word, since the Court, on request, may reinterpret matters.
On the basis of the analysis of institutionalisation between an extensive T0 and T2, the study 
concludes that over time the European Union has established a social security dimension, which 
increasingly has impacted on and restructured the organising principles of national welfare policies, 
however, not in a systematic, immediate or converging wav.
Keywords: European integration: Welfare Policies: Regulation 1408 71: Intra-European social 
security; Institutionalisation through the interaction o f  law and politics; Domestic impact.
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Chapter I: Introduction
To what extent has the European Union1 institutionalised social security rights, how and with what 
impact on national welfare policies? This research question addressing to what extent, how and with 
what impact is the main focus and puzzle of this thesis. The study analyses the European 
integration2 of welfare policies as a result of the free movement of workers and later persons. It thus 
aims to add to the scholarly discussion on the extent to which and how a "social Europe' has been 
established, and what the consequences arc for national institutions. Specifically, the study 
examines how intra-European social security rights have been established for the European migrant3 
over time and how this has affected the national welfare institutions in place. Following a two-step 
research agenda, the study aims to go beyond existing research, which either tends to investigate the 
process of European integration in its own right, or focuses more or less exclusively on its impact. 
A two-step research strategy has been chosen on the basis o f the argument that the effective reach, 
meaning and impact of Community law and policy can only be assessed when analysing how 
supranational decision-making is subsequently implemented into nationally enforceable rights or 
obligations. This thesis argues that in order to capture the dynamics and impact of a given 
integration process, we need to examine the process as two-layered and unfolding over time,
1 The term 'European' refers to the geographical scope of the European Community and later the European Union. By 
the Maastricht Treaty of November 1993, the European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU). In general,
1 will refer to the EU in this thesis, except when giving historical references.
2 As noted by Kelstrup, 'integration’ is a static as well as a dynamic concept for the degree of coherence: ’In  general, 
integration is seen as denoting either the degree of coherence in a system or a process which increases the degree of 
coherence in a system” (Kelstrup 1998, p. 18).
J The concept ‘migrant* refers to both the ‘immigrant' and the ‘emigrant’. The concepts ‘migrant' and ‘migration' are 
used to describe intra-European circulation, rather than a defined movement ‘to ' or 'from' one specific country, as 
'immigration' and 'emigration' do.
1
analysing the subtle steps of and feedbacks between supranational integration and national response 
in terms o f  subsequent implementation.
The focus throughout the thesis is on the concrete institution of Community Regulation ¡408 714. its 
creation, institutionalisation and impact. Institutionalisation5 is defined as the process by which 
rules (institutions)6 arc created, applied and interpreted (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998. p. 16). By 
studying institutionalisation as a two-layered process, the thesis analyses in detail the meeting 
between supranational obligations and national institutions in place in the case of social security. 
The study concludes that while the European Union has established a social security dimension over 
time, which has increasingly impacted on and restructured the organising principles of the member 
welfare state, it has not, however, done so in a systematic, immediate or converging way.
1.1: Transnational Social Security in the European Union
Since the foundation of the European Economic Community, the free movement of labour has been 
one of the Community's cornerstones (Comelissen 1997, p. 29: Pcnnings 1998, p. 3). In order to 
realise the Community objective o f free movement of workers as well as its subsequent extension to 
other persons. Regulation 1408/71 has for decades coordinated EU migrants' social securin' rights 
across member states' borders.7 The framework coordinating social securin' rights is based on the 
assumption that in order to stimulate intra-Community migration, it is necessary to abolish national 
barriers to movement. Such a barrier might be the loss or risk of losing social security entitlements.
4 Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application o f social security schemes to 
employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members o f their families moving within the Community; as 
amended by Regulation (EC) 118/97 of flic Council o f 2.12.1996 (OJ L 2 8 of 30.01.1997).
5 'European integration' and 'European institutionalisation' essentially refer to the same process, except that the latter 
focus on the institutional process o f change.
6 Institutions are in this thesis defined as 'formal rules'. Different theoretical definitions of institutions will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter II section 2.2. As an introductory note, it shall here be emphasised that tire thesis employs a 
definition o f  institution different from how the concept o f institution is normally used within the discipline of law. 
Whereas 'institutions' in political science may range from organisations, rules to norms, 'institutions' in law generally 
refer to 'organisations' or 'bodies’, as for example the European Commission as an European institution. I'or theoretical 
purposes, this thesis defines Regulation 1408/71 as an 'institution', whereas European bodies such as the Commission 
and the European Court of Justice are defined as 'supranational organisations'.
Since the coming into effect o f the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) on the 1st o f January 1994, 
Regulation 1408/71 also applies to the nationals from Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. This means that the rights and 
obligations entailed in die Regulation apply to 18 states. This diesis will, however, not distinguish between EU and 
EEA nationals, but simply refer to the rights o f EU or European citizens.
2
which would make the Community worker reluctant or unwilling to take up work outside his own 
member state (Flynn 1997, p. 18). Against this background, the Regulation prescribes that migrant 
workers/persons in the Community’ have equal social security- rights when settling in another 
member state, as the nationals of that state, and migrants have a right to export their social security’ 
entitlements when deciding to reside in another member state. The aim of the Regulation is to spur 
intra-European migration, which according to the Commission serves as a means to labour market 
flexibility', again assumed to create prosperity-. The gradual development of intra-European social 
security’ rights has been explained as part of this larger chain of cause and effect, which makes up 
the ideational context of the Regulation.
Regulation 1408 prohibits national legislation that discriminates against citizens from other member 
states, as it partly prohibits territorial principles formulated in national social security legislation. 
The Community’ institution thus intervenes directly on two of the core principles and the historical 
reasoning of the welfare nation-state. From an organisational perspective, the decisions on access to 
and the territorial scope of welfare policies have traditionally been regarded as a national 
prerogative. Welfare policies have traditionally been organised through clear links between the state 
and the entitled persons, demarcating benefits to the national, the long-term resident or the insured 
person and confined within national borders. The organising principles of the policy domain have 
traditionally been social citizenship and territoriality (Marshall 1950; Altmaicr 1995; Leibfricd & 
Pierson 1995; Comellisscn 1997). The process of European integration has increasingly put these 
two main principles under adaptive pressure.
1.2: Research Puzzle
Studying European integration of welfare policies implies researching the puzzle arising from the 
contradictory’ meeting between mobility for the European migrant on the one hand and national 
welfare encapsulated within territorial borders on the other hand. That is, the meeting between the 
European mobilisation of production factors to create an internal market and the immobility that 
national welfare in its traditional construct represents. Historically, the construction o f welfare has 
been closely linked to the formation and consolidation of the nation-state (Eichcnhofer 1999; 2000; 
Fcrrcra 2003). The demarcation of the nation and the territorial borders of the state has traditionally 
defined social citizenship, i.e. who and where to be protected against social risks. In its gradual 
development, welfare came to constitute a decisive means of national integration, where material
3
rights and obligations linked the state and civil society together. European integration challenges the 
original national embeddedness of welfare.
The existence and reach of ‘social Europe* has long been debated.8 Formally regarded, the 
organisation of welfare continues to be a national prerogative, and ‘social Europe* has been laid 
dow n as “the road not taken'* (Maydell 1999, p. 9; Scharpf 2002, p. 645).
"...the course of European integration from the 1950s onward has created a fundamental asymmetry between 
policies promoting market efficiencies and those promoting social protection and equality" (Scharpf 2002, p. 665).
From a formal point o f view, member states possess social sovereignty. Despite a generally 
intensified process of European integration, social policies have appeared as a remaining stronghold 
of the sovereign nation-state against the influence o f European law and policy -  ‘an island beyond 
its reach'9 (Eichenhofer 1999b. p. 102).
It has, however, also been pointed out that the market building process of the European Union 
entails social integration through the abolishment of national barriers to the internal market 
(Lcibfricd & Pierson 1995, p. 51). As part of a negative integration process, 'social integration* 
means constrained policy options for the national welfare state instead of a positive build-up o f a 
European social polity' (Lcibfricd & Pierson 1995. p. 65; Scharpf 2002, p. 666; Maduro 2000. p. 
327).
This thesis examines an extract of 'social Europe', namely social integration of the traditional core 
of w elfare; protection against social security' risks. It does so byr analysing the gradual development 
of Regulation 1408/71 and its implementation in Danish and German social security legislation. The 
research aims to assess To what extent' and ‘how' an intra-European social security dimension has 
been built up as well as The impact' it has had on the national institutions in place.
“ See among others Abrahamson & Horchorst 1996'. Amum 1999; Hantrais 1995; Goma 1996; Leibfried <fc Pierson 
1992; 1996; Majone 1996; Montanari 1995; Nielsen & Szyszczak 1997; Rhodes 1995; 1997; Ross 1995; Scharpf 2002.
** As fonnulated by Advocate General Tesauro in the cases C-l 20/95 Decker and C-l 58/96 Kohll, para 17. The case-law 
will be discussed in detail in chapter V and VII below.
4
The discipline of law has investigated the scope of European social security law in detail and 
described the legal dynamics which have extended rights across member state borders.10 Law 
studies have furthermore contributed with research on the effects of social security integration on 
organising principles or specific welfare policies.11 Political science has supplemented these studies 
by more general conclusions on the consequences for the autonomy to define national welfare 
policies.12
The conglomerate of existing research tells us that Europe's social security dimension has mainly 
been the result o f a Court driven process, which has had either considerable, some or hardly any 
impact on national welfare policies. Whereas existing work may depict the scope of intra-European 
social security protection, and thus provide descriptions o f ‘to what extent', we have no coherent 
study on the path dependent process, expanding supranational social security competencies. We still 
lack diachronic, process tracing studies able to link incidents over time and thus investigate ‘to what 
extent* and ‘how’ in connection. If social integration has transformed welfare states from sovereign 
to semi-sovereign, as Leibfricd and Pierson claim, how could such transformation take place despite 
the fact that welfare policies arc national competencies (Leibfricd & Pierson 1995)? We lack the 
analytical insight into how integration can expand and constrain national policy options, without 
any apparent political reaction. Why do member states allow a change o f ‘status' from sovereign to 
semi-sovereign entities? Such questions are left unanswered by existing research. In order to 
examine the puzzle o f ‘to what extent' and ‘how* in relation, the present study will link decision­
making. trace path dependency and analyse the dynamics of social securin' integration, by focusing 
on the acts and reactions of law and politics and by tracing the process as it has unfolded over time.
When turning specifically to ‘with what impact*, the puzzle is intensified by the fact that scholars 
disagree quite strongly on the effects of European coordination of social securin' rights. Leibfricd. 
Pierson and Ferrera argue that social sovereignty has been compromised. Member states have lost 
the means of welfare policy control, including the ability to control who are to benefit from national
10 See among others Becker 1998; Bieback 1990; 1994; Christensen & Mahnstedt 2000; Comelissen 1997; Eichenhofer 
1995; 2000; 2001; Haverkate & Huster 1999; Holloway 1981; Huster 1999; Igl 1998; Kôtter 2000; Langer 1999; 
Malmstedt 2000; Maydell & Schulte 2001; Pennings 1998; Sakslin2000; Sieveking 1997; 2000.
11 See among others Altmaier 1995; Berg 1999; Comelissen 1996; Ketschcr 1998; 2002; Schulte 1998; Zuleeg 1998.
12 See among others Abrahamson & Boichorst 2000; Conant 2001; 2001b; 2002; Ferrera 2003; Leibfried & Pierson 
1995; 1996.
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social security schemes and the spatial consumption thereof (Lcibfricd & Pierson 1995, p. 5 0 ; 
Ferrera 2003, p. 632). Furthermore, by constraining policy options, coordination may indirectly 
converge national policies:
“ ...coordination has become the catalyst for an incremental, right-based homogenisation of social policy’' 
(Leibfried & Pierson 1995, p. 65).15
The work o f Conant contrasts with these rather strong assessments of impact. Conant finds that a t 
the same time as the European Court of Justice has attempted to blur national boundaries by' 
constructing transnational social rights and obligations, member states have been successful in 
maintaining and reconstructing national borders through the means of law , politics and practices 
(Conant 2001b, p. 24). Whereas we may identify a cause, we will have to keep searching for its 
effects (Goetz 2001). Conant argues that member states are able to overturn or pre-empt the effects 
of unw elcome legal decisions (Conant 2001b; 2002). According to Conant. member states respond 
actively to social security integration and have various w ays of minimising its general impact:
“Tlie exclusion of many migrants from their legal entitlements to equal treatment reflects a significant discrepancy 
between what the F.CJ justices and national officials consider to be appropriate practice. The HCJ created rights 
that national governments never intended to honor, and reactions of evasion, overrule and pre-emption prevail as a 
result" (Conant 2001b, p. 27).
Existing research thus offers conflicting interpretations on social security integration in the EU. The 
puzzle left to be resolved questions 1) to what extent and how transnational social security rights 
have been established within the European Union and 2) whether supranational institutionalisation 
has compromised welfare sovereignty', as argued by Leibfried, Pierson and Ferrera, or largely been 
impact neutral, as suggested by Conant.
The separate aspects of the research puzzle arc. however, interlinked and related in cause and effect 
as well as by feedbacks. Examining ‘how’ requires an examination of ’to what extent'. Questioning 
'with what impact* necessarily requires a preceding analytical mapping of 'to what extent'. Also 
here 'how ' becomes the underlying puzzle. Only by studying both layers of the institutionalisation 
process, will its separate and interlinked dynamics stand out. By analytically laving down the scope
Leibfried and Pierson note that they deliberately do not speak about 'supranationalisation', nor 'harmonisation' but 
use the term ‘homogenisation'. According to them, effects such as supranationalisation or harmonisation would imply a 
stronger political centre than the current construct of the TU (Leibfried &, Pierson 1995, p. 65).
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of the cause, retaining it, and diachronically searching for its effect, impact may become 
identifiable. Only by tracing cause-effect relations over an extensive period of time will we be in an 
analytical position to decline or identify impact. By examining institutionalisation and its eventual 
effect as it evolves over decades, we should be able to assess both the hypothesis of semi-sovereign 
welfare states as well as the opposing one on impact neutral processes of European integration. In 
addition, by studying impact comparatively, variations in effects may be revealed although referring 
to the same cause. The following analysis will address the three questions contained in the research 
puzzle, by first discussing theoretical approaches on institutionalisation and impact, then 
analytically mapping the bits and pieces of supranational institutionalisation and finally 
investigating impact as it appears in relation to national institutions, as it differs between the Danish 
and German member states and as it manifests immediately or in the long run.
The following two sections will further detail research motivation and approach.
1.3: Research Motivation
The motivation for researching European institutionalisation of social security rights has in part 
been empirical and theoretical as well as disciplinary. The empirical motivation has been that the 
regulatory framework coordinating social security entitlements across member states' borders 
exemplifies an extraordinary piece of ‘Europe’ in the sense that it guarantees concrete rights to the 
migrant. Substantive rights which most likely would not have been established or extended without 
the regulatory framework of the European Union. At the same time, it interferes with the core 
functions of the nation-state and by challenging traditional organising principles ultimately 
questions social sovereignty'. Its development has been highly sensitive politically, and from time to 
time the Regulation has been attributed a converging effect. The ‘convergence hypothesis*, 
however, remains an abstract proposition rooted in academic and political assumptions which has 
not been rigorously tested. From an empirical point of view, the field should be ripe for analysis. 
From a theoretical point o f view, an analysis of Regulation 1408/71 allows us to apply, question 
and perhaps ultimately improve on some prevailing theoretical assumptions about institutional 
creation, institutionalisation and the domestic impact thereof. Finally, from a disciplinary point of 
view, research on the institution of 1408/71 has largely been left to the discipline of law despite the 
considerable impact on European and national politics that has been ascribed to the Regulation. A 
political science perspective on theories of integration combined with a detailed analysis of the
7
evolution of Community social security law and policy may highlight important aspects o f  
institutionalisation between law and politics within the field of welfare.
Concerning the empirical motivation, the coordination system institutionalised by Regulation 1408 
has been viewed as the most advanced social policy achievement o f the EU, and as the m ost 
comprehensive system of access to cross-border health care in international social law (Eichcnhofcr 
2001. p. 227; Palm ct. al 2000, p. 28). Above all, the coordination system gives 'life* to Europe, by 
extending concrete rights beyond national borders, by solving very practical and material problems 
for the person crossing borders, and recently by adding flesh to the skeleton of European 
citizenship. For migrants exercising their right to cross-border movement, the Regulation is a 
concrete and substantive example of how the EU may add to their lives in practice. For the member 
states, the Regulation solves allocative questions concerning those who do not remain and those 
who enter established social communities. The Regulation weaves social responsibilities across 
borders, however, without imposing any rcdcstributive instructions. In temis of substantive rights 
and in its practical effect, 1408 is an extraordinary regulatory instrument. Furthermore, its 
development concretely mirrors the move of the general integration process from economic 
community to European union. Researching its institutionalisation over time may therefore provide 
us with a particular depiction of a general development.
However, the success and practical effect of Regulation 1408 is likely to be acknow ledged only by 
national administrations and by the relatively small number of EU workers and citizens who cross 
borders. As noted by Eichcnhofcr, despite its radical achievement, the social security dimension o f  
the European Union has not received much recognition:
"[Regulation 1408] has been the most significant development so far in social policy at the European level. Its 
success has been remarkable, yet its implementation has been scarcely noticeable. For decades pensions have been 
exported, medical treatment has been available for tourists travelling between Member States, and pro-rata 
pensions have been payable to lliose who have spent their working lives in more than one Member State. Such 
benefits o f  EU social security co-ordination is today taken for granted” (Eichcnhofer 2000b, p, 231).
While intra-European social security rights have been added with little attention being paid to them, 
the Regulation has been attributed with having had a significant impact on domestic welfare 
policies. For reasons which will be detailed in chapter VI and VII on domestic impact, the core 
rationales o f the Regulation have thus been held to Tif the social insurance welfare model, and
8
equally ‘misfit’ the principles of the residence-based welfare model (Banke 1998, p. 30; Kctscher 
1998, 2002; Abrahamson & Borchorst 2000).14 The assumptions hold that the Regulation does not 
impact uniformly, but foremost challenges universal, non-contributory social policy designs: 
“Coordination requirements work best with individualized, earned social rights of the employed, and worst with 
collective provision of services to all citizens. Policymakers are thus encouraged to follow the program designs of 
Bismarck (benefits based on contribution) rather than Beveridge (universal, flat-rate benefits).” (Leibfried & 
Pierson 1995, p. 57).
Within Danish academia, it has been argued that free movement and Regulation 1408 favour an 
individualistic insurance principle to such an extent that it will gradually force the residence-based, 
non-contributory welfare state, i.e. the Danish welfare state, to converge with the dominating social 
insurance pattern of the HU member states (Kctscher 1998, p. 283; 2002, pp. 221-222; PI Lige 
Lovligt, 26 November 2003).
The comparative research conducted in this thesis between Denmark and Germany originates in the 
motivation to examine whether empirical findings actually support the proposition that the 
coordination requirements foremost challenge the residence-based, non-contributory welfare state, 
and to examine whether an empirical analysis identifies an equally strong impact on the welfare 
institutions of Denmark.
The theoretical motivation for studying the European institutionalisation of social security rights 
has been to follow an institution through, thus analysing its rationale and its transformative capacity 
as established over time. The case of social security' has deliberately been chosen as a research field, 
since it represents a case distinct from the core areas of economic integration. In part the choice of 
case has been strategically motivated from a theoretical perspective, since if integration and impact 
occur within the ‘less likely’ policy field of social security, it demonstrates that integration 
increasingly occurs and has effects and that control is increasingly escaping member states - also 
within policy fields at the margin of European integration.
14 The work of Risse, Cowles and Caporaso on “Europeanisation and Domestic Change”, as w ell as the w ork of BiSrzel, 
suggest that the ‘adaptation^ pressure' exerted by Europeanisation varies depending on the ‘goodness o f fit' between a 
specific European integration process and the national institutions in place (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001; Bdrzel 
1999; BOrzel & Risse 2000). By identifying the degree o f ‘fit' or ‘misfit' (compatibility/incompatibility), one identifies 
the degree of adaptational pressure on domestic institutions which may cause change.
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Another part of the theoretical motivation has been to conduct an empirical analysis which 
confronts some frequently raised and essential theoretical questions in both institutional analysis 
and the study of European integration. The research question of this thesis can thus be 'translated' 
into a theoretical one. inquiring: To what extent do institutions matter as inputs in the European 
integration process. how do they evolve and what impact do they have on established national 
institutions? The case and the research question thus address three frequently asked theoretical 
questions within the study of institutions and European integration:
• How was the institution created?
• How has it subsequently been institutionalised?
• How have its creation and institutionalisation impacted on national institutions? I.c. how have 
supranational path dependencies impacted on national ones?
The theoretical chapter will address these questions in turn and so will the five analytical chapters, 
thus overall aiming to answer both the empirical and theoretical research motivation. Chapter II 
contains the theoretical discussion. Chapter III addresses the creation of the institution from an 
empirical point of view. Chapter IV and V examine the gradual supranational institutionalisation 
over time. Chapter VI and VII analyse the impact of institutionalisation on Danish and German 
welfare institutions.
Finally, the more disciplinary oriented motivation increased gradually as insight was gained into 
the process of integration of social security. The insight early encouraged an inter-disciplinary 
study, which although initiated on the basis of political science, revealed impossible to conduct 
without the discipline of law. Despite the fact that the institutionalisation of intra-European social 
security has gradually removed the national barriers to welfare across borders and despite the fact 
that institutionalisation may challenge core organising principles of the welfare state, political 
science has largely left the study of the coordination system to law.15 Coordinating social security 
rights across the EU is indeed a very technical matter, where questions of accessing, accumulating 
and exporting rights across borders have been decided by national and European administrations as 
well as inside national and European courtrooms. By and large, integration has been legally driven 
to the fore. However, the motivation for studying a predominanti}’ legal integration process from a
1! That o f course does not account for such writers as Ferrera (2003), Leiblried & Pierson (1995: 1996) and 
Abrahamson & Borchorst (2000) among others.
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political science perspective has been that the case powerfully demonstrates the relative autonomy 
of the European Court of Justice. Additionally, it demonstrates how political and judicial decision­
making at times arc interwoven so tightly that their separateness almost dissolves. Finally, the case 
exemplifies repeatedly how the spheres of law and politics reciprocally restrain one another and 
how implementation may -  at least in the short term - constitute a second stronghold of national 
control. To answer "to what extent, how and with what impact" in fact requires the insights and 
tools of both disciplines.
1.4: Research Approach
The research question "to what extent has the European Union institutionalised social security, 
how and with what impact on national welfare policies?" requires a thorough analysis of 
Regulation 1408/71 and its development over time.
The question 'to what extent' addresses the development of the Regulation. The question implies a 
comparison over time. A process-tracing study will therefore be conducted, comparing the 
regulatory scope of 1408 at identifiable points of time. It will compare institutional innovation in To 
with the regulatory framework before, the gradual development in Tt mapping decisive incidents, 
and the output of recent negotiations on 1408 in T? will be compared with the established 
institutional path. The research strategy is diachronic, aiming to assess institutional dynamics as 
they unfold over time.
The question 'how' aims to investigate what has moved the institution of 1408 forward as well as 
what has restrained its integrative course at times. Investigating how the scope of the Regulation is 
laid down brings the supranational organisations of the European Court o f Justice and the 
Commission into focus, as well as the Council representing the collective voice of the member 
states. Since unanimity has been maintained as the procedural rule for 1408/71, reforming the 
Regulation has at times been politically very difficult. At the same time that members of the 
Council have refuted or considered the Commission's reform proposals, the European Court of 
Justice has taken a most active part in defining the scope and meaning of the Regulation as well as 
its Treat}- base, thus defining Community competencies. Analysing the evolving scope of intra- 
European social security rights is inextricably bound with examining the actions and reactions of
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Council, Commission and Court. From the fact that the political actors in long periods between To 
and T2 have been unable or unwilling to act the European Court of Justice has at crucial m om ents 
played the lead, seconded by the Commission. In the following analysis, the capacity o f th e  
European Court of Justice and the Commission to extend the scope o f a supranational institution 
and settle its effective meaning will be depicted. The reactions of the Council and individual 
member states will, however, demonstrate how supranational organisations do not unilaterally 
define the integrative steps. Politics may retort.
The question 'with what impact' requires an examination of the effects that supranational decision­
making has had on national institutions and on the national autonomy to formulate welfare policies. 
Although 'impact' may appear as a concrete concept, its operationalisation demonstrates that it 
contains many facets, and there is much disagreement as to whether impact takes place. First o f all, 
the compatibility between national institutions and the obligations of European law and politics 
determines the degree of adaptive pressure that European integration exerts on national policies.16 I f  
implementation of supranational decision-making occurs to the letter, adaptive pressure is equal to  
impact. However, adaptive response may not correspond to adaptive pressure. A national 
(re)interprctation of European obligations in relation to national institutions may reduce or increase 
actual impact. To the extent that this happens, the impact o f the same decision-making is diversified 
across member states, not only due to varying adaptive pressure but also due to national responses. 
Furthermore, when discussing free movement of workers and later persons the notion of ‘adaptive 
pressure' contains a de facto component. The factual adaptive pressure on national social security 
systems varies across member states depending on the extent of EU-rclated immigration into that 
country. Secondly, perceptions o f  impact may van- over time and be decisive for the member state's 
bargaining position in the Council. How the impact of the regulation is at first perceived may 
therefore hinder further integration, but perceptions may equally be dynamic thus allowing 
integrationist decision-making at a later stage. Perceptions o f impact thus feed back into decision­
making, which in the end determines the actual impact. Finally, the actual impact depends on the
16 The definition o f 'adaptive pressure' contains both an institutional and a de facto component. From an institutional 
perspective, ‘adaptive pressure' can be defined as being constituted by the degree of compatibility (the ‘fit') between 
the principles and obligations of a given European integration process and those of national institutions (Risse, Cowles 
& Caporaso 2001, pp. 6-7). In the concrete case of the free movement of workers and, later, persons, 'adaptive pressure' 
likewise contains a de facto aspect. From a de facto perspective, ‘adaptive pressure’ arises from the actual EU- 
immigration into a member state and the extent to which such immigration challenges the organisation of national social 
securin' policies. ‘Adaptive pressure' will be analysed in chapter VI and VII of tins thesis. For more references at this 
stage, see footnote 14 above.
national response in terms of implementation. In the short/medium run, member states alone attend 
to implementation. In the longer run, their compliance with Community obligations is monitored by 
the Commission and the European Court of Justice. The actual impact of supranational political and 
judicial decision-making is studied through the process of national implementation. On the whole, 
researching the question ‘with what impact* highlights the significance both of the time-variable 
and of variations across member states. In order to analyse the domestic impact, a diachronic and 
comparative analysis is carried out. Variations on the impact of Regulation 1408/71 over time are 
examined, and a comparative analysis of the effects of supranational decision-making between the 
member states of Denmark and German)' is carried out.
Figure 1 sums up the research question, puzzle and approach of the present study as detailed above.
Figure 1: R esearch  Puzzle a n d  A pproach
In q u ir y : * To  w h a t  e x irn t ' h »  ih r  E u ro p e a n  1 nlo n
Institutio na lise d  social secu rity  r ig h t?
f im a a r i 'h  u i n r  T o  l a y  d o w n  th e  g ra d u a l  e x p a n s io n  o f  in tr a - E u ro p e a n
s o c ia l  s o c u n iy  r ig h i» .
E x a m in e s  t h e  c a u s e  in d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia t i le . T h e  c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  a
c s u p ra n a t io n a l  s o c ia l  s e c u n ty  p o lity
£ T o  b o  ç a r r io d  o u t  C h a p te r  11 ( th e o r e t ic a l  d i s c u s s io n ) ,  c h a p te r  t i l
«
•
1  /
( in s t i tu t io n a l  c r e a t io n  j .  c h a p te r  IV  &  V  f in s t i tu t io n a l i s a t io n )
f 1 In q u ir y : ’ H o w *  h a t Institutional c re a tio n  and institu tio n a lisa tio n
Q
ta k e n  place?
P R e s e a r c h  a im  T o  tr a c e  th e  d y n a m ic s  b e h in d  th e  p a th  d e p e n d e n t
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Ü. E x a m in e s  t h e  d y n a m ic s  a n d  r e s tr a in ts  o f  so c ia l  s e c u n ty  i n te g ra t io n  T h e
a c t io n s  a n d  r e a c t io n s  o f  (h e  E u ro p e a n  C o m i  o f  J u s t ic e . C o m m is s io n .  &
C o u n c i l  o f  M in is te rs .
T o  b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  C h a p te r  I I  ( th e o r e t ic a l  d i s c u s s io n  i. c h a p te r  111V ( in s t i tu t io n a l  c r e a t io n ) ,  c h a p te r I V  &  V  ( in s t i tu t io n a l i s a t io n ).
c
£ I n q u ir y :  'Y V M h  w h a l Im paci* o n  n a tio n a l w elfare  polic ies?
£
R e s e a r c h  a im  T o  l a y  d o w n  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  s u p ra n a t io n a l  d e c is io n
9 m a k in g  o n  n a t io n a l  in s ti tu t io n s  a n d  a u to n o m y  to  f o r m u la le  w e lf a re
a p o lic ie s .
«
6 E x a m in e s  th e  e f f e c t /d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le . A d a p tiv e  p re s s u re ,  r e s p o n s e  to
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i
(d o m e s t ic  im p a c t) .
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1.5: Research Strategy
Analysing European institutionalisation of social security rights is done by means of a case study o f  
Regulation 1408/7PS creation, development and impact over time. The research strategy o f th e  
present study thus employs the case study method. Furthermore, the study o f the question ‘w ith  
what impact' uses the comparative method, examining the impact on the Danish and G erm an 
welfare states respectively.
The general characteristic of a case study is that it deals with ‘how’ or 'why' questions (Yin 2 003 , 
pp. 6-7). Case studies are explanatory in character. By questioning ‘how' or ‘why', they reveal th e  
links o f an incident over time, its cause and effect or context, rather than consider frequencies or th e  
incident in isolation. According to Yin, a case study is an empirical inquiry into a topic, w hich  
could be characterised as:
'T h e  essence of a case-study, the central tendency among all types o f case-study, is that it tries to illuminate a 
decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” (Schraimn 
1971, quoted in Yin 2003, p. 12).
Apart from their general characteristics, case studies are conducted for different purposes and thus 
make different contributions to thcoiy. A case study can be conducted for purely athcorctical 
reasons and only serve a descriptive purpose. But case studies may also lead to theoretical 
refinement or even theory-building. To set out explicitly the theoretical purpose of the case study 
becomes an important part of the research strategy, since it details how the empirical work relates to  
theory.
I classify the present case study as 'disciplincd-configurativc* in character, but one adding a 
‘heuristic’ research approach when analysing 'with what impact' (Verba 1967, pp. 114-115; 
Lijphart 1971; Eckstein 1975).17 In his landmark essay on the case study method and theory in 
political science, Ekstcin described the disciplincd-configurativc case study as the study aiming to
1 The different case study categories are ideal ty pes (Lijphart 1971, p. 691). Their application to empirical phenomena 
and existing theory reveals that the borders between them are blurred, for which reason a particular study may lit m ore 
than one category. The disciplined-conilgurative case study was originally recommended as a method by Verba (1967). 
Verba did not, however, limit the approach to the research on a single case, but found that it could also be employed in 
the comparative study (Verba 1967, p. 117).
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explain on the basis of existing theories (Ekstein 1975, p. 99).18 In the disciplined-configurative 
case study type, the researcher recognises the availability and explanatory value of existing theories 
and thus structures her/his research strategy in accordance therewith. A case study of this t>pc, 
however, need not be a passive application of existing theory, but may on the basis of its empirical 
findings bring into question some of those guiding theoretical propositions. Finding existing theory 
insufficient calls for alternative theoretical explanations. In this sense, applying existing theory to a 
concrete case is likely to have a feedback effect on such theorising, leading to its refinement. 
Therefore, a disciplined-configurative case-study may contribute to theorising.
The heuristic case study, on the other hand, inductively aims to find new variables or generate 
hypothesis in order to establish reasonable explanations on the basis of the empirical findings.19 
Previous to the heuristic study, a disciplined-configurative case study may have taken place, 
concluding that existing theories cannot -  fully or partly -  be applied to the case at hand. A 
heuristic case study may then be carried out, deliberated from the binding clement of a priori 
theoretical propositions.20 *25Heuristic case studies “tic directly into theory building" and do so 
' ‘...less passively and fortuitously than does disciplined-configurative study, because the potentially generalizable 
relations do not jast turn up but are deliberately sought out’* (Ekstein 1975, p. 104).
In the present study, the disciplined-configurative case study has been combined with the heuristic 
one to frame and explain different stages of European institutionalisation of social security' rights. 
The empirical research has been structured with the clear objective of addressing and perhaps 
providing new findings to three reposed theoretical questions within the institutional study and that 
on European integration: How was the institution created? How did it subsequently' institutionalise? 
Hoyv has its creation and institutionalisation impacted on national institutions? Before the empirical
18 In his landmark essay, Ekstein operated yvith five types of case studies; 1) the configurative-idiographic study, 2) the
disciplined-configurative study, 3) the heuristic case study, 4) plausibility probes, and 5) the crucial case study (Ekstein
1975, pp. 96-123). Lijphart termed the disciplined-configurative study as ‘interpretive*, but the category essentially 
accounts for the same (Lijphart 1971, p, 692). Lijphart classified six types of case studies; 1) the atheoretical case study,
2) the interpretive case study, 3) the hypothesis-generating case study, 4) the theory-confirming case study, 5) the
tlieoiy-infirming case study, and 6) the deviant case study (Lijphart 1971, pp. 691-693).
,g Ekstein termed this case study type as ‘heuristic’, whereas Lijphart termed it as the ‘hypothesis-generating* case
study (Ekstein 1975, pp. 104-108; Lijphart 1971, p. 692). The two labels, however, account for the same relation 
between research strategy and theory-building.
25 In the process of theory-building, tire findings o f one case-study may be tested in a subsequent one, thus applying a 
“building-block technique’* (Ekstein 1975, p. 104). The findings of a disciplined-configurative case-study may through 
this technique be supplemented by a heuristic study.
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research is conducted, chapter II of this thesis discusses how existing theories explain the facets o f  
institutionalisation as contained in the questions. These theoretical propositions arc finally tested 
against the findings of the case study. The theoretical aim is to question their explanatory value 
against the researched case and eventually contribute with analytical insights to refine theoretical 
arguments. In this aspect, the case study method chosen is disciplined-configurative.
However, when moving beyond established theoretical reasoning, analysing adaptive pressure, 
national response and impact, the research strategy falls between the disciplined-configurative and  
heuristic case study type. The research on 'with what impact' cannot be structured on the basis o f  
existing theories by the fact that there is no single coherent theoretical school or competing schools 
on the impact of supranational decision-making on national institutions. Studies on the effects o f  
European integration still move largely within a theoretical vacuum. Although recent research 
indeed makes valid theoretical suggestions which may gradually lead to theory building, they still 
do not provide a coherent theoretical framework on the basis of which a research strategy can be 
formulated (Borzel 1999; Bôrzel & Risse 2000; Conant 2002; Risse, Cowles & Caporaso 2001). 
Whereas the objective of the research on "with what impact* is not in itself to develop a theoretical 
generalisation, the aim on a more modest scale is to provide detailed empirical insight in a under- 
researched as well as under-theorised dimension of European integration, and by this insight 
eventually contribute to theory-building as it evolves.
In general, the generalising, and thus theorising, ability of case studies has been questioned. It has 
been questioned how the findings of a case-studs' can be generalised beyond the immediate study, 
since the study singling out a case evidently docs not operate with a large n-sample. Ycl. the fact 
that the results of a case studs- cannot be generalised to a sample or immediately generate theory, is 
not the same as arguing that the method cannot sen e a theoretical purpose, as here pointed out by 
Lijphart:
"The scientific status o f the case study method is somewhat ambiguous, however, because science is a 
generalising activity. A single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground lor 
disproving an established generalization. Indirectly, however, case studies can make an important contribution to 
the establishment of general propositions and thus to theory-building in political science" (Lijphart 1971, p. 691).
The drawback of the case study being the lack of frequencies, its advantage clearly is that focusing 
on a single case allows its details to be examined intensively. A case study conducted in depth
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obviously provides more detailed and contextualised information, which is relevant to the theory 
being evaluated or generated. The many observations gathered on the basis of a single case should 
compensate for the n=T sample. Thereby, the case study is a method making information accessible, 
which, for example, the statistical method cannot provide.
Furthermore, the case can be selected for strategic-theoretical purposes. Such a case aims to test a 
theory- or theoretical proposition. If the case beforehand seems unlikely to support theory, it 
constitutes the ‘least likely" case, or in the contrary case a ‘most likely" case. The least likely" case 
may confirm the theory against odds. The propositions of the theory thus appear stronger and more 
likely to hold in other cases as well. It has gained explanatory' value. The opposite account is true 
for the ‘most likely" case. If contrary to expectations it invalidates the theory, that theory has been 
fundamentally weakened. The ‘least likely" case is thus foremost tailored to confirmation, and the 
‘most likely" case to invalidation of a theory (Ekstein 1975, p. 119). By choosing one’s case 
strategically along the continuum of * least likely’ and 'most likely", the case study becomes a most 
suitable method for testing and improving theories:
“A single crucial case may certainly score a clean knockout over a theory” (Ekstein 1975, p. 127).
Placed on a continuum between ‘least likely* and 'most likely" cases, the case study on European 
institutionalisation of social security rights represents the ‘less likely" case of integration. Not 'least 
likely", because the free movement o f workers constitutes a key principle in the construction of the 
internal market and therefore makes up a key factor within the process of economic integration. 
However, still ‘less likely", because member states maintain the prerogative to organise their social 
security policies, and have repeatedly refuted harmonisation mot es from the European Union. The 
autonomy to decide on welfare policies has been jealously guarded by the member states. 
Integration, compromising national welfare competencies, is thus ‘less likely* to happen.
As a final point to be mentioned with regard to this thesis* research strategy', the comparative 
method has been employ ed in order to relate findings on the study of impact. The comparative 
method allows an inquiry into the effective reach, meaning and impact of European law and policy 
when supranational decision-making is transposed into nationally enforceable rights. By employing 
the comparative method, it becomes possible to assess whether the European coordination system 
foremost challenges the residence-based, non-contributory welfare state and eventually causes
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convergence. In chapter VI, competing hypotheses on impact are drawn up, including a specific o n e  
on convergence of national institutions. Of the 15 member states, Denmark and Germany have b e e n  
chosen for comparison, as representing the residence-based and insurance-based welfare s ta te s  
respectively. Other member states would likewise have been interesting comparative cases, but in  
historical terms Denmark and Germany are strong examples of two member states which ch o se  
different paths of the social security model, and by and large confirmed these through a century- 
long process of general change. Due to the significant difference of these national institutions, th e  
examination of their individual adaptation to the European acquis communautaire is assumed to  
uncover comparative differences. The convergence hypothesis makes us expect that European 
institutionalisation of social security rights foremost impacts on the residence-based welfare s ta te , 
i.c. the Danish member state. This is, however, up for empirical contestation.
Comparatively, Denmark constitutes the primary case and Germany the contrasting one. Given th e  
tw o-step research agenda of the present study demanding a detailed and time-consuming collection 
and analysis of materials at two levels of decision-making as well as over time, it has not b een  
possible to undertake research strictly equally on the two cases. In practical terms, this means th a t 
more interviews and more primary sources have been examined in the Danish ease. These empirical 
findings have then been compared with the German case on the basis of extensive, but few er, 
interviews and the use of secondary’ sources. For this reason, chapter VII on domestic impacts 
analyses ‘perceptions of impact' only for the Danish case, whereas impact in institutional terms is  
analysed in individual sections for both Denmark and Germany.
1.6: Research Material
To stud\' ‘to what extent, how and with what impact' the EU has institutionalized social security 
rights necessitates several selective choices. This necessity- arises from the two-step research 
agenda, aiming to examine supranational institutionalisation as it evolves over time and its impact 
on national welfare. The specific institution of Regulation 1408/71 is complex, dense and not least 
dy namic and so are national institutions of social security-. The study has therefore required a  
specific delimitation, based on rigorous methodological choices on what to research, using which 
material and sources, and within which period of time.
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In essence, the meeting between the EU Regulation and national institutions in place means that the 
supranational institution obliges the member states to grant equal treatment to the personal scope of 
1408 and partially to make acquired social security rights exportable. This is an obligation which 
exerts adaptive pressure on the nationally institutionalized welfare principles of social citizenship 
and territoriality. This confrontation o f organizing principles explains the research choices made.
Against this background, the analysis o f the process o f supranational institutionalisation contains an 
investigation o f five interrelated aspects: 1) how the Regulation's principle o f equal treatment has 
been enforced over time; 2) to whom intra-European social security rights have been granted over 
time, i.e. the personal scope of Regulation 1408/71; 3) how the material scope of 1408 has been 
defined and extended over time; 4) how the Regulation’s principle o f  exportability has been 
enforced over time; and, finally, 5) the institutionalisation of the concrete social security field of 
health care is examined in order to demonstrate how the meeting between supranational obligations 
and national institutions may unfold within a specific welfare policy field. In the analysis of all the 
five aspects, the time variable is significant. The research is chronologically structured in order to 
uncover eventual institutional dynamics.
In terms of materials, the selection has been made on the basis of specific articles in the Regulation. 
Article 2 treats the personal scope of Regulation 1408/71, Article 3 its principle of equal treatment, 
Article 4 the material scope, Article 10 the principle o f exportability and Article 22 treats the right to 
health care in another member state. The development of the five individual articles has been 
analysed in detail using three sources: 1) the case law by the European Court of Justice in which at 
least one of the five articles has been cited as instrument: 2) the Commission's amendment 
proposals and recommendations: and 3) amendments adopted by the Council. The three sources 
thus equally allow an examination of the role of the two supranational organizations as well as of 
the Council as collective voice for the member states. The case law of the Court and the 
amendments adopted by the Council are listed in appendix 1 and 4 respectively. Appendix 1 is 
detailed below. Appendix 4 lists the Regulation number, the date of adoption, and the articles 
amended. Between 1971 and 2002, Regulation 1408/71 has been amended 28 times. This 
introductory finding alone indicates the dynamism of the institutionalisation process.
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Again in order to delimit the very large amount of material and the very dynamic process, the three 
sources of material address institutional changes happening from 1971, when 1408 was adopted, 
until the end of 2002. However, the historical examination of 1408's regulatory background in 
chapter IV includes an analysis of case-law preceding 1971 and in addition examines 1408's 
predecessor Regulation 3/58. The case-law preceding 1971 has, however, not been selected 
systematically according to the five articles. Furthermore, recent negotiations on the reform of the 
Regulation as well as its domestic impact analysed in the subsequent chapters includes incidents 
occurring in 2003 to the extent that they were emphasized in the qualitative interviews carried out.
In order to access the case law of the European Court of Justice interpreting the regulatory scope o f  
1408, a CELEX analysis has been carried out. Between 1971 and the end of 2002, the Court ruled 
on Regulation 1408/71 in 338 cases. The 338 cases are listed in appendix 1. The case law has been 
coded according to: date of the judgment, name of litigant, member state under examination, case- 
law number, European Court Report details and the Article of 1408/71 cited in the case law. The 
cases in which at least one of articles 2, 3, 4. 10 or 22 have been cited have been chosen for 
^examination. These cases, which number 138, are emphasized in appendix 1. Initially, all 138 cases 
have been examined. They have, however, not all had the same impact in settling the supranational 
regulatory scope or on national institutions for which reason not all of them have been analysed in 
detail. Nevertheless, the majority o f the cases are discussed in the analytical chapters, some in the 
text itself, others as substantiating case-notes listed as endnotes in the individual chapters. The rest 
simply constitute the background material of this thesis. The early research strategy was to 
systematically examine all case law related to one of the five articles. As research progressed, the 
qualitative interviews and secondary sources enabled me to focus among the case law. Although 
indeed time consuming, the early approach was necessary in the sense that it helped me to 
understand the material as a whole. From a methodological point of view, I furthermore find (hat 
the early research strategy was important to avoid the peril of "selective citation of illustrative 
cases'* (Garrett, Kcleman & Schultz 1998, p. 151: Burley & Mattli 1993, pp. 50-51).
Additional sources of information to study the supranational institutionalisation process have been 
documents from the Council, press releases from the Commission and the European Court of 
Justice as well as documents and reports from the European Parliament.
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Researching ‘with what impact* has required delimitation of the national social security institutions 
on which to examine impact. In practical terms, it has not been possible to analyse the impact of the 
whole material scope of 1408, covering social security legislation on: illness and maternity; 
invalidity benefits; old-age pensions; survivors' benefits; occupation-related accidents and disease; 
death grants; unemployment benefits; and family benefits. Domestic impact will be analysed for the 
national policies of statutory pension, long-term care, family benefits and health care. Thereby the 
analysis addresses the two classic social security schemes of statutory pension and health care, as 
well as the younger ones of long-term care and family benefits, representing more recently 
institutionalised social responsibilities of the welfare states.
For the primary ease, i.e. Denmark, a very valuable source of information has been governmental 
notes to the Danish Parliament's European Affairs Committee. These have been collected through 
documental search in both the Library of the Danish Parliament and in the Parliament's EU 
Information Centre (Folkctingcts EU-Oplysning). Also Danish parliamentary debates and questions 
to individual ministers on the free movement of workers and the consequences of European 
integration on national welfare have been examined. Furthermore, decisions from the Danish Social 
Appeal Authority (Den Socialc Ankcstyrclsc) treating Regulation 1408/71 have been analysed. In 
addition, newspaper articles treating the topic have been sought out. Also, secondary material in the 
form of academic writing has been used for both the Danish and the German ease. It is. however, 
notable that whereas Germany has a whole school of prominent scholars dealing with international 
social security this is far from the ease in Denmark, where the issue has been treated widely by the 
press but relatively little by academia.
Regarding the contrasting ease, i.e. Germany, the ease law on German legislation and 
administrative practice have constituted decisive material for analysing the impact of the 
Community Regulation on the insurance-based welfare state. The ease law concerning Germans is 
listed in appendix 2. according to the same coding as appendix 1. but adds which national court 
referred the ease. Furthermore, for the eases citing at least one of articles 2. 3, 4. 10 or 2 2 .1 have 
analysed and coded whether the European Court of Justice ruled in favour of the migrant or found 
the German act in accordance with European obligations. The rulings citing one of the five articles 
are emphasised in appendix 2.
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Finally, a very important source of information for this study has been qualitative interviews. 
Between April 2001 and February 2004, 21 interviews were conducted with representatives from 
the Commission as well as from the Danish and German civil service. The large majority o f the 
interviews were held in person, recorded and subsequently coded. Tw o interv iew ees insisted on no t 
being recorded in order to speak more freely, and five interviews were conducted over the phone. 
The length of the interv iews were between 45 minutes and 31/2 hours, most being about 114 hours. 
Interviews were conducted with representatives from the Commission's DG on Employment and 
Social Affairs -  the Unit of Free Movement of Workers and Co-ordination o f Social Security 
Schemes; from the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs; the Danish Ministry' of Interior and Health; 
the Danish Social Security Board; the Danish Foreign Ministry; the Danish Permanent 
Representation; the German Federal Ministry o f Labour and Social Affairs; the German 
Verbindungsstelle; and the German Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung.
I promised that none of my sources would be identified or quoted in the written text. Therefore, 
when referred to in the following, the date of the interview appears as well as the organisational 
affiliation of the interviewee, but name and rank do not.
1.7: Thesis  Structure
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The present chapter I introduces and chapter II contains 
the theoretical discussion. The five subsequent chapters conduct the empirical analysis o f  
Regulation 1408/71 's creation, institutionalisation and impact over time. Chapter VIII finally 
concludes on the empirical and theoretical findings.
Chapter II discusses theoretical accounts of institutions, institutionalisation, and institutionalisation 
through the interaction of law and politics together with the domestic impact of such 
institutionalisation. This is intended to enable us to understand how European integration of social 
security rights has taken place over time and what the impact thereof on national institutions has 
been. The chapter introduces an analytical model with which to analyse European 
institutionalisation of social security rights as a two-layered process of integration.
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Chapter 111 initiates the empirical analysis by introducing the Regulation, its meaning, scope and its 
main principles. The chapter then analyses the context and history of the Regulation. This is done 
by examining the process by which the objective of Regulation 1408 -  i.e. the free movement of 
workers and subsequently of persons more broadly -  was institutionalised. Secondly, it is done by 
examining de facto intra-European migration on the basis of statistical observations and, lastly, by 
analyzing the inherited institutional context on the basis of which Regulation 1408/71 was created.
Chapter IV  initiates the analysis of the Regulation’s process of supranational institutionalisation. 
The chapter traces the process of how the principle of equal treatment and the personal scope of the 
Regulation has been settled and extended over time. Individual sections focus on the actions and 
reactions of the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the Council of Ministers, 
separately and intertwined as they are.
Chapter V continues the analysis on supranational institutionalisation. The chapter analyses how the 
Regulation's principle of exportability has been institutionalised over time in relation to the material 
scope of the legislation, in relation to ‘special non-contributory' benefits and finally' in relation to 
the specific policy field of health care. This chapter also focuses on the action and integrationist 
ability of the Commission and Court of Justice, and on the existence of political support for or 
restraint of supranational activism.
Chapter VI initiates the analysis of the ‘second layer' of institutionalisation whereby it is national 
implementation which determines the effective meaning and impact of supranational 
institutionalisation. The chapter identifies the adaptive pressure on the Danish and German welfare 
models which is caused by an ultimate incompatibility betw ccn European and national institutions. 
It docs so by examining the historical reasoning, the organizing principles and the boundaries of 
welfare w ithin each of the two member states. This examination is concretized by focusing on the 
four contemporary social security institutions of statutory pension, public health care, long-term 
care and family benefits. Finally, the chapter examines the dc facto pressure exerted by EU 
immigration into the two member states respectively.
Chapter MI continues the analysis o f the second layer of institutionalisation. The chapter conducts 
a comparative analysis of the national response to and the domestic impact o f intra-European social
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security rights in Denmark and Germany. This is done, first, by researching how Denmark has 
changed its perceptions o f the impact of this legislation over time; secondly, by analyzing how th is  
particular instance of supranational institutionalisation has impacted on the Danish social 
institutions of statutory' pension, family benefits, long-term care and health care; and, thirdly, b y  
examining the response of Germany and the impact on its four social security schemes.
Chapter VIII concludes by presenting my analytical findings which are summed up and related back 
to the earlier theoretical propositions concerning institutions, institutionalisation and their domestic 
impact.
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Chapter II: Theoretical Explanations on European 
Institutionalisation of Social Security Rights
In a general discussion on European integration, ‘social security' represents a ‘less likely case' of 
integration. For national and historical reasons, member states have safeguarded their welfare 
competencies and have not left much for the Community to do.
“The Europeanisation is capable of effective action only in areas which the major interests affected arc either 
convergent or complementary. Such areas do exist .... but social policies and welfare state are not among them 
(Scharpf 1997, p. 25).
However, it is debatable whether social policies continue to be the exclusive competence of the 
member state, since the policy ‘island beyond reach’ may be indirectly -  but increasingly -  affected 
by the market making processes of European integration:
“Irrespective o f the results o f “high politics” struggles over social charters and Treaty revisions, the movement 
towards market integration carries with it a gradual erosion of national welfare autonomy and sovereignty, 
increasingly situating national regimes in a complex multi-tired web of social policy” (Leibfried and Pierson 
1996, pp. 186-187).
On a theoretical account, how and why European integration has taken place continues to be a 
theme of great controversy. When applying European integration theories to the policy-field of 
social security-, such controversy becomes even more pronounced. On the one hand, a liberal 
intergovernmental!st interpretation would argue that social integration is ‘the road not taken' due to 
the absence of converging national interests.21 On the other hand, nco-functionalist interpretations 
would identify integration and among other factors explain these findings by spill-overs from one 
policy-field to the other and by the self-sustaining dynamics of the Community.22
:| See among others Garrett 1992;Moravcsik 1991; 1993.
"  See among others Haas 1958; Lindberg & Schcingold 1970; Tranholm Mikkclsen 1991; Burlev & Mattli 1993; Stone 
Sw eet & Sandholtz 1997,1998; Pollack 1998.
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In order to inquire to what extent. how and with what impact the European Union h a s  
institutionalised social security rights, the dichotomised dispute between liberal 
intergovcmmentalism and neo-functionalism becomes inadequate. Even a quick glance at the case  
makes it clear that we need theoretical explanations which go beyond intergovernmental 
negotiations and decisions of high politics. Instead, we need theoretical approaches able to explain a  
process constituted of very subtle and detailed steps of integration, in which politics and identifiable 
interests seem absent for long periods, but where integration may, however, proceed discreetly. A  
process where contradictory dynamics at times further integration, but at others roll back previous 
steps taken. Empirical findings of the latter exclude any straightforward application of nco- 
functionalism.
Furthermore, the research question of the present study necessitates a theoretical frame able to  
bridge the study of supranational integration on the one hand with its domestic impact on the other. 
The recurring debate between neo-functionalism and intergovemmentalism has generally been 
concerned with explaining the integration dynamics of the emerging European polity alone, and has 
largely ignored research on the domestic impact of that same dynamic. The same goes for proposed 
alternative theoretical interpretations such as multi-level governance and ‘the path to European 
integration' as presented by historical institutionalism (Marks. Hooghc & Blank 1996; Pierson 
1998). In illese studies, it is the European polity itself which becomes die main dependent variable 
(Bòrzel & Risse 2000, p. 1).
In order to analyse ‘to what extent, how and with what impact* the EU has institutionalised a social 
security dimension, this thesis will juxtapose theoretical propositions highlighting and explaining 
different aspects of two intertwined processes of change. In theoretical terms, the focus throughout 
the stud\' is institutional, since it analyses Community Regulation 1408/71 in detail and context. 
The institution will be analysed as a historical phenomenon, i.e. as it evolves and impacts over time. 
This study's theoretical point of departure is therefore that of historical institutionalism and applies 
its key propositions on how to research ‘the patii to European integration', as described by Paul 
Pierson:
“This scholarship is historical because it recognizes that political development must be understood as a process 
that unfolds over time. It is institutionalist because it stresses that many of the con temporal)- implications of these 
temporal processes are embedded in institutions - whether these be formal rules, policy structures or norms"
(Pierson 1998, p. 29).
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However, as pointed out above, the path to European social security integration cannot be captured 
by historical institutional explanations alone. First of all, a historical institutional theoretical view 
needs to be supplemented by more detailed theoretical accounts of the dynamics, actors or 
organisations furthering integration and those restraining it. The European Court of Justice plays a 
key role in defining and interpreting the regulatoiy scope of 1408 as well as its purpose, thus in part 
deciding the subtle moves of social security integration. Therefore, the explanation of the case 
requires a theoretical frame which treats judicial decision-making as a decisive part of policy­
making, but which also highlights how politics responds towards such judicial activism. Secondly, 
we need to add theoretical interpretations where the national institution becomes the dependent 
variable: that is, propositions which enable the two layers of institutionalisation to be combined and 
suggest whether we should expect supranational integration to have domestic impact - or not.
Empirically and theoretically this thesis aims to follow Regulation 1408/71 from institutional 
creation onwards, and thus research its rationale and transforming capacity as it is established over 
time. The theoretical purpose of the research question is to examine to what extent do institutions 
matter as inputs in the European integration process, how do they evolve and what impact do they 
have on established national institutions?
To meet this purpose, the present chapter will investigate certain theoretical approaches which make 
propositions on the central research questions of 1) institutional creation. 2) institutionalisation, 3) 
institutionalisation through the interaction of law and politics, and 4) the domestic impact thereof. 
The individual sections of this chapter as well as the subsequent empirical analysis in the following 
chapters correspond to these questions.
I initiate this chapter by presenting a model created to analyse ‘institutionalisation as a two-layered 
process of integration*. The model is composed of different theoretical propositions on European 
institutionalisation and its impact, and divided into two figures. The next four sections discuss the 
theoretical propositions behind the model, and argue why they should be joined in order to explain 
the path to social security institutionalisation. In the second section, I examine historical 
institutionalism as the theoretical point of departure for the subsequent research and discuss the 
definition of ‘institutions', their function and impact as well as the core concept of ‘path 
dependency*. I then address the approach ‘institutionalisation of Europe*, which explains the 
virtuous cycle of European integration, where self-sustaining institutionalisation dynamics drive the 
process forward. In order to explain institutionalisation, the mediating and transforming role of the
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Commission and European Court of Justice are brought into focus. The next section narrows th e  
discussion on institutionalisation down to what occurs through the interaction of law and politics. 
The position of the European Court of Justice is discussed in greater detail, as well as its historical 
ability to ’transform Europe". The section contrasts theories of legal autonomy with those o f  
political power, in individual subsections questioning whether judicial activism sets aside politics, 
or politics manage to overturn law. The final section deals with the question o f domestic impact. I t  
brings in theoretical approaches, discussing how rights and obligations generated through 
supranational decision-making are implemented nationally. In general, the section discusses th e  
effective impact of supranational institutionalisation and the Community's ability to monitor th e  
reach and correct implementation of the acquis communautaire. The section emphasises th e  
importance of the time-variable when wc assess the effectiveness and impact of EU law an d  
politics.
1.0: A  Model to Analyse Institutionalisation as a Tw o-layere d  Process
In order to conduct the analysis on European institutionalisation of social security rights as a tw o- 
lay ered process of integration, a model has been built on the basis of certain existing theories. The 
model is presented in figures 2 and 3 below. Figure 2 details the applied historical institutional 
approach and is inspired by Paul Pierson's 'path to European integration" (Pierson 1998. p. 49). The 
figure, how ever, extends the historical institutional outlook by including national implementation as  
the second layer of institutionalisation. Figure 3 presents the part of the model focusing on  
institutionalisation through the interaction of law and politics. This second part of the model 
concerns how the effective impact of institutionalisation establishes as a process determined by the 
interplay of law and politics, where activism is followed by reactions, and precise cause - effect 
relations blur through feedback. The figure is inspired by Garrett, Kclemen & Schultz's ‘the legal 
politics game', but extends their stage game by propositions about what happens when a litigant 
government accepts a decision (stage 2) and by detailing how other EU governments apart from the 
litigant react to judicial decision-making (stage 3). The figure furthermore holds that a 'law — 
politics* game does not end in stage 3, but continues beyond it. A main proposition in the model as 
a whole is that the meaning, effectiveness and impact of European law and politics is only 
identifiable over time. In both figures the time-variable is therefore in focus, either presented as a Tx 
or a stage X.
Figure 2 formulates the more general framework to analyse how Regulation 1408/71 has been 
institutionalised over time, constituting both output and input in the process o f integration. 
Institutionalisation is pictured as two-layered where the institution is first created as an outcome of 
intergovernmental negotiations in To and subsequently implemented at the national level. The 
supranational institution may exert adaptive pressure on national institutions in place, but the actual 
impact of social security7 integration essentially depends on how national actors or organisations 
respond to and implement European decision-making. In Tj the effective institutional meaning is 
reformulated and re-proposed by the Commission as well as being re-interpreted and clarified by 
the ECJ. Against this background, the Regulation is re-negotiated and re-codified by the Council of 
Ministers. The re-clarified and re-codified institution is subsequently implemented nationally. The 
institutionalisation process repeats between To, T] and T2, where the feedback effects of 
intergovernmental bargains, supranational mediation and rulings, and national implementation 
mutually formulate and reformulate the effective meaning of Regulation 1408.
F igu re  2: Institu tionalisa tion  as a Tw o-layered Process
The dynamic perspective of rulemaking is likewise expressed in the model's second figure. Figure 
3 concentrates on the interaction between the ECJ and the member states. This part of the model 
thus specifies how institutionalisation occurs as a result of the interaction between law and politics, 
and makes up the background against which to analyse how politics respond to judicial decisions
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and vice versa. This part of the analytical framework aims to identify the reach and impact o f  
Community law as manifesting over time.
F igu re  3 : Institu tionalisa tion  th ro u g h  th e  In te rac tio n  of L aw  a n d  Politics
Together the two figures depict the steps to be analysed to meet the research objective on *to what 
extent how and with what impact' the European Union has institutionalised a social security 
dimension. The model treats institutional creation, institutionalisation where the Regulation 
becomes output and input in the decision-making process, institutionalisation as determined by the 
interplay o f law and politics, and, not least, domestic impact. Theoretically derived, the model 
constitutes the analytical framework for the subsequent empirical study. The remaining part of this 
chapter will discuss those theoretical approaches on whose arguments the model is essentially 
based, that is that of historical institutionalism and ‘institutionalisation o f  Europe \ certain 
contrasting viewpoints concerning institutionalisation through the interaction o f  law and politics, 
and, finally, different interpretations on the domestic impact thereof.
2.0: A n  institutional S tu d y  o f  European Integration
This thesis' theoretical point o f departure for understanding European integration as well as its 
national impact is a historical institutional one. Whereas historical institutionalism may still call for
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theoretical reinforcement, it provides very specific and opcrationable methodological suggestions 
proposing to cam ' out process-tracing studies to uncover a given path to European integration.
In essence, historical institutionalism brings into focus the time-variable for any conducted 
research. Change sediments gradually and can therefore only be captured by a diachronic analysis. 
Furthermore, this approach prescribes the detailed study of institutions, their innovation and change. 
That is, the approach takes the transformative impact of gradualism seriously, assuming that by bits 
and pieces it comes to constitute the greater regulator) whole. Process-tracing studies on 
institutionalisation should therefore be carried out, w here different points of time T0, Ti and T2 each 
entail an individual integrative output, which at the same time represent input in the future process. 
By linking output and input over time, rather complex chains of cause and effect appear.
' 1
This section begins by outlining the historical institutionalist perspective on European integration, 
w hich proposes to study institutions in their ow n right and as historical phenomena. The intricacies 
of institutions and their resounding impact require a more detailed examination of the analytical 
objects, which will be carried out subsequently. How: arc institutions defined? What arc their 
function and impact? And w hat arc their premises for change?
2.1 : European Integration View ed from  a Historical Institutional Perspective
Historical institutionalism from comparative politics has been applied to the study of European 
integration most successfully by Paul Pierson. According to Pierson, European integration gradually 
establishes gaps in member states' control and these gaps thus explain why supranational 
competencies expand.23 If a gap o f control emerges and is identified, it is difficult for member states 
to regain control and at the same time gaps "create room for actors other than member states to 
influence the process of European integration while constraining the room of manoeuvre for all 
political actors" (Pierson 1996, p. 126). Historical institutionalism points to four factors responsible 
for establishing gaps of control:
• The relative autonomy o f supranational organisations. Through delegation of authority, 
member states and supranational organisations enter into a relationship of principals and agents. 
The prime function of the agent tow ards the principal is to establish transparency and credibility 
in the decision-making process. How ever, at the same time the agent w ill restrict the principal
Gaps are defined as "significant divergences between the institutional and policy preferences of member-state 
governments and die actual functioning of institutions and policies" (Pierson 1998, p. 34).
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by formulating and enforcing Community legislation and by institutionalising the 
intergovernmental relationship. Redesigning policies or even organisations is complicated by 
institutional barriers to reform, such as decision-making rules.
• The restricted time horizon o f  political actors. Contemporary political outcomes have long-term 
consequences, but member governments act in a restricted time horizon and are interested in the 
more immediate result of politics and law.
• Unintended consequences and issue-density. Political actors cannot grasp the total complexity o f  
the political process, because of its long-term consequences and high level o f issue-density. In 
this context of complexity, the political action is likely to be short-sighted and applied alone to  
the case at hand. However, even what seems to be an isolated political or legal result may affect 
other policy domains in the longer run. Issue-density7 increases the likelihood of ‘spill-over' 
between policy fields. As complexity7 and interrelatedness between issues arc dense in the 
European Union, an individual outcome may have manifold impact.
• Whereas intergovernmental ism tends to view national preferences as largely fixed, these are 
dynamic. National preferences may change as governments change, external change occurs or 
ideological change takes place.
Historical institutionalism prescribes a path-dependent analysis, applying an institutional focus 
which unfolds between To and T2, detailing what happens in Tj. The institutional outcome in T0, a 
regulation, a directive or a Treaty7 revision, is to be analysed as an input in the future process. The 
gaps in member states' control and the transformative impact of institutions can only be identified if  
we conduct a diachronic analysis, assuming that rule-making has its own dynamic. Member states 
arc not irrational, but they act in an institutional context which transforms their position and 
institutional outlook.
2.2: D efin ing Institutions
When turning to the roots o f historical institutionalism in comparative politics, some o f the 
theoretical arguments sketched out above get more flesh on the bone. This section and the next two 
will discuss the definition of institutions, their functions and impact, as well as the notion of path 
dependency. The discussion will take place on a general historical institutional theoretical basis, and 
not be specifically related to the study of European integration.
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Historical institutionalism is less a coherent school of thought than a label for scholars who apply a 
historical focus to institutional development, and do so by arguing against both rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.24 Thus the definition of ‘institution’ varies 
considerably, some being more abstract than others. Pierson adopts the definition of Douglas North, 
where institutions are "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990, p. 3; Pierson 1998, p. 29, note 2). Immergut 
pictures institutions as almost every mechanism that filters or structures political interaction; "the 
formal rules of political arenas, channels of communications, language codes, or the logics of 
strategic situations” (Immergut 1998, p. 20). Bulmer also supports the broad definition, making 
institutions both formal and informal policy-instruments and procedures, as well as embedded 
symbols and norms (Bulmer 1994, p. 355; Bulmer 1997, p. 7).
The 1 en and Steinmo conclude with different definitions and write:
“In general, historical institutionalism work with a definition of institutions that include both fonnal organizations 
and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct” (Thelen & Steinmo 1992, p. 2).
Their definition refers to that of Hall, as formulated in 1986. According to Hall, institutions are: 
“ ...the fonnal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship 
between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Hall 1986, p. 19).
This thesis applies a rather narrow definition of institution, based on the definition given by Hall but 
narrowed down to the formal rule. This docs not deny that a broader definition may yield 
meaningful insights, but is done to operationalise ‘institution’ in a very concrete sense, namely to 
the formal rule of Regulation 1408/71. By a very restricted definition, applicability increases and 
the institutional scope and effect becomes identifiable at all specific points of time. The aim behind 
this specific notion of ‘institution’ is to reduce the theoretical and analytical abstractness of a 
concept. Some of the definitions given above appear to be so all encompassing that it is difficult to 
identify what institutions are not. Regulation 1408/71 is an institution which prescribes 
administrative practices and routines as well as containing principles and rationales. For analytical 
purposes these are, however, not defined as institutions in the present study.
24 The discussion on the differences and similarities betw een the three variants o f new institutionalism is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. For such a discussion see, among others, Campbell 1994; Hall & Taylor 1996; Amum 1999; 
Torfing 2001.
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How even in order to avoid interdisciplinary conceptual confusion, it should be emphasised that this 
thesis" institutional definition goes beyond what is normally regarded as an institution by the 
discipline of law. Law would hardly define formal rules as ‘institutions'. Contrary to the broad 
conceptual use of political science, ‘institutions’ in law generally refer to ‘organisations' or 
‘bodies', for example, the European Commission is seen as an European institution. However, for 
theoretical purposes this thesis' institutional concept originates in theoretical discussion conducted 
primarily within the disciplines of political science and sociology. Against this background, 
Regulation 1408/71 is defined as an ‘institution', while the Commission and the European Court of 
Justice are defined as ‘supranational organisations'.
2.3: Institutions, their Function and Impact
Institutions arc instruments to achieve defined objectives. Furthermore, they regulate actors* 
interaction and structure their political choices. In this function, institutions constitute mediators for 
the political process (Thclen & Steinmo 1992, p. 2). At the same time, institutions act as constraints 
on any immediate pursuit of economic and political aims. They bind or obligate actors. As they 
manifest, they become increasingly difficult to ignore. The functional characteristics of institutions 
are such that they constitute both enablements and constraints.
When institutions regulate, certain sets of political options which are likely to correspond to 
previous choices are favoured. Every political system w ill over time have constructed its own set of 
institutions, interlinked and explained by reference to one another and within the historical context. 
The institutional outlook of an actor is a determining factor for perceptions, preferences and 
strategics:
'■....different institutional structures set the rules of the political or policy game in different ways. Institutional 
rules provide different incentives to political actors, yielding different power resources and interests. Different 
institutions shape the context in which individuals and groups define their interests; thus institutions shape tire 
strategic choices o f  policy actors’ (Steinmo & Tolbert 1998,p. 168).
Actors are not unaware of their institutional context and may act strategically on that basis. 
However, a key argument of historical institutionalism is that, once established, institutions tend to 
take on a life of their own (Puchala 1999, p. 318). However, utilitarian calculations may now and 
then be part o f the political process. Historical institutionalism does not subscribe to the ‘logic of
appropriateness' as an almost general imperative for action.25 At the same time, there are clear 
limits to rational institutional design, where outcome X exists because it sen es function Y (Pierson 
2000a).26 Strategics and solutions may be adopted because they seem to be the most efficient for the 
task at hand, but an adopted institution may actually reveal itself to be dysfunctional in the long run. 
Dysfunction or unintended consequences are reinforced by the short-sightedness of political actors. 
Generally, political actors are incapable -  perhaps sometimes unwilling -  of regarding the long­
term consequences of an institutional creation. Often the larger institutional and political context is 
not considered, in which very long and complex causal chains connect political actions to political 
outcome (Pierson 2000a, p. 482). And then, even if institutional designers act instrumcntally and 
actually focus on long-term effects, unanticipated consequences may disturb the outcome. 
Unanticipated consequences arise since decision-making is increasingly complex and tightly 
coupled. The likelihood of unanticipated consequences is fortified by time constraints, information 
scarcity and by the functional need to delegate decisions (Pierson 2000a).
The institutional environment affects or may even transform the actor's reading of his/her own 
preferences. Preferences are politically and socially constructed, hence endogenisied.
"The preferences and capabilities o f political actors cannot be treated as exogenous variables; they can only be 
understood within the context of a given set o f institutional arrangements” (Krasner 1984, p. 238).
Institutions arc ambiguous when it comes to their consequences for the political process, since they' 
sometimes constitute independent contributors and at other times are dependent variables, formed 
due to the functional needs of actors. As channels of information, institutions reduce the insecurity 
of the intentional action of other actors, mediate the relation between actors and make the political 
process more transparent. Institutions may' thus be what enables the actor to decipher the political 
context (Norgaard 1996, p. 33).
”  In this aspect, historical institutionalism opposes the arguments of sociological institutionalism, as presented by 
writers such as Scott (1987, 1994 & 1995) and March and Olsen (1984 & 1989). Sociological institutionalism explains 
the logic of appropriateness' as when actors act mainly in accordance with the norms of a given institution, and thus 
leaves individual utilitarian calculations aside in order to comply with what is considered ‘appropriate' by the 
institution.
By these arguments, historical institutionalism distances itself from the rational choice institutionalism, represented, 
among others, by North ( 199U).
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2.4: Path Dependency and Institutional Prem ises fo r Change
Historical institutionalism has been criticised for focusing on continuity and being unable to ex p la in  
change. The critic says that the approach generally places institutions as mechanisms restraining th e  
free action of individuals, and therefore mechanisms blocking innovation (Campbell 1994, p. 11 ; 
Amum 1999, p. 58). However, this criticism disregards the fact that historical institutionalism 
analyses the mediating function of institutions, i.e. when institutions become driving forces.
The structuring function of institutions connect the political process. Institutions should therefore b e  
analysed as a historical phenomenon. The historical focus is conceptualised by 'path dependency * ; 
the contemporary institutional construct is a result of previous choices which adds up to becom e 
path dependent developments. The actor acts in, and is influenced by, an inherited institutional 
context. Therefore, most political choices have a direct reference to the past and link up w ith  
historical experience.
“The natural path for institutions is to act in the present as they have acted in the past" (Krasncr 1984, p. 235).
Path-dependency therefore contains both self-reinforcing and reactive sequences (Mahoney 2000).27 
Pierson defines path dependency as "a social process grounded in a dynamic of 'increasing 
returns'" (Pierson 2000b, p. 251). This again relates to a broader definition where path dependency 
is a concept referring to "the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence" (Pierson 
ibid, p. 252). As a metaphor, 'path dependency' has been described as a tree where branches o f  
continuity are punctuated by a 'critical juncture’. ‘Critical junctures’ arc moments when substantial 
change takes place, thereby creating a ‘branching point' from which historical developments m ove 
onto a new, but not unrelated, path (Krasncr 1984: Hall & Taylor 1996, p. 942).
Returning to the Pierson description of the dynamics of ‘increasing returns', the definition w orks 
mathematically rather than metaphorically. He illustrates 'increasing returns' by Arthur's 'Polya 
Um Process'. The ‘Polya Um Process' is a cycle of self-reinforcing activity. There are two balls o f  
different colour in an um. One picks up a ball, puts it back at the same time as adding a ball of the 
same colour as the one removed until the um is filled up. The possibility of grabbing a ball of the 
same colour as the one grabbed the first time will increase as the process unfolds. By repeating the 
action, an equilibrium will be found:
‘ Whereas ‘sell-reinforcing sequences' refer to a process of increasing returns where the initial choice is decisive, h u t 
not deterministic, for the final outcome, reactive sequences' are “chains o f temporally ordered and causally connected 
events (Mahoney 2000, p. 526). In his distinction between the two typos of sequences, Mahoney relates 'se lf-  
reinforcing sequences' to economic historians and 'reactive sequences' to historical sociologists.
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“Early draws in each trial, which have a considerable random effect, have a powerful effect on which of tire 
possible equilibrium will actually emerge" (Pierson 2000b, p. 253).
The dynamics of increasing returns means that the initial choice frames future political means and 
objectives. Through self-reinforcing mechanisms, the rationale of institutional genesis accumulates 
its advantage over time (Mahoney 2000). Actors as well as organisations arc in their actions rc- 
crcators of tradition, which in advance make radical change less likely:
‘'Historical developments are path dependent; once certain choices are made, they constrain future possibilities. 
The range of options available to policymakers at any given point in time is a function of institutional capabilities 
that were put in place at some earlier period, possibly in response to very different environmental pressures” 
(Krasncr 1988, p. 67).
The premise for change is a question of the intensity and character of the internal or external 
pressure on the established institutional order. Theoretically, premises for change depend on the 
'critical juncture* or 'branching point*. As far as possible, actors and organisations respond in 
incremental, reinforcing ways to new challenges, but sometimes the pressure for change will be so 
severe that the established institutional structure must be reformed. Radical or optimal change 
seldom happens in a highly institutionalised environment. Change is more likely' to lake place as a 
long-winded, rather sub-optimal process of adjustment.
2.5: The M issing Link; W hat Develops the Institution?
In die institutional study of European integration, historical institutionalism offers theoretical 
explanations on how institutions emerge, how they change as a repetition of prev ious choices and 
which consequences they hold for actors' preferences and the political process.
Notwithstanding the fact that an institution may have a life of its own. we still lack explanations as 
to what contributes to the life, objectives and development of the institution. Intcrgov cmmcntalism 
would suggest that the member states arc crucial actors, but we hav e just learned that they may be 
neither far-sighted, nor even very instrumental. Who. apart from some intentional actors, assures 
that institutions have at least some anticipated effects, in order not to lose their raison d’etre? What 
mediates a process of institutionalisation and helps us explain how an institution mov es from being 
a dependent variable in To. to become an independent variable in Ti. and go back to being a 
dependent variable in T:? Although institutions may constitute independent variables for the
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political process and actors' preferences, institutions themselves are unlikely to develop  
independently or acontextually.
Furthermore, the application of historical institutionalism to the study o f European integration 
details only how a given supranational path dependency restricts the long-term decision-making 
scope o f member governments, but does not explicitly consider what happens when such a  
supranational path meets and challenges national path dependencies. If supranational institutions a rc  
capable of establishing gaps in member states' control, are they equally capable of withering aw ay  
national path dependencies? How does a supranational institutionalised path sediment into a  
national one? As with other theories on European integration, historical institutionalism does n o t  
reach beyond the isolated scope of the European polity and does not extend its argumentation to th e  
impact of supranational institutions on national institutions. It identifies different causes o f  
European integration, but it does not capture its effect on national policy making.
Before returning to the question of the impact of such supranational path dependencies, I will now  
bring in certain theoretical explanations focused on the dynamics of institutionalisation. These 
interpretations furthermore attribute a significant role to the supranational organisations of th e  
Community, seeing them as adding ‘life* to the institution, and sometimes as being capable o f  
developing it contrary to the preferences of its creators, the member governments. The next tw o 
main sections are devoted to explanations of institutional dynamics and restraints.
3.0: The Dynamics o f  institutionalisation
When studying institutions, their functions and impact, a recurring question is why are institutions 
created in the first place? In a European integration context, theoretical explanations on institutional 
innovation are various. Institutional creation may be a reflection of national interests, or explained 
as a collective choice dealing with a collective problem, or as adopted to realise a Community 
objective. When discussing the co-ordination of European social security rights, all suggestions 
explain parts of the institutional emergence of Regulation 1408, as w ill be empirically substantiated 
in chapter III.
These explanations of institutional creation have a certain functionalist orientation. Institution X is 
adopted because it has been agreed to, interpreted, or actually does serve function Y. The 
functionalist assumption is maintained because of the more immediate relation between institution
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X and function Y. Whereas actual, agreed or interpreted functionalism may be a general rationale 
for institutional innovation, it does not necessarily explain the continued existence of an institution, 
nor how the institutional domain may be expanded or intensified over time. Subsequent institutional 
development may not straightforwardly refer to the initial motives for adoption. Hence a theoretical 
approach which can explain institutional evolution, here phrased as ‘institutionalisation’, is called 
for.
3.1: Understanding Institutional Evolution
The theoretical approach to the ‘Institutionalisation of Europe' as presented by Stone Sweet and 
others focuses on the dynamics of institutional evolution.28 Over time, the answer to the question of 
‘who governs' has changed and the dynamic cannot solely be attributed to the deliberate actions of 
member states. As a starting-point, this approach dissociates itself from the key-arguments of 
intergovernmental ism. Essentially, intcrgovcmmcntalists “have gotten it wrong” (Stone Sweet & 
Brunell 1998, p. 63). Although there arc strong intergovernmental components in the integration 
process, governments do not fully control the content, scope or direction thereof, since they do not 
fully control the process of legal integration, all aspects of rulemaking, or the political autonomy of 
the supranational organisations (Stone Sweet & Brunell 1998, p. 73; Caporaso & Stone Sweet 2001, 
p. 224).
When considering the institutional features of the Community, it remains a puzzle why 
supranational governance has expanded at all. First, the Rome Treaty did not specify how the aim of 
market integration was to be achiev ed. Second, the decision-making rules of unanimity and 
qualified majority voting should mean institutional inertia instead of change. However, deadlocks 
have been overcome, and Community’ competences have expanded (Stone Sweet. Fligstein & 
Sandholtz 2001, p. 16). Somehow, the Community has moved from a relatively ‘primitive site of 
collective governance' to a ‘densely institutionalised system of interrelationships' (Caporaso & 
Stone Sweet 2001, p. 221). institutions' and ‘institutionalisation’ have independently influenced
28 As presented in the 1998 volume edited by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet on ’"European Integration and Supranational 
Governance", in the 2001 volume edited by Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein on ‘‘The Institutionalisation of 
Europe”, in the w ork o f Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1997) and in that of Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998).
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 ^^ 9this process of change. Whereas 'institutions' are defined as systems of rules, 'institutionalisation “ 
is the dynamic process by which these are created, adopted and interpreted:30 
"Actors behave in self-interested ways, but both the interests and the behaviours take form in a social setting 
defined by rules Institutions are systems o f  rules and institutionalisation is the process by which rules are 
created, applied, and interpreted by those who live under them" (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998, p. 16, emphasis 
added).
Individual as well as interlinked institutionalisation dynamics have been powerful mechanisms 
behind this general change of the European Community. Institutional innovation is the premise for 
further institutionalisation. Generally', the Treaty' of Rome is considered the integrative starting 
point in institutional terms, but is in itself a minimalist and vague document which docs not specify7 
how to get there;
"the Rome Treaty is a vague document, like many constitutions, in that it declares the high aspirations of the 
Member States, and fixes mundane organisational procedures, but barely touches on the precise modalities o f 
achieving market integration” (Stone Sweet, Fligstein & Sandholtz 2001, p. 16).
In the absence of any initial institutionalist guidance, the supranational mode of governance that wc 
w itness today' has to a certain extent been creatively constructed. Life and shape have been given to 
the Treaty7 text along the way, in a manner which was not predictable for those who originally 
formulated and adopted the text.
According to the arguments o f Stone Sweet and others, a given institutionalisation process begins 
outside the rule context by7 increased transaction between actors. Transnational activity is the basic 
justification for institutional innovation and the catalyst of European integration. Intensified cross- 
border action will produce a social demand for transnational regulation, since actors arc gradually 
confronted with the limits o f existing rules in the face of new interactive problems. However, 
transaction does not in itself determine the details or timing of supranational rule-making, although 
it docs activate the Community's decision-making bodies. The member states, acting in the 
European Council or the Council o f Ministers, may facilitate or hinder rulemaking. However, 
obstructing supranational rulemaking implies greater costs as transnational exchange increases *10
■g European integration and institutionalisation refers to the same process (Fligstein & Stone Sweet 2001, p. 29, 
footnote 1 ).
10 The theoretical approach on 'Institutionalisation o f Europe’ conceptualises institutions with reference to North's 
definition of institutions as "humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”, including rules o f the game’, 
‘customs and traditions', 'conventions, codes o f conduct, norms of behaviour, (and) ...law' (North 1990. chapter 1; 
Caporaso &. Stone Sw eet 2001, p. 227).
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(Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998. p. 4). Transnational exchange may in itself give member states a 
greater incentive to adjust their policy position in favour of integration. Furthermore, supranational 
organisations, such as the Commission and the European Court of Justice, will respond to the 
demand expressed by extending the regulatory framework in place or propose to create new ones. A 
process of rule innovation or extension has begun:
"Once fixed in a given domain, European rules -  such as the relevant Treaty provisions, secondary legislation, and 
the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) case-law generate a self-sustaining dynamic that leads to a gradual 
deepening of integration in that sector and, not uncommonly, to spill-overs into other sectors' (Stone Sweet & 
Sandholtz 1998, pp. 4-5).
3.2: The Role o f Supranational Organisations
Supranational organisations initiate and transmit the rules that guide cross-border action. In these 
functions, they arc policy’ innovators/cntrcprencurs behind the regulatory construction or evolution, 
with "meaningful, autonomous capacity to pursue integrative agendas“ (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 
1998. p. 6).
The view of supranational organisations as 'engines of integration* goes back to the early nco- 
funclionalisl literature. As 'engines of integration*, supranational organisations arc assumed to be in 
a position of autonomy to pursue their interests and independently influence the policy outcome 
(Pollack 1998. p. 219). In a principal-agent explanatory framework, this means that the agent 
enjoys considerable discretion from the control of the principal. The framew ork says that a group of 
collective principals have chosen to delegate authority to an agent in order to minimise transaction 
costs and maximise the gains from interaction. So far the principal has acted deliberately. However, 
in fulfilling its functions the agent may generate its own preferences and act contrary to the aims of 
the principal (Pollack 1997, p. 111).31
The member states have entrusted the Commission^ with the right of initiative for the Community . 
It thus enjoys the formal agenda-setting power. In addition, it may informally set the agenda, being
M The last assumption would not be part of a liberal in tergo v emmenta 1 i si principal-agent argumentation. According to 
this argumentation, the principal maintains control over the agent. The principal and agent engage in a contractual 
commitment, where the principal chooses to delegate certain, specified functions. The organisation, the agent, does not 
act beyond its mandate and remains the passive instrument to facilitate intergovernmental bargain and ensure credible 
commitment under uncertain conditions (Moravcsik 1995. p, 620, Talberg 2002, p. 33). Supranational organisations are 
therefore in no position to exert independent causal influence on the policy process, but act rather obediently according 
to the preferences of the member states or. at least, the most powerful among them.
For a brief description of the Commission's functions, see Pollack 2003, pp. 84-88.
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the persistent policy entrepreneur, who acts when a "policy window’ allows it (Pollack 2003, p. 5 1 )- 
Furthermore, its function is to execute EU policy in specified domains, and ensure that m em ber 
states comply with EU rules. The Commission is the guardian of the treaties, and is to in itia te  
infringement procedures against non-complying states. At the same time, the delegated function to  
the European Court of Justice is to interpret the treaties and make sure that EC law is correctly 
applied in the member states. When the Commission has initiated an infringement procedure against 
one of the member states, it is the ECJ that ultimately decides whether the state complies or n o t  
(Talberg 2002).
The supranational autonomy of the Commission is constituted and compromised by several factors 
(Pollack 1998):
• The free action of the supranational organisation is basically constrained by the preferences o f  
the member states. By skilful action, the organisation may exploit conflicting preferences 
between the member states. Thereby the Commission may manage to get a legislative proposal 
through, and the ECJ may avoid subsequent sanctions after a controversial case.
• Just as the Community's decision-making rules make it difficult to get proposals through, ru les 
make up thresholds for sanctioning the agent.
• Asymmetrical information about a policy-field is likely to favour the agent, which is closer to  
the heart and interests o f transnational actions.
• Autonomy is likely to increase when the agent is supported by sub-national organisations, 
interest groups or indiv iduals. Such ‘transnational constituencies' make it possible to build up  
links bypassing the state, which intensify the pressure the agent can exert against the principal. 
Over time, the Commission has built strong links with interest organisations, multinational 
firms and European citizens. The same goes for the ECJ, relying on the support of national 
courts, national lawyers and European citizens acting as litigants.
The autonomy of both the Commission and the European Court of Justice and their ability to  
institutionalise ‘more Europe' van' across issue-areas and over time, and will in the end always be 
determined by member states' preferences. The Commission will not be able to get its ‘ideal 
proposal’ adopted without considering the preferences of the member governments, but it may act 
creatively within such constraints (Pollack 1997, p. 120). This is where the Commission proves its 
ability as ‘policy entrepreneur', managing persistence and expertise (Pollack 2003, pp. 50-51). 
However, the possibility' of entrepreneurship is clearly limited in situations where the member states 
have defined and coherent preferences contrasting with those of the Commission.
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The autonomy o f the European Court o f  Justice differs as it is confronted with different constraints. 
The fact that the treaties are framework treaties and that it is the ECJ's task to interpret them, gives 
the supranational organisation wide discretion to lay down the letter of the text and specify its 
objectives (Talberg 2002, p. 27). The same goes for parts of the secondary legislation which are 
incomplete, to the extent that their actual meaning and scope is disputable. What constrains the ECJ 
is the possibility that the member states may sanction a legal interpretation that they disagree with, 
by rc-legislating or, ultimately, by redefining the mandate of the ECJ. The possibility of sanction 
invites the ECJ to exert self-restraint. The Court may rationally anticipate the principal's reaction 
and adjust its behaviour to avoid sanction (Pollack 1997, p. 116). Concretely, this w ould mean that 
the Court would try to avoid jurisprudence which significantly goes against the preferences of the 
member states -  or the most powerful among them (Garrett 1992; Garrett. Kclcmcn & Schultz 
1998). The position of the Court, as well as institutionalisation through the interaction of law and 
politics and its limits w ill be discussed in greater detail in the follow ing main section.
The Commission and the ECJ arc normally assumed to act in some kind of partnership, preferring 
’more Europe", and sharing a teleological reading of the treaties. But. from time to time, the Court 
rules against the Commission. Compared with the ECJ. the Commission is more constrained as it 
operates in an environment where the most immediate sanction is to have a proposal rejected. The 
Commission thus needs continually to mobilise support for its proposals (Talberg 2002. p. 30). 
When its policy-agenda is supported by existing EC rules. Court decisions and transnational 
interests, its authority is clearly enhanced.
In the process of institutionalisation, supranational organisations apply, interpret and clarify rules, 
so that the context for subsequent action is changed (Stone Sweet. Fligstcin & Sandholtz 2001. pp. 
13-14). How these organisations interpret the ruling word gives life to the institution, since it 
establishes its effective meaning. Supranational organisations thus have a key impact on the content 
and scope of institutionalisation.
3.3: On Institutionalisation
The ‘institutionalisation of Europe" approach theorises integration as a dynamic chain of cause and 
effect. Institutionalisation is initiated by transnational exchange. Transnational exchange creates 
situations with a need for dispute resolution. The legal system considers the dispute and lowers the
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costs of future transactions by providing certainty. Legislation elaborates legal rules, which 
facilitates and structures exchange.
The three factors; transnational exchange, judicial activity and rule production are viewed in a 
dynamic relation, where they evolve interdependcntly and 'in doing so constitute and reconstitute a 
polity' (Stone Sweet & Brunell 1998, p. 64). The legal system is a core component in this dynamic 
relation since, as cross-border activity increases, judicial activity' will increasingly be needed. The 
dynamic of rules and rule-making constitute the core o f the institutionalisation logic (Stone Sweet 
&Sandholtz 1998,p. 16).
The work of Slone Sweet and Brunell introduces co-integration analysis to the study o f European 
integration. On the basis of testing four propositions, they find that their theoretical assumptions are 
sustained. The four testable propositions are (Stone & Brunell 1998, pp. 66-67);
1. Transnational exchange generates social demand for judicial activity',
2. Higher levels of transnational activity' will push for supranational judicial or legislative rules,
3. The consolidation and expansion of European rule-making will cause more transnational 
activity and more judicial references in an increasing number of domains,
4. The future course of development will be such that the three factors; transnational activity-, 
judicial activ ity and the production of European legislation, will evolve interdependcntly. This 
will drive European integration in a predictable direction, i.e. towards more integration. The 
causal link between the three factors will produce a self-sustaining dynamic.
On the first proposition, they argue that their data analysis supports the view that transnational 
exchange has been a crucial driving factor behind the construction of the EC legal system (Stone 
Sweet & Brunei! 1998, p. 69). They find a very high correlation between intra-EC trade and Article 
177 references. However, from this high correlation, it cannot simply be inferred that there is a 
long-run relation between these variables, because both time series have a nonstationary stochastic 
trending behaviour. For this reason. Stone Sweet & Brunell apply the Johansen cointcgralion test to 
check if this high correlation is due to a real long-run relation, i.e. a cointegration relation (Engle & 
Granger 1987), or to a spurious relation (Granger & Newbold, 1976). They find cointegration w ith a 
positive sign of the coefficient which demonstrates that, in the long-run, member states w ith more 
intra-EC trade also have a higher number o f judicial references (Stone Sweet & Brunell ibid. pp. 67- 
68).
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They add an additional variable to the cointegration analysis, rule production, to test the other three 
propositions. They find cointegration again between the three variables (Stone Sweet & Brunell 
ibid, pp. 70-71). From these econometric findings. Stone Sweet and Brunell go further with their 
conclusions. From their cointegration analysis, it seems that there is the possibility of two 
cointegrated relations between the variables. One between intra-EC trade and judicial activity and a 
second one among all variables, an issue that could shed more light on the dynamics of the three 
variables. However, as emphasised in the econometric literature, the cointegration test is very 
sensitive to some aspects of the statistical model building that are not specified in the paper of Stone 
Sweet and Brunell, and could change their results completely. Thus, it would be interesting to check 
if cointegration is found using a different specification of the statistical model, This criticism means 
that the conclusions based on the propositions should not be accepted without reservations.
According to Stone Sweet and Brunell, their data analysis support the argument that the three 
variables make up a virtuous circle, expanding European integration:
“The theory, after all, posits an expansive logic to integration processes. According to this logic, the growing 
interdependence of tnm sm tiom l exchange, judicial activity, and Euro-rules drives the progressive construction 
o f the supranational polity>. By that we mean the process by which governmental competencies, in an increasing 
number o f  domains, are transferred from the national to the supranational level [ . . . ] .  These national rules and 
practices will be targeted by litigants, and pressure will be exerted on EC legislative institutions to widen the 
jurisdiction of EC governance into new domains. We think of this dynamic as a kind of legal “spill-over” (Stone 
Sweet & Brunell 1998, p. 72, emphasis added).
It may be argued that the first proposition formulated by Stone Sweet and Brunell addresses 
institutional creation, whereas the others concern institutional evolution, i.c. institutionalisation. The 
first proposition thus looks at the functional demand for institutions. Studying subsequent 
institutionalisation is. on the other hand, to assume that institutions have a supply -side as well, and 
exert independent effect. When an institution is first in place, it may still transform functionally as a 
response to an exogenous change. However, the more frequent form of institutional change is likely 
to be caused by an endogenous process. The transaction-based analysis suggests that transnational 
exchange, judicial activity and the production of rules develop along mutually reinforcing paths. 
Feedback effects arc powerful parts of institutionalisation. Applied complexes of supranational 
rules fertilise further rule creation, since established rules will point to unregulated aspects of a 
specific policy domain. When applied, adopted rules may need clarification or extension to new 
situations. Rules are seldom definitive, and need constant rewriting. The dynamics of 
institutionalisation arc a result o f this constant revelation of the insufficiency of existing rules.
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Institutions are continuously asked for, interpreted, clarified and rewritten by actors a n d  
organisations, and the context for subsequent social demands and institutional solutions are a l te re d  
along the developmental path.
As a rule-paltcm gradually materialises itself, it expresses tracks of causality;
‘‘When an institutional or organisational solution to a particular problem emerges and stabilises into accepted ru les  
and procedures, it will shape subsequent expectations, interaction, and institutional innovation. Once such  
developments come to follow' a specific track, shifting to another track will be increasingly difficult [ .]" (Stone 
Sweet, Fligstein & Sandholtz 2001, p. 18).
Institutionalisation is thus described as a path dependent process, where feed back mechanisms o r  
increasing returns reinforce the direction once chosen (Caporaso & Stone Sweet 2001, p. 2 30 ). 
Change is patterned along the way by the institutions in place. Therefore, studying 
institutionalisation requires a historical form of process-tracing, since this seems to be the o n ly  
obvious way of tracking down chains of cause and effect.
3.4: The Possibility o f De-institutionalisation?
Stone Sweet et al's theoretical presentation of how 'Europe' became institutionalised echoes k e y  
propositions from neo-functional ism. Like early neo-functionalism, the argument is that there is a  
logic of institutionalisation (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998, p. 16). Like neo-functionalism, they 
find that *spiIl-ovcr' is a driving mechanism of the integration process. A kind of 'legal spill-over' 
is phrased as a powerful dynamic (Stone Sweet & Brunell 1998. p. 72). Finally, like neo­
functionalism, the approach suggests that institutionalisation or integration has its own self- 
sustaining dynamic (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998, p. 5). The authors note that some of them arc 
quite comfortable under the label 'modified neo-functionalists' (Caporaso & Stone Sweet 2001, p. 
224).
The immediate critique of the theory seems to be rather like the one formulated against early neo­
functionalism. Is the approach equally capable of theorising the limits of institutionalisation? The 
dominant viewpoint seems to be that institutionalisation drives progressively towards ‘more 
Europe':
"Although we do not rule out the possibility that ‘de-institutionalisation' can occur or that institutionalisation in 
Europe can accommodate a great deal o f deregulation and decentralized administration, we are sceptical of roll­
back [....]. Because modes of supranational governance tend to be heavily rule-oriented, legalistic, and demanding
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of coordination among relatively autonomous governmental entities, they are also expansionary and potentially 
subversive of national practices” (Stone Sweet, Fligstein & Sandholtz 2001, p. 21).
The description of path dependency through a virtuous cycle of self-sustaining dy namics ignores 
the possibility of negative feed-back or 'dc-crcasing returns', and for these reasons the approach is 
inappropriate when trying to explain outcomes other than those sustaining or expanding 
institutionalisation. The approach is likely to overestimate jurisprudence as the source of deepened 
integration and, on that account, not pay sufficient attention to the role of politics.
By theorising a supranational institutionalisation logic which is almost automatically expansive, the 
arguments are up for both theoretical and empirical contestation. Hence, institutionalisation through 
the interaction of law and politics, including its limits, will be discussed below in further detail.
4.0: Institutionalisation through the Interaction o f Law  and Politics
By making judicial activism a core component in the virtuous circle driving European integration 
forward, it could be argued that the "Institutionalisation of Europe* theoretical approach describes a 
process which downplays the importance of politics, and thus the member stales. Nevertheless, the 
approach docs analyse the relation between law and politics, since the institutionalisation process 
described above has important political consequences, involving moving competencies from the 
national to the supranational level. It is, furthermore, an approach that is highly relevant for political 
science, since it highlights litigation as a central part of supranational decision-making that at times 
overlaps with, at times overtakes, the role of politics. It thus emphasises judicial activism as indeed 
politicising, (co)dcciding the scope, content and direction of European integration. Studying legal 
integration inherently implies a study of politics:
"The legal process, and live process of expanding the reach and scope o f European law in the national realm, is 
inherently political” (Alter 2001, p. 44),
That said, the institutionalisation approach may have a fundamental flaw, since it docs not account 
for the possibility of negative feedbacks or "decreasing returns', when European jurisprudence and 
rulemaking arc not ever-expanding. Crucial questions remain open. To what extent docs the 
European Court of Justice enjoy political autonomy? What characterises institutionalisation through 
the interaction of law and politics? What arc the limits to the institutionalisation which is furthered 
by the Court? Different interpretations by political science and law-in-context approaches on these 
questions will be addressed in what follows, which discusses the position of the Court of Justice, its
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ability to 'transform' Europe, and whether judicial activism goes beyond politics or whether politics 
is capable of overturning law. On the whole, this section discusses how the instrument o f law 
mediates supranational institutionalisation and the limits set on it by politics.
4.1: The Position o f the European Court o f Justice
The European Court of Justice is generally regarded as having an unusually influential position, 
compared with other international courts. No matter whether scholars ascribe to the Court a high 
degree of autonomy, or view it as a restrained supranational organisation with a conditioned scope 
of manoeuvre, it is widely agreed that the ECJ has managed to further integration (Garrett, Kelemen 
& Schultz 1998, p. 149; Moravscik 1993, p. 513; Alter 1998, p. 121; Burley & Mattli 1993). Its 
unusual position lies in the fact that it can declare both EU law and national law that violate the 
acquis communautaire illegal, even within areas that have traditionally been regarded as the pure 
prerogative of the member state. As will be demonstrated in the following empirical analysis, social 
and health policies are powerful examples of the Court's ability to extend EU law and principles to 
other policy domains.
Article 234 of the Treaty (ex. art. 177) has proven to be among the most important provisions to 
have shaped Community law and enhanced its effectiveness. Article 234 authorizes the Court to 
give preliminary rulings on the interpretation o f the Treaty, secondary* legislation and on the relation 
between Community law and national law (Craig & de Burca 1998, pp. 406-407). Through Article 
234, the relationship between the Community and national legal systems has been defined. The 
Article on preliminary' ruling has enabled private individuals to challenge the compatibility of 
national law with Community law. Whereas lower national courts can refer a question on the 
interpretation o f Community law to the ECJ, national courts of last resort are in certain contexts 
obliged to do so. By engaging national courts and private individuals in the extension of 
Community law. Article 234 has served as a powerful means o f promoting the uniformity of 
Community law (Rasmussen 1998, p. 478).
Furthermore, the ECJ can be requested by the Commission to judge whether a member state fulfils 
its Treaty obligations. Article 226 (ex. art. 169) authorizes the Commission to initiate infringement 
proceedings against any of the member states, and ultimately gives the Court the final word in 
determining whether the member state complies or not (Talberg 2002, p. 26). Finally, according to
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Article 227 (ex. art. 170) a member state can bring an infringement procedure against another 
member state to the Court. However, that procedure has very seldom been used.33
Over the years, the judicial activity of the Court has increased dramatically, especially since the 
1980s. Between 1960 and 1999, the Commission has brought 1604 infringement cases to the Court, 
and. during the same period, 4157 preliminary rulings have been brought from national courts to the 
ECJ. Graph 1 below illustrates that the Court's caseload has dramatically increased since 1980.
G raph  1: A rticle 226 & 234 cases betw een 1960 -  199914
The authoritative rulings of the Court have continually increased, as more and more cases have been 
referred to it. The legal push for integration is not only a matter of quantitative terms, but also a 
matter of the method through which the ECJ has given substance to the words of the Treaty. The 
Court's reasoning and methodology has generally been described as teleological or purposive, 
where law is interpreted in the service of an objective. That is, the goal is the motor of law (Alter 
2001, p. 20: Craig & dc Burca 1998, p. 89). It has been described as the application of a systematic 
method of ‘gap-filling’, where the line of a legal principle is gradually being drawn and extended to
”  In fact, between 1960 and 1999 there has onlv been 4 infringement cases brought to the Court bv a member state 
(Alter 2001, p. 15).
' 4 Article 226 cases brought to the Court between 1960-1999 were in the individual periods: 1960-69: 27 cases: 1970- 
79: 70 cases: 19X0-89: 646 cases: 1990-99: 861 cases. During the same periods. Article 234 cases brought to the Court 
were: 1960-69: 75 cases: 1970-79: 666 cases: 1980-89: 1255 cases; 1990-99: 2161 cases. The figures rely on the w ork 
of Alter (2001). p. 15. The calculations of Alter are based on infringement statistics from the Commission and 
preliminary ruling statistics provided in the European Court of Justice's 1999 annual report.
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new situations. The gradual establishment of a legal principle means establishing precedent, w here 
the content or conclusive parts of a former case are applied to a subsequent one. The full scope an d  
consequence of the legal principle is thus revealed from case to case:
“A common tactic is to introduce a new doctrine gradually : in the first case that comes before it, the Court will 
establish the doctrine as a general principle, but suggest that it is subject to various qualifications; the Court may 
even find some reason why it should not be applied to the particular facts of the case. The principle, however, is 
now established. If there are not too many protests, it will be re-affirmed in later cases; the qualifications can then 
be whittled away and the full extent of the doctrine revealed” (Hartley 1998, p. 79).
Teleological interpretation of Community law and a creative casc-by-casc establishment o f  
precedent suggest a proactive position by the Court o f Justice and that it has a great deal o f  
manoeuvrable scope. However, we are reminded to be cautious about generalizing conclusions on  
judicial activism;
"The Court has at times been reactive, at times proactive, and at times a mixture of both. In other words, the Court 
has not pursued a project of integration growing more or less ‘activist' all the time. At times it appears cautious in 
one area of law and ambitious in another, responding peihaps to external events and to tire position o f the member 
states or other institutions” (Craig & de Bürca 1998, pp. 78-79).
The quote above pictures judicial activism as rather complex. It rejects the idea of the Court as 
being generally proactive, and furthering integration. Moreover, it also docs not support the 
proposition that the Court has generally exerted a greater degree of self-restraint after the 
réintroduction of qualified majority voting with the Single European Act, as has been hypothesised 
(Weiler 1993, p. 430; Dehoussc 2000, p. 27). The quote suggests a Court which acts contextually, 
capable of both politicising and showing political cautiousness.
This ambiguous style of action serves as a starting point for entering into the theoretical 
disagreement that exists on the question o f the political autonomy of the European Court of Justice. 
On the one hand, a group of scholars argue that the Court, historically and at present, is a decision 
maker, which ov er time has extended its own scope o f manoeuvre alongside that of 'Europe'. On 
the other hand, a different group of scholars argue that the Court does not act with more autonomy 
than that which the member states permit.
4.2: Transform ing Europe
The autonomy ascribed by scholars to the Court of Justice is, in part, historically deduced. When 
the member states signed the Treaty' o f Rome and thereby adopted Article 177 on preliminary
1
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ruling, it was neither the intention to give individuals the opportunity to sue their own governments, 
nor to declare the supremacy of Community law. The case law of the Court itself established the 
doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, and thereby, in the words of Weilcr, initiated the 
transformation of Europe and with it the relationship between the Community and its member states 
(Weilcr 1991).
The Court's ruling in the von Gend case of 1963 gave Community law direct effect.35 The doctrine 
of direct effect meant that certain provisions conferred direct rights on individuals and equally 
imposed obligations on national authorities, without these necessarily having been implemented in 
national law .36 With the principle of direct effect, individuals became subjects of Communin' law. 
The establishment of direct effect thus made Community law different from traditional international 
law, as the latter only has states as the subjects of law . By conferring direct rights on individuals, 
the Court built an important alliance with 'the man in the street", and laws adopted in Brussels 
became directly enforceable as if they had been adopted by national parliaments (Wind 2001. p. 
138; Weilcr 1994, p. 513).
The legal doctrine of direct effect gave the private litigant a supranational possibility to challenge 
national policies. The later doctrine of supremacy established by the Costa case in 1964 reinforced 
that possibility.37 Whereas federal constitutions normally specify that in the case of conflict, federal 
law is supreme to the law of lower states, the Treaty does not define the relation between 
Community law and national law (Rasmussen 1998, p. 263). In the Costa case, the Court laid down 
that if national law conflicted with Community law, the latter was supreme.38 The doctrine made
3' Case 26/62. van Gend i t  Loos vs. Xetherlands Inland Revenue Administration. 5. February 1963. FCR 1963, p. 1.
it> In the conclusions of the van Gend case, the Court stilted: "The F.uropean Economic Community constitutes a new 
legal order o f  international law for the benefit of w hich the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit w ithin 
limited fields, and the subjects of w hich compromise not only the member states but also their nationals. Independently 
of the legislation of the member suites, community law not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended 
to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are 
expressly granted by the Treaty but also by reasons of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined wav 
upon individuals as well as upon the member states and upon the institutions o f the Community“ (emphasis added).
r  Case 6/64, Costa vs. EM U. 15. July 1964. ECR 1964. p. 564.
38 In the conclusions of the Costa case, the Court stated: "The integration into the law s o f each member state of 
provisions which derive from the Community and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it 
impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over the legal 
system accepted by than  on the basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with that legal 
system. The law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law , could not because o f its special and original 
nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as 
Community law and without the legal basis o f the Community itself being called into question. The transfer by the
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European law supreme to subsequent changes of national law, meaning that member states cannot 
adopt policies that contradict their Community obligations (Alter 2001, p. 17). In the Costo case, 
the Court concluded that by being part of the Community legal system, the member states had 
permanently limited their sovereign rights. By establishing a new legal hierarch)', the Court stressed 
that Community law was more than the simple sum of national legal orders (Wind 2001, p. 145).
Whereas the Treaty nowhere states the principles of direct effect and supremacy, the legal reasoning 
of the Court brought about this conclusion. The Court of Justice thereby revolutionised the 
preliminary ruling system and the Community legal order, from a system where individuals could 
question Community law to a system allowing them to question national law, even in national 
courts (Alter 1998, p. 126; Alter 2000, p. 491). The Court's legal actions integrated the national and 
supranational legal systems, and engaged national judges in upholding the supremacy of European 
law (Stone Sweet & Brunell 1998, pp. 65-66). By allying itself with the citizens of the member 
states, granting them direct rights beyond their own state, the Court made sure that individuals 
would take a private interest in monitoring state compliance with supranational law. By allying 
itself with national courts, the Court ensured a decentralised enforcement mechanism of 
Community law. The transformation of the Community's legal system thus increased the 
effectiveness of European law.
The two doctrines have considerable political implications. The doctrines compromise the sovereign 
position of national parliaments by giving direct effect to supranational law and make Community 
law supreme over what has been or will be legislated nationally. By establishing the doctrines, the 
direct and effective impact of Community law had exceeded the original intentions of the Treaty 
drafters. The question as to why politicians did not step in when legal interpretations ’transformed 
Europe* remains a fundamental puzzle to both the theoretical and empirical study of European 
integration. The relation between law and politics will be discussed in the follow ing sections.
4.3: Judicial Activism  Beyond Politics?
Legal, nco-functional scholars, as well as scholars of comparative politics, have claimed that the 
European Court of Justice should be accredited its own part in European integration dynamism, and
states from  their domestic legal system to the Community legal system o f  the lights and obligations arising under the 
Treat}'carries with it a permanent limitation o f  their sovereign rights" (emphasis added).
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that it docs act as a policy maker in its own right (Weiler 1991,1993, 1994; Shapiro 1999; Burley & 
Mattli 1993; Mattli & Slaughter 1995; Pierson 1996; Alter 1998,2000,2001).
However, a point to which discussion continually returns is why member governments should have 
ever allowed a supranational organisation, serving as an agent, to expand its autonomy, to define 
competencies and to limit the role of politics.
One explanation is that law masks politics (Burley & Mattli 1993, p. 44; Beach 2001, pp. 46-47). 
Due to the dominant belief in the separation of law and politics, the Court has had considerable 
manoeuvrability to be political exactly because its actions are generally believed to be apolitical.
In this line, Alter has argued that the political implications of a legal ruling arc unlikely to be 
revealed in the first place (Alter 1998; 2001). When establishing the doctrines of direct effect and 
supremacy, the Court's conclusions were revolutionary' from a legal perspective. But from a 
political perspective, the cases did not seem to have a significant political or financial impact. The 
financial implications in the van Gcnd case against the Netherlands were small. In the Costa case, 
the Italian government actually won the case, at the same time as the Court in a obiter dictum 
formulated the supremacy of Community' law, which had no relevance for the case at hand. The 
Court simply added that had there been a conflict of law, Community law would have prevailed. 
Thus, what, it has been argued, has constitutionalised the Community legal order, were, when taken, 
rather marginal legal decisions from a political point of view (Alter 1998, p. 131-133).
This argument explains political non-action. It pictures law and politics as two distinct spheres, 
which do not follow to the same logic, and instead respond to very different logics. According to 
this argument, lawyers and judges evidently take a long term interest in the evolution of law', 
w hereas politicians have short term interests, and react to judicial activism for its immediate impact 
and not for its potential one. To lawyers and judges, case-law is interesting for its establishment of 
precedent. For politicians, the rather short term material impact of a case is what makes it important 
-  or not. Applying Pierson's argument on the restricted time horizon of political actors. Alter 
explains that whereas political non-action towards the judicial activism establishing direct effect 
and supremacy today seems short-sighted, the doctrines, at that time, appeared at most only as 
potential problems (Alter 1998, pp. 130-132; Alter 2001, p. 189).
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Finally, should member governments wish to act and restrain the legal praxis of the Court, they are 
confronted with varying, but considerable, institutional barriers. 1) To limit the mandate of the 
Court of Justice would require a Treaty amendment, and thus unanimity as well as ratification by 
national parliaments. 2) Should member states wish to correct one of the Court's interpretations o f  
the Treaty’, this would equally require a Treaty’ amendment -  and unanimity’. To rule in the Court 
through the means of a Treaty’ amendment is severely constrained by the fact that, besides 
unanimity’, it would require national processes of ratification, meaning referendums for several 
member states, or approval by national parliaments 3) If politicians wish to overrule a legal 
interpretation of secondary legislation, it can be done by the Council's amendment of the 
legislation, which clarifies the points of dispute. Such a political correction would require unanimity’ 
or qualified majority voting, depending on the decision making procedure. These different decision­
making rules thus constitute the thresholds to sanction a legal course of integration. Although the 
institutional barriers to amend secondary legislation are considerably lower than those involved in 
restricting the Court's authority' by a Treaty’ amendment, Alter notes that the Court's decisions have 
surprisingly seldom been rewritten by the change o f a simple statute (Alter 1998. p. 138). One 
explanation is that a legal decision seldom affects member states equally, and only seldom all or the 
qualified majority of the member states disagree w ith the legal interpretation. Under the unanimity 
rule, which applies to Regulation 1408/71, only one member state needs to support the 
jurisprudence, and it will be impossible to mobilise the necessary political support for re-legislation. 
Such institutional barriers to change express what Scharpf has termed, the ‘joint decision trap' 
(Scharpf 1988).
These difficulties for the member states to sanction the Court, when it goes loo far beyond political 
intentions, pictures a European Court o f Justice which enjoys a relative high degree of interpretive 
autonomy and authority. However, not all scholars agree on the extent of legal autonomy it has in 
its interpretation. The political power approach, outlined below, understands the Court's position as 
much more interdependent and restrained and, at the end of the day, subordinated to the political 
will of the more powerful member states.
4.4: Politics O verturning Law?
The basic argument of the political power approach is that, ultimately, member states control the 
Court and thus the process of legal integration. The Court does not have the autonomy to rule
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against the more powerful states, but must generally bend to their interests (Garrett 1992, p. 537; p. 
552). The basic assumptions of the approach thus agree with those of intergovernmental ism.
In a set o f articles written in the 1990s, Geoffrey Garrett and co-writers pose the argument that 
control of the course of integration has not escaped national governments due to legal integration. 
On the contrary, legal integration has largely taken place when it has been politically supported. 
The political power approach pictures the Court of Justice as a strategic actor, sensitive to political 
constraints and preferences (Garrett 1992, 1995; Garrett & Weingast 1993; Garrett Kclemcn & 
Schultz 1998).
In contrast to neo-functionalism, the approach introduces a focus on politics in the process of legal 
integration - or disintegration. By bringing in political power as a (co)de term inant for Court 
decisions, assumptions on self-sustaining dynamics are criticised. Far from being self-sustained, 
dynamics arc politically sustained, and law is not shielded from political pressures. Politics is seen 
as ever present and if judicial activism oversteps what member governments can accept, politicians 
will attempt to overturn or evade the legal decision. Politics respond actively to law.
The relationship between politics and law is illustrated in ‘the legal politics game* by Garrett. 
Kclemcn & Schultz (1998, pp. 152-154). As emphasised in section 1 of this chapter, their 
description of ‘the legal politics game' has inspired the model drawn up to analyse 
institutionalisation of social security rights as a two-laycred process of integration, depicted in 
figure 3. The argument for making 'the game* an essential part of the model which is built up for 
the subsequent analysis, is that it forces us to include a focus on the limits of legal integration, 
which is essentially left out in a neo-functional depiction of legal path dependencies.
The first part of the game, as described by Garrett, Kelemen and Schultz, is when the Court rules on 
a national law or practice and decides whether or not it complies w ith European law . There arc tw o 
possible outcomes. In the first, the ECJ finds the national act in compliance w ith Community law, 
and that is the end of the stage game. In the second, the Court rules against the national law or 
administrative practice. The second part of the stage game pictures the political reaction to the 
adverse decision. The member government must choose whether or not to conform with the 
decision. If it chooses to abide, it must change the national law or practice. But if it chooses to 
challenge the ruling, it has three ways to react, i) It may overtly or covertly evade the decision, ii) It 
may work for a collective overturning of the decision, i.e. re-legislation, iii) It may propose a
revision of the Treaty. The third part of the stage game concerns how the other member states will 
react in that situation. They may either support the overruling of the judicial activism of the Court, 
through re-legislation or ultimately through a Treat}’ amendment. Or, they may not support the 
proposal to correct or constrain the Court, in which case the litigant member state will either 
continue its defiance alone, or finally choose to accept the decision.
According to the political power approach, this is the temporary end of the legal politics game, but 
the game continues with new rulings of the Court and political reaction. The infinite repetition of 
the game directs the evolution of legal integration. In this sense, the process of legal integration is 
shaped dynamically, but not apolitically.
4.5: Institutionalisation and its Lim its
Within both political science and law-in-context legal approaches, a significant disagreement exists 
as to what extent the European Court of Justice may integrate contrary to political preferences. 
Returning to the discussion on the position o f the Court, such disagreement may mirror the fact that 
the Court behaves in contradictory’ ways: at times furthering integration and. at other times, 
behaving cautiously. Explanations based on legal autonomy may account for those cases where 
judicial activism has furthered integration, whereas the political power approach highlights the 
motives for the Court to be cautious. Different theoretical deductions on the position of the Court 
and its scope of manoeuvre is likely to mirror the empirical material selected and studied.
The political power focus of Garrett and co-authors is supported by cases, which arc not adverse, 
where the litigant government chooses not to accept an adverse decision, or where the oilier 
member governments support the litigant state in restraining the Court. It is notable that the 
approach criticises legal autonomy studies for supporting their conclusions "with selective citation 
of illustrative cases**, but hardly avoids basing its own conclusions on some kind of case selectivity 
(Burley & Mattli 1993, pp. 50-51; Garrett, Kelemen & Schultz 1998, p. 151).
The model built up for the purpose of the present study, focusing on institutionalisation through the 
interaction of law and politics (figure 3, section 1), aims both to account for institutional stagnation 
or dc-institutionalisation, as well as to bring into focus the parts of social security integration w hich 
are not captured by the ‘legal politics game* as formulated by Garrett, Kelemen and Schultz. Their 
study o f the "legal politics game* must be based on case selections, since it does not theorise the
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various wavs a litigant government may accept a decision (stage 2, figure 3). Furthermore, it only 
considers the reactions of other member governments in the case where the litigant government 
defies the ECJ ruling. However, to trace the reaction of other member governments to adverse cases 
which were accepted by the litigant government may be just as important (stage 3, figure 3). These 
cases vary greatly and may show the reach and effectiveness of Community law as well as the 
establishment of a binding precedent. When a litigant government accepts an adverse decision, it is 
by no means the end of the legal politics game, as suggested by Garrett, Kelemen and Schultz, but 
rather the beginning of the second layer of institutionalisation. Other member states may refuse the 
multilateral effect of an individual ruling and continue to deny any general applicability, until the 
day the ECJ rules otherwise. But other member states may also accept a ruling as having general 
impact and implement the rights and principles themselves. Furthermore, all member governments 
may gradually agree together on a legal principle, and amend European law so that it reflects the 
legal principle established (stage 3. figure 3). Such a political response to innovative legal 
interpretation would suggest a great degree of political acceptance of judicial authority, even when 
the Court rules against defined national preferences. Finally, it may be that politics manage to 
overturn law, and it may be that the Court subsequently accepts such a political restraint, but if 
analysing the acts and reactions of law and politics between an extensive To -  Ti, law may answer 
back (beyond stage 3, figure 3). Since institutionalisation is a repetitive process, it is very likely that 
in a given ‘beyond stage 3', the Court will rc-intcrprct national application or non-implementation 
and reassert its previous conclusions.
Despite significant disagreement between legal autonomy and political power approaches, they 
resemble one another on one key point. Institutionalisation is theorised as a process shaped alone at 
the supranational lev el of decision-making. The scope, effectiveness and effects of Community law 
all considered without taking the subsequent phase of national implementation into account.
By researching national implementation and impact, considerable variations in the cross-case, 
cross-time and cross-country reach of Community law are likely to be revealed. How 
supra nation ally generated rights arc subsequently institutionalised into national policies and 
adm ini strativc practices gives us different insights into the effectiveness and limits of Community 
law, and may add to our understanding of why politicians do not respond immediately or 
consistently to new legal conclusions and doctrines. In the following section, the national impact of 
supranational institutionalisation will be discussed.
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5.0: W hat Is the National Impact o f Supranational Institutionalisation?
Integration theories generally seem to expect that when institutionalisation takes place, it implies a 
corresponding policy change at the national level. In addition, it seems to be generali)’ expected that 
when the scope of integration increases, it will produce a greater uniformity in national policies 
(Dimitrova & Steuenbcrg 2000, p. 202). Neo-functionalism, intergovernmental ism, as well as most 
of their modified variants, focus on how and why member states engage in European decision­
making. but do not discuss what impact a decision-making result may have on national policies 
(Bòrzel & Risse 2000, p. 1). Moreover, the theoretical dispute about the member states' possibility' 
to control the scope and direction of European integration does not consider the member states' 
ability to control how EÜ policies are implemented into national legislation. When it comes to the 
political impact of jurisprudence, most work has focused on the influence of ECJ decisions on EU 
policies, but has left out the question of how litigation influences national policies (Alter 2000, pp. 
507-508). Generally, integration theories have in common the fact that they focus on supranational 
decision-making in itself, but leave out how such output is subsequently transposed into national 
policies or administrative routines. Such a focus may determine a great deal of the conclusions these 
approaches reach.
This section argues that the effective meaning of an institution is established through both 
supranational political and judicial decision-making, as well as through national implementation. It 
is argued that both layers of institutionalisation are decisive for the domestic impact of European 
integration. National implementation of EU law and policies constitute the reactive 
institutionalisation process, which, at least in the medium run, is controlled by national politicians 
and administrations. Implementation as a reactive part of policymaking makes up the second 
stronghold of national control, where actors arc capable o f filtering and sometimes modifying the 
actual impact o f EU decision-making. It is argued that it is important to view implementation as an 
act of 'governance', rather than a neutral ‘management’ of political decisions, and to consider 
analytically the discretion member states possess when implementing (Dimitrova & Steuenbcrg 
2000, p. 215; Scott 2000, p. 259). Institutionalisation will be examined as a two-laycred process.
5.1: Im plem entation Form ally Regarded
Implementation may be defined as the way decisions arc put into effect (From & Stava 1993, p. 59). 
Implementation is therefore the process which establishes concrete rights and obligations for those 
subject to law.
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From a formal point of view, member states arc legally bound to uphold the acquis communautairc. 
in other words treaties, secondary legislation and ECJ jurisprudence However. to a great extent 
member states themselves decide how to comply with their Community obligations The European 
Union has its own division of labour. Whereas the decision making lex cl is European, member 
states attend to implementation, which, in practical terms, is often carried out at the sub-national 
level. The structures of Community implementation appear fairly independent, formal lx regulated 
through Article 10 (ex. art. 5) of the Treaty:
“Member states shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from actions taken by the institutions of ihe t'ormnuinn 1 Inn 
shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. The} shall abstain from am measure wInch could 
jeopardise the attainment of die objectives of litis Treaty"
The degree of discretion that member slates enjoy when implementing depends on the institution in 
question. Regulations arc directly applicable, whereas directives have to be adopted in national 
legislation (Hartley 1998. pp. 196-206). Directives thus leave more room to slip in national 
preferences when enacted in national legislation, whereas regulations to a greater degree, ensure the 
uniformity of Community law. However, regulations max- also from time to time, require 
implementation. That will be needed when the terms of the regulation are formulated \ aguelv. and 
individual provisions need to be applied in detail. At the same time, the case-law of the Court has 
laid down that directives may also be directly effective w In this way. the distinction between 
regulations and directives has become somewhat blurred.
The w ays of integration also differ in their domestic impact and implementation requirements (Kntll 
& Lchmkuhl 1999). Positive integration prescribes the direct institutional requirement for domestic 
adjustment, and leaves limited discretion for the member state in deciding which concrete 
arrangement to apply. Negative integration, on the other hand, focuses on ‘market making’ and 
prohibits national barriers to the internal market (Scharpf 1996)111 When confronted with negative 
integration, member states do not have to implement a prescribed institutional model, but instead 
abolish those parts of domestic policies which conflict with internal market principles In this sense. *40
V) Sec for example Case 41/74. Iroww vanDian v Home Ofl'icv 4. December l ‘>7-4 1 CR 1*17-4. p I V'7
40 Positive integration is intergovemineiitaUy enacted in the sense that it depends ujvm agreements m the Council of 
Ministers. The basic rules of negative integration are already laid down b> the primary law of the Comnumitv. and the 
scope of negative integration may be expanded supranationalh without involving the Council of Ministers i Scharpf 
1996, p. 18).
negative integration leaves more decision-making scope for member states to decide how to comply 
with the law and policies of the Community.
Regulation 1408/71 is an illustrative example of the fact that sharp distinctions between different 
types of institutions, and ways of integration, may not mirror the degree of discretion member states 
enjoy when implementing. As a regulation, 1408 should be directly applicable. However, putting 
the provisions of 1408 into effect has indeed required implementation and, in some cases changes in 
national law. The social security rights that the Regulation covers are prescribed, not only by the 
Treaty' and the text of 1408, but also by the extensive case-law o f the Court, which lays down the 
meaning of broad and sometimes rather abstract provisions. Transposing the acquis communautairc 
into enforceable rights in accordance with national legislation implies a national administrative 
assessment. Although a regulation, 1408 requires implementation in a more or less detailed fashion. 
Furthermore, the principles of Regulation 1408 prescribe negative integration, aiming to abolish 
national barriers to free movement. The Regulation does not 'harmonise’, but ‘coordinates' national 
social security' policies.41 In contrast to positive integration, 'coordination", as a form of negative 
integration, leaves considerable scope for national actors to interpret whether national acts arc in 
compliance with Community' obligations. For these reasons, it is essential to study implementation 
when assessing the domestic impact of European coordination o f social security- rights.
5.2: Institutionalisation Equal to  Change? Im plem enting EU Policies
Thus when considering impact, it is important whether a specific institution allow s for flexible or
uniform implementation. Institutions allowing more flexible implementation are likely to produce a 
greater degree of differentiation between member states when decisions are put into effect. Such 
differentiation must be expected in the case of 1408, due to the regulation's special characteristics, 
as described above. But differentiated implementation does not only depend on the characteristics 
of the European institution, but must likewise take those o f national institutions into account.
Although in general rather under-researched and vaguely theorised, there has been recent literature 
on 'Europeanisation' which analyses the national impact of European integration and the process 
through which national policies may change due to integration (Borzel & Rissc 2000, p. 3).
41 The difference between the concepts o f 'harmonisation' and ‘coordination’ will be discussed in more detail when 
introducing the Regulation in chapter III below.
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Theoretical assessments of the domestic impact of integration may be diwdcd into three main 
groups (Jacobsen, Lxgreid & Pedersen 2001).42
The first group is the neo-functionalist onented research, which regards EU policies as the 
independent variable, determining change. Member states translate supranational rules loyally and 
unambiguously into national legislation and administrative practices Therefore the scope of 
supranational decision-making is equal to the extent of national change A h-l omi group consists of 
more intergovernmentalist oriented scholars and arrncs at the opposite interpretation of 
implementation, namely that it is a process that national actors manage to control through strategic 
action. Supranational decision-making is thus transposed in accordance w ith national interests
The third group, however, focuses on the stability and historical heritage of national institutions and 
administrations. The robustness of national rules and practices will mllucncc am final effective 
outcome. The dynamics and details of Europeanisation cannot be captured by the simple logics of 
independent and dependent variables (Olsen 19%. p. 271) European integration matters, and may 
thus constitute an independent variable for change, but national institutions, with all their legitimacy 
and historical heritage, were in place long before. Cause - effect relations therefore become blurred, 
and the importance of explanatory factors, such as national institutions and their compatibility with 
Community obligations, arc highlighted.
According to the third approach, change will always be historically embedded, and depend on 
national traditions, established administrative practices and the willingness to transpose Such 
studies of Europeanisation apply a historical institutional perspective. but. m contrast w ith Pierson's 
interpretation, the starting point is national. The expectation is that European institutionalisation 
only conditions change in a slow and incremental way. Institutionalisation may reflect a 
supranational path dependent process, but it is confronted with the resistance to change of all the 
separate national path dependent institutions:
"Starting from such a historical, institutional perspective we must expect that norms. traditions. routines ami
established practice, w hich have evolved through a long historical process, in the si tort tenn change \ ct\ tittle"
(Jacobsen. I.xgreid & Pedersen 2001, p. 19. own translationi
1: The following division on impact-studies into three main group rch inninh on the work el .Unhsai. I xgreid A- 
Pedersen (2001). which researched the Europeanisation ol’ llie Nordic central-administrations J.icoKoi. I xgreid A. 
Pedersen, however, work with a division into four groups Both the third and fourth group Imd tlut national institutions 
constitute important explanatory variables for variations in impact Smte the analytical perspectives oi illese two groups 
do not dilì er considerably, they have, for simplification reasons, been integrated in the tollowing description
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In the long run, European institutionalisation may cause change, while leaving room for national 
interpretations. Rules are not translated to the letter, but as far as possible, according to national 
traditions -  and perhaps preferences. Established national practices are decisive for the effective 
meaning of an institution.
The third approach views integration as neither equal to convergence, nor to status quo. It is 
emphasised that implementation is not an automatic process, but is indeed coloured by national 
institutions, norms and practices. One key point that is emphasised in the work of Risse, Cowles 
and Caporaso is that, although European integration matters, it docs not lead either to convergence 
or to continued divergence, but rather to "domestic adaptation with national colours" (Risse, 
Cowles & Caporaso 2001, p. 1). Since national institutions vary, so docs the extent of adaptive 
pressure caused by any European institutionalisation process. The extent of the adaptative pressure 
that European integration exerts depends on the degree of 'fit'/compatibility or 
‘misfit'/incompatibility between European law and national policies (Borzcl 1999; BòrzeI & Risse 
2000; Risse, Cowles & Caporaso 2001).43 Some national institutions may be much more EU- 
compatible than others. However, even when a degree of adaptive pressure exists, it may not lead to 
change, since member states could simply choose not to respond to 'Europeanisation'. There may 
be "no straightforward connection between adaptive pressures and adaptive reaction" (Goetz 2001, 
pp. 214-215). It is therefore a research task to account for both the variations in European impact, as 
well as to explain the differing responses and robustness of national institutions against European 
pressures for change (Olsen 2002, p. 12). 'Europeanisation' is not dictated by a specific form of 
institutional adaptation, but considerable discretion is left to the domestic actor and organisation. 
Impact is not "perfect, universal or constant*' (Olsen 2002, p. 15). Such analytical observations 
should make us expect that comparative research on the impact of European institutionalisation will 
reveal both cross-country, cross-case and temporal variations.
"...w e have to pay attention to how institutional spheres are affected differently and how they attend to, interpret 
and respond to European developments differently and in a non-synchronized ways" (Olsen 2002, p. 13).
5.3: Case-law  Enacted as Policies? Im plem enting Case-law
EU-policies are implemented at the national level, and member states thus may have a second 
stronghold of national control. Implementation has been regarded as the national "come-back",
43 Adaptive pressure and response, as phrased by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001 ) among others, will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter VI, as it w ill be operationalised into practical research in chapter VI and VII.
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where member states can recodify HU decisions more in accordance with national traditions, thus 
clawing back what they may have lost through intergovernmental decision-making (Goetz 2001, p. 
217; Meny et al. 1996, p. 7).
Many of the observations above on the implementation of EU-policies also contain insights into the 
more concrete implementation of the Court's case-law. Here member states may equally exert 
discretion. The quite recent work of Lisa Conant accepts the arguments of retained political power 
(Conant 2002). Conant criticises conclusions on judicial empowerment at the expense of politics for 
not following legal interpretations out of the courtroom, and for simply assuming that member 
states enact case-law as policies (Conant 2002, p. 44). Among others, her critique addresses the 
approach on the ‘institutionalisation of Europe’ as formulated by Stone Sweet et al. Her argument is 
that it may well be that legal innovation takes place and that the ECJ generates new rights, but ECJ 
rulings may not be automatic catalysts for policy change, and innovative legal interpretation may 
not result in wide-ranging domestic reforms. The reach of European law outside the courtroom 
largely depends on how member states accommodate the rights and obligations that have been 
created. Conant emphasises that it is the member states, rather than the ECJ, which control the 
specific content of policy change. Like the political power approach, Conant (rc)focuscs on the role 
of politics, but she does so by concentrating on how politics subsequently meets settled law. 
Individual case-law is characterised by ambiguity and by being incremental or by having been 
generated piecemeal. This leaves considerable reactive and interpretive scope for the member states 
as it may insulate, to a certain extent, the policy process from judicial interference. Studies focusing 
on the radical aspects of judicial activism forget that innovative legal interpretation docs not 
necessarily translate into a corresponding policy response.
Furthermore, Conant argues that Article 234's system of judicial review only compels member 
states to comply w ith individually addressed rulings, since the system of preliminary ruling has no 
doctrine of ‘stare decisis', establishing binding precedent (Conant 2002, pp. 63-73). Lacking the 
institution of precedent, preliminary rulings have no ‘erga omnes' (generally binding) or ‘ultra 
partes' (beyond the parties) effects (Conant 2002, p. 63). The scope of a judgement is formally 
limited to the individual law suit. That, means, first of all that the referring court only has to apply 
the judgement to the facts of the specific case. Secondly, it means that the judgement has no direct 
effect for similar facts in other member states. Without binding precedent national courts and 
administrations arc not obliged to base legal or administrative decisions on prior judicial rulings. 
Conant argues that since an ECJ judgement is not generally binding, the national administration
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may refuse to evoke the rights until it gets its own lawsuit, obliging it to do so. The effect o f an ECJ 
generated principle thus depends on the member states' decision whether and how to apply it, but 
generally preliminary rulings are not treated by national administrations as binding policy 
prescriptions. Instead Conant argues that her empirical findings substantiate that "contained 
compliance constitutes standard administrative practice”, thus restricting the policy impact o f ECJ 
decisions (Conant 2002, p. 69). According to Conant, the lack of binding precedent constitutes a 
crucial limit to law in Europe.
“The European system of judicial review operating through Article 234 (177 EEC) references only compels 
compliance with individual judgements because ECJ preliminary rulings do not constitute binding “precedents” .
The absence of generally binding legal obligations enables national officials to disregard principles that are 
articulated in ECJ case law. National administrations capitalize on this restriction to contain justice” (Conant 
2002, p. 63).
The Conant argument is, however, disputable. Craig and de Burca find that, in effect, the ECJ has 
established a system of precedent, inviting national courts to regard previous rulings as generally 
binding. Contrary to Conant, they find that a previous ruling has a ‘‘multilateral and not merely a 
bilateral effect” (Craig & de Burca 1998, p. 418). They thus conclude that the points of law 
generated in a judgement have a general effect and reach beyond the individual lawsuit (Craig & de 
Burca 1998; de Burca 1998, pp. 229-230). This dispute may reflect that the reach of Community 
law varies across time. There may be a considerable gap between when a general premise is 
established by an ECJ decision and when its binding precedent is accepted by political and 
administrative response, as well as by national courts.
Conant lists three forms of dominant policy response to innovative ECJ interpretations, and three 
rarer forms of policy response (Conant 2002, pp. 32-33). The dominant forms of response arc far 
from any idea of complete application o f the Court's interpretation, and include, a) contained 
compliance, b) restrictive application as policy, and c) pre-emption. Contained compliance happens 
when member states apply an innovative ruling to the individual case, but refuse to treat the ruling 
as a broader established principle, i.e. refuse its status as a binding precedent. Restrictive 
application as policy is w hen member states subsequently place limits and exceptions on the judicial 
principle in sccondaiy and primary law'. Restrictive application thus modifies the principle 
generated. Pre-emption takes place when member states construct European or domestic law so as 
to avoid ECJ interference in that policy area. Pre-emption thus addresses how past judicial activism 
may influence future policies. Rarer forms o f response include d) non-compliance with individual 
cases, e) complete application as policy, f) legislative overruling. Non-compliance is not the norm.
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Neither is complete application, where member states apply the generated principle without posing 
any conditional limits on its application. The interpretation of a principle is likely to diverge to 
some extent. Finally, member states may decide on a collective legislative overruling of the Court's 
interpretation, which, however, is a rare outcome due to the institutional constraints on mobilising 
support. Overruling docs, however, take place, and is the most direct wav politically to correct an 
innovative legal interpretation. This Final reaction corresponds to Garrett ct al's collective 
overturning of a legal ruling in the ‘legal politics game', which was sketched in section 4 4
The work of Conant argues against the assumptions of legal autonomy, by focusing on the restricted 
domestic impact of legal innovation. A legal principle, which may seem radical when first stated in 
the courtroom, goes through a second process of institutionalisation where it is interpreted 
according to national institutions, administrative practice and. not least, political, administrative and 
judicial willingness to transpose and comply. The domestic impact of legal integration may thus 
reveal itself to be less significant, when supranationally generated rights and principles arc 
translated nationally.
5.4: Monitoring Implementation
After all. political or administrative attempts to ignore or refuse Community obligations cannot be 
solutions in die long run. Although implementation is the concern of the member states, the 
Community possesses instruments to ensure that the acquis communautaire is rightfully put into 
effect. Subjects of Community law such as individuals and enterprises may complain to the 
Commission or the ECJ over non-compliancc with Community law.
The Commission's infringement procedures (the Treaty‘s art. 22f>) and the preliminary rulings of 
the Court (the Treaty's art. 234) arc thus important means of monitoring implementation The 
actions of the Commission and the Court have, over time, enhanced the effectiveness of FU law and 
its domestic impact. However, it is clear that the reach of the instruments \ ancs from member state 
to member state.
The Commission is assigned the task of monitoring the implementation of EU law To fulfil this 
task, it will collect information about implementation (Bursens 2002, p I76> It will be notified by 
the member states about how they hav e carried out their Community obligations Furthermore, the 
Commission can investigate implementation on its own initiative. In addition, complaints may be
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made to the Commission that rights have been violated. Against such backgrounds, the Commission 
may initiate an infringement procedure to monitor implementation. It first gives the member state 
the opportunity to submit observations on the matter, then submits a ‘reasoned opinion' on the basis 
of those observations and, finally, if non-compliance continues, bring an infringement procedure 
before the ECJ. The Treaty did not initially entail any sanctions for non-compliance with legal 
decisions. The Commission's enforcement powers have, however, been increased gradually through 
Treaty amendments. The Maastricht Treat)’ amended art. 228 (ex. art. 171) and gave the 
Commission the possibility of infringement procedures against member states which had not 
complied with an ECJ ruling, and moreover the power to fine member states for their non- 
compliance (Pollack 2003, p. 86).
The quantitative demonstration of how’ many infringement procedures the Commission has initiated 
in recent years against individual member states, and how many of these have led to actual Court 
referrals, indicate the different compliance records of the member states, as well as the different 
ways of response when the Commission questions implementation.
T abic  1: In frin g em en t P rocedures In itia ted  a n d  R eferred  I998-200044
Infringem ent S ta rted_________ Reasoned O pin ion____________ C o u rt R efe rra ls
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 20(H) 1998 1999 2000
D enm ark 51 51 61 50 50 61 1 1 0
F in land 69 51 81 68 49 77 1 0 4
Sweden 70 72 88 69 71 85 1 1 3
N eth erlan d s 54 85 92 51 84 80 3 1 12
UK 102 102 104 101 94 100 1 8 4
A u stria 118 131 126 114 122 122 4 9 8
Belgium 186 125 131 166 110 126 20 15 5
Spain 120 100 133 114 93 125 6 7 8
L u x em b u rg 112 121 134 101 103 118 11 18 16
Ire lan d 129 114 135 109 99 118 10 15 17
Germany 139 123 143 154 114 132 5 9 11
G reece 162 150 173 146 136 150 16 14 23
P ortugal 142 150 176 137 137 166 5 13 10
France 238 182 180 225 147 153 23 35 27
Italy 217 158 192 201 126 168 16 32 24
T otal 1899 1713 1953 1776 1535 1781 123 178 172
The figures are in absolute numbers. Table 1 's data rely on tire work o f Bursen (Bursen 2002, p. 178) on infringement 
established. Bursen's work is based on various issues o f the Commission's “Report on Monitoring the Application of 
EU Law”. Tire Commission will initiate a given infringement procedure by informing the member slate by a letter of 
formal notice, then followed by the administrative procedure in which the Commission gives a reasoned opinion. If  the 
member state does not comply with die opinion, the Commission may refer the matter to the Court.
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Tabic 1 breaks down the data from graph 1 in section 4.1, which pictured the development in 
infringement procedures referred to the Court between 1960-99. Whereas the data on the 
development betw een 1960-99 indicate a dramatic increase in the number of Commission-referred 
cases, table 1 above specifies that, generally, member states decide to comply before the 
Commission refers the infringement. Article 226 proceedings happen only “when all other means 
have failed" (Borzel 2001, p. 11). Between the initiated infringement procedure and the actual 
Court referral, the Commission and the member state engage in bilateral negotiations, w hich means 
that the conflict is most often solved before it comes to a legal clarification. However, the 
compliance behaviour of the member states varies. Focusing on Denmark and Germany, it can be 
seen that Denmark has, between 1998-2000. faced fewer infringement procedures and has, to a 
greater extent, complied with the opinion of the Commission, thus avoiding a Court referral. That 
suggests that Denmark reacts less confrontationally when accused of non-compliance than, for 
example, Germany. Such findings are supported by the reputation Denmark enjoys as a member 
state which generally seeks to fulfil its Community obligations (Borzel 2001, p. 12). As noted by 
Hjalte Rasmussen. Denmark deliberately endeavours to avoid infringing the acquis communautairc 
(Rasmussen 1988, p. 97). Danish political and administrative tradition seems to have led to a 
"conscientious non-infringements policy", where in the situation that litigation seems unavoidable, 
the government w ill carefully weigh the pros and cons of its chances of w inning a case:
“As a matter of policy, if a threatening in-court battle is unlikely to be won, the government seems to prefer to 
settle it by an out-of-court compromise. This « ill often be followed by pertinent new legislation being issued or 
other sorts o f legal enactments which brings Denmark impeccably in line with its obligations" (Rasmussen 1988,
P- 97).
As emphasised by Borzel. infringement procedures do not mirror the actual level of non-compliance 
in the EU. They merely cover a fraction of member states* violation of their Community 
obligations. As graph 1 in section 4.1 above demonstrates, the preliminary ruling procedure of 
Article 234 reflects that non-compliance occurs extensively without attracting the attention of the 
Commission through the art. 226 procedure (Borzel 2001). In addition, many other incidents of 
non-compliancc are likely to occur without it ever coming to a lawsuit. At best, cases of non- 
compliancc as expressed through art. 226 and 234 procedures mirror a random sample of actual 
non-compliancc.
The Treaty's art. 234 system of preliminary rulings is the other important instrument with which to 
monitor compliance. We have learned that, with the support of EU citizens and national courts, the 
preliminary rulings of the Court have enhanced the effectiveness and uniformity of Community law
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(Alter 2000; Wind 2001; Rasmussen 1998). When litigants initiate a judicial procedure, arguing 
that their rights according to Community law have been violated, national implementation is 
questioned and an implementation deficit may be improved. However, an examination of the 
variations in the reference patterns o f the member states suggests that Community law docs not 
have an equal reach in all member states, and may have different effects. Incorrect or insufficient 
implementation may be the object o f legal inquiry to a greater extent in some member states than in 
others.
Table 2 pictures the reference patterns of 12 member states as illustrated by Alter (2000. p. 499). 
The use of preliminary references varies significantly between the member states. The cross­
country comparison shows that, in all periods, the national courts in Germany have most frequently 
made use of the system of preliminary references.
Table 2: R eference P a tte rn s  in 12 M em b er S ta te s  1961-9745
1961-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-98 T o ta l
Germany
France
N etherlands
Italy
Belgium
L uxem burg
UK
Ireland
Denmark
Greece
Spain
Portugal
Total
30 (40%) 
7 (9%) 
22 (29%) 
3 (4%) 
10(13% ) 
3 (4%)
7 5 (1 0 0 % )
284 (42%) 
85 (1 3 % ) 
108(16% ) 
8 4 (12% ) 
77 (11% ) 
4 ( 1%) 
20 (3% ) 
6 ( 1%) 
6 (1% )
674 (100% )
346 (28%) 
285 (23%) 
189 (15%) 
125 (10%) 
142(11% ) 
17(1% ) 
85 (7%) 
15(1% ) 
25 (2%) 
21 (2%) 
5 
1
1256 (100% )
463 (26%) 
216(12% ) 
174(10% ) 
370 (21%) 
124(7% ) 
18(1% ) 
163 (9%) 
16(1% ) 
47(3% ) 
32 (2%) 
116 (7%) 
30 (2%) 
1769(101% )
1123 (30%) 
593(16% ) 
493 (13%) 
582(15% ) 
353 (9%) 
42 (1%) 
268 (7%) 
37 (1%) 
78 (2%) 
53(1% ) 
121 (3% ) 
31 ( 1% ) 
3774 (99 % )
Such variation may lead to a variable impact of Community law on national policies. There is a 
clear difference in how much the national courts arc wfiling to make references and subsequently to 
enforce Community law. Citizens and national courts have not responded equally positively to the 
invitation to participate in the European legal system (Conant 2001, p. 101). Cross country and
45 The figures rely on Alter s data oil reference patterns in EU member states 1961-97 (Alter 2000, p. 499). The data are 
based on the statistics o f ECJ's 1997 annual report.
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cross case differences in reference patterns have been explained by various factors, such as the 
litigiousness of a society and transnational activity7 (Alter 2000; Conant 2001; Stone Sweet & 
Brunei! 1998). Concerning the litigiousness of a society, the work of Alter points out that German 
citizens raise more legal questions concerning domestic law than, for example, French and British 
citizens (Alter 2000, p. 497). That point of view is supported by the work of Conant, who argues 
that, since Germany faces a more active use of the national legal system, it is likely also to face the 
greatest bottom up societal pressure to participate in the legal system of the Community (Conant 
2001, p. 105). Both Alter and Conant emphasise that the national legal tradition influences the 
reference pattern.
Their conclusions arc based on a comparison between the three biggest member states. Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom, which finds that German national courts have enforced EU law7 
more than the other two. When, however, we consider citizens as the basic unit enforcing EU law, it 
becomes relevant to compare references based on the individual member states* population size. 
That is done in graph 2 below, whose details can be found in the attached appendix 3*s table 1. The 
graph pictures the number of references that 11 member stales made 1961-1997 pr. I million 
people. The graph is divided over four different periods of time and, finally, one in total. In such a 
comparison, Germany no longer stands out. It remains a member stale with a high number of 
references, but the reference rates of Belgium and the Netherlands become so much more 
remarkable, with a total number of references pr. 1 million people almost 3 times higher than 
Germany. Even Denmark has made a higher number of total references pr. 1 million people than 
Germany, even though Denmark could not make references before its membership in 1973.
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G rap h  2: R eferences pr. 1. million people in  I I  m em ber states (L uxem burg  excluded)46
Graph 2 and the attached table 1 (appendix 3) furthermore show that, in the beginning of their 
ncmbcrship, member states make fewer references. That suggests that citizens and national courts 
leed a learning period, in w hich they acknow ledge EU law as a means of questioning national law.
0 The data on the total number of references are the same as used in table 2 above (Alter 2000, p. 499). The data are 
hen divided by the population size of the 11 individual member states. The individual population sizes have been 
nformed by the Danish f  oreign Ministry and are the population sizes as of January 2003. That means that changes in 
jopulation sizes between 1961-97 are not taken into account.
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and a source of additional rights. This is another finding which substantiates the argument that 
enhancing the effectiveness of EU law and its domestic impact seems to be time dependent.
5.5: Monitoring Im plementation o f Regulation 1408
In order to analyse the case-law development and its content regarding Regulation 1408/71, a 
CELEX study has been carried out as part of this thesis' empirical work. For each year between 
1971-2002, the number of preliminary references and infringement procedures that the Court has 
ruled on the basis of 1408/71 has been examined.47 The results are listed in appendix 1 on 
‘"Preliminary References and Infringement Procedures on the Basis of Regulation 1408/71 between 
1971-2002“, which was detailed in section 1.6 on ‘Research Material' in chapter I of this thesis.
In total, the European Court of Justice has concluded 338 cases related to 1408 between 1971-2002. 
The extensive case-load tells us that judicial clarifications have been a most important source of the 
regulation's institutionalisation. However, it is important to note that judicial clarification has not 
necessarily furthered integration, but has at times restrained that process, as will be further 
demonstrated in the analysis of the following chapters. The high number of cases should therefore 
not be taken as provisionally supporting Stone Sweet et al.'s propositions on progressive 
institutionalisation, as formulated in section 3.3 above.
Appendix 1 lists the case-load for each year, which is depicted aggregated in graph 3 below:
47 These are judgements b\ the European Court o f Justice, where one of the provisions cited relates to Regulation 
1408/71.
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Sraph  3: P relim inary  References and  Infringem ents P rocedures be tw een  1971-2002 reg ard in g  
Regulation 1-108/71
References
he aggregated data appear in more detail in table 3 from which it is possible to assess the case-load 
;fcrrcd or infringed against by the individual member states. For simplification reasons, table 3 
x s  not detail the case-load of each year, but periods of years:
T ab le  3: P re lim in a ry  R eferences a n d  In frin g em en t P rocedures on th e  basis o f R egulation 1408/71 
regard ing  Ind iv idual M em ber S tates:
1972-76 1977-81 1982-86 1987-91 1992-% 1997-2002 T o ta l
Germany 9(42,86% ) 16(27,59% ) 5  (10,42%) 18(28,13% ) 17(25% ) 21 (26,58%) 86(25,44% )
N etherlands 3 (14,29%) 11 (18,97% ) 15 (31,25%) 7(10,94% ) 12(17,65% ) 10(12,66% ) 58(17,16% )
Belgium 6 (28,57%) 22 (37,93% ) 18(37,5% ) 23 (35,94%) 23 (33,82% ) 18 (22,78%) 110 (32,54%)
U nited K ingdom 1 (4,76%) 6 (10 ,34% ) 2(4,17% ) 5 (7,81%) 6  (8,82%) 4 (5,06%) 24 (7,1%)
F ran ce 1 (4,76%) 3(5 ,1 7 % ) 7(14,58% ) 9(14,06% ) 4 (5,88%) 2 (2,53%) 26 (7,69%)
Ita ly 1 (4,76%) 1 (2,08%) 2(3,13% ) 1 (1,47%) 4 (5,06%) 9 (2,66%)
L uxem bourg 1 (1,47%) 4 (5,06%) 5(1,48% )
D enm ark 1 (1,47%) 1 (0,3%)
S pain 2 (2,94%) 5 (6,33%) 1 (2,07%)
G reece 1 (1,47%) 1 (1,27%) 2 (0,59%)
Sw eden 2 (2,53%) 2 (0,59%)
F in land 2 (2,53%) 2 (0,59%)
A u stria 6 (7,59%) 6(1,78% )
Total 21 (100%) 58 (100%) 48(100%) 64 (100,01V.) 68 (99,99%) 79 (99,98%) 338 (99,99%)
The information contained in table 3 is not divided between preliminary references, on the one 
hand, and infringement procedures on the other. As appears from appendix 1, only 15 infringement 
procedures have been referred by the Commission to the Court on behalf of 1408, within the 
analysed period. 6 procedures were against France, 5 against Belgium, 1 against the Netherlands. 1 
against Luxembourg, 1 against Greece and 1 against Germany. Monitoring implementation and 
compliance as regards to Regulation 1408 has primarily taken place through preliminary references, 
with migrants as litigants and national courts as questioning national policies or practices against 
Community law.
The results listed in table 3 indeed points to the fact that preliminary references as an instrument 
with which to question Community, as well as national law, vary between member states. To the 
extent that judicial clarifications have enhanced the effectiveness and uniformity of intra-European 
social security rights, such enhancement is only general if national courts and administrations 
subsequently accept the multilateral effect o f  a judgement. It is evident in the case of social security 
that, if the conclusions of a judgement do not impact beyond the individual lawsuit, as argued by 
Conant, the transforming effect o f preliminary references docs not reach equally across Europe. 
Preliminary references have primarily been raised by the national courts o f Belgium, Germany and
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the Netherlands, whereas countries such as Denmark, Greece, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and 
Portugal have only raised a very few -  or no -  references. Again focusing on Germany and 
Denmark, Germany scores second highest by number of references and infringement procedures 
with 86, whereas Denmark has only had one case referred. Whether this means that Community 
law, as clarified by judicial decision-making, impacts less on Danish welfare policies will be 
questioned and analysed in chapter VI and VII.
Such cross country differences in the reference patterns regarding coordination of social securin’ 
confirms Karen Alter's findings of the relatively high degree of litigiousness of German society. 
However, it should be added that societal litigiousness needs mediating institutional structures. One 
key difference between Denmark and Germany, when it comes to social security reference patterns, 
is that, whereas Germany has national social courts at local, land and federal level, Denmark has 
not. Denmark instead has an administrative social appeal authority. Appendix 2 concerns the cases 
referred by German national courts. The appendix lists the same information as appendix 1, but 
adds the national court which has referred the case, as wrell as listing the output of individual 
cases.48 It is evident that German social courts at all levels - as well as across time - have taken an 
interest in questioning Community and national law, thus, at times, enhancing intra-European social 
security rights. The existence and accessibility of social courts is likely to influence social 
litigiousness in society and thus, in part, to explain the variance in reference patterns.
German national courts have been essential for the enforcement of Community social security law. 
However, when comparing references on the background of the individual member states 
population sizes, Germany no longer stands out. Graph 4 below confirms the general pattern 
depicted in graph 2 above. The details of graph 4 are found in appendix 3, table 2:
4B Chapter VII will elaborate further on the information contained in appendix 2.
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G rap h  4: P re lim in ary  References m ade 1972-2002 concerning Regulation I4ÌIV7I pr. I. million people
in 13 m em ber states
Belgium, the Netherlands and recently Luxembourg have had most references pr inhabitant 
Compared on the basis of population size, the German number of references no longer stands out as 
for example Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Whether that mirrors lughlv litigiousness 
societies in the three latter countries, their institutional structure, or rclativclv higher non- 
compliance with Community obligations is for another comparative research project to detect The 
essence here is that, estimated on the basis of population si/c. German) faces no significant!) 
greater bottom up pressure to participate in the Community's legal svstem. as argued b> Alter and 
Conant (Alter 2000, p. 497; Conant 2001. p. 105). As a matter of fact, the greatest bottom up 
pressures arc faced by the Benelux countries. That, however, mav impact general!) if a binding 
precedent has. in effect, been established. The process-tracing stud) of die two-lav ers of 
institutionalisation to be carried out in the subsequent chapters will in part address this question
5.6: National Implementation -  the Second Layer o f Institutionalisation
Studies on domestic impact suggest implementation to be the national possibility of ‘come-back*, 
despite the fact that further integration may appear to have compromised national competencies. 
Implementation is an act of ‘governance* through which the effective meaning of an institution is 
established. As the reactive part of decision-making, it may limit the actual impact of 
institutionalisation or defer it. These impact studies point to the importance of national path 
dependencies, politicians and administrators, which do not automatically yield to European 
principles and obligations. National institutions and actors instead filter impact, and translate the 
need to adapt in accordance with national rules and practices.
That national implementation is crucial for the way European decisions are put into effect, suggests 
that institutionalisation is a two-layered process, which unfolds supranationally when rights arc 
continuously generated and clarified, and nationally when these arc put into effect, either to the 
letter, restriclively, or simply ignored. There is, however, more to the argument than, for example, 
has been suggested by Conant. Returning to the model built up for the analytical purpose of this 
thesis. Conant's argument on the limits of European law is mainly substantiated by national 
reactions of contained compliance. The argument is, however, not supported by incidents where 
member states, other than the litigant, implement the principles of a decision and accept its binding 
precedent or where member states collectively codify the ruling o f the Court by amending 
secondary legislation (stage 3, figure 3). The tracing of such political responses indeed 
demonstrates the effectiveness and reach of Community law. Such empirical findings would 
substantiate the argument that member governments gradually accept preliminary rulings as having 
erga omnes (generally binding) and ultra partes (beyond the parties) effect. That would seriously 
question the limits to European law, as pointed out by Conant (Conant 2002, pp. 63-65). 
Furthermore, the Conant argument is not supported by empirical findings which demonstrate that, 
over time, at a given point beyond stage 3, law may (re)interprct political constraints or its own 
established legal reasoning (beyond stage 3, figure 3). Examining the different ways that member 
states may comply or non-comply with ECJ rulings, most certainly requires both a short/medium 
term examination as well as a long-term one. In the long run. contained compliance or non- 
compliance should be addressed by the European legal system, thus clarifying anew the relation 
between national and European institutions.
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Disagreement is characteristic for empirical and theoretical research on the impact of European 
institutionalisation. Such disagreement appears to be determined by cross-country, cross-case and 
temporal variations. The effect and reach of European law and policies continue to be disputed. 
This thesis proposes to understand institutionalisation as a two-layered process of integration. That 
is, however, not to view the supranational layer as enhancing EU law and policies, at the same time 
as the national layer hinders its true effect. It is instead to understand institutionalisation as a 
repetitive process, where the national level accommodates rights and obligations generated 
supranational ly as far as possible in accordance with national rules and practices, but. at the same 
time, is also receptive to European integration and, for this reason, such rules and practices may 
become more EU-compatiblc over time. Institutionalisation, implementation and monitoring 
implementation make up reciprocal interpretation, redefining competencies, rights and obligations, 
which is likely to enhance gradually the effectiveness and domestic impact of European integration. 
As an outcome of this reciprocal interpretation, national policies may not converge, but change in 
various ways as a response to the same cause, i.e. European institutionalisation.
6.0: Concluding Remarks
By juxtaposing and discussing different theoretical interpretations, this chapter has aimed to 
substantiate why institutionalisation should be analysed as a two-layered process, through which a 
given institution emerges, evolves and establishes its effective meaning.
At the supranational level, institutionalisation occurs due to the relative autonomy of supranational 
organisations, the restricted time horizon of politicians as well as dynamic national preferences. 
Institutionalisation is furthermore intensified by the unintended consequences of collective 
decision-making and issue-density, facilitating spill-over between policy fields. At the same time as 
institutionalisation is conditioned and developed by actors and organisations, part of its evolution 
seems almost self-sustaining. These self-sustaining dynamics arc furthered by the fact that 
institutions arc seldom definitive, but need constant rewriting as their context is changed or 
interpreted as having changed, and as they are applied to new situations or policy-domains. The 
dynamics of institutionalisation is a result of a constant revelation or interpretation of the 
insufficiency of existing rules. Supranational institutionalisation compromises member 
governments' ability to control outcomes in the long run. and its progressive construction max- 
transfer competencies from the national to the supranational level of decision-making.
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However, institutionalisation is not shaped through intergovernmental and supranational decision- 
making alone. National implementation is the second layer of institutionalisation, establishing the 
effective meaning and impact of the institution. Studies of ‘Europeanisation’ place implementation 
as the second stronghold of national control. Implementation filters the institutional impact, for 
which reason supranational institutionalisation may not be equal to a corresponding administrative 
or policy change. At least in the medium run. it is a member state’s decision how to comply with 
Communin' obligations and decide whether a case has bilateral or multilateral effect. Accepting that 
supranational institutionalisation develops path dependently and thus, in a self-reinforcing way, is 
not the same as assuming that it will obliterate national patii dependencies. The latter are likely to 
continue to express their own legitimacy, robustness and resistance to change. However, either 
gradually, or more immediately, they may react to the adaptational pressure, and thus evolve along 
a new, more EU-compatible, branch. But since the integrative starting-point varies according to 
national institutions in place, cross-country outcomes along the path arc likely to van- equally. 
Different starting-points produce different outcomes. Change may take place as parallel, but not 
converging, processes.
The scheme below summaries the key arguments that provide the theoretical background for the 
subsequent analysis on institutionalisation of intra-European social security rights:
Tabic 4: A T w o-layered  Process of In te g ra tio n :
Institutional definition: Formal rules, compliance procedures & standard operating 
practices
Operationalised as the formal rule of Regulation 1408/7]
Institutions as both instruments and barriers, mediating as w ell as constraining the 
political and judicial integration process
Institutions affect and may transfonn the actor's reading of their own preferences. 
They create transparency, connect and shape change, through path dependent 
processes o f increasing returns
Must be analysed as historical phenomenons unfolding over time
»Characteristics o f institutions____________________________________________
Due to national interests
Due to a collective choice
To realise a Community objective
Social/functional demand due to increased transnational exchange
Institutional point o f departu re____________________________________________
The puzzle: that institutionalisation happens despite vague prescriptions and at times 
contrary to political preferences 
How:
•  Institutionalisation furthered by restricted time-horizons and dynamic preferences of 
national actors, unintended consequences o f collective decision-making and issue 
density
• Supranational organisations as mediators. Interpret and detail incomplete contracts.
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exert skilful actions and persistency. Protected from sanctions by thresholds and 
transnational constituencies.
* Transnational exchange, juridical activity and rule-production constitute and 
reconstitute the polity, create legal ‘spill-over' and further integration In between 
supranational organisations apply, interpret and clarify rules thus changing the 
context for subsequent actions.
• Dynamics of institutionalisation: a constant revelation of the insufficiency of existing 
rules. Constantly asked for, interpreted, clarified and rewritten. A path dependent 
process of increasing returns.
—*■ F irst layer establishing the effective m eaning o f  the Institution
Institutionalisation 
through the 
Interaction of Law 
and Politics
Legal autonomy emphasis:
•  Litigation as a key component for integration, teleological interpretation & binding 
precedent enhance the scope and content of Community law
• Politicians react reluctantly due to the mask of law; the opaque political and financial 
impact of legal decisions; the short time horizon of politicians: thresholds to sanction, 
only rarely the majority of member governments disagree with die legal 
interpretation; different impact and perceptions of impact of die legal decision — law 
and politics accord to different logics
Political power emphasis:
•  Political power and preferences (co)detcnnine legal decisions: the ECJ not an 
autonomous organisation but a responsive one — integrative dynamics are politically
sustained
• Various possible reactions to adverse legal decisions: i ) accept, ii ) evade, m ) apply 
restrictively, iv) propose legislative ovenulc or Treaty revision
—* Limits to Institutionalisation
—» First laver establishing the effective meaning of the institution
Adaptive Pressures 
and Impact on 
National Institutions
•  Adaptive pressures vary' according to national institutions in place According to die 
degree of compatibility* between European and national institutions
•  Member states largely control implementation
• Implementation as the reactive part of policy -making, transposing at times radier 
abstract rights into concrete enforceable ones
•  Impact varies across lime, according to national institutions, implementing traditions 
and procedures
•  Impact does not necessarily mean greater uniformity. nor convergence of national 
policies, but ‘adaptation with national colours'
•  National traditions, preferences and institutions as well as contained or non- 
compliance with judicial decision-making constitute hauls to institutionalisation
—*■ Second  layer  establish ing the effective m eaning of the institution
In the following chapters, the model to analyse institutionalisation as a two-layered process of 
integration and the theoretical propositions upon which it is derived, will be operationalised into 
practical research.
As in figure 2 above, the analysis initiates by investigating T(» -  the point of institutional creation 
The main analytical purpose of chapter III is to seek the historical and ideational context behind the 
adoption of Regulation 1408/71 in 1971, in order to explain institutional innovation.
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Chapter IV  and V then examine the supranational institutionalisation dynamics from T0, over Ti, up 
to the analytical T2. Figure 2 and 3 depict their part of these institutionalisation dynamics. As in 
figure 2, the regulation’s path dependent process from output to input will be traced. It will be 
analysed 'to what extent’ cross-border social security has been institutionalised, and 'how’ the 
effective institutional meaning is gradually established through intergovernmental negotiations, 
through the Commission's reformulating and re-proposing praxis and through the ECJ’s legal 
(re) interpretati on and (re)clarification. As in figure 3, the analysis will detail the many stages that 
make up institutionalisation as determined by the interplay o f law and politics. Where there is an 
important adverse legal decision, I will examine how the litigant government responded (stage 2) 
and subsequently how the other EU governments reacted towards the adverse decision (stage 3). 
The analysis will take certain decisions up to the point ‘beyond stage 3' to examine how path 
dependencies have unfolded over an extensive To -  T2. The analysis of institutional evolution, 
focusing on the dynamics of incremental change, is expected to demonstrate the importance o f the 
time-variable when investigating how politics and law respond to one another, and how 
supranational objectives, means and competencies may gradually be defined and redefined.
Chapter VI and VII analyse the second layer of institutionalisation -  the implementation of 
supranational decision-making at the national level. As depicted in figure 2 ,1 will analyse whether 
supranational institutionalisation exerts adaptive pressure on national institutions and how national 
actors and organisations perceive and respond to European decision-making. This analysis aims to 
lay down 'with what impact’ intra-European social security has been established. As in figure 3, the 
analysts will identify how national politics and administration react to an adverse decision by the 
ECJ. Empirically, the question whether the litigant government responds to the adverse ruling by 
compliance, i.e. by policy reform or change of administrative practice, by contained compliance, or 
by non-compliance (stage 2) will be traced. Furthermore, the question of how other governments, 
apart from the litigant respond to and eventually implement the principles generated in the adverse 
decision, by cither refusing its status as a binding precedent or by implementing the relevant parts 
of the decision, thus proving the multilateral effect of judicial decision-making (stage 3), will be 
analysed. Response and domestic impact will be traced over time, in order to investigate whether 
the analytical results concerning compliance and impact depend on the period of time investigated.
The following chapter initiates the analysis of the path to social security integration by tracing its 
historical and ideational raison d'être.
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Chapter III: On Institutional Creation
This chapter initiates the analysis of European social security integration by investigating the 
ideational and historical premises for the institutional creation of Regulation 1408/71 in To. In a 
theoretical perspective, the present chapter considers the context and origins of the path dependent 
process that institutionalised social security rights, and argues that an assessment of the scope and 
dynamics of the contemporary institution requires a reference to the past.
The purpose of the chapter is, first of all, to offer a brief introduction to Regulation 1408/71 and, 
next, to explore its raison d'etre, by laying down its purpose and historical origins. To explain why 
the Regulation was created in the first place, as well as to account for its subsequent 
institutionalisation can only be done through an examination of its purpose; the free movement of 
workers and later persons. This chapter, along with the following ones, highlight the strong issue- 
linkage betw een purpose and means, which, in part, explain both institutional innovation, as well as 
the dynamics of institutionalisation.
By exploring the origins of aim and means, the empirical analysis addresses theoretical propositions 
on institutional emergence. How and why w ere the institutions of free movement of workers and 
transnational social security adopted in the first place? Where they adopted as an outcome of 
converging national interests, thus supporting intcrgovcmmcntalist explanations? Or to realise a 
Community objective, thus moving beyond a strictly intergovernmentalist account? Or 
alternatively, out of a functional demand which mirrored increased movements between member 
states, as suggested by Stone Sweet's transnational exchange interpretation? To address the latter, 
the analysis will include statistical information of de facto movements between member states. The 
purpose of these statistical observations is to examine whether de facto movements explain
81
institutional creation as well as subsequent institutionalisation, or the aim and means emerge and 
develop in a rather detached manner.
In order to examine the institutional point of departure, this chapter is divided into five sections. 
Section l introduces the Regulation; its instrumental justification, its meaning, scope and main 
principles. Section 2 studies the path to free movement of workers and later persons, the purpose of 
European social security co-ordination. The section will explore the national interests behind the 
establishing of supranational rights, and how the institution of free movement has subsequently 
been furthered. Section 3 examines, on the basis of statistical information, how actual European 
migration has developed, while the liberalisation of free movement and cross border social security 
have been institutionalised, and investigates whether institutional emergence and institutionalisation 
happened as a function of actual migration. Section 4 analyses how Regulation 1408 emerged out of 
a historical context, from which it inherited principles and content, but left regulatory gaps open and 
thus raised questions which required future clarifications. Finally, section 5 concludes on the unique 
system of free movement and social security co-ordination, proposed, negotiated and approved over 
the past decades in the Community’.
1.0: Introduction to European S o cia l Security Coordination
European social security* coordination, as materialised in Regulation 1408/71, is a Community 
instrument in an extended chain of aims and means. One of the main purposes for establishing the 
common market, in which persons, goods, sendees and capital can circulate freely, is to allocate 
resources more efficiently (O'Leary 1999, p. 389). A reallocation of resources is assumed to 
improve the economy of the common market. Among those resources to be more efficiently 
allocated arc workers, who rank as a production factor just like each of the other fundamental 
freedoms.
From the foundation of the European Economic Community’ in 1957, the free movement of workers 
has been one of its cornerstones (Comelissen 1997, p. 29; Pcnnings 1998, p. 3). The legal basis for 
the Community pillar on free movement of workers is the Treaty's Article 39 (ex Article 48).49
Article 39 o f the Treaty’ of tire European Union reads as follows;
“1. Freedom o f movement for workers shall be secured within the Community.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition o f any discrimination based on nationality 
between workers o f the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of 
w ork arid employment.
3, It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds o f public policy, public security or 
public health:
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Co-ordination of the migrant worker's social security rights constitutes one of the main Community 
means of realising the basic freedom of workers and later persons (Pieters 1997, p. 177). The 
general purpose of Regulation 1408 is to stimulate intra-European migration by ensuring that 
movements across member state borders will not cause the loss o f or put into jeopardy social 
security entitlements.
The Community regulator)- framework, which was put in place to guarantee that migrant workers 
will not suffer negative effects in their social security rights by working abroad, is in secondary 
legislation constituted by Regulation 1408/71 and the implementing Regulation 574/72* 50. 
Furthermore, Regulation 1612/6851 entails a provision on the ‘‘social advantages" that the 
Community migrant worker is entitled to when working in another member state. Regulation 
1408/71 is the focus here, but brief reference will be made to the two other Regulations when it is 
considered to be analytically important.
1.1: Why is Co-ordination of Social Security Necessary?
Community coordination of social security rights has been regarded as necessary, because welfare 
generally is a restricted phenomenon, where the member states have traditionally limited their 
responsibility to their own citizens and/or own terri lory. National social security provisions thus 
entail territorial principles and discriminating rules, since social security policies generally were set 
up to deal with facts happening within national borders, or to grant rights to life-time members of 
the national community (Pcnnings 1998, p. 5). These historically embedded boundaries of welfare 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter VI. Such limitations in the set of national rules hinder 
cross border mobility of w orkers.
(a) to accept oilers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory o f Member States for this purpose:
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing 
the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, Regulation or administrative action:
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member Stale after having been employed in that State, subject to 
conditions which shall be embodied in implementing Regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employ ment in the public service".
50 Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of the Council o f 21 March 1972, laying down the procedure lor implementing 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employ ed persons, to self-employ ed 
persons and to members o f their families moving within the Community; as amended bv Regulation (EC) 118/97 of the 
Council o f2.12.1996 (0.1 L 28 of 30.01.1997).
51 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement o f workers within the 
Community (OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, p. 2). Article 7 (2) of Regulation 1612 is the provision on "social advantages".
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The necessity for the Community to co-ordinate social security rights among its member states was 
recognised by the authors of the Treaty of Rome and, in part, already by the Treaty of Paris. The 
free movement of workers was enshrined in Article 48 (now Article 39) and Article 51 (now Article 
42), which required the Council to take the necessary measures regarding social securin’. Article 42 
emphasises the close link between free movement of workers and coordination o f social security 
rights (Hichenhofer 2001, p. 60). Article 42 o f the Treaty of the European Union reads as follows; 
“The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, adopt such measures in the 
field o f  social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers: to this end, it shall make 
arrangements to secure for migrant w orkers and their dependants:
a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating tire amount of 
benefit, o f all periods taken into account under the law s of the several countries;
b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories o f Member States.
The Council shall act unanimously throughout the procedure referred to in Article 251".
1.2: Treaty Basis and Geographical Scope of 1408
The preambles of the various amendments of Regulation 1408/71 always refers to Article 42 of the 
Treaty’. In addition, the explanatory' memorandums often make reference to the Treaty 's Article 252 *, 
stating the wide spectrum of the Community's social, economic and cultural tasks, and to Article 12 
(ex Article 6) on the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality’. Furthermore, 
amendments of the Regulation have, since 1981, been adopted through the use of the Treaty's 
Article 30855 (ex Article 235), thus constituting the Regulation's legal basis in conjunction with 
Article 42 (Pieters 1997, pp. 182-183). Article 308 allows the Council to adopt measures beyond 
those where the Treaty’ has provided the necessary powers. The continuous use, since 1981, of the 
rather controversial provision 308 has been fundamental to the development of Regulation 1408. On 
the one hand, it has provided the Regulation with a certain flexibility, making it extendable to new 
situations, but has, on the other hand, raised questions on the scope and limits o f Community 
competencies. This controversy will be demonstrated in the analysis o f the subsequent chapters.
52 As in accordance with the case-law’, Article 2 o f the Treaty has no direct effect.
5> The Treaty’s Article 308 reads as follows: “If  action by the Community shall prove necessary' to attain, in the course
of the operation of the common market, one o f the objectives o f the Community and this Treaty has not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal front the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament, take the appropriate measures".
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Article 42 lays down two important procedural features for chancing the coordination rules. 1) that 
it can only be done by unanimity in the Council and, 2) that it is done with the co-decision of the 
Parliament as referred to in Article 251 (ex Article 189b) of the Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
has in 1997 extended the role of the Parliament from co-operation to co-decision. These decision­
making rules make up the thresholds to amend the Regulation.
Since the entry into force of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) on tire P* of 
January 1994. Regulation 1408/71 also applies to the nationals of Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein (Schulte 2000, p. 144). This means that the rights entailed in the Regulation applies to 
18 states.54
Furthermore, the Regulation reaches beyond the territorial borders of those 18 states. Rights 
acquired, for example, in an cx-colonv of a member state arc co-ordinated by the Regulation, if a 
member state's legislation grants those rights. This means that it is the link between the person and 
the social security scheme which defines the territorial scope of the Regulation, and not the concrete 
borders of the 18 EEA states. It is not where the occupational actiwty is earned out which makes 
the Regulation applicable, but under which social security scheme rights arc acquired (Pennings 
1998. pp. 33-37). The question of the Regulation's geographical scope has been settled by the case- 
law of the European Court of Justice.1
1.3: What Does Co-ordination Mean?
Neither the Treaty's Article 42, nor Regulation 1408. entail a staled definition of co-ordination'. In 
addition, the case-law of the Court has not given a precise definition of the main concept, but has 
related the concept to the fact that the Regulation leaves it up to the member state to determine the 
type and content of a benefit (Pennings 1998. p. 8). In the ease 1/78 Kenny, the Court did. howcx er. 
touch upon a definition, which to date remains the interpretative line (Nielsen ct al 1997. p 127. 
note 248)." The judgment came close to a definition of co-ordination, by positocly outlining the 
national legislator's competencies:
" . . .  it is for the national legislation to lay down the conditions for lbo acquisition. retention. Io>s or suspension of 
the right to social security benefits so long as those conditions apply without discrimination to the nationals of the 
member stales concerned and to those of other member stales"* (para. 16 of the judgement l
M Since this study analyses the institutionalisation over time of Regulation 1-lux. and thus begins a long time before ns 
extension to the EEA, it will not distinguish between EU and EI A. but siniph refer the geographical seojn: as to the 1 C 
or EU and to nationals from tire European Community or Union.
The above quotation suggests that the rules of the national schemes are left intact by ‘co­
ordination’. The distinct features of the various national social security schemes remain, and 'co­
ordination', as the more neutral or negative form of integration, does not interfere in the 
competence of the national legislator to decide who is to be insured; which benefits are to be 
granted; under what conditions; how many contributions should be paid; how benefits should be 
calculated; and for hew long they should be granted (Schulte 2000, p. 148; Comelisscn 1997, p. 31; 
Eichcnhofer 1996, p. 4). At the other pole of the continuum of integrative methods stands 
‘harmonisation', which would require positive integration, and thus involve direct change in 
national legislation to abolish differences.
However, the exact border between the concepts of ‘coordination' and 'harmonisation' is far from 
being a given, but leaves a large interpretive scope for the Community organisations to fill out. 
Regulation 1408 does not aim to ‘harmonise’ national social security schemes, but those same 
schemes must not hinder the overall objective o f the free movement of workers. In practice, it 
remains clear that the concepts o f 'co-ordination* and ‘harmonisation* are more closely connected 
than it appears at first sight (Pieters 1997, p. 187). It remains clear that 'coordination* is not a pure 
technicality, but rather an intervening policy tool (Christensen & Malmslcdt 2000, p. 14). It could 
be argued that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality challenges or even hinders 
the national legislator's autonomous competence to decide on the personal scope of a given social 
security scheme. Furthermore, the Community provision on the exportability of benefits challenges 
the national autonomous competence to decide the spatial reach of social security benefits. The 
analysis in chapter IV and V bclcnv will illustrate that concepts and competencies are fluid ones, 
which is mirrored in the changing scope of Regulation 1408.
1.4: The Co-ordinated Personal and Material Scope
The personal scope of Regulation 1408 has also undergone a gradual, but continual development. 
From entitling only the worker ‘stricto sensu’, i.e., the market citizens55, to cross-border w elfare, 
the personal scope has been incrementally expanded to the point where the Regulation this year
55 The concept of "market citizen’, as it is used here, refers to one who exercises economic activity (Shaw 1997b). 
Among others, a market citizen is the w orker 'stiicto sen.su', i.e., one with a contract of employment. The European 
market citizen is one production factor among three others; goods, services and capital, whose free movement is one of 
lire constituting pillars of the internal market. Tims the notion of "market citizen’ may be used as a contrast to ‘European 
citizen*. The former refers to a status where market participation releases provisions or legal rights. As a contrast, the 
latter has entitlements without necessarily being an active market participant (Everson 1995, p. 84).
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will extend to all European citizens and indeed, where legally residing third country nationals 
have recently been included in its personal scope. The development is thus a specific reflection 
of the general development from economic community to political union. The current personal 
scope of the Regulation has been settled through a detailed legal-political dialogue, consisting of 
piecemeal judicial interpretations, Commission proposals and the Council's codification thereof.
January 2004 marks the forthcoming and perhaps most remarkable extension of Regulation 
1408/71 *s personal scope, and thus temporarily closes the long-running history of defining those 
with a right to cross border social security. On 26 January' 2004, the Council unanimously 
adopted a common position on the amendment proposal COM (98) 779, and hereby agreed that 
all nationals of member states covered by the social security legislation of a member state shall 
be part of Regulation 1408's personal scope.56 This means that not only employed workers, self- 
employed workers, civil servants, students and pensioners but also non-activc persons are to be 
protected from the coordination rules, Furthermore, as of 1 June 2003, nationals from third 
countries as well as their family members and survivors, prov ided that they are legal residents in 
the territory' of a Member State and that they have moved between member states, are covered by 
the Regulation.57 Although, on the face of it the inclusion of third country nationals marks 
another, remarkable, step tow ards a generalised personal scope irrespective of nationality, the 
practicable rights of third country nationals arc much more restricted, since they lack the 
underlying right of free movement.
1408/71 cov ers a very extensive range of material benefits, originally applying to all national social 
security legislation on (a) illness and maternity; (b) invalidity benefits: (c) old-age pensions; (d) 
surviv ors' benefits: (c) occupation-related accidents and disease; (f) death grants; (g) unemployment 
benefits: (h) family benefits. That is, the original material scope of the Regulation entailed the 8 
traditional social security forms, as defined by the 1LO in its conv ention 102. Since it was originally 
laid down, the substantive scope has been extended on the basis of developments in national social 
security legislation. Regulation 1408’s own premises and its Treaty base. Furthermore, by the
^  COM (2004) 44 filial, by 27 January 2004. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
concerning Uie common position of the Council on the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament ami of the 
Council, on the coordination of social security systems.
As laid down by Council Regulation (EC) No 859/2003 of 14 May 2003 extending the provisions of Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 mid Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 to nationals o f third countries who are not ahead) covered b\ 
those provisions solely on the ground o f their nationality.
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Council's recently adopted common position, the material scope will be extended to cover also 
statutory' pre-retirement schemes.58
Held outside the material scope o f the Regulation are 1) social and medical assistance and 2) 
benefits granted to victims of war and their consequences.
The gradual development and clarification of 1408’s personal and material scope will be analysed 
in detail in chapter IV and V below.
1.5: The Main Principles of Regulation 1408
Regulation 1408/71 is organised around a set of main principles, the added aim of which is to 
promote free movement. Four main principles seek to transcend the Treaty objective into secondary 
legislation, which again are to be implemented in national policies and practices.
• The principle o f  non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, which is concretely expressed in 
Article 3 of the Regulation and Article 12 of the Treaty'. The principle applies without 
exception.
• The principle o f  exportability\ Acquired rights are exportable within the geographical scope of 
the Regulation. The principle is expressed by Article 42 of the Treaty and mirrored in Article 10 
of the Regulation.
• The principle o f  aggregation. Social security rights earned in one state is added to rights earned 
by working next in another state. The principle is formulated in the Treaty-'s Article 42.
• The principle o f  pro-raterisation. The Regulation grants right to a pro-rata share if the 
benefician' has not worked long enough, lived long enough or been insured long enough in one 
member state to receive the full social security- benefit.
By institutionalising the principle o f non-discrimination and exportability-, the Community- co­
ordination o f social security- effects the core o f traditional national welfare organisation. By an ever 
generous interpretation of the principle o f non-discrimination, the Court has expanded the concept 
of who has the right to enjoy equal treatment along with a member state's own nationals. 
Simultaneously, the same generous interpretation means that the individual member state's welfare 
system is restricted from favouring their own citizens when granting social security- benefits. The
58 COM (2004) 44 final. See endnote 56 above.
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evolution of the Community principle of equal treatment, as mirrored in Article 3 of Regulation 
1408. will be analysed in chapter IV below.
The principle o f  exportability challenges the traditional territorial boundedness of social security. At 
the national level, the principle of territoriality has been a organising principle in social security law 
and policy, allowing the member states to use a territorial element in defining the scope of a social 
security scheme, and in setting the qualifying conditions (Comelisscn 1996, p. 441; Huster 1999, p. 
10). Unlike the principle of non-discrimination, exportability is not an absolute principle. Bcncfits- 
in-kind can still be territorially demarcated without contradicting Community law (Haverkatc & 
Huster 1999, p. 123). The case-law of the Court, clarifying the scope of the principle of 
exportability, has however been criticised for eroding the principle of territoriality on a general 
basis (Altmaicr 1995, p. 71). The Court's interpretations of the principle of exportability show that 
there is no clear distinction between benefits-in-cash and in-kind. In its jurisprudence, the Court has 
continually held that the true nature of a benefit is defined by its content and function, and not by its 
classification in national legislation. Chapter V will analyse to what extent social security benefits 
have been dc-tcrritorialised as a consequence of Community law.
Another ruling principle of 1408/71 is that o f Vex loci laboris ’ or 'the place of work principle'. In 
order to avoid a conflict of law59 in die situation where a person works in one member state, but 
resides in another, the legislation that applies, in general, is that of the work state. The work state 
designates one's rights, irrespective of the place of residence. The principle o f ‘lex loci laboris’ is 
expressed in the Articles 13-17 of the Regulation. To choose the legislation of the work state as the 
applicable one. was a rather natural choice when negotiating both Regulation 1408 and its 
predecessor. Regulation no. 3. When both Regulations were adopted, most of the social security 
legislation o f the 6 signatory member states was clearly Bismarckian oriented (Pieters 1997, p. 190; 
Comelisscn 1997. p. 35). To choose ‘lex loci laboris' as the general rule was a way of solving the 
question of allocative responsibility, since social security costs in this way are borne by the state 
where one works, and thus contributes to the economy. The Community co-ordination system has 
remained faithful to the “Bismarcian notion of social security", although the Union now consists of 
activity and residence based social security systems (van Rapenbusch 1996. p. 81).
‘w A negative conflict of law characterises a situation where no law is applicable. A positive conflict of law, a situation 
w here more than one legislation is applicable (Pennings 1998, p. 82).
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As a last principle to be mentioned here, is the Petroni60principle or the principle of favourability.1“ 
Expressed in a simplified form, the principle dictates that co-ordinating member states legislations 
must not result in a worse situation for the migrant, than if only national legislation applied (Pieters 
1997b, p. 185). In the Petroni case, the Court concluded;
'‘The aim o f Articles 48 to 51 would not be attained if, as a consequence o f the exercise o f their right to freedom of 
movement, workers were to loose advantages in the field of social security guaranteed them in any event by the 
laws o f  a single Member State" (para. 13 o f the judgement).
1.6: Institutional Characteristics
The institutional characteristics, as summed up above, make up the contemporary scope and limits 
of Regulation 1408. The institutional identity of Regulation 1408 originates as an instrument with 
which to realise the free movement for workers. Its function is not to harmonise the social security 
policies of the member states, nor to interfere directly in the national competence to design its own 
welfare policies, but to co-ordinate those policies in a more neutral way. As supranational principles 
gain precision through integrative dynamics, the regulatory’ scope o f  1408 has been extended and 
co-ordination appears as being far more than a neutral method of coordination, but in fact as an 
intervening policy tool. After all, the hierarchy between Community objectives and national policies 
is clear; the former are supreme. The aim to be achieved, the free movement of workers and later 
persons, undergoes its own separate institutionalisation process, to which the evolving character of 
Regulation 1408 is closely linked. Due to the causal link between aim and means, the emergence, 
evolution, and institutional status quo of the objective will now be discussed.
2.0: Free M ovem ent of Workers/Persons
The formal liberalisation of free movement of persons in Europe has a long historical background. 
It was initiated as a rather unilateral Italian effort to open up foreign labour markets for its own 
unemployed: and proceeded as a complex of bilateral agreements which favoured the need of the 
host state; it became multilateral as it allowed for a restricted circulation of workers of proven 
qualification; later it became a supranational guaranteed right to free movement for workers; and 
finally transcended incrementally into free movement for the self-providing European citizen.
M Case 24/75, 21. October 1975. Teresa et Silvam  Petroni v Office national des pensions pour travailleurs salariés 
(OXPTS), Bruxelles. ECR 1975, p. 1149.
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This section traces how the institution of free movement was put in place, the interests behind it, the 
context from which it emerged and how it has subsequently evolved. That is, this section aims to 
identily the ideational context of Regulation 1408/71, by depicting, in brief, the institutionalisation 
process that the free movement of workers/persons has undergone. Although, Regulation 1408 
clearly gains a life of its own as institutionalisation proceeds, many of its progressive steps 
furthering cross border welfare are justified by its objective: to ensure or promote the free 
movement of workers/persons. Historically, and in the present, we are dealing with two interlinked 
processes of change.
2.1: The Era of “Bilaterally Organised Interdependence”
European labour migration is far from being a new phenomenon. International migration in the 19lh 
century not only consisted of European workers heading for opportunities in the United States, but 
migration within Europe also took place at the same. Out of the I5 million Italians who migrated 
between 1876 and 1920, 6.8 million went to another European country. This early European 
migration then decreased between 1914 and 1945, due to the two w orld w ars and their economic 
consequences (Holloway I98l,pp. 227-229).
Nor is European legislation on free movement for workers a process exclusively linked to the 
European Community. Bilateral agreements between individual countries became the early 
regulatory modus. From the beginning of large scale migration till the 1960s. Italy was the main 
labour exporting country in Europe, and the Italian governments were strong advocates for the 
liberalisation of w orkers' movement in Europe. According to the work of Romero, the position of 
the Italian governments was based on national interests, attempting to give its unemployed assess to 
the European labour market, thereby easing domestic social tension and, at the same time, getting 
hold of foreign currency (Romero 1993). This Italian advocacy reflected a convergence in domestic 
political, social and economic interests.
In 1946, Italy signed bilateral agreements with France, Belgium. Switzerland, the UK and 
Luxembourg (Romero 1993, p. 39). The bilateral agreements were, however, formulated very much 
in favour o f the labour importing countries. The agreements only welcomed a certain type of 
workers, and granted them only a temporal stay. The foreign workers were not supposed to settle in 
the inviting country, but rather to fill in cyclical gaps (Romero 1993. p. 50). Given the rather 
unpredictable content of the bilateral agreements, Italy was much in favour of a multilateral
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Regulation of free movement (Holloway 1981, p. 254). Post-war Europe, however, lacked both the 
willingness and, perhaps even more importantly an effective organizational structure to regulate 
multilaterally the access to national labour markets.61
With the negotiations of the Treaty of Paris, Italy got a potential frame for the multilateral 
Regulation of free movement. Italy argued that an integrated market should entail a complete 
liberalisation of the coal and steel labour markets of the six member states. The Italian viewpoints 
were, however, not supported. The Benelux countries were not interested in increased mobility, and 
France and Germany would only accept mobility for a few and highly qualified workers. Art. 69 of 
the Paris Treaty came to reflect the restrictive French -  German position, committing the member 
states to lift employment restriction based on nationality for workers with “proven qualification' 
(Romero 1993, pp. 42-43). Apart from Italy, the governments were not willing to give up national 
immigration control. In the mid-1950s, the socio-economic context seemed to favour the Italian 
preferences. Unemployment had generally decreased and, in 1955, Italy signed a migration 
agreement w ith the Federal Republic of Germany. The era of what Romero has termed "bilaterally 
organised interdependence" had thus culminated with the agreement between the main labour 
exporting and the main labour importing country (Romero 1993, p. 49). Italy could focus its 
multilateral ambitions on the negotiations of the Common market, w hich began in 1955.
2.2: The Initial Supranational Steps
Article 69 of the Paris Treaty was the first, somewhat timid, step taken at Community level to 
allow for worker mobility. The background to it wras an actual migration between the six member 
states of about half a million workers62, and the Italian government’s attempts to make the new 
multilateral organisation commit itself to the free movement of its workers. The right of mobility 
qua Article 69 was, however, a much restricted one, only given to workers of proven qualification, 
thus from early on reflecting the economic purpose of free movement. As noted by O'Keeffe, the 
right of the free mover w as, from its earliest provisions, a deconstructed one. only conferred on 
someone engaged in the economic process (O'Keeffe 2000, p. 20).
61 From the foundation o f the OF.EC in 1948, Italy tried to include liberalisation of migration on the agenda. France and 
the United Kingdom, however, opposed granting the young international organisation such important competence
(Romero 1993, p. 42).
62 Straubhaar(1988), w hich will be discussed in more detail in section 3 below.
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The Italian — German bilateral agreement on cross-border mo\cmcnt of 1 ‘>55 shows that Article 6(v 
was far from sufficient in a context where economic growth and decreasing unemployment 
favoured a greater degree of worker mobility-. The negotiations on the Treats of Rome became the 
next multilateral platform upon which Italy could push for its ambitions on European mobility 
When the objectives of the common market were initially discussed at the Messina conference in 
May 1955, the resolution adopted obliged the committee to work for a ’ gradual establishment of 
the free circulation of manpower”. In the subcommittee on social issues. Italy argued for a quick 
and complete free movement, where the unemployed would also be entitled to look for work in 
other member states. The other member states, however, held that circulation of labour should be 
decided by demand, and free movement should only- be a long-term goal, llic indmdual stages of 
yvhich needed to be carefully negotiated. The restrictive viewpoints on demand-decided migration 
were later challenged in the Spaak report of May 1956. The Spaak report seemed to support the 
Italian position, vicyving unemployment as a potential resource for European economic growth, and 
that therefore national labour markets should be opened up and integrated
The Federal Republic of Germany was behind the final compromise. Germany increasingly needed 
foreign labour, and thus favoured more flexible conditions for migration At the same time, it did 
not wish to give up extensive national control, and so circulation yyas still to be demand-induced 
Against this background, the six member states agreed to reduce their barriers on entry and 
residence for Community yvorkers over a 12-year transition period (Romero 19').\ pp 52-54) 
Article 48 in the Rome Treaty became die provision in primary legislation, yyInch granted free 
movement for workers and obligated the member slates to rcmo\c the parts of national legislation 
yvhich discriminated on the basis of nationality.
Actual free movement for workers yvas institutionalised by the adoption, in |W*X. of Regulation 
1612/68 and the directive 68/36063. on the abolition of restrictions on workers’ moyernent (Carher 
& Vcnvilghcn 2000, p. 7). Free movement, as adopted in 1968. had been gradually approached 
towards by the admittance of three successive regulations in 1961. 1964 and 1968. where 1612'68 
was the culmination of a rather long process which gradually reduced national restrictions on 
labour entry- and settlement (Holloyvay 1981. p. 264) 6,4 That it look 11 \cars to put the rights
63 Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the uhohiinn olTestnctions on mountcnt and icmJcik.c within 
the Community for workers of Member States and (heir families i OJ 1.257.lu |u |o<,x. p I ’ i
w The tyvo predecessors o f  Regulation 1612/68 were Regulation l>/ol of It»'* Angus! I‘«*l and Regulation 
vyhich entered into force Mav 196-4.
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granted by the Rome Treaty into secondary legislation, illustrates that the conversion from Treaty 
objective to secondary legislation was a complex matter, calling on a difficult compromise of 
national prerogatives.65 Dahlberg has described this troublesome negotiation process, which was 
difficult for the Commission to steer. He argues that the Commission's final achievement, among 
other factors, was supported by the fact that Italy politically backed almost all the Commission's 
proposals on the matter, and that the economic conditions of that time favoured labour circulation. 
The Commission proved capable of using these favourable conditions skilfully in order to realise 
its policy objective (Dahlberg 1968, p. 331).
In 1970, the next institutional step concerning free movement and residence came about. With 
directive 1251/7066, workers and their family members were granted the right to remain in the host 
state after having worked there.67 In 1974, the self-employed and their family members got the 
same right, with directive 75/3468 (Grevc 2000, p. 192). •
2.3:... And the Subsequent Ones
A general right of residence for all member state citizens was from early on on the Community 
agenda. At the Paris Summit of the heads of government in 1974, an intra-Community right of 
residence, independent from the exercise of economic activity, was discussed. Five years later, the 
Commission adopted its directive proposal on a general right of residence to be admitted on the 
basis of Article 235 of the Treaty. The Council of Ministers did, however, not agree on die 
proposal, which remained pendent in its general formulation for a decade. To get the Council to 
approve, the Commission apparently changed strategy in 1989, and separated the general proposal 
on free movement into three individual proposals with the respective categories of students, retired 
persons and economically inactive persons. The separation into individual groups made adoption *6
However, free movement came in place before the agreed deadline o f 12 years. Article 48 of the Treat) of Rome laid 
down that free movement should be secured bv tlie end of a transitional period, at the latest running until January 1970 
(Cartier 2000, p. 44).
w Regulation (EEC) 1251 /70 o f the Commission of 29 June 1970 on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a 
Member State after having been employed in that State (OJ L 142 of 30.06.1970, p. 24).
6 The directive did, however, not grant the right to remain in a member state unconditionally. The person wishing to 
remain should have stated at least three t ears in the member state, have the age for receiving an old age pension, and 
have worked at least 12 months in that state (Greve 2000, p. 192).
^  Council Directive 75/34/EEC of 17 December 1974 concerning the right o f nationals o f a Member State to remain in 
the temtoiv o f another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a self-emploved capaeitv (OJ L 14 of 
20.01.1975, p. 10).
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possible and. on the basis of Article 235 of the Treat), the dirccii\cs were approv cd b> the Council 
on June 1990 (O Leary 1999b. p. 381)69 Although it had proved troublesome for the Commission 
to get the Council to approve the general right of residence, the approval merely codified a 
development which had already been laid down by the Court In successive case-law. the Court had 
extended the right to free movement far beyond the worker ’stricto sensu’, as will be demonstrated 
in chapter IV section 2.2, and thus prepared the terrain for political codification It can thus be 
argued that the residence directives was foremost a symbolic, political confirmation of the prev i o u s .  
legally established precedent.
Intergovernmental negotiations did. howev er, not make the right to reside in other member states 
unconditional. Today, the conditions entailed in the three residence directives arc still intact 
Member states are allowed to deny a residence permit if a person docs not have sufficient means to 
provide for her/himsclf, or does not have health insurance for the entire family The aim is to avoid 
the situation whereby a citizen of another member state becomes a burden to the social security 
systems of the host state, to which system he may never have contributed The directives leav c it up 
to the member states to define the level of "sufficient means", but suggest that if the migrant has 
means higher than that which gives right to social assistance, then these should be considered 
"’sufficient" (Grevé 2000, p. 193).
1990 thus marks the year in which the right to settle down in a preferred member state was 
generalised by political agreement after decades of negotiations and legal clarification However, 
the conditions of the residence directives divide European citizens mto two categories of persons 
Workers, self-employed and those providing services hold rights directly under the Treats and can 
move freely The residence rights of students, pensioners and the non-active depend on their ability 
to provide financially for themselves (O’Keeffe 2000. p. 24)
In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the notion of European citizenship, and Article U <c\ 
Article 8a) now grants every citizens of the Union the right to move and reside freely within the 
member stales. Nevertheless, that right is still "subject to the limitations and conditions" laid down
** The three residence directives are Council Directive *X)/364/ITC of 2S June on the ne hi of ro id ak e  iOj I |sn. 
13.7.1990, p. 26): Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June I91K) on the right of rcMJence lor emphwevs and >elf- 
employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity iOJ I. ISO. 137 1‘nm.p 2S unJ '* rtoo ) l C of 2S June 
1990 on the right o f residence for students. The Court did. how ever, not accept Anic le 2'5 I teatv Kims lor MnJenu 
and annulled the directive in 1992. The directive was amended to W io/11C of 2'» October t*'*'’ itM 1 ’ P . of 
18.12,1993. p. 59), without that its content was changed apart from some more technical a>[wt> il 1 ’-Kamov p 
272, note 12).
in the Treaty and in secondary legislation, i.e. in the residence directives (Langer 2000, p. 38). In 
practical terms, the new notion has not broken the link between economic means and mobility and 
has been argued to add nothing new, because it relies on a formalistic definition (Shaw 1997b).70
Whereas Union citizens can be divided in two categories with different sets of rights, third country 
nationals, legally residing in a member state, stand as the excluded category upon which no 
Community rights to free movement are conferred, unless they come from a family of a 
Community worker. Whereas legally residing third country nationals have recently been granted 
the right to coordinated social security, they lack the underlying right of free movement (Peers 
2002; Martinsen 2003). Regulation no. 859/2003, which extends 1408 to non-Community 
nationals, even highlights that it does not cover the situation ‘'which is confined in all respects 
within a single Member State”. At the same time as actions have been taken to reduce the barriers 
to free movement based on nationality within the Community, nationality as an assess point from 
which to be granted rights is as important as ever. The special -  or deprived -  status of third 
country’ nationals will be discussed further in chapter IV.
2.4; From Restricted Labour Circulation to the Free Movement of Persons
The entry’ and residence rights of the free mover no longer precariously depend on the temporary- 
labour demand in the host state and the negotiating skills o f the state of origin, but have been 
improved into a right o f free movement for all European citizens, who by work, means or family 
status can maintain themselves.
Italian persistence managed to bring the issue o f worker circulation to the negotiation table; first 
bilaterally, then supranationally. Formulated in the Rome Treaty as a main Community aim. the 
Commission took over the issue in an entrepreneurial fashion (Dahlberg 1968). Having completed 
the process that allowed for the free movement for workers in 1968, the Commission proposed a 
general right of entry’ and residence as early as 1974. The proposal, however, had to wait for 16 
years before unanimity was reached by the Council, granting the conditional right of free movement 
to the European citizen. In the meantime, the Court contributed with proactive interpretations.
"° Shaw points to the uncertain boundaries o f European citizenship, which either relies on the formalistic definition in 
Article 8 o f the Treaty (now Art. 17) or as defined by the contours of rights attached to European citizenship. Shaw 
emphasises that EU citizenship remains a figure developed in a transnational market context, and therefore in essence 
still refers to the concept o f 'market citizenship' (Shaw 1997b).
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From bilaterally organised interdependence, to supranationallv guaranteed free movement for 
workers and later persons, institutionalisation of free movement has emerged and evolved by small 
institutional steps. The process stands out as a slowly and carefully negotiated one, where only the 
persistency of the national actor, subsequently followed up by Commission insistency and legal 
clarification, brought a proposal from early agenda-setting to late approval. Whereas 
intergovemmcntalist interpretations of converging national interests may explain institutional 
emergence, subsequent institutionalisation was, from early on, furthered by supranational 
organisations.
In both dc facto and de jure terms, significant barriers to intra-European mobility still exist. 
Although legal liberalisation has extended rights far beyond its original limits, decisive economic 
conditions must still be fulfilled. As a matter of fact, the analysis below demonstrates that the 
Community's institutionalisation of free movement -  and coordination of social security rights - has 
not significantly spurred actual intra-European mobility. Extra-legal barriers remain decisive.
3.0: De Facto Intra-European Migration
It could be hypothesised that the institutionalisation of free movement has happened as a function 
of, or as a response to, growth in European cross-border movement. Such a hypothesis corresponds 
to Stone Sweet ct al.'s theoretical assumption that transnational exchange creates a functional 
demand for dispute resolution and rule production, thus furthering institutionalisation. However, the 
examination of European migration in absolute and relative figures, carried out below, points out 
that the most significant grow th in intra EC mobility happened between the six original member 
states when the issue of the liberalisation of labour movement was still on the negotiation table.
This section discusses, in statistical terms, actual intra-European migration for almost four decades. 
In order to illustrate the migrators* background upon which the Community institutions of free 
labour movement, as well as Regulation 1408, were first put in place and the earls context for 
further institutionalisation. Straubhaar's data on intra EC-6 migration for the scars I960, 1968, 
1974, and 1984 are considered. Eurostat's annual scries on intra EU-15 migration for the period 
1985-98 is then described in order to get the more recent statistical information on intra-European 
migration. Both sources of information mirror the dc facto context upon svhich institutional creation 
and further institutionalisation of free movement and co-ordination of social security rights have 
taken place.
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3.1: Migratory Pattern in Post War Europe
In his study on the economics of international labour migration, Straubhaar analyses migration 
flows between 1960 and 1984 from Southern to Northern Europe. On the basis of statistical 
material, he divides the migratory pattern into post-war Europe in four phases. The first phase took 
place right after the war, where refugees migrated from Eastern Europe to Germany and the 
Benelux countries. In the same period, France and the Netherlands received immigrants from their 
former colonies. The second phase, between 1955 and the early 1960s, was characterised by 
migration within the European Economic Community and within the Nordic countries. Italy w as the 
main provider of immigrant workers moving north (Straubhaar 1988, p. 53).71 The third phase ran 
until the first oil price shock of 1973. The northern directed movement of workers from Southern 
Europe continued, but Italians w ere increasingly joined by Portuguese, Greek and Spanish w orkers. 
How ever, the period w as also characterised by increased immigration, especially from Turkey and 
Yugoslavia. The fourth phase, from 1973 to 1984, fundamentally changed the post war tendency of 
gradual liberalisation of labour market assess. As a reaction to the oil price shock and rising 
unemployment, the receiving countries stopped recruitment policies and, instead, installed other 
measures to restrict further the inflow of foreign labour (Straubhaar 1988, pp. 53-58). Due to the 
free movement principle which had been implemented in the European Community in the 
meantime, such restricting measures were, however, solely directed towards third countries.
3.2: The Figures of EC-6 Migration 1960-1984
In another study72, Straubhaar focuses specifically on the case of the European Community, 
questioning whether migration between the original six member states increased as a result of the 
legal liberalisation of the free movement of workers. He compares the number of Community 
migrant workers living in the EC of six member states before the Regulation on free mov ement, 
w ith the number o f Community migrant worker afterwards. The key years which he compares arc 
1960, 1968, 1974, and 1984. In order to decide whether the legal liberalisation stimulated intra- 
Community migration, Straubhaar compares the variation in immigration from another member 
state with the variation in immigration from outside the Community, arguing that: *98
1 Besides the movement o f Italians to northern Europe, in tra-European movement was characterised by movements 
between neighbouring countries; front the Netherlands to the Ruhr-district in Germany, from Southeast I-rance to 
Southwest Germany, from Belgium to the Netherlands and France, and from Finland to Sweden (Straubhaar 1988, p. 
53; 1988b, pp. 50-51).
: The studv is based on Eurostat data and data from national statistical offices.
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“If the number of migrants of Community countries working in other member countries has increased faster than 
the number of migrants coming from non-EC countries, this would suggest that the formation of the EC has 
stimulated the intra EC-migration flows5’ (Straubhaar 1988b, p. 49).
Based on that assumption, Straubhaar concluded that the legal liberalisation of free movement had 
not stimulated Community migration between 1960 and 1984 (Straubhaar 1988b, p. 54). This 
Straubhaar conclusion is restated in the later work of O'Leary (O'Leary 1999, p. 388). The 
comparative premises can, however, be criticised, since the question is whether the two migratory 
groups arc not too distinct to draw a comparative conclusion on their basis. It can be argued that the 
push and pull factors behind migration for the two groups are very different indeed. The largest 
non-EC emigrating group is from the third world, where the motivation to emigrate to the 
community1 must be assumed to be based on political and social factors, as much as on economic 
ones. It must, furthermore, be assumed that the economic motivation to emigrate is much stronger 
from the third world, with the income gap as a major pull factor. These differences makes it more 
likely that immigration from non-EC countries will grow stronger over the years, than EC- 
migration. In the light of the considerable differences between the two migrating groups, we argue 
that it is more accurate to analyse the two groups separately, than to use a relative comparison, in 
order to conclude w hether legal liberalisation has stimulated EC movements or not.
Despite this criticism of its conclusions, the Straubhaar study provides relevant information on 
migration in absolute figures between the original six member states.73 In 1960, 576,700 migrants 
resided in one of the six original member state other than their state of origin.74 Between 1960 and 
1968, the EC-6 migration increased, on average. 4.7% cveiy year, so that, in 1968. when the 
Community institutionalised the free movement of workers. 830.000 citizens were living in a 
member state other than their home state. After institutionalisation in 1968, the increase of the 
migration slock was less important with an average annual growth rate of 1.5% until 1974 where
73 It is important to note that more historical time series on mobility hardly fulfils gâterai data demands on consistency 
and comparability. In 1988, Straubhaar stressed that a general problem of statistical data on migration was that most 
countries used to organise their migration statistics without much consideration o f their comparability. However, he 
found that tlte w ork by OECD in the SOPEMI reports from 1973 had partly compensated for the lack of comparable 
data on the national level (Straubhaar 1988, pp. 60-63). On a later date, the Eurostat migration observations from 1985 
makes comparison possible for the latest years, as printed in “European Social Statistics: Migration“. Still, it must be 
emphasised that studies on population movements continue to be a complex area, where data problems relate to their 
availability, comparability and lack of data source harmonisation (Eurostat: “The social situation in the European 
Union“ (2002), p. 24). Furthermore, all figures used here represent stocks and, for tit is reason are likely to underestimate 
real migration flows (Molle & van Mourik 1988, p. 323).
4 The absolute figures for the t ears 1960, 1974 and 1984 are listed by Straubhaar in table A l, A2 & A3, pp. 59-61. The 
growth rates are calculated on this background.
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the absolute figure was 905,300 migrants residing in another member state. From 1974 to 1979, the 
stock of migrants remained approximately constant, and from 1979 to 1984, the intra-EC 6 
migration suffered a strong fall with a yearly decrease o f 6.8%. In 1984, only 636,000 migrants 
stayed in another member state.75
Therefore, the period 1960-1984 can be separated into two very different sub-periods. From 1960 to 
1974, there is a continuous increase, much stronger during the 60s than in the first half of the 70s, of 
the intra-EC-6 migration, while from the mid 70s, the stock of EC-6 migration stops increasing and 
suffers a strong fall after the institutionalisation of free movement The Community adoption of free 
movement in 1968 was thus not able to counterbalance the remaining barriers for cross-border 
mobility between the original six member states.
G raph  5: In f ra  E C -6 M igration  1960-1984 in  A bsolu te F igures
Graph 5 suggests that the adoption of free movement might have stimulated free movement for an 
initial period but, considering the average annual growth rates of the different periods, the main 
stimulating factor seems to have been the demand for foreign labour in the host state. The demand 
for foreign labour must again be assumed to depend on the general economic situation of that 
period. The growth rates thus suggest viewing the functional relationships the other way around. 
Migration may not be a function of previous institutionalisation, but institutional emergence may be 
a function of previous migration. Such a finding supports Stone Sweet et al.'s explanation of
'  It is important to note that the Straubhaar figures on EC-migration may underestimate the actual migration which 
took place between 1960-84. The difference between his figures and the ones provided by Eurostat on EU15 migration 
1985-98 figures, is indeed considerable. It does not solely reflect the fact that Straubhaar considers migration in the 
original 6 member siaies and Eurostat migration between the contemporary 15 member states, but also that the 
Straubhaar figures are for the stock of migrant M’orkers living in another member states. Ilis figures rely on the w orking 
permission certificates issued by the immigration countries (Straubhaar 1988, p. 50).
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institutional creation as a result of a functional demand, but does not confirm the virtuous circle, in 
which increased transnational exchange is only one component, which should further 
institutionalisation.
3.3: The Statistics of EU-15 Migration 1985-1998
Since 1985, Eurostat has provided us with data on migration between the 15 member states for 
each year.76 This makes it possible to consider later intra-European migration in a more precise 
way. Table 5 and graph 6 below demonstrate that in absolute figures, migration has increased over 
the years. In 1985, 5,2 million citizens were living in a member state other than their home state, 
whereas, in 1998, 6 million EU-citizens resided in another member state. EC 15 migration between 
1985 and 1998 grew, on average, at 1.12% even’ year. However, if we do not consider the 
anomalous periods 1988-1990 and 1992-1994, the average growth rate is about 1.8%. Therefore, it 
is more precise to characterize the period 1985-1998 as having an approximate annual increase of 
migrants about 1.8%.
T able 5: In tra  EU-15 M igration 1985-I99877
Migrants 
Cxi 000)
Growth Rate Migrants
(xIOOO)
Growth Rate
1985 5200 1992 5800 3,57%
1986 5300 1,92% 1993 5700 -1,72%
1987 5400 1,89% 1994 5700 0,00%
1988 5300 -1,85% 1995 5800 1,75%
1989 5500 3,77% 1996 5900 1,72%
1990 5500 0,00% 1997 6000 1,69%
1991 5600 1.82% 1998 6000 0.00%
* Tiie Eurostat data include European migration to and from Spain and Portugal before the states became members in 
1986, Again it is important to emphasise that the figures represent migration stocks and do not mirror actual migration 
flows, which is likely to be higher (see Molle & van Mourik 1988, p. 323).
The figures on yearly stock of immigrants 1985-1998 are from Eurostat (2(X)2) "European Social Statistics -  
Migration". In the Eurostat 2002 edition on migration, the time series run 1985-2000 lor immigration to individual 
member states, whereas the time series on the EU as a whole only runs 1985-1998.
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Graph 6: Intra EU-15 Migration 1985-1998 in Absolute Figures
Migranls(xlOOO)
However, w hen considering EU-15 migration as a percentage of the population, the relative grow th 
of migration is less significant Migration between the 15 member states, as a percentage of the total 
population, has increased from 1,5% in 1985 to 1,6% in 1998.
Separating the temporal observation 1985-1998 into two periods, 1985-1991 and 1992-1998, 
makes it possible to consider whether migration increased significantly, 1) after the Council 
adoption in 1990 of the residence directives, granting the conditional right of free movement for 
persons, and 2) when the southern member states of Spain and Portugal acquired the full right to 
mobility in 1993. The periodical grow th rates demonstrate that this has not been the case. Intra 15 
migration grew 7,69% in the period 1985-1991, w hereas the growth rate in 1992-1998 diminished 
to 3,45%.
Thus, when comparing the historical observation 1960-1984 with the more recent time-series 1985- 
1998, we see interesting portraits of the migratory background upon w hich institutional creation and 
institutionalisation have taken place. Institutional creation happened after a period of intense 
increase in intra EC-6 migration, mirroring a high demand for foreign labour in the higher income 
member states. The demand continued until the first oil price shock in 1973, and migration 
remained at a relatively high level until the second economic crisis at the end of the 1970s. The
102
period 1985-1998 shows a general growth tendency in intra EU movements but despite the 
progress in remov ing formal barriers to mobility, growth rates have remained low compared with 
the 1960s. According to these later data, subsequent migration has not increased significantly as a 
function of legal liberalisation. This finding suggests that further institutionalisation happened 
rather independently of the functional demand as expressed by de facto migration. It furthermore 
suggests that institutionalisation has proceeded even though previous institutional steps have not yet 
proven capable of fulfilling its objective; promoting intra-European mobility. The dynamics which 
spur institutionalisation must thus be sought for in other factors than the dc facto context of 
migration.
3.4; The Characteristics of Free Movement Institutionalisation
The historical development of free movement in Europe shows that co-opcration due to cross- 
border movement o f labour has changed fundamentally over the decades. From being unregulated 
movement at the beginning of the century, it turned into "bilaterally organised interdependence". 
From being demand-decided bilateral agreements in the first post war decade, it became 
supranational regulated free movement for workers. From being a right that was exclusive to labour, 
granted at the supranational level, it was extended to a conditional right of free movement for EU 
citizens.
A characteristic of European migration is that, in scope, it has remained rather static. When 
considering migration between the six original member states, it is remarkable that, despite legal 
liberalisation which was initiated in 1951, mobility has not notably increased. The fears of the 
immigrating countries, that liberalisation would urge Southern Europe to go North, has not taken 
place (O'Leary 1999b, p. 388).
Observations over time on European migration seems to support the ‘convergence hypothesis'. The 
convergence hypothesis assumes that generally a person will move to improve his/her economic 
situation, and therefore the prospect of economic gains, by moving from one place of settlement to 
another has to at least compensate for the socio-economic costs of that movement. The more equal 
economies become, the less the incentive to move will be. The assumption can be applied to the 
Community, as O'Lean- puts it:
“One of the fundamental purposes for establishing a common market is to allocate resources more eiïîciently. 
However, the more similar national economies are, the less incentive there is for a reallocation of production factors 
and the less reallocation will take place" (O'Leary 1999b, p. 389).
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As in the general debate on European integration, disagreements remain on whether supranational 
institutionalisation of free movement is a unique system offering a new set of rights to the free 
mover, or simply a system codifying what has already been put in place by bilateral agreements.
According to Romero, Community free movement as institutionalised between 1957 and 1968 came 
into place because of favourable economic conditions and a temporal convergence of national 
interests. The work of Romero thus sustains the theoretical proposition of liberal 
intcrgovcrnmentalism (Moravscik 1991, 1993, 1995). Romero finds that the final compromise on 
mobility is too ambiguous to support the theoretical assumptions of neo-functionalism and 
automatic integration dynamics, contrary to political preferences;
'in  the field of migration, the actual history of the Community-building process did not at all proceed along the 
allegedly ineluctable route of a functionalist expansion of the supranational dimension, nor did it witness any 
significant spillover from technical solutions into larger political powers for the Community” (Romero 1993, p. 55).
Another interpretation is found by Quintín, who terms the establishment of labour mobility in 
Europe as a "'revolution" for Community w orkers. His argument is that it is crucial to compare the 
actual situation with the one before 1968, where work and residence permits were granted to 
European workers -  as to other foreign workers -  according to national legislation. Before 1968, 
the European worker had to apply for authorisation to work and live abroad before going to another 
member states (Quintín 2000, p. 9).
Different interpretations on whether Community- institutionalisation on free movement is or is not 
considerable, and whether it has happened as an output of national interests or as a result of rather 
detached dynamics, are likely to be based on the analytical context, as well as the time-span 
compared. Romero may be right in arguing that the Council’s adoption, in 1968, of free movement 
for workers was not a functional output of other supranational dynamics, but an outcome of a 
specific favourable economic situation, where the interests of the labour exporting and receiving 
states converged. But that still makes the result -  delegation to the supranational level of national 
immigration control -  outstanding. Among other aspects, it is outstanding because it is plausible to 
suggest that European workers might not have maintained their right to free movement if the 
legislative competence had not been delegated to Community level, if one considers the restrictive 
immigration policies that most member states applied after 1973 (Holloway 1981, note 69, p. 278).
104
Furthermore, what emerged as a carefully negotiated compromise, stood as the regulative input for 
new negotiations, making further integration possible. In this respect the institution which was put 
in place became an asset for the future process.
4.0: The Historical Institutionalisation of European Social Security  
Rights
The co-ordination of social security rights, as one of the Community's main means for the 
realisation of intra-European migration, has been historically codified as happening in parallel with 
the free movement for workers and persons. The early institutionalisation of intra-European social 
securin' rights clearly cannot be explored in isolation from the history of its objective.
Having now examined how the objective, which the co-ordination of social security w as established 
to achieve, emerged and has evolved as a separate institutionalisation process, and having examined 
the historical and recent development of de facto European migration, this part now turns to the 
institution of coordinated social securin' itself.
Conceived of bilaterally, social security across borders became the social attachment to the 
restricted liberalisation of labour movement between the ECSC states, before it developed as a 
stated priority in the Treaty of Rome. Thus obliged by the Treaty, die Council agreed on social 
security co-ordination as one of its first and major pieces of secondary legislation: the voluminous 
Regulation no. 3. Regulation 1408 was produced as a lengthy revision of its predecessor. 
Regulation no. 3. However, during the last three decades. 1408 has dev eloped far beyond its 
institutional inheritance, a development which will be brought into focus in the next two chapters. 
What follows here is a short description of the historical context from which Regulation 1408 
emerged.
4.1: Bilateral Predecessors
The regulative endeavour to co-ordinate social security across borders is almost as old as the 
institutionalisation of social security itself. When social insurance w as established for workers in 
the beginning of the 20th century, it became clear that national legislation w as insufficient in cross- 
border situations (Pennings 1998, p. 3). In 1904. the first bilateral social security agreement w as 
signed between France and Italy which covered the areas of industrial accidents, old age and
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unemployment insurance (Eichenhofer 2001. p. 25; Holloway 1981, p. 124). The French-Italian 
agreement became an institutional example for a large number of bilateral treaties concerning the 
conditions of the migrant worker. Italy, as the main labour exporting country, was a forerunner in 
bilaterally negotiating the social security conditions for its nationals working abroad. With the 
agreement from 1904 as model, Italy had similar social security provisions inserted in its 
commercial treaties with Switzerland, Germany and Austro-Hungary within the following year 
(Holloway 1981, p. 251). From these early treaties on, the contracting states adopted the principle 
of equal treatment of their nationals.
By 1920, 31 agreements on social security had been concluded. By 1945. 133 bilateral agreements 
had been signed, and between 1946 and 1966 another 401 agreements together with several 
multilateral conventions were concluded. In 94% of the 401 post-war agreements, both of the 
signatory states were European. The continual rise in the number of bilateral treaties was since its 
foundation in 1919, particularly stimulated by the work of the International Labour Office. The ILO 
recommended in its conventions that social security matters adopted the principle of equal treatment 
(Holloway 1981, p. 125 & p. 251).
4.2: The Social Security Co-ordination of the ECSC
At the same time as European states were increasingly concluding bilateral agreements, the future 
members of the European Coal and Steel Community agreed that the limited circulation of w orkers 
of "proven qualifications'* had to be assisted by Community provisions on their social security 
situation (Havcrkatc & Huster 1999, p. 88). Therefore Article 69 (4) o f the Paris Treaty laid dow n 
that:
‘They [the member states] shall prohibit any discrimination in remuneration and working conditions between 
nationals and immigrant workers, without prejudice to special measures concerning frontier workers: in particular 
they shall endeavour to settle among themselves any matters remaining to be dealt with in order to ensure that 
social security arrangements do not inhibit labour mobility".
With the Treaty granting the qualified migrating coal and steel worker a right to equal treatment, the 
High Authority, national representatives, with technical assistance from the ILO. began the 
preparative work on a European convention on social security in 1953. In May 1954, an 
intergovernmental conference w as held to discuss the principles and content of the convention. The 
negotiations made clear that it would be far from easy to co-ordinate six different schemes, agree on 
how to finance the co-ordination system, and arrange the cost-division between the states. Because
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of the complicated negotiations, the convention was not signed before the 9*h December 1957. It 
was, however, never ratified (Holloway 1981, p. 135).
4.3: Early Co-ordination in the European Community
The European convention on social security was never ratified, because of the intervening Treaty of 
Rome, establishing the EEC. Article 51 was adopted in the Treaty of Rome as the primary 
legislative formulation of how to achieve the objective of free mov ement for workers, as laid dow n 
in the Treaty's Article 48. On the basis of Article 51, it was decided that the easiest way to adopt the 
European convention was as a Regulation of the new Community, thus avoiding the problems of 
ratification. The text o f Regulation no. 3, adopted by the Council on the 25th September 1958. was 
more or less identical with that of the European convention. The arrangements around 
administrative implementation were adopted in Regulation 4 on December 1958, Regulation no 3 
became the first major piece of legislation in the European Community (Holloway 1981. p. 260).
Regulation 3 stood out from other initial Community legislation because of its scope. It consisted of 
56 Articles and 7 annexes. Compared with the existing bilateral treaties, the starting point of the 
Regulation may not have been revolutionary, but rather it codified principles which were already 
laid down bilaterally (Mabctl & Bolderscn 2000. p. 4). The Regulation applied the principle of 
equal treatment in its Article 8. thereby mirroring the Rome Treaty's general principle of equal 
treatment, as formulated in Article 7. The prohibition of discrimination based on nationality was. 
however, already a present principle in the bilateral agreements and international recommendations. 
Furthermore, a basic principle of the Regulation was aggregation of acquired rights, which was 
already an institutionalised praxis in the agreements between indiv idual slates. In addition, it 
adopted the rule, normal in international treaties of that time, that the applicable law to the 
migrant's situation was that of the place of his/her w ork.
However, Regulation no. 3 should still be considered as an unique piece of legislation, adding much
to the rights of the migrant worker (Holloway 1981, pp. 138-142). First of all. it had a much
broader scope of application than any existing agreement, including all the branches of social
security as listed in the ILO convention no. 102: sickness, maternity, disability, old age. survivors,
industrial injuries and diseases, death, unemployment and family benefits. Sccomih\ a novelty of
the Regulation was that it partly prohibited residence clauses in national legislation, thus making it
possible to maintain acquired rights when not remaining in the state in which one worked. For the
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first time, it became the rule rather than the exception that benefits could be provided outside the 
work state. Thirdly, the Community Regulation replaced the existing bilateral treatments and, in this 
way, simplified the extensive and complex, but still incomplete, systems of individual agreements.78
4.4: Criticism, Negotiations and the Adoption of Regulation 1408/71
Regulation 3 had not been long in place, before criticisms were raised. The institution was found to
be incomplete, and too complex to achieve its aim. The Regulation did not cover frontier workers, 
seasonal labour nor seamen, who were respectively covered by Regulation 33/63. 75/63 and 47/67. 
In addition, the litigation of the European Court of Justice, national courts and administrative 
practices had pointed to regulatory gaps and unclear definitions in the co-ordination of social 
security.
Having just established a co-ordinating practice, the Commission began work on a new Regulation 
as early as 1964. The Commission submitted its first proposal for the new Regulation in the 
beginning of 1966 (OJ no. 194,28. October 1966, p. 3333). After having considered the opinions of 
the Community Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, the Commission modified its 
proposal and. in 1968, the Council received the revised one (OJ no. C95, 21. September 1968, p. 
18).79 Three years of negotiations took place before Regulation 1408/71 w as finally adopted by 14th 
June 1971.
The early Community Regulation no. 3 was the predecessor of Regulation 1408/71, and served as 
its source o f inspiration and model. Although bilateral agreements had established a practice for 
dealing with social security issues in cross-border situations. Regulation no. 3 marked an important 
improvement in the equal treatment of migrant w orkers. The Regulation w as nevertheless soon ripe 
for improvement. As will be emphasised in more detail in the follow ing chapters, the European 
Court of Justice played a decisive role in the revision of the Regulation, leading to the adoption of 89
8 According to the study ofllolloway, the bilateral and international agreements left a number of problems unsolved, 
whereby many regulatory lacunae remained. The most significant problems left w ere: that not all nationality restrictions 
had been removed: that residence restrictions still dominated: that aggregation and the pro-rata principle was a complex 
matter when the social security scheme o f one of the signing parties was non-contributory: that the agreements left 
controversial matters untouched, such as unemployment benefits, voluntary and complementary insurance schemes: that 
the system was far from complete since several states still had signed no agreement, such as Germany and Luxembourg, 
and Germany and Belgium (Holloway 1981, p. 134).
9 Tire first ESC opinion w as printed in OJ no. 64, 5th April 1967, p. 1009 and the first Parliament opinion in OJ 14,h 
February' 1968. The opinion by tire ESC regarding the modified proposal was printed in OJ no. C21,20 February 1969, 
p. 18 and the opinion by the Parliament by OJ no. c !3 5 ,14. December 1968,p. 4.
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1408/71; 1) the early litigation of the Court had constantly revealed problems in the rceulaiorv 
systems; 2) the clarifications and interpretations of the Court became pan of the new Reculation. 
whereby the Court's interpretative line was finally codified; 3) the Court's interpretation of Article 
51 came to constitute “the basis, the framework and the limits" for the new Regulation (Hollowav 
1981, p.146).
4.5: The Institutional Origins of Regulation 1408
On its adoption, Regulation 1408/71 built on a tradition of 12 years of co-ordination with 
Regulation no. 3, which again incorporated codified principles developed through early bilateral 
practices of cross-border social security. 1408/71 thus has an institutional history which goes back 
far beyond 1971, In a Community context, the objectives with social security co-ordination had 
been continuously developed by the Court since 1957 (Comclisscn 1997, p. 28) 1408 came to 
contain the same structure and principles as its predecessor and as adopted in 1971, it was closely 
modelled after Regulation no. 3. The main improvement brought about by 1408 was to complete an 
insufficient institutional situation, and. indeed, many of its provisions were initially responses to the 
problems that Regulation no. 3's implementation had brought about. The historical understanding 
of 1408 is thus lightly coupled to the previous institutional context.
5.0: Concluding Remarks - Two Unique Community Systems
It is often argued that neither the free movement for persons nor the European co-ordination of 
social security rights add significantly to the rights of the European citizen, Thai, after all. the right 
of the free mover is conditional and the co-ordination system is simply multilateral co-operation, 
without the delegation of national competences.
From a historical, comparative point of view such assumptions arc not supported Since 1%8. the 
Community docs not simply encourage worker mobility, but it removes from the member stale the 
prerogativ e of controlling immigration from another member state. With the residence directives 
granting free movement of persons, the right is no longer one exclusiv e to workers, but extended to 
anyone who can provide for hcr/himself at a minimum level.
When it comes to social security, the co-ordination system has relativised the link between the state 
of origin and the citizen. In the early post-war years, the migrant was only to remain in the receiving 
state as long as he/she was productive. The costs of unproductive periods such as childhood.
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maternity, unemployment, invalidity and old age were to be paid for by the state o f origin 
(Holloway 1981, pp. 235-236). With the co-ordination system, the link to the state o f origin, as the 
site issuing social security, is replaced by a link to the state o f work.
Compared with bilateral and international treaties on social security, Community co-ordination of 
social security rights has, from the beginning, been an institutional novelty and. as further 
institutionalisation takes place, the system becomes increasingly wider and more complete. It may 
re-codifv some of the principles developed by bilateral or international predecessors, but its depth 
and scope go much beyond that. First of all, the co-ordination system stands out for its intensity. It 
covers a much broader area than any previous agreement (Holloway 1981, p. 144). Secondly, 
whereas it borrows the principle of equality, it adds the principle of exportability. For the first time, 
social security benefits are de-territorialised as a rule, which previously had only been the 
exception. Thirdly, compared with bi-lateral social security agreements, the provisions on 
Community co-ordination have direct effect and thus immediately grant rights upon the citizen. The 
free mover docs, at least in principle, not have to wait until the rights have been implemented in 
national law (Bicback 1994, p. 27). Furthermore, the Community rules enjoy supremacy over 
national law. Fourthly, European co-ordination is comparatively unique because the European 
Court of Justice continuously interprets the Regulation, the national administration thereof, and the 
consistency between the principles and criteria of the Regulation and those of national legislation 
(Comelissen 1997, p. 28). In addition, the ‘Administrative Commission on Social Security for 
Migrant Workers'80 81will clarity the more technical aspects of the Regulation and how to convert it 
into national administrative practice. Finally, the Commission can take the individual member state 
to Court when national law and its administration contradict the Community prov ision, and the 
Commission will propose to amend the Regulation when it is incapable of achieving its aim. The 
free mover's right to intra-European social security is thus guarded by permanent supranational 
organisations, granting institutionalised rights their own lasting credibility.
80 The ‘Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers' is attached to the Commission. The 
‘Administrative Commission' consists o f a government representative from each member state and a representative 
from the Commission. The Commission provides secretarial serv ice for the Administrative Commission. The tasks of 
the Administrative Commission are among others to deal with administrative and interpretive questions regarding the 
Regulation, to develop tire cooperation between the member states in social security matters and to submit suggestions 
for amendments to the Commission on the basis o f Ute more practical insight o f its members. The Administrative 
Commission is one important forum of contact between the member governments and the Commission. Provision 80 &
81 of Regulation 1408/71 describe the composition and tasks of the Administrative Commission.
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The Council s gradual acceptance, between 1957 and 1971, of European free movement for 
workers and the original provisions on social security co-ordination may reflect the specific socio­
economic situation o f that time of high growth, low unemployment in high income member states 
and a need for foreign labour. It may have resulted from a regulative need to clarify the social 
security' situation of intra-6 migration which increased by 44% between I960 and 1968. However, 
an intergovemmentalist argument that the convergence of national interests explains the w illingncss 
to co-operate, becomes insufficient w hen the social, economic and political context of the 1970s up 
to the mid-1980s is considered. Rights remained and were even expanded, despite decreased 
migration, despite economic crisis and despite restrictive immigration policy towards third country 
nationals. The historical analysis suggests that whereas the institutions of free movement for 
workers and cross-border social security may have been conceived historically as a response to 
national interests and in a propitious socio-economic context, subsequent institutionalisation seems 
rather detached from the broader context, and, to a certain extent, developed according to its ow n 
internal logic.
In theoretical terms, Regulation 1408/71 w as created in To, i.e. 1971, but w as at that time already an 
output of a long socio-economic and institutional history. Its predecessor had been put in place, 
pushed by national interests and institutionalised as a collective choice to solve cross-border 
problems. Furthermore. Regulation no. 3 came about in order to realise a Community objective as 
laid down in the Treaty's text. Finally, it can be theorised as being a result of the functional demand 
due to increased transnational exchange, i.e. migration. The institutional adoption of 1408's 
predecessor became an output of converging political interests, the establishment of an multilateral 
organisational framew ork, and a favourable socio-economic context.
As an institutional output in To. 1408 occurred as a historical phenomenon. The range of optimal 
solutions and alternatives that politicians assessed in To were already embedded in -  and restricted 
by -  the inherited institutional context. Furthermore, the need to reform the existing piece of 
legislation. Regulation no. 3, was successfully argued by the Commission, which thereby mediated 
the institutional course through skilful action. In addition, earlier interpretations by the Court had 
already given substance and direction to the developmental path of the Regulation. The output in To 
was thus not only a result of intergovernmental negotiations, but had in part been transmitted by the 
supranational organisations. The institution in T0 thus already evolved out of an established path of 
increasing returns. Further supranational institutionalisation on that path will be analysed in the two 
following chapters.
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Case-notes
' In several cases the Court has dealt with the question o f the ex-colonies and thus with the territorial scope of 
Regulation 1408/71.
•  In case 87/76 Bozzone [31 March 1977. Walter Bozzone v Office de Sécurité Sociale d  "Outre-Mer. EC R 1977, p. 
687] the Court stated that the definition o f employed person is encapsulated in one who was affiliated in one o f the 
social security schemes listed in art. I (j). Mr. Bozzone was entitled to Belgian invalidity benefit, being Italian and 
residing there, but having worked in Belgian Congo and, at that time, affiliated with the Belgian social security 
system.
• Case 10/78 Belbouab [12 October 1978. Tayeb Belbouab v Bundesknappschaft. ECR 1978, p. 1915] considered 
both the change of nationality and work held in an ex-colony. Belbomb  was bom in Algeria, given French 
nationality by birth and preserved this until Algeria became independent in 1962. In the period in which he held 
French nationality, he worked as a miner in Germany. When he later applied for the Gennan minewoikcr pension, 
the application was rejected, since he no longer possessed French nationality. The Court emphasised that the two 
criteria for belonging to the personal scope were; to be or have been subject to a member state legislation for 
employed or self-employed persons and to have nationality o f one o f the member states. Belbouab fulfilled the first 
criteria having been subject o f the relevant German social security schemes, while working there. Furthermore, the 
Court concluded that because he held French nationality when the w ork was carried out, he was part of the personal 
scope. The Court thereby emphasised that the nationality’ required is that when the work is carried out and not at the 
time of application.
• The joined cases 82 and 103/86 Laberero and Sabato [Joined cases 82 & 193/86,9 July 1987. Giancarlo laborcro  
and Francesca Sabato v Office de Sécurité sociale d ’outre-mer (OSSOAf). ECR 1987, p. 3401 ] concerned Belgian 
index-linking, which adapted social security benefits to the cost o f living. The cases concerned the ex-colony of 
Belgium, which became independent in 1960 and was thereafter named Zaire. Mr. Labotvro was Italian, resided in 
Belgium, but worked in Belgian Congo from 1953 to 1968. Mrs. Sabato was Italian and resided in Belgium as w ell. 
She is the widow of an Italian national, who worked in the republic o f Zaire from 1968 to 1970. Both claimed that 
their pensions should be index-linked, according to the periods in which the work w as held in Belgian Congo/Zaire, 
but insured under Belgian law. In its written observation the Belgian government argued that tire territorial scope o f 
the Regulation could not be wider than that of the EEC Treaty. However, the Court's conclusion made it clear that 
it was not the geograpliical scope of tire Treaty which demarcated rights. The decisive criteria was tire link between 
the worker and the social security scheme, regardless o f the place of activity. It referred to case 300/84 van 
Roosmalen, which will be discussed in chapter IV 's part on the personal scope, and stressed that the essential 
criterion was not where the occupation was held, but the existing link between the worker and completed periods of 
insurance within a social security scheme of a member state (para 24. o f the judgement). Referring to Bozzone, the 
Court emphasised that the definition o f legislation in Article 1 (j) was very broad (para. 23 of tire judgement). Both 
Laberero and the husband of Sabato had been affiliated with a relevant legislative scheme, and could thus be 
defined as “employed" persons. They were therefore entitled to the Belgian index-linking for the period where they 
worked in the former Belgian colony.
•  The outcome was the contrary in case C - l05/89 Buhari Haji [Case C-105/89, 14 November 1990. Ibrahim Buhari 
Haji v Institut national d 'assurances sociales pour travailleurs independents. ECR 1990, p. 1-4211]. Ilaji was bom 
in Nigeria and thus from birth possessed British nationality until Nigeria gained independence in I960. From 1937 
to 1986, he worked in Belgian Congo and until the country became independent, he paid compulsory' pension 
contributions to the Belgian scheme. With this background he applied for a pension. His application was refused in 
1987 by the competent Belgian institution due to his Nigerian nationality, and the fact that he resided in Zaire. The 
Court concluded that the Belgian refusal was not against EC law’, since the term ‘'national of one of the member 
states” in Article 2 (1 )  must be considered in the period in which the worker held his occupation (para. 18 of the 
judgement). Despite the fact that Haji had paid contributions, he did not come within the personal scope of the 
Regulation, since he was working in Belgian Congo and held British nationality, when Britain was not yet a 
member state.
u Case 1/78, 28. June 1978. Patrick Christopher Kenny v Insurance Officer. ECR 1978, p. 1489. Kenny was an Irish 
national residing in Britain. He received cash benefits, since he was incapable of working. In the summer 1973, he w ent 
to Ireland and was imprisoned there because o f a previous conviction. During the time in prison, he became ill and was 
send to an Irish hospital. When he returned to United Kingdom, he claimed cash sickness benefit for the time in 
hospital. His claim was, however, refused with reference to the British national insurance act, saving that a person was
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not granted the benefit during imprisonment. The Court ruled that the national competent institution had a right to 
withdraw benefit in the concrete case, since had Kenny been a British national, or spend his time in a British prison, he 
would suffer the loss of benefit as well. There was no discrimination against Kenny, for reasons of his nationality.
ui Petroni was an Italian national who w orked both in Belgium and in Italy and, on retirement, w as entitled to a Belgian 
old age pension on the basis of Belgian legislation alone, and to an Italian pension calculated on the basis of 
aggregation. How ever, as an effect of Article 46 (3) o f the Regulation, his Belgian pension would be reduced if 
aggregated with the Italian pension. The preliminary question therefore addressed if such an effect w ould be compatible 
with Article 51 o f the Treaty. The Court concluded that aggregation shall not be carried out if it diminish the benefits 
that the worker would be entitled to by applying tire laws of a single member stale.
Chapter IV: Extendable Rights - From Market 
Citizens to European Citizens and Beyond
This chapter, and the next one, explore the supranational institutionalisation process, assumed to 
have transformed Regulation 1408 from output in To to dynamic input over T\ up to the analytical 
T2. The present chapter traces out the process of how the principle o f  equal treatment and the 
personal scope o f Regulation 1408/71 have been settled and extended over time. By doing so, the 
chapter analytically questions *to what extent' the European Union has built up a social security 
dimension. It furthermore addresses the research question of ‘how exploring in detail how the 
institutional reach gradually establishes and expands through the European Court of Justice's 
(reinterpretation and (re)clarification, through the Commission's praxis of (re)formulation and 
(re)proposing, and through intergovernmental negotiation and codification. In other words, the 
individual and interlinked actions and reactions between Court, Commission and member states arc 
examined in order to trace the dynamics furthering the institutionalisation of social security.
The empirical analysis of the present chapter relates to the theoretical propositions on 
institutionalisation discussed in chapter II. Questioning whether a logic of institutionalisation can be 
identified, the diachronic analysis explores the subtle steps of law and politics on the path to 
European social security integration and thus traces the premises for institutional change. 
Questioning the role of supranational organisations, the analysis investigates how case-law and the 
legal reasoning of the Court, as well as the Commission's persistency and agenda-setting capacity 
may have furthered integration. Questioning the role of politics, the analysis examines national 
positions and the political capacity to control over time the direction of the integrative path. 
Questioning institutionalisation through the interaction of law7 and politics, the chapter researches 
how member states have responded to legal activism and eventually have set its limits.
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The chapter is divided into four analytical sections, where section one concerns the principle o f  
equal treatment and the subsequent three sections analyse the evolution of the Regulation's 
personal scope. The first section examines how equal treatment was conferred on Community 
workers and how- the reach of the principle has been extended by the teleological interpretations of 
the Court. The second section equally focuses on the role of the Court, analysing its interpretations 
on the personal scope. The section examines the Court's historical definitions of ‘employed person', 
as well as the purpose of the Regulation's predecessor and its Treaty base. The third section 
analyses the agenda set by the Commission, which, by continuously linking intra-European social 
securin’ to the free movement of persons and Union citizenship, alongside its stated political 
commitment to treat non-Community nationals equally, has argued that the Regulation should be 
extended to all persons, irrespective of economic activity’ and nationality. The fourth section turns to 
the reactions of the Council and the individual member states and analyses how the negotiations on 
a generalised personal scope evolve up to the point where 1408/71 "s personal scope extends to 
cover non-active Community nationals, as well as legally residing third country nationals. The fifth 
section concludes the analytical findings and relates them theoretically.
1.0: The Principle of Equal Treatment
One of the founding pillars and general principles of the European Community is the prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality (Comclisscn 1996, p, 440; Pcnnings 1998. p. 91; 
Pieters 1997. p. 197: Quintin 1997, p. 233). This means that, w ithin the scope of the Treaty citizens 
from another member states are to be treated equally with a host state*s own citizens. The principle 
of equal treatment is expressed in Article 12 of the Treaty.81
Studies on the general evolution, in EC-law, of the prohibition of discrimination have pointed out 
that, over time, the principle has changed nature. The right to be treated equally arose as a privilege 
conferred on one exercising a market activity, but has through generous interpretations by the Court 
been extended to the European citizen (More 1999; Stoor 2000; Flynn 2000). Thanks to the Court's
81 Article 6 o f the TEU, Article 7 of tire Rome Treaty. The principle reads as follows: "Within the scope of application of 
this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall he prohibited”.
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ongoing interpretations, the non-market actor has been granted equal rights, however conditionally. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the principle changes its character or function, depending on the 
context it operates in. It may serve as an instrument with which to achieve a specific Community 
aim, play a mediating role for other Community goals, or be an independent objective in its own 
right (de Burca 1997; Stoor 2000).
The system co-ordinating social security rights ascribes the same high importance to the principle of 
equal treatment as Community law generally docs. The prohibition against the discrimination of the 
migrant in social security terms is detrimental to free movement. The general principle of equal 
treatment is mirrored in Article 3 of Regulation 1408/71:
“....persons resident in the territory of one of the Member States to whom this Regulation applies shall be subject 
to the same obligations and enjoy the same benefits under the legislation of any Member State as the nationals of 
the State".
The absolute status o f the principle of non-discrimination is, however, conditioned by the fact that it 
is limited by the Treaty's applicable scope. It can therefore only operate beyond market goals to the 
extent that the Treaty does so, just as it can only regulate the situation defined as Community- 
competence (More 1999, p. 537). The scope of the non-discriminating principle regarding social 
security rights is thus set on the basis of the personal and material scope of Regulation 1408. 
However, to whom and to what the Regulation applies has been under continuous interpretation, for 
which reason the scope of the principle of equal treatment becomes dynamic as well, as will be 
demonstrated below and in the following chapter.
This section examines the evolution o f the principle of equal treatment, from a principle prohibiting 
direct discrimination against the migrant worker, to a principle regulating indirect discrimination as 
well, thus far beyond a workers-only privilege.
1.1: The Broad Spectrum of Equal Treatment
The judgements of the Court have clarified and re-settled the limits and the scope of the rights to 
equal treatment in social security matters.
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The Court laid down a negative definition, settling down the circumstances under which the 
principle did not apply. The migrant worker was not entitled to equal treatment when the social 
benefit in question fell outside the material scope of Regulation 140X'' Neither duj die principle 
apply, when the facts of a case had happened within a single member state, i c without am cross- 
border movement having taken place.' Nor did the principle rule, if a ease imohed only one 
member slate and the second party was a third country.'1 Furthermore, discrimination did not take 
place simply because different rights were conferred on different occupational categories, and the 
migrant therefore was treated different than a national, but on objective grounds
On the other hand, the positive clarification by the Court extended the principle of equal treatment 
beyond direct discrimination, and prohibited all forms of indirect discrimination as well The Court 
laid down that indirect discrimination took place when criteria which seemed to be based on non­
nationality or appeared as neutral ones, had in fact a discriminators result (Pieters 1997. p 197)
That w as the case against Ms. Toia of Italian nationality, residing in France, when she was denied 
the French allow ancc for women w ilh children.82 *The Court decided that the French social security 
code indirectly discriminated against migrant workers and their dependents, since one of the 
qualifying criteria for the allowance w as that at least five of the children had French nationality *’ In 
the case of Toia, the Court stated its w ide interpretation of the principle of non-discnnnnalion 
"The rule on equality of treatment, laid down by Article 3 (1) of Refutation No ld<iX/7l prohibits nm orih jutem 
discrimination, based on the nationality of die beneficiaries of social secmirt schemes, txii aU> all disguised 
forms of discrimination which, by the application of other distinguishing entena. lead m tact to the same tcMili" 
(Summary of case 237/78, Toia).
The broad interpretation of discrimination, embracing overt as well as co\crt forms, was later 
restated, as laid down in Toia.'™
In the Pinna Z84 case, French family benefits were readdressed.'' The ease clarified that the 
prohibition o f indirect discrimination applied to the Regulation itself as well as to national
82 Case 237/78, 12 Julv 1979. Caisse Regionale d assurance Maladie fCIl-LW), ¡.¡He v Pianianic / Wrmo. mv Toia 
ECR 1979, page 2645.
8? On the contrary to the requirement, five of her seven children had Italian nationality from birth
8J Case 41/84, 15 January 1986. Pietro Pima  v Cais.se <1 allocations fantihales <ie la Savoie I CK I VS'*, p |
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legislation (White 1999, p. 13). The Pinna case confirmed the broad interpretation of the principle 
of equal treatment, even when a praxis leading to actual discrimination of the migrant worker might 
be justified by Regulation 1408 itself. When 1408/71 was adopted, the Council did not reach 
unanimity on which state was to grant family benefits when the family o f a migrant worker did not 
stay in the state of work. The general rule applied by Article 73 (1) was that of ‘lex loci laboris', 
stating that it is the state of work which pays family benefits, regardless of where the family lived. 
However, a dual system was established for the sake of France, where Article 73 (2) permitted a 
French exception. Article 73 (2) allowed that, if the family of a migrant working in France stayed 
abroad, they were to receive benefits according to the law of the state in which they resided. In the 
case of Pinna, the Court, however, found that the French exception operated to make a distinction 
between French nationals subject to French legislation and Community nationals subject to the 
same legislation. The Court made clear that the principle of equal treatment prohibits “all covert 
forms of discrimination which, by applying other distinguishing criteria, in fact achieve the same 
result" (Summary of case 41/84, Pinna). Even though French legislation did not discriminate 
directly between the migrant worker and French citizens on grounds of nationality, the non- 
cxportability of French family benefit was more likely to affect the migrant worker and his family 
than a family of French citizens, presumably staying in France:
'Even though the legislation of a Member State employs the same criterion to determine the entitlement to family 
benefits o f  a national o f that State employed in its territory, that criterion is by no means equally important for that 
category of worker, since the problem of members o f the family residing outside the Member State o f 
employment arises essentially for migrant w orkers“ (Summary o f case 41/84, Pinna).
On this basis, the Court concluded that not only did French legislation and praxis in fact 
discriminate against the migrant worker, but that the indirect discrimination was justified by the 
Community institution. Article 73 (2) of Regulation 1408 was therefore condemned as being 
invalid. The Council codified the rulings of the Court 3 years later by amending Article 73 of the 
Regulation, so that family benefits were now generally paid according to the legislation of the 
member state of work, also when the family stayed abroad (Comelissen 1997, p. 37).85 Reacting in 
accordance with the authoritative ruling of the Court, the Council’s codification closed the 
regulatory gap, which previously had permitted the French exception. Both the Court and the 
Council thereby took a decisive integrative step, laying down that discrimination as a result of
85 Regulation 1408/71 was amended by Regulation 3427/89 o f 30 October 1989.
118
mobility was contrary to the aims of the Community even though no overt discrimination happened 
on grounds of nationality.
In the later Masgio86 case, the Court continued along the established line of reasoning, finding 
German practice indirectly discriminatory, occurring on the ground of mobility.91 The Court 
emphasised that equal treatment in social security terms was a precondition for the actual possibility 
of free movement within the Community. Its teleological conclusion stated that Article 3(1) must 
be interpreted in the light of its objective, which was to contribute to the greatest possible freedom 
of movement for migrant workers, and thus to achieve one of the funding aims of the Community' 
(para. 16 of the judgement). In the case, the Court underlined the link between the right to free 
movement, the maintenance of social security advantages and the realisation of free movement.
(he aim o f Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty would not be attained if, as a consequence o f the exercise of their 
right to freedom o f movement, migrant workers were to lose the advantages in the field of social security 
guaranteed to them by the Ians of a single Member State (...) Such a consequence could deter Community 
workers from exercising their right to freedom of movement and would therefore constitute an obstacle to that 
freedom" (para. 18 of the judgement).
The Commission furthermore brought infringement procedures before the Court regarding the 
principle of equal treatment, thereby monitoring member states* compliance with the Community' 
obligation to treat nationals from other member states equally.*1 The Commission found that Greece 
had not fulfilled its obligations, concerning family benefits. The cases of Tota, Pinna and the one 
against Greece*7, marked family policies as a rather controversial social security' area, where more 
discrete discriminating criteria characterise member states' legislative means of pursuing 
demographic goals. The case against Greece considered the Greek conditions for its large family 
benefit w hich w as based on the number of children and. additionally on Greek nationality or origin. 
In putting forward its case, the Greek government explained that benefits paid to large families had 
a historical and sociological basis, and the protection thereof had constitutional rank. The benefits 
w ere demographically aimed, since the percentage of old people in the Greek population increased. 
These policy objectives were, however, set aside by the Court, which found Greek law and practice *8
8<> Case C-10/90,7 March 1991. Maria Masgio v Bundesknappschaft. ECR 1991, page 1-1119.
8 Case C-185/96.29 October 1998. Commission o f  the European Communities v Hellenic Republic. ECR 1998, pose I- 
6601.
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discriminator}'. The national policy aims were thereby superseded by Community obligation and the 
objective to promote free movement.
Ch er time, the case-law of the Court has furthered the principle of equal treatment. Historically 
considered, it could be argued that the principle was simply inherited from previous bilateral 
agreements on social security. However, the activism o f the European Court of Justice, seconded by 
the Commission, brought equal treatment far b e y o n d  its overt meaning, to cover indirect forms of 
discrimination as well. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the Court not only sought to bring 
national legislation into line with the principle, but it also interpreted to what extent the 
supranational institution itself was in accordance w ith one of its main principles. The Court thus 
overruled previous political decisions, and the Council subsequently accepted the legal reprimand 
and amended the Regulation. Finally, litigation expanded the character of the principle from being 
concerned with non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality, to non-discrimination on the 
grounds of mobility. According to the teleological interpretation of the Court, more discrete criteria 
in national legislation, such as a residence clause or a method of calculation, might -  even if they 
were applied equally - tend to disfavour the free mover, thus hindering the overriding aim of free 
movement.
1.2: Beyond a Workers-Only Privilege
The carl}- case-law of the Court established a restrictive view on the rights of the family member. In 
case 40/76 Kermaschek88, the Court drew a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, the rights of 
the worker and, on the olher hand, the rights of their families. The family member had only 
“derived rights", meaning those acquired by national law through his/her status as a family member. 
The family member could therefore not rely personally on the principle of equal treatment. The 
Court maintained the distinction for more than 20 years, confirming it in a line of judgements 
known as the Kermaschek case-law.*“
88 Case 40/76,23 November 1976. Kermaschek v Bumiesanstalt/itr Arbeit. ECR 1976, p. 1669.
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In 1996, the Court came out with a very important judgement, which came to influence much more 
than the individual law -suit, as will be demonstrated in chapter V and VII. In the Cabcmis-hsarte89 
judgement, the Court reconsidered the scope of the equal treatment provision and its application to 
the family member, and revised the interpretive path of established case-law, which had been 
confirmed through more than 20 years of legal interpretation.”"
In the case of Cabcmis-lssarte, the preliminary questions addressed whether it was justifiable to 
treat family members as a separate category, to whom the principle of equal treatment did not apply 
directly ,XIV Analysing the wording of Article 3 (1) of 1408/71, the Court found that the provision 
itself did not distinguish between workers, family members or surviving spouses (para. 26 of the 
judgement). In addition, it was unquestionable that the family member was part of the Regulation's 
personal scope (para. 27 of the judgement). Reconsidering its own logic, as established by the 
Kermaschek case-law, the Court departed here from it, and thus took a decisive step, extending 
equal rights and furthering integration. The Court held that a distinction which is maintained 
between rights in person and derived rights;
'‘may undermine the fundamental Community law requirement that its rules should be applied uniformly, by 
making their applicability to individuals depend on whether the national law' relating to the benefits in question 
treats die rights concerned as rights in person or as derived rights, in the light o f specific features of die domestic 
social security scheme” (para. 31 of the judgement, emphasis added).
As argued by the Commission, the Court agreed that it might be increasingly difficult to apply 
Community law uniformly, because national social security sy stems tended to blur distinctions as 
social security schemes had come to offer more universal cov er. On basis of this new logic, the 
Court concluded that the distinction between personal and derived rights had to be partially 
abandoned.90 The consequence was that family members and survivors can invoke the principle of 
equal treatment. The radicalism of the departure from the established interpretation is illustrated by 
the fact that the Court limited the material impact of the Cabanis-Issarte judgement, emphasising 
that its conclusions did not apply before the date of the judgement, i.e, 30 April 1996.
sg Case C-308/93,30 April 1996. Bestuur van tie Sociale l erzeketitigsbank v JJi/. Cabanis-Issarte. ECR 1996, page 1- 
2097.
The distinction shall only be upheld for unemployment benefits, which in general are conferred personally.
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"Both the SVB and the governments o f the Member States* 91 which have submitted written observations to the 
Court submit that, in the event of a departure from the Kermaschek line o f authority, the temporal effects of the 
judgement should be limited. In this regard, reference has been made to the serious consequences which the 
judgement would entail for the funding o f  social security schemes and the radical change involved in such a 
departure from precedent” (para. 46 of the judgement).
By limiting the financial impact o f its conclusions, the Court seemed to meet the national 
governments halfway. In this way, a subsequent political correction of the Court's interpretation 
became less likely. In the absence of a political response, the Court managed to stretch out the right 
to equal treatment. By connecting the objective o f a uniform legal order in the Community- with the 
general development o f the social security- schemes at the national level, the principle of equal 
treatment was extended beyond a \vorkers-only' privilege.
Also, the often discussed case of Martinez Saief 2, considered the personal scope of the equal 
treatment provision.93 The case is perhaps more famous for its clarification potential on European 
citizenship and the opinion of the Advocate General, than for what the Court ended up saying about 
the actual content of the European citizen's residence right.xv However, the Court's conclusions 
were radical in laying dow n who has a right to equal treatment in social security matters. The Court 
examined whether the non-active Spanish citizen Sala could benefit from the non-discrimination 
provision of the Treaty and therefore be entitled to the German child raising allowance, due to her 
lawful residence in Germany.*'1 The right to reside was conferred on Sala by the 1953 European 
Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, and thus not by Community- law itself.
Referring to the 1996 cases of Hoever and Zachow, w hich will be discussed in chapter V below, the 
Court reaffirmed that the German child raising allowance was a social security benefit within the 
material scope of 1408/71 (paras. 24 & 28 of the Judgement). Having thus clarified on the material 
scope and having left the question o f the status as employed person for the national Court to decide,
91 The SVB was the competent Dutch institution. The member states which submitted observations were the 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria and the UK.
9" CaseC-85/96, 12 May 1998. Sfaria Martinez Sala v Frcistaal Ba\>ent. ECR 1998, page 1-2691.
91 For an in depth discussion o f the Sala case, see, among others, More (1999), O 'Lean (1999), Langer (1999c),
Tomuschat (2000).
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the Court laid down that an EU citizen, lawfully residing in another member state, could rely on the 
Treaty's equal treatment provision, in all situations covered by the material scope of Community 
law (O'Leary 1999, p. 74, Langer 2000, p. 46):
“As a national of a Member State lawfully residing in the territory o f another Member State, the appellant in the 
main proceedings comes within the scope ratione personae of the provisions of the Treaty on European 
citizenship. Article 8 (2) o f the Treaty attaches to the status of the citizen of the Union the rights and duties laid 
down by the Treaty , including the right, laid down in Article 6 o f the Treaty, not to suffer discrimination on 
grounds of nationality within the scope o f application ratione materiae of the Treaty” (paras. 61 & 62 of the 
judgement).
The Sola case clearly expanded the personal scope of the principle of equal treatment extending it 
much beyond the entitlement of workers and self-employed (More 1999, p. 540). The principle was 
distanced from its market restrictions. The application of the non-discrimination provision no longer 
depended on the performance of an economic activity, but lawful residence was declared a 
sufficient prerequisite (O'Leary 1999, pp. 77-78, More 1999, p. 540). Future case-law will have to 
clarity- whether the principles of the Sola case have established binding precedent."11
1.3: From Inherited Provision to Objective in its Own Right
The principle of equal treatment in Regulation 1408/71 reflects partly the general principle on non­
discrimination in Community- law, partly a practice already established by bilateral agreements, and 
later codified in the early Community social security Regulation no. 3. Considering its origins, it 
may be argued that the principle is an inherited one.
However, subsequent Community' case-law developed the principle on its own premises, so that its 
present content is only a mild reflection of its past bilateral predecessors. Through the activism of 
the Court, the right to be treated equally in social security matters developed its own Community' 
character. The case-law analysis carried out above demonstrates that the principle both functions as 
a means tow ards the free movement of workers, as it performs as an independent goal in its own 
right, promoting migrants' position as if  this were a separate Community* aim. Through the 
clarification and generous interpretations by the Court, the scope of the principle has been widened, 
applying it to the case of indirect discrimination, the family member and the non-active Community’ 
citizen.
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From a theoretical perspective, an analysis of the principle of equal treatment sustains legal 
autonomy assumptions. It has been law alone which has decided the scope and meaning of equal 
treatment and thus the premises for change. What to politicians may have appeared as clarifications 
of legal details have in fact detached the right to equal treatment from the exercise of economic 
activity, and thus greatly compromised the member states" ability' to decide who should be treated 
equally with their own nationals. This enforcement of the principle took place as judicial decision­
making alone and politics did not subsequently respond. Such empirical findings support the 
theoretical argument that politics and law follow different logics (Alter 1998, pp. 130-132; 2001, p. 
189). It is a characteristic of all the case-law analysed in the present chapter that legal 
interpretations had no general or immediate political, or financial implications, and therefore made 
political response unnecessary, even irrelevant. The eventual unintended consequences of the 
Court's expansive deductions and political non-action will be analysed in the subsequent chapters.
The evolution, over time, of migrants' right to equal treatment in the area of social security reflects 
the general development of the EU from an economic area to a more “genuine community" (Stoor 
2000, p. 125). The specific development of the principle of non-discrimination in the field of social 
security suggests a principle, which moved beyond its strictly instrumental role and reappeared as 
having gained some autonomous value (de Burca 1997). As held by the ex-commissioner of Social 
Policy, Padraig Flynn, equal treatment in social security matters can be interpreted as a practical 
recognition of European citizenship:
"One of the most important protections offered by Regulation 1408/71 is the guarantee that people within its 
scope w ill receive equal treatment in whichever Member State they are insured. It means in fact, that they should 
be treated by this Member State as if  they were one o f its own citizens, The principle of equal treatment is an 
important factor in the concept of citizenship of the Union. In this sense, the Regulation has, in very practical 
temis, long recognised the concept o f  citizenship'' (Flynn 1997, p. 19, emphasis added).
Having quoted this, it is still important to emphasise the limits of the provision. The principle only 
applies within the scope of the acquis communautaire. For the concrete case of social security, this 
means that the principle o f equal treatment does not reach beyond the material scope of Regulation 
1408 and Regulation 1612/68. Furthermore, whereas the right to invoke the principle no longer 
depends on economic activity-, it still depends on lawful residence. In the present institutional 
context, lawful residence in the Community is decided by the conditions of the residence 
directives/'111 As long as the material scope of the social security- Regulation mainly covers benefits
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granted on the basis of work, and as long as lawful residence depends on the ability to provide for 
oneself, the principle of equal treatment has not definitively broken its link with economic activity 
or status. Thus, if the equal treatment provision in the Regulation is the practical expression of 
European citizenship, it has not fully recognised the traditional notion of citizenship, since some 
people certainly remain more equal than others.
2.0: The Historical Setting o f  a Personal Scope
The personal scope of Regulation 1408 has been extended incrementally through judicial 
interpretations by the Court, Commission proposals and the Council's codification thereof. The 
current personal scope has been under a process of definition since the adoption of 1408/71 "s 
predecessor, Regulation no. 3 in 1958. During more than four decades the personal scope of 
Regulation 1408 has been clarified. The last five years have been marked by very intense 
negotiations in the Council on extending the personal scope to non-active Community nationals as 
well as third country nationals. Only very recently have these negotiations been concluded by 
apparently extending the personal scope to all migrants in the EU covered by the social security 
legislation of a member state.
Behind the personal scope, as it stands today, is both the Court's early and gradually evolving 
interpretations of 'employed person', as well as its interpretations of the scope and limits of the 
Treaty's Article 42 (ex. Art. 51). An ongoing interpretation of the spirit of the Regulation's Treat)' 
base, initiated years before the free movement of workers was implemented by secondary 
legislation in 1968, is behind the ever broader understanding of the personal scope, and the gradual 
construction of its ow n meaning.
In this first section on the personal scope, we examine how an independent social security 
conceptualisation of ’employed person* developed from the judicial activism of the Court, and how 
Regulation 1408 inherited the personal scope from its predecessor Regulation no. 3, but 
subsequently extended it far beyond that. First w e sketch the current personal scope of 1408/71 and 
compare its unique definition of 'employed person' with Regulation 1612/68*s definition of 
'worker'. Second, we analyse the historical definition of 'employed person' based on Regulation no. 
3. In the third part, we illustrate how 1408/71 subsequently inherited its notion of 'worker*. The
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fourth part presents a discussion of the inclusion of self-employed persons in early case-law, while 
part five analyses the later Council codification thereof.
2.1: Who Has a Right to Cross-Border Welfare?
The personal scope of 1408, as it stands today, has departed fundamentally from that which once 
allowed access to welfare across European borders to a few workers of 'proven qualification". Not 
only has Regulation 1408 recently been extended to legally residing third country nationals by 
Regulation 859/2003, but on 26 January 2004, the Council has furthermore finally adopted a 
common position on extending the Regulation to non-active persons (COM (2004) 44). These last 
categories of persons who are now included thus provide a provisional conclusion of a 'long- 
running saga" (Peers 2002, p. 1395).
Traditionally. Article 2, defining the Regulation's personal scope, entailed two criteria for a person 
to invoke the right to co-ordinated social security. First of all, apart from refugees, stateless persons, 
and family members, one must be a national of a member state. Secondly, one must qualify within 
one of the included personal categories.
The first criterion meant that a third country national would not enjoy any rights according to 
Regulation 1408, unless he or she was a family member of a Community national, in w hich case 
nationality became irrelevant, or else, if he or she was a refugee or a stateless person. The 
Regulation thus clearly discriminated against third country workers, despite their possibly 
considerable contributions to a member state's economy. Apparently, the recently adopted 
amendment puts an end to an intense debate between the Commission, Council, Parliament and 
Court on the status o f third country nationals, and finally gives equal rights to a previously deprived 
group. How ever radical such an extension may seem, it should be noted that, in practice, it is not of 
much use. Third country nationals legally residing in member states have no right to free 
movement, but they can only invoke the rights according to Regulation 1408 if they do move 
between member states. The negotiations on the position of third country nationals w ill be 
discussed in detail in sections three and four below.
The second criterion means that in order to be included in the personal scope, one has to fulfil the 
criteria as listed in Article 1 of the Regulation. Article 1 lays down that one qualifies as an
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employed or self-employed person, if one is insured by a social security scheme for employed or 
self-employed persons on a compulsory or voluntary basis. The relevant schemes are listed by each 
individual member state in annex 1 of the Regulation. Thus, the inclusivcncss of national law 
becomes decisive. According to 1408, when national law allows a person without an employment 
contract to participate in a social security scheme for employed persons, that person holds worker 
status. The concept o f ‘worker’ in the Treaty's Article 42 and Regulation 1408 relies on a particular 
social security law definition, and the meaning of this definition is established with reference to 
national legislation (Langer 2000, p. 56; Haverkatc & Huster 1999, p. 89 & p. 96; van Racpcnbusch 
1997, pp. 74-75).
The special social security meaning of ‘employed person* in 1408/71 implies that the concept 
differs from the meaning of ‘worker’ according to the Treaty's Article 39 (ex Art. 48) and 
Regulation 1612/68, where ‘worker* is defined by labour law. The personal scope of Regulation 
1612/68 is a narrower one, addressing the worker ‘stricto sensu', i.e., those with a contract of 
employment.94 Regulation 1612/68 docs not cover the unemployed seeking work, nor the self- 
employed (Pcnnings 1998, p. 103; Havcrkate & Huster 1999, p. 90).95 Furthermore, a ‘social 
advantage', earned according to 1612/68, cannot in principle be exported (Huster 1999, p. 15). 
However, the equal treatment provision of Regulation 1612, as stated in Article 7 (2)%, entitles the 
migrant worker to a broad scope of ‘social advantages' which, through the Court's interpretation, 
includes benefits outside of a contract of employment (Jacobs 2000, p. 36). Case-law has widened *2
The narrower personal scope of Regulation 1612/68 would mean, if interpreted literally, that family members of the 
worker would not be entitled to the ‘social advantages' of the host state. The Court has, however, interpreted Article 7
(2) in a much broader way, arguing that if family members were not granted social rights that would hinder free 
movement and thus contradict the objective and spirit of the free movement provision (Pcnnings 1998, p. 104). The 
broad interpretation was, among other cases, exemplified in case 157/84, 6 June 1985. Maria Fm.scogna v Caisse ties 
depots et consignations. ECR 1985, page 1739; in case 94/84, 20 June 1985. Office nationalde i'entploi vJoszef Peak. 
ECR 1985, page 1873; in case C-310/91, 27 May 1993. Hugo Schmid v Belgian State, represented by the Minister van 
Sociale 1 oorz. ECR 1993, page 1-3011.
^  The exclusion of the unemployed was how ever questioned by the Antonissen judgement where the Court ruled that 
the Treaty's Article 48 (now Art. 39) also protects the one in search of work (Case C-292/89, 16 February 1991. The 
Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal. ex parte Antonissen. ECR 1991, p. 1-745],
1,0 Article 7 o f Regulation 1612/68 reads:
" l )  A worker who is a national of a member state may not, in the territory of another Member State, be treated 
differently from national w orkers by reason of his nationality in respect of any conditions of employment and w ork, in 
particular as regard remuneration, dismissal, and should he become unemployed, reinstatement or re-employment;
2) He shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers''.
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the scope of "social advantages* to include childbirth loans97, invalidin’ benefits98, minimum means 
of subsistence99, financial support for studies100, maternity benefits101 and benefits for large 
families102 (Stoor 2000, pp. 116-117). In addition to this, the Court has interpreted the personal 
scope of 1612 generously, pushing the limits o f an ‘effective and genuine* activity to exclude 
nothing but activities “on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary*’ 
(O'Leary' 1999, p. 392)XIX. Although case-law may have pushed Regulations 1408 and 1612 in the 
same direction, extending their scope o f application, the equal treatment provisions of the two 
Regulations still refer to distinctive functions and rationales. Article 7 of Regulation 1612, and its 
clarification in case-law, aim to promote the full integration o f the migrant worker into the host 
state. Regulation 1408, in full text and provision, aims to promote cross-border mobility by 
ensuring that rights can be acquired under another member state's legislation, and that acquired 
rights are maintained and aggregated when moving between states (Stoor 2000, pp. 120-121),
2.2: The Historical Definition of Employed Person’
The distinctiveness of the concept o f worker in Regulation 1408 was established through clusters of 
case-law, and subsequently codified by the Council. The activism of the Court has indeed amplified 
the social security meaning of who is to be defined as an 'employed person*. The historical process 
establishing the Community's social security meaning of worker, started from the same place as the
* Case 65/81, 14 Januarv 1982. Francesco Reina and Letizia Reina v. landeskreditbank Baden ll'ürttenberg. ECR, 
1982, p. 33.
1,8 Case 63/76, 16 December 1976. Inzitillo v. Caisse d'allocations familiales de l ’arrondissement de Lw n. ECR 1976, 
p. 2057; Case C -310/91,27 May 1993, Schmid v. Belgian State. ECR 1993, p. 3011.
99 Case 261/83, 12 July 1984. Carmela Castelli v Office National des Pensions pour Travailleurs Salariés (ONPTS), 
ECR 1984, p. 3199; Case 249/83, 27 March 1985. Vera Hoeckx v Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn, 
Kalmthout. ECR 1985, p. 973; Case 122/84, 27 March 1985. Kenneth Scrivnerand Carol Cole v Centre public d ’aide 
sociale de Chastre. ECR 1985, p. 1027; Case 139/85, 3 June 1986. R. H. Kempf v Staatssecretaris van Justitie. ECR 
1986,p. 1741.
100 Case 235/87, 27 September 1988. Annunziata Matteucci v Communauté française o f  Belgium and Commissariat 
général aux relations internationales o f  the Communauté française o f Belgium. ECR 1988, p. 5589; Case C-308/89, 13 
November 1990. Carmina di Leo v Land Berlin. ECR 1990, p. 1-4185; Case C-3/9Q, 26 Februari 1992. M. J. E. Bemini
v Minister van Onderl ijs en Wetenschappen. ECR 1992, p. 1-1071.
101 Case C-111/91, 10 March 1993. Commission o f  the European Communities v Grand Duchv o f Luxembourg. ECR 
1993, p. 1-817.
102 Case C-l 85/96, 29 October 1998. Commission o f  the European Communities v Hellenic Republic. ECR 1998, p. I- 
6601.
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definition of ‘worker" in Regulation 1612 and in the Treaty's Article 39, with a more traditional 
understanding of the ‘wage-earner. The concept, however, gradually developed its own meaning 
and scope through case-law and the Council's codification of it.
Soon after Regulation no. 3 came into force, the disagreements among member states on the extent 
of the personal scope became clear. France and Luxembourg held the opinion that the Regulation 
only applied to workers ‘stricto sensu\ i.e. workers with an employment contract. The other 
member states found no such limitations in the Regulation. The discussion continued in the 
‘Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers'103, where the member states 
in 1962, managed to agree on the broader interpretation of the concept (Holloway 1981, p. 166). 
However, the setting out of the conceptual meaning continued in the form of legal dialogues 
between the national Courts and the European Court of Justice.
In one of the first social security cases, 75/63 Hoekstra104, the Court interpreted the personal scope 
in Regulation no. 3 quite broadly, presumably applying it far beyond what the authors of the 
Regulation could have imagined (van Raepcnbusch 1997, p. 74).x* In the Hoekstra case, the Court 
emphasised that since Regulation no. 3 was adopted on the basis of Article 51 of the Treaty, the 
meaning of ’wage-earner' depended on the scope of this Treat}' provision. The Court interpreted 
that since Article 51 was placed in the Treaty's Title III on free movement of persons, services, and 
capital, its aim was:
"The establishment o f  as complete a freedom o f  movement o f workers as possible, which thus fonns part o f the 
‘'foundations" of the community, therefore constitutes the principal objective o f  Article 51 and thereby conditions 
the interpretation o f  the Regulations adopted in implementation of that Article" (Summaiy of the Judgement, 
75/63 Hoekstra, emphasis added).
The objective of establishing “as complete a freedom of movement of workers as possible" meant 
that the term ‘wage-earner' could not be defined by national legislation alone. The objectives of the 
Treaty would not be achieved if the concept was “unilaterally fixed and modified by national law"' 
(Summary of the Judgement, 75/63 Hoekstra). The preliminary questions of the case furthermore 
addressed the question whether the term ‘wagc-camcr' covered a person such as Mrs Hoekstra, who
l0i See footnote 80 above.
101 Case 75/63,19 March \96A .\irs Hoekstra (née Unger) v Bestuur der Cont. Bedrijfswrettiging voor Detailhandel en 
Ambachten. ECR 1964, p. 177.
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was no longer in active employment, but still covered by the social security scheme for employed 
persons, and whose movement was motivated by leisure. The Court answered that the concept 
‘wage-earner or assimilated workers' referred to “all those who, as such and under whatever 
description, are covered by the different national systems of social security" (ibid). The Court thus 
clarified that it was the attachment to a social security scheme for wage-earners that linked a person 
to the Community Regulation. This conception even covered those who no longer held active 
employment, but continued to be voluntarily insured in a social security’ scheme for wagc-camcrs 
(Holloway 1981, p. 168). Thus, the concept did not restrict protection to those in active 
employment. Also, the motives of the movement w-ere treated as irrelevant, since Regulation no. 3 
not only covered movements for work reasons, but also for leisure, such as in the case of Mrs 
Hoekstra s desire to stay with her parents in Germany (Langer 2000, p. 57).
Since one o f its first social security- cases, the Court has stretched the personal scope through a 
teleological interpretation, where the aim and spirit of the Treaty- have been decisive for the 
conceptual borders of ‘w age-earner’. The earlier cluster of cases, which interpreted Regulation no. 
3, confirmed that 'worker' was not defined by national law, but rather according to Community- law, 
and that a broad interpretation in light of the Treaty's Article 51 was called for. Subsequent case- 
law repeated that the reasons motivating movements were irrelevant as long as the person moving 
was covered by a social security scheme for wage-earners. In the 44/65 Singer10* case concerning a 
German mineworker who w as killed in a car accident during his holiday in France, one of the 
involved parties argued that it would be against the aim of Article 51 to apply the Regulation to the 
leisure situation as well. However, the Court confirmed its Hoekstra interpretation, referring once 
again to the spirit o f Article 51:
"It would not be in conformity with that spirit [of the Treaty] to limit the concept o f “worker" solely to migrant
worker stricto sensu or solely to workers required to move for the purpose o f their employment. Nothing in Article 
51 imposes such distinctions, which would in any case tend to make the application of the rules in question 
impracticable. On the other hand, the system adopted by Regulation no. 3, which consists in abolishing as far as 
possible the territorial limitations on the application o f  the different social security schemes, certainly corresponds 
to the objectives of Article 51 of the Treaty” (Summary o f the Judgement, 44/65 Singer).
105 Case 44/65, 9. December 1965. Hessische Knappschaft v Maison Singer et Fils. ECR 1965, p. 1191.
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2.3: Inherited Definition and Beyond
The case-law on the scope of Regulation no. 3 developed a broad definition of worker, clarifying 
that the actual nature of the work was irrelevant (Comelissen 1997, p. 42). The definition went far 
beyond the written text of the Regulation, and extended the personal scope to practically everyone 
insured under a social security scheme for wage-earners (van Rapcnbusch 1996, p. 75). When 
adopting Regulation 1408, the same extended scope w as codified in Article 1 (a), which defined a 
worker merely by her/his attachment to a relevant social securin' scheme.
Although 1408/71, when adopted, contained the institutional experience of its predecessor and 
inherited its notion o f ‘worker’, the personal scope of co-ordinated social securin' rights was far 
from settled, and it continued to be disputed for the next three decades. Legal dialogues benveen 
citizens, national courts and the Court of Justice have questioned and clarified the rights of family 
members**1, the concept of employed and self-employed persons, and whether employment status 
depends on the hours spent on the work-activity**11. Through its successive case-law, the Court 
declared that the meanings of employed and self-employed are extensive, and that the amount of 
hours spent working does not influence one’s status as worker whatsoever. The individual 
development of Regulation 1408*s personal scope emphasised that the Regulation applied to 
persons w ho were not migrant workers within the meaning of the Treaty's Article 39, nor w ithin the 
meaning of Regulation 1612. As time went by, the applicable scope of the Regulation became wider 
as its notion of w orker became more precise.
2.4: Anticipated Extension to the Self-Employed
Two years after Regulation 1408 was approved, the UK, Ireland, and Denmark joined the 
Community, and with this first enlargement the acquis communauitairc was to be applied to the 
residence-based social security models of the new members. The application was by no means 
straightforward, one reason being that the residence-based model did not have distinct schemes for 
w orkers on the one hand, and other categories of persons on the other. The problem w ith applying 
institutionalised rules to different social security traditions became evident in case 17/76 Brack106, 
on which both the United Kingdom and Denmark submitted observations.
I<* Case 17/76,29 September 1976. A l L. E. Bmck, widow o f  R. J. Brack v Insurance Officer. ECR 1976, p. 1429. The 
Submitted Danish observation will be discussed in chapter VII as part o f the analysis on perceptions o f impact.
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In the Brack case, the Court was asked whether a British national who had been an employed 
person 17 years earlier, but was self-employed at the time of the actual incident, had a right to claim 
for sickness cash benefits for a period o f illness in France.xx,u Mr Brack had been insured under the 
British national insurance scheme both as an employed and as a self-employed person. The 
observation submitted by the UK government provided a description of the development of its 
social security legislation, initially covering only narrowly defined classes of workers, but gradually 
extended to other classes. The general scheme did not draw a distinction between those regarded as 
wage-earning workers and those belonging to other categories. According to the United Kingdom, it 
would be beyond the scope of the Regulation if  an actually self-employed would be covered due to 
the fact that he was insured by a national social security scheme which did not distinguish between 
categories of employment.
In this specific case, the Court overruled the institutional objections put forward in the submitted 
observations, and referred instead to the historical logic of 1408/71. Just as Regulation no. 3 was, 
1408/71 must also be interpreted in light o f the spirit and the objectives of the Treat)'. With 
reference to the historical case-law on Regulation no. 3, the Court stressed that the evolution of the 
Community rules on social security reflected the developments in the social law of the member 
states, where more personal categories have been covered by social security schemes;
"... it must be borne in mind that, as the Court has previously held, the Community' rules on social security "follow 
a general tendency of the social law of Member States to extend the benefits o f social security in favour of new 
categories of persons by reasons of identical risks’'"' (para. 20 of the judgement ).107
Since Brack was still insured under the social security scheme for employed persons, the Court 
found that he enjoyed the rights to sickness cash benefits, despite falling ill outside of the UK's 
territory. Though Brack had been self-employed for most of his working life, and was so when he 
fell ill in France, he retained the full rights provided for in Regulation 1408/71. The Court found the 
Regulation applicable to;
"persons who, although they have lost the status as employed persons, remain compulsorily insured under the 
same scheme w hich covered them previously w hen they had that status” (para. 24 o f the judgement).
10 The Court referred to Case 19/68, 19 December 1968. Giovanni de Cicco v Landesversicherungsanstalt Sclrwaben. 
ECR 1968, page 473 and to Case 23/71, 27 October 1971. \  tichel Janssen v Landsbond der christelijke mutualiteiten. 
ECR 1971, page 864.
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In the Brack case, the European Court of Justice granted intra-Europe an social security rights to the 
self-employed. 5 years before the Council adopted the amendment Regulation 1390/81, which 
definitively included the category.
2.5: Council Codification and Further Interpretation
A key feature throughout the historical development of co-ordinated social securin' has been the 
continual work to amend the Regulation. As depicted in Appendix 4. Regulation 1408 has been 
changed 27 times between 1971 and 2002. Behind this high number lies an even higher one of 
proposed amendments, which suggests that from the Commission's point of view, co-ordinated 
social security is never really sufficient or up-to-date.
When the Commission began its revision of Regulation no. 3 in 1964, it was initially envisaged that 
the self-employed shoutd be included in the personal scope (van Racpenbusch 1997, p. 71). 
However, the proposal was later withdrawn with the argument that including the self-employed 
would add too much technical complexity to the Regulation (Hollow ay 1981, p. 296).
In light of the case-law interpretations of the personal scope, the Commission proposed in 
December 1977 that the self-employed should be included.108 The proposal was subsequently 
amended and rc-proposcd to the Council in October 1978.109 At the same time, the 'Administrative 
Commission* suggested extending the applicable scope to include all persons covered by a social 
security scheme of a member state, regardless of their employment status (Pieters 1997, p. 205). 
However, the latter idea had to wait until the beginning of the 1990s. when it was re-vitalised in the 
light of the three residence directives110 (van Racpenbusch 1997, p. 80).
108 OJ C 14/9 o f)  8 January 1978, proposed to the Council 31 December 1977.
10g O.T C 246/2 o f!7  October 1987, proposed to the Council 28 September 1978.
110 See footnote 69 above.
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Envisaged as early as 1964, the self-employed and their family members were finally included in 
the personal scope by the Regulation amendment 1390/81, adopted in May 1981.111 In the 
explanatory memorandum, the extension of the scope of application was reasoned by the fact that 
the free movement o f persons was not confined to employed persons and, in the framework of the 
freedom o f establishment and the freedom to supply services, Regulation 1408 should include the 
self-employed as well. The explanatory memorandum further reasoned that since 1408/71 already 
covered certain categories of self-employed persons, it should, for the sake of equity, be extended to 
all self-employed.
Whereas the inclusion of the self-employed in the co-ordinating framework was deemed necessary 
for attaining one of the Community objectives, the Treaty did not provide a specific legal basis for 
this purpose. Since the Treaty’s Article 51 could not be used as a legal basis for any extension of 
social security rules beyond workers, the self-employed were brought within the regulatory' scope 
on the legal basis of Article 235 (now art. 308). The Council hereby agreed that the Community 
objectives went beyond the strict meaning of Article 51. The total Treaty basis for the inclusion of 
self-employed thus consisted of Articles 2, 7, 51 and 235.
Despite its inclusion, the meaning of "self-employed" was not immediately elaborated, and had to 
be clarified through another legal dispute. In case 300/84 van Roosmalen112, the Court was asked 
whether a Roman Catholic priest fell within the definition of sel f-em ployed.xx,v In its judgement, the 
Court emphasised that Regulation 1390 was adopted to achieve the same objectives as 1408, and 
therefore self-employed were entitled to the same level of protection as employed persons. The term 
"self-employed“' had a wide meaning as well (Comelissen 1996, p. 421; Pcnnings 1998, p. 43). 
Despite a somewhat non-standard type of self-employment, a person engaged in work such as van 
Roosmalen 's, fell within the personal scope o f the Regulation, because like ‘employed person* 
‘self-employed' was to be interpreted according to the objective of the Treaty's Article 51.
“With regard to the interpretation of the expression “self-employed person", it must first be pointed out that 
initially the provisions of Regulation no 1408/71, adopted for the implementation of Article 51 of the Treaty, 
applied only to those who were covered by the term “employed person". According to the established case-law' of
111 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1390/81 of 12 May 1981 extending to self-employed persons and members o f their 
families Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application o f social security schemes to employed persons and their 
families moving within the Community.
112 Case 300/84,23 October 1986. AJJiI. van Roosmalen v Bestuvr van de Bedrijfsvereniging voorde Gezondheid, 
Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen. ECR 1986, page 3097.
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the court, "employed person'' is a term of Community law rather than national law and must be interpreted 
broadly, having regard to the objective of Article 51, which is to contribute towards the establishment o f the 
greatest possible freedom of movement for migrant workers, an objective w hich is one of the foundations of the 
Community''(para. 18 o f the judgment).
The Court thus reasoned its interpretation, referring to its previous case-law, and the logic o f the 
argument closely resembled that used in the early judgements on Regulation no. 3. The teleological 
interpretation of the Court defined the concept of self-employed broadly.
2.6: In the Light of the Treaty Spirit -  Dynamic Aims and Means
The personal scope of both Regulation 3, and its descendant Regulation 1408, extended 
incrementally due to a teleological interpretation by the Court and the Council's acceptance and 
codification of it. The Court cultivated a distinct social security notion of 'worker', which, from its 
earliest interpretations, covered more than just those in active employment, such as individuals 
moving for leisure reasons. The first cases justified the wide interpretation on the basis of Article 5 1 
of the Treaty itself. The principal objective of Article 51 was not simply to guarantee migrant 
workers social security, but also to promote the greatest possible freedom of movement for workers. 
Interpretations followed the guiding light of the Treaty spirit. After the adoption of Regulation 
1408, the Court anticipated the imminent inclusion of the self-employed, once again justified as 
being in keeping with the spirit o f the Treaty. Five years later, the Council adopted the Regulation 
amendment which finally covered the self-employed. However, no matter how broadly the aims of 
the Treaty's Article 51 were constructed, it could not be used as the legal basis of any extension 
beyond workers. Adopting Regulation 1390/81 required Article 235 (now art. 308) as the other 
Treaty base, in this way, the member states formally accepted that the purpose o f 1408/71 went 
beyond promoting the free movement o f workers. The adoption illustrates that the Community 
objectives with Regulation 1408, as well as the competencies of the Community', were by no means 
given, but open to further interpretation. With the self-employed persons included under the 
umbrella, the Court continued its broad definition of the personal scope, whereby the line of 
reasoning in previous case-law served as grounds for new conclusions. Since ‘employed persons’ 
was understood broadly, ‘self-employed’ had to be as well.
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As was the case in the previous section on the principle of equal treatment, this section's analytical 
findings equally support theoretical interpretations on legal autonomy. The process tracing study on 
the historical definition of 1408/71 personal scope has pointed the Court out as a supranational 
organisation enjoying a relative high degree of interpretive autonomy and authority. Furthermore, 
the examination of the institution as a historical phenomenon has made it clear that member states 
have disagreed among themselves, and with the Court, on the aim and content of the Regulation. 
The Court has, however, overruled member state opinions, and institutionalisation has proceeded 
despite the absence of converging national interests. The research findings have demonstrated the 
gradual emergence of a legal path dependency as a process decided by continuous, but very gradual, 
(rc)intcrpretarions and (re)clarifications of who has the right to intra European social security rights. 
In this incremental extension of rights, the Court has certainly been the proactive part and the 
Council has merely codified judicial activism, and accepted a dynamic legal interpretation of aims 
and means.
The development of the personal scope from Regulation no. 3 to the first two decades of 1408/71 ‘s 
institutional existence, left students, civil servants, non-active persons, and third country nationals 
without access to cross-border social security. These excluded groups have subsequently been 
incorporated in new proposals, which were formulated by the Commission and considered by the 
Council, as will now be demonstrated.
3.0: Pro po sin g  a Generalised Personal Scope
Up until the 1990s, the personal scope of 1408 was extended mainly through the jurisprudence of 
the Court and the Council's 1981 adoption of the extension to the self-employed. The 1990s was the 
decade in which the Commission re-challenged the status quo of the Regulation, and initiated a 
dialogue with the member states on the future personal scope of the Regulation through proposals 
and recommendations. According to the Commission, a personal scope restricted to the market 
citizen would be inadequate. Instead, it should include all European citizens as well as legally 
residing third country nationals. By putting the latter on the agenda, the Commission went beyond a 
communitarian conception of social protection.
136
This section focuses on the Commission's position as initiator and policy entrepreneur. The section 
analyses the way in which the Commission managed, through proposals and recommendations, to 
set an agenda that proved the insufficiency of Regulation I408*s personal scope. As later 
negotiations demonstrate, the Commission pursued its agenda by coupling key issues. European 
citizenship and the free movement of persons were invoked as strong arguments for extending the 
co-ordination of social security rights to all Community nationals. The moral obligation and the 
political commitment to improve the legal status of third country nationals became arguments for 
including persons who were not member state nationals. Below, the analysis first illustrates how a 
"People's Europe'" developed into a citizenship argument, and how Commission recommendations 
were used as a means to substantiate the need to extend Regulation 1408. Second, it explains how 
the Commission initiated its dialogue writh the member states concerning the extension of the 
regulatory scope beyond European citizens, and also how the Commission initially interpreted the 
scope and limits of the Treaty base, so as to justify- an extension to third country nationals.
3.1: Proposing New Value to European Citizenship
The adoption of the three residence directives in 1990 revived the idea, which dated back to the late 
seventies, that 1408/71 should be extended to all member states* citizens. In December 1991, the 
Commission presented a proposal to extend the Regulation to all Community citizens insured in a 
member state.111 The proposal referred to the new general right of residence, and was found to be 
"indispensable in the context of the social dimension of the internal market and a People's Europe" 
(COM (91) 528, p. 3).
However, it soon became clear that, in the beginning of the 1990s. the member states were far from 
prepared to grant any such radical extension of the personal scope. The Commission therefore had a 
long way to go to gain support for its proposal. The soft-law tool of recommendations was used to 
emphasize how 'the peoples of Europe* merited equal rights. European citizenship was brought in 
as a new dimension of European integration (Comelissen 1997, p. 30). In its communication. 
"Modernising and Improving Social Protection in the European Union*'114, the Commission argued:
,t3 COM (91 ) 528 final. Presented by the Commission 13 December 1991. 
m Communication from the Commission. COM (97) 102 final. 12 March 1997,
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“The original dimension of European integration, i.e. a common market allowing and fostering free movement of 
workers, has been enriched by a new concept, namely that o f European citizenship. The personal scope of 
Regulation 1408/71 should be adapted accordingly” (COM (97) 102, p. 16, emphasis added).
There were other soft-law communications on the free movement of persons in 1997, which also 
dealt with the instrument of Regulation 1408. On a Commission mandate, a high level panel on the 
free movement of persons was set up to identify the ‘'obstacles which confront European citizens 
seeking to exercise their rights to move freely and to work within the Union'7 (‘'Report of the High 
Level Panel'7, p. 91).115 The report was motivated by the Commission's recognition that, of the four 
fundamental freedoms of the single market, the least progress had been made on the free movement 
of persons. The Commission argued that even though free movement was an institutionalised right, 
it was not yet a practicable fact for European people. The report confirmed the Commission's line 
of reasoning according to which the exercise o f free movement was argued to constitute an essential 
means towards other Union objectives;
“The effectiveness o f the right to move freely would contribute not only to attaining the objectives of the single 
market but also bringing the Community closer to the goal of an “ever closer union among the peoples o f  
Europe" envisaged in the original treaties, which gave form to the Communities and, subsequently, to the 
European Union” (“Report of the High Level Panel”, p. 94, emphasis added).
The high level panel pointed out the incompleteness of Regulation 1408 as one of the obstacles to 
free movement. Its personal scope was held to be inadequate, given the many changes that had 
occurred since its adoption, particularly the adoption of the three residence directives. The panel 
found it both logical and essential to extend the scope to cover all persons entitled to move freely 
within the Union.
The panel's recommendations were later followed up in “An Action Plan on the Free Movement of 
Workers'7. In this document, the Commission stressed that free movement had to be seen in a new 
perspective. The Commission expected that, due to demographic changes and the changed nature of 
working life, free movement would become much more important over the next 10-20 years than it 
had been for the last 30 years (COM (97) 586, p. 8). Although the ‘acquis communautairc' was 
pointed out as the starting point for reinforcing free movement, it contained “serious flaws and
115 "Report o f the High Level Panel on the free movement of persons chaired by Mrs Simone Veil” . Presented to the 
Commission on 18 March 1997.
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lacunae" (COM (97) 586, p. 5). Once again, the Commission identified the right of free movement 
as a substantial part of European citizenship:
“Moreover, following the report o f the High Level Panel, which also concerns free movement o f persons who are 
not exercising an economic activity, the Commission has already announced its intention to present in 1998 
proposals to simplify and enhance the existing secondary legislation with a view to drawing all consequences in 
order to give fu ll value to the citizenship o f  the Union' (COM (97) 586, p. 9, emphasis added).
The communication emphasised co-ordination of social security rights as a prerequisite for free 
movement, but said that the Community system was in need of reform and simplification. The 
Commission obliged itself to press for the adoption of pending proposals, among others the 
proposal on the personal scope from 1991. Furthermore, it intended to present a simplification 
proposal before the end of 1998 (COM (97) 586, pp. 11-12).
3.2: Proposals, Recommendations and a Partial Adoption
The proposals and recommendations set forth by the Commission in the 1990s, introduced and 
reinforced new perspectives on the co-ordination of social security' rights. Whereas the institutional 
aim in the 1970s and 1980s had been to allocate production factors more efficiently, by the 1990s, 
the goal of cultural integration among the "peoples of Europe* had been added to the economic 
objectives of the single market. According to this line of reasoning, 1408 should be up-dated to 
reflect the state of overall Union development, and brought in line with the general right of free 
movement. The Commission formulated its point of view clearly; cross-border social security rights 
should be attached to European citizenship rights.
However, the proposal for a generalised personal scope made no headway until the late 1990s. 
During the Austrian presidency in the autumn of 1998, a compromise was formulated that 
proposed a separate extension o f the personal scope to students. The strategy of the Commission 
and the Austrian presidency was to isolate the more controversial part of COM (91) 528 on the 
extension to non-active persons and special schemes for civil serv ants, and thereby accelerate the 
Council's approval of the inclusion of students.116 Furthermore, the compromise was made
116 Informative note from the Danish Ministry o f Labour to the European Committee of the Danish Parliament, 19 
October 1998, supplement 47, p. 15.
139
Lii
possible by proposing a separate material scope for students. The proposal put students outside of 
the Regulation's part on social pension, and the material impact of the extended personal scope 
was thus reduced (Interview, DG Employment and Social Affairs, 12 September 2001). Since 
students had already been granted the right to medical treatment outside of their home country117, 
the inclusion only meant access to cross-border family benefits. The Council adopted the 
proposal including students in December 1998, and codified the inclusion in Regulation 307/99 
of 8 February 1999.118 As had been the case with self-employed, students were included on the 
grounds of both Articles 51 and 235 of the Treaty.
3.3: Beyond European Citizenship
At the same time as ‘European citizenship* was being introduced as the new justification for an 
extension of Regulation 1408’s personal scope, the Commission also suggested that the Regulation 
be extended to legally residing third country nationals. It thus presented a notion of European 
citizenship which was independent of the exclusion of a third part as the “inevitable flipside'* of the 
concept of membership, and thereby challenged a traditional communitarian perception of co­
ordinated social security rights (Shaw 1997, p. 3). By placing the rights of third country nationals 
on the agenda, the Commission introduced an amplified comprehension of the Regulation's 
purpose, arguing that, although non-Community nationals do not enjoy any rights of free movement 
under Community law, they should still enjoy the social protection of 1408. The questions of 
whether and how to ensure the co-ordination of social security rights for third country nationals 
launched a protracted legal and political dispute, in which legal questions became political and vice 
versa. Indeed, this dispute exemplifies the degree to which law and politics may become 
intertwined.
The background to the Commission's initiative was the fact that even though third country nationals 
are not entitled to free movement under Community' law, they may, due to international law or
11 By Council Regulation (EC) No 3095/95 of 22 December 1995, the right to cross-border medical treatment had been 
granted to all insured member state citizens, thus including students. This extension will be discussed further as part of 
die analysis in chapter V below.
118 Council Regulation (EC) No 307/1999 o f 8 February 1999 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the 
application o f social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employ ed persons and to members of their families 
moving within the Community and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 with a view to extending them to cover students.
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bilateral agreements, enjoy the right to move between member states (Interview, DG Employment 
and Social Affairs, 13 September 2001). Due to their exclusion from 1408/71, they risked losing 
any social security entitlements they had accrued via regular contributions to a member state's 
social security scheme, if they left that member state for another (Roberts 2000, p. 190).
On these grounds, the Commission opened the discussion in 1993, questioning whether it was still 
justifiable to exclude third country nationals from the protection offered by 1408 (COM (93) 551). 
The question was posed by the Belgian chair to member slate representatives, at an informal 
Council in Charleroi in November 1993. However, the meeting did not mobilise sufficient support 
for a general extension of Regulation 1408 beyond Community citizens. The meeting nevertheless 
suggested that a limited extension, granting third country nationals a right to intra European health 
care, as regulated under Article 22 o f 1408/71, might be supported (Roberts 2000, p. 192). On this 
basis, the Commission announced its intention to extend Article 22 to third country' nationals as a 
first step (COM (94) 333). Furthermore, at the Portuguese colloquium in November 1994, the 
Commission presented its long-term intentions to extend the whole scope of 1408 to non- 
Community nationals legally residing in the Union. The member states' delegates attending were 
told that such an extension would not only satisfy' a moral obligation, but that it would also result in 
a legal and administrative simplification (Roberts ibid). Even though granting third country 
nationals a right to health care benefits would only be an initial and very limited extension of 1408, 
the proposal was vetoed by the UK, when it was finally presented to the Council in November 
1995. As part of the same negotiations, the Council adopted Regulation 3095/95, w hich extended 
1408/71 's Article 22 to all member states* nationals insured in a social security scheme.
This initial Council refusal did not, however, discourage the Commission from proceeding with its 
long-term intention. In the recommendation that suggested that free movement and Regulation 1408 
be brought in line with European citizenship, the Commission also insisted that 1408, on the whole, 
should be extended to third country nationals (COM (97) 102, p. 17). The Commission obliged 
itself to present a separate proposal in 1997 concerning 1408's extension to non-Community 
nationals with legal residence in the Union (COM (97) 586, p. 12).
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3.4: The First Separate Proposal on Third Country Nationals
Within the normative framework o f the European Year Against Racism in 1997, the Commission 
came up with its announced separate proposal on an extension of 1408/71 to third country nationals, 
legally residing and insured in one of the member states.119 The rather extensive explanatory 
memorandum of COM (97) 561, amounting to no less than 8 pages, indicates that the proposal was 
controversial on several points.
The proposal was motivated by the general desire to improve the legal status of third country 
nationals residing in the Community’. The Commission emphasised that this objective was generally 
accepted and had been formulated in its own recommendations: in resolutions from the European 
Parliament; and in opinions from the Economic and Social Committee (COM (97) 561, p. 2). 
Moreover, the Commission reminded the Council that it had recognised;
“the great importance o f implementing, in the field o f social policy, policies based on the principle o f non­
discrimination and equal opportunity at Community' and Member State level, within the framework of their 
respective powers, as a contribution to the common fight against racism and xenophobia’' (COM (97) 561, p. 3, 
quoted from Council resolution120 of 5 October 1995).
The Commission pointed out that third country' nationals suffered from a ‘‘muddied legal situation", 
where rights w ere by no means uniform and each individual case could be considered through a 
"multiplicity of protection levels" (COM (97) 561, p. 5). Some might be covered by 1408 as 
refugees or stateless persons, some as family members, others through an agreement between the 
Community and a specific third country, and yet others by individual bilateral or multilateral 
agreements. A remaining group of third country' nationals might not benefit from any social security 
protection at all, should they move within the Community. This complexity was identified as 
harmful to individuals, and a source of administrative difficulties when deciding specific rights. The 
Commission noted that third country nationals contribute to the social security systems of member 
states, just as Community nationals do.
m  COM (97) 561 final. Presented by the Commission 12 November 1997.
120 Point 3 o f the Resolution of the Council and the representatives o f the Governments of the Member States of 5 
October 1995 on the fight against racism and xenophobia in the fields of employ ment and Social Policy (OJ C 296, 
10.11.1995).
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The Commission did not find that 1408's requirement to be ‘'nationals of one of the Member States'" 
precluded an extension of the Regulation to third country nationals. It emphasised that the 
nationality requirement was not an absolute, and indeed was set aside in the cases of family 
members and survivors, refugees and stateless persons, and persons from the EE A member 
countries (COM (97) 561, p. 4).
3.5; The Reach of Community Competence?
The issue of nationality underlies the long argumentation in proposal COM (97) 561 on its Treaty 
basis. Traditionally, 1408 had been formulated as an instrument to promote the free movement of 
workers and, according to Article 48 (now art. 39) of the Treaty, only Community workers enjoy 
the right to free movement. A key point in the long-running dispute on the potential inclusion of 
non-communitarian nationals in Regulation 1408 was the question of whether Article 51 (now art. 
42) of the Treaty was inextricably bound to Article 48, and thus dependant on the nationality 
requirement of the latter. According to the Commission this was not the case. Article 51 and 
Regulation 1408 had gained instrumental value, not solely as means of promoting free movement, 
but also as instruments of social protection:
“Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 is not just geared to the free movement o f workers but also constitutes an 
instrument o f  social protection. For the purpose o f applying the Regulation, the crucial element is not exercise of 
the right to freedom of movement but the fac t that the person concerned is insured under a social security’ 
scheme. The purpose is to maintain social protection for persons moving within the Community for whatever 
reason. In line with the task devolving on the Community under Article 2 of the EC Treaty, the aim is to provide a 
high level o f  social protection'' (COM (97) 561, p. 8, emphasis added).
To support its interpretation, the Commission pointed out that 1408/71 also regulated the cases 
where the person concerned might not have exercised her/his right to free movement for workers, 
but where a problem of social security arose due to a cross-border situation.121 Furthermore, it 
substantiated its viewpoint with the historical fact that Regulation no. 3 was adopted on the basis of 
Article 51 ten years before the right to free movement for workers actually came into force in 1968 
with Regulation 1612/68 and directive 68/360. Finally, the Commission reminded the Council and
121 The Commission emphasised that Article 10 o f the Regulation makes it possible for a person to export benefits to a 
member state in which he may never have worked, that Article 22 enables persons temporarily staying in another 
member state to receive health care, and that Article 73 ensures family benefits to family members who reside in 
another member state.
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the Court that they had already applied the Regulation to persons who were not migrant workers 
according to the meaning of Article 48 of the Treaty, and thus,
"appear to recognize that Article 51 of the EC Treaty allows the Community to co-ordinate national social security 
schemes for all workers insured under one of those schemes, even if they are not migrant workers within the 
meaning o f Article 48 of the EC Treaty'’ (COM (97) 561, p. 9).
Referring to the extension of the Regulation to the self-employed, the Commission suggested that, 
in so far as Article 51 was not a sufficient legal basis on which to include third country nationals, 
Article 235 could be added with the objective of attaining ‘a high level o f social protection" which 
is stated as a Community task in the Treaty’s Article 2.
Despite the various arguments listed by the Commission, member states remained dead-locked on 
the issue, and it was left unresolved for years. One political concern put forward by the UK was 
that, although the proposal emphasised that third country nationals were not granted any right of 
free movement under Community law122, it still remained unclear if  non-community nationals 
would be entitled to the social protection of the Regulation without having moved between member 
states. 1408"s Article 3, stating equal treatment, in conjunction with Article 2 of COM (97) 561 
could be understood as if the Regulation covered non-Community nationals moving from a third 
country directly into a member state, and who had only been subject to the legislation of one 
member state (Roberts 2000, p. 194; Langer 2000, p. 42). The UK thus feared that Community law 
could oblige member states to treat third country nationals equally to their own nationals on the 
basis of 1408/71, w ithout their having moved across Community borders.
Directly or indirectly, the major disagreement hampering negotiations in the Council was the 
question of the appropriate Treaty' basis and, thus, the scope and limits of Community competences. 
On the one hand, the Commission held that 1408/71 had become an instrument of social policy, 
even when free movement had not been exercised. It did not find that the use of Articles 42 and 308 
as a Treaty base, required the personal category' addressed to enjoy also the right to free movement. 
On the other hand, a minority of member governments, i.e. the United Kingdom, Denmark and 
Ireland, maintained that Articles 42 and 308 did not together constitute an appropriate Treaty base
122 COM (97) 561, p. 7.
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(Council document123 12831/99, SOC 394). Behind these reservations was a political conviction 
that, since the Treaty conferred free movement on Community citizens only, the task formulated in 
the Treaty's Article 2 was to promote a high level of social protection equally applied to citizens of 
the Community only. These member governments thus found that the primary law of the 
Community did not contain any competence to extend the personal scope of 1408/71 beyond 
Community nationals. Such an extension would fundamentally extend the Community's objectives, 
and thus require a Treaty amendment (Roberts 2000, p. 195).
Until November 2001, the Commission maintained that Article 42 and 308 together constituted the 
appropriate Treaty base on which to extend 1408 to third country nationals. Both the European 
Parliament and most member states supported the Commission.124 In the autumn o f 1999, the 
Finnish presidency set about getting the negotiations out of deadlock by presenting various types of 
compromises, in which the extension of the Regulation was restricted in terms of the material 
scope. None o f these compromises, however, were approved. The presidency thus concluded that it 
was not the substance of the proposal that caused problems, but rather its legal basis. Only Denmark 
continued to express its political reservations about extending 1408 to third country nationals, 
whereas all the other member states were, in principal, in favour (Council document125 13186/99, 
SOC 414). However, as long as no agreement was reached on the legal basis of the proposal, 
member states were unwilling to continue the discussions on the actual content of the proposal. The 
question on the legal basis was a dead-end for COM (97) 561, and no progress was made despite 
the political commitment declared by the great majority. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
paved the way for a compromise between the two positions.
3.6: Proposing New Borders of a Personal Scope
In the 1990s, the Commission formulated its agenda for the future personal scope of Regulation 
1408. In theoretical terms, the research findings above have shown the Commission to be the
m  Council document of 12 November 1999.
124 See Council document of 1 June 1999, no. 8807/99, SOC 228: Council document o f 11 November 1999, no. 
12830/99, SOC 393: Council document o f 12 November 1999, no. 12831/99, SOC 394; Council document o f  22 
November 1999, no. 13186/99, SOC 414: Parliament document of 7 September 1999, no. A4-0302/98; Parliament 
document of 5. November 2002, no. A5-0369/2002.
125 Council document o f 22 November 1999.
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supranational organisation which pertinacious attempted to set the agenda. By continually linking 
coordination rules to the issues of free movement and later to European citizenship, it emphasised 
that objectives and instruments, were at no stage definitive or literal, but dynamic and contextual. 
Through issue-linking and creative readings, the Commission pushed, from early on, towards a 
'social Europe'. The Commission found Regulation 1408 outdated and incongruous with the 
Union's development from an economic community to a political union, with rights granted on the 
basis of citizenship. The argument so far seemed to replicate a traditional communitarian reasoning 
for granting rights, where social rights strengthen the link between the political centre and its 
citizens. But the Commission's agenda went beyond such limitations and aimed at including all 
persons with legal residence on the geographical territory of the Community, independent of 
economic status and nationality.
By proposing a regulatory scope which included non-active persons and third country nationals, the 
Commission went far beyond the strict wording of the Treaty's Article 42, literally aiming to 
provide freedom of movement for workers by coordinating their social security rights. According to 
the Commission, Regulation 1408 had become an instrument of social policy and not merely an 
instrument which promoted free movement. The Commission did not find that it would be beyond 
the scope of the Treaty, and thus the competence of the Community, to extend 1408's personal 
scope to third country nationals legally residing in a member state. This viewpoint was widely 
supported, though it was opposed by a minority composed of the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark. Although the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere conclusions gave new momentum to 
case the rigid positions, the disagreement on Community competences and the appropriate Treaty 
base continued until the case-law of the Court, in 2001, came to settle the matter, as shall be 
demonstrated below.
4.0: Negotiating a Generalised P ersonal Scope
While the previous section described the Commission's agenda to pursue a more generalised 
personal scope, this section analyses the subsequent negotiations in the Council on including non­
active persons and third country nationals in the personal scope. The a n a ly s is  is presented in five 
stages. First, we examine the reform proposed by the Commission to simplify and modernise 
1408/71, and how that proposal was initially negotiated in the Council. Second\ we look at how the
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Commission attempted to overcome a deadlock by proposing a full-scale reform of Article 42 
during the Treaty of Nice negotiations. Third, we discuss how the political question of the inclusion 
of third country nationals turned into a legal search for the correct Treaty base. Fourth. wc describe 
the case-law solution that emerged out of that legal search. Finally, in the fifth part, wc analyse how 
the Khalil judgement brought about a breakthrough in negotiations, and how the original 
Commission proposal was split in two, whereby negotiations on the rights of European citizens 
were held separate from those of third country nationals. After a decade of negotiations and 
political-judicial dispute, the Council has recently unanimously adopted a common position on 
extending the Regulation to non-active persons, thus definitively breaking the link between 
economic activity and the right to cross border social security. Furthermore, legally residing third 
country nationals have finally been granted a right to intra-European social security in 14 member 
states, the exception to this being Denmark. However, without the right of free movement, the 
extension is, first and foremost, of an abstract and symbolic value, rather than being enforceable in 
practical terms, as will be argued below.
4.1: Modernisation and Simplification Proposed and Negotiated
With no appreciable progress on the separate proposal concerning third country nationals, the 
Commission presented its long-announced proposal to simplify and modernise Regulation 1408 in 
late December 1998. which had been politically mandated at the Edinburgh Council in I992., ’'t The 
6 years between mandate and proposal had been used for detailed discussions in the ‘Administrative 
Commission' and seminars had been held in each individual member state, followed by careful 
drafting (Interview, German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 19 September 2001). 
The aim of the proposal was tw ofold: to simplify and modernise 1408/71.
The Edinburgh Council recognised the need to simplify the Regulation at the highest political level. 
This political mandate was followed up by the Commission in its various communications, arguing 
that, over the years, the instrumental value of the Regulation had decreased by its ovens helming 
complexity. The many amendments that 1408 had undergone during its almost 30 scars of 
institutional existence, had mainly consisted of modest changes, with no full-scale reforms. The
1:6 COM (1998) 779 final. Proposal for a Council Regulation (PC) on coordination of social sevunty systems of 2\ 
December 1998.
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requirement of unanimity had repeatedly hindered major reforms, and the consensus procedure had 
established a practice whereby a strong political pressure in favour o f an exception to the main rule, 
was met by adding an annex (Interview, DG Employment and Social Affairs, 12 September 2001). 
However, the practice of adding exceptions had created a situation where very' important aspects of 
the Regulation were found in annexes, and not the main text (Interview, Danish Ministry of Social 
Affairs, 8 November 2002). Within this procedural context, complexity had gradually been fortified 
by (Pennings 2001, pp. 45-47), 1) the many exceptions from the main mlcs formulated in the 
annexes; 2) the case-law interpretations of how to read the regulatory text, distancing the literal text 
from the correct interpretation; and 3) the lack of memorandums explaining the rationale of the 
individual provisions, for which reason administrative institutions and the ECJ have had to 
continuously interpret the actual content of the Article. The result was that rights and obligations 
could not be read directly from the text, but had to be ‘translated' on the basis of a detailed 
knowledge of the extensive annexed text and established case-law, as well as of national 
administrative practises. The complexity’ of 1408 made it unreadable for the migrant wishing to 
inform hcr/himself of her/his rights, difficult to access for those who wished to advise the migrant; 
and difficult to administer for the respective competent national institutions. In the Commission's 
proposal, simplification had concretely produced a more accessible regulatory’ text, in which the 99 
governing Articles were reduced to 70,
With simplification as one ambitious purpose, the proposal furthermore aimed at modernising 1408. 
The negotiations on modernisation highlighted several sensitive political issues. First of all, 
modernisation concerned an amended personal scope. As originally proposed, the Regulation was 
meant to ‘‘apply to all persons who are or have been covered by the social security legislation of any 
of the Member States" (COM (1998) 779, p. 4). This formulation meant that ‘persons' would be 
covered irrespective of their economic status and of their nationality. In this way, 1408 would come 
to include non-active persons, students with no separate substantive scope, and third country 
nationals. By including non-active persons and non-community’ nationals, the original proposal 
addressed the two main controversial aspects of the previous proposals (91) 528 and (97) 561. 
Secondly, the material scope of 1408 was supposed to be modernised so as to cover pre-retirement 
benefits, besides the classic branches of social security’ (COM (1998) 779, ibid; Eichcnhofcr 2000, 
p. 233).
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As originally formulated, the proposal added Article 18 to the Treaty base, along with Articles 42 
and 308. The Commission thus suggested that, formally, 1408 should be based on the provision on 
free movement which is included in the Treaty's section on citizenship of the Union. In the 
explanatory memorandum, the former aim of the Regulation - to promote free movement of 
workers - had now been replaced by the aim of giving “real and tangible value7' to the free 
movement of persons:
“Community legislation on social security is a sine qua non for exercising the right to free mowment ofpersons.
Only by ensuring that persons moving within the Community do not suffer disadvantages in their social security
rights will this freedom guaranteed by the Treaty be of real and tangible value" (COM (1998) 779, p. 1, emphasis
added).
From the outset, the Council agreed in principle to simplify the Regulation (Interview, DG 
Employment and Social Affairs, 13 September 2001). Although the Commission drafted the 
proposal, the member states had been closely involved in its creation, mandating simplification at 
the Edinburgh Council, and participating in the preparatory’ discussions in the ‘Administrative 
Commission' as in the national seminars. The extent of reform could therefore hardly be surprising 
to the national representatives. Nevertheless, discussions in the Council's ‘working party on social 
questions' progressed slowly.
Negotiations, initiated during the German presidency in the first half o f 1999, continued during the 
Finnish, Portuguese and French presidencies, but without any noticeable result (Interview, Danish 
Permanent Representation, 18 December 2002). On simplification, progress was difficult when 
discussing individual provisions or exemptions, which were favoured by a specific member state or 
group of member states. Discussing the details, national representatives added reservations, and 
waited for a political mandate or asked for further scrutiny of the matter. Since the current 
regulatory text reflected a subtle balance of compromises between the member states, even modest 
changes became delicate issues (Interview, Danish Ministry o f Social Affairs, 4 April 2001).
However, the real crux of the matter appeared to be the politically sensitive parts o f the proposal 
(Pcnnings 2001, 45). The inclusion of third country nationals was again the most controversial 
issue, and, from the beginning, Denmark and the UK held strong reservations (Roberts 2000,
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Council Document127 8807/99, SOC 228). Also, the inclusion of non-active persons caused some 
trouble, and, furthermore, the extension of the material scope delayed negotiations (Interview, DG 
Employment and Social Affairs, 12 September 2001).
4.2: Negotiating the Treaty Base
In the meantime, the intergovernmental conference on institutional reform, which negotiated the 
Treat}' of Nice, held out the prospect that the deadlock situation could be resolved by changing the 
procedure and content of the Treaty's Article 42. Pointing to the prospect of enlargement to up to 28 
Member States, the Commission argued that qualified majority voting should be the rule and 
unanimity the exception.128 In its first initiative, the Commission noted that, over the years, the 
unanimity requirement in Article 42 had often rendered reform of Regulation 1408 impossible.129 
Ongoing negotiations on COM (1998) 779 suffered the same difficulties, since the unanimity 
requirement seriously hindered progress. The Commission therefore proposed that the procedure of 
Article 42 was amended to qualified majority voting. In addition, it argued that it was necessary to 
broaden the formulation of Article 42, extending its scope beyond workers. The amendment of the 
Regulation to include the self-employed and students, had only been possible with Article 308 as a 
second legal basis. If a future extension of the personal scope still had to be approved in conjunction 
with the Treat}-'s Article 308, which required unanimity, it would make no difference to approve of 
qualified majority to Article 42. Article 42 would therefore have to be rewritten "to cover not only 
migrant workers but all persons who exercise the right to move and reside freely within the Union" 
(COM (2000) 114, p. 10, emphasis added).
Finally, in line with the European Council conclusions in Tampere, the redrafted Article should also 
make it possible for the Council to extend the co-ordination instruments to third country
127 Council document o f 1 June 1999.
138 In COM (20UO) 34 final of 26 Januaiy 2000. “Adapting the Institutions to make a Success of Enlargement -  
Commission Opinion in accordance with Article 48 o f the Treaty on European Union on the calling o f a conference of 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to amend the Treaties”.
iy> COM (2000) 114 final o f 14 March 2000. “Communication from the Commission. Supplementary contribution of 
the Commission to the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reforms. Qualified majority voting for Single 
Market aspects in the taxation and social security fields”.
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nationals.130 The Commission set out explicitly that the Treaty*s Article 63, as amended by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, could not be used to provide social protection for third country nationals 
moving within the Union, since the Article only concerned their admission and residence (COM 
(2000) 114, ibid).
The Commission's approach was backed by the Portuguese presidency, which prepared the agenda 
for the intergovernmental conference. The presidency suggested that qualified majority voting 
should be applied to Article 42, holding that, whereas unanimity should still govern the Treaty's 
social provisions which w ere regarded as “highly sensitive politically", QMV should be envisaged 
for the social provisions “closely linked to the establishment and operation of the internal market" 
(CONFER 4708/00, p. 2)131. The Portuguese presidency found that qualified majority voting was 
the appropriate procedure for Article 42, due to its close link with the achievement of the internal 
market. It furthermore argued that it was institutionally illogical to maintain unanimity side by side 
w ith the Parliament's co-decision.
However, as the discussions on the institutional reforms proceeded between Commission, 
presidency and the other member states, it turned out that the initial Commission proposal was not 
unanimously supported. The following French presidency tried to formulaic a compromise by 
maintaining qualified majority voting as the procedure, but proposing a less radical change of 
Article 42*s wording. The presidency proposed a compromise whereby the Commission's extension 
to all persons, including third country nationals, was to be replaced by a more modest Article 42, 
which covered workers, self-employed, students and pensioners. In other words, the content of the 
proposed Article 42 embraced all categories of persons currently covered by 1408. as well as those 
who had been included by the use of Article 308 as legal basis (CONFER 4767/00, CONFER
130 The wording of the Commission's proposed Article 42 was:
‘T he Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, adopt such measures in the field 
o f social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for persons: to this end it shall notably make 
arrangements to secure for migrant persons and their dependents:
(a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the 
amount o f benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of several countries.
(b) payments o f benefits to persons resident in the territories of Member Stales,
[deletion]
T h e  C o u n c il m a y , a c tin g  in  accord an ce  w ith  the  sam e procedure, extend w holly o r  partly the benefit o f  th is  
sy s tem  to  n a tio n a ls  o f  a th ir d  country, w ho are legally  resident w ithin the territory o f  a M em ber State".
131 Presidency note on the extension of qualified majority voting of 22 February 2(100.
151
4776/00)132. The proposed formulation of Article 42 would make it possible to reform Regulation 
1408 with regard to its current personal scope by qualified majority voting. But any extension 
beyond that would still require the use of Article 308, and thus unanimity.
However, this effort to change the letter and scope o f primary law did not gain sufficient support. In 
the end. the UK announced that it could not accept any change of procedure or content of Article 
42. Despite intense work on the institutional reform of the context, content, and procedural illogic 
of Article 42, the Article remained as it stood.
Concurrent with the intergovernmental conference's failed attempts to facilitate any approval of the 
simplification and modernisation o f 1408/71 on the grounds of Article 42, was the Treat}' of Nice's 
explicit provision that Article 18(2) o f the Treaty could not be used as legal base for the adoption of 
(1998) 779. The current Article 18(3) of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty o f Nice, specifies 
that Community actions needed to attain the objective of the Union citizen's free movement and 
residence within the territory of the member states, do not apply to “provisions on social security or 
social protection*". In light of the Nice intergovernmental conference, the Commission had to omit 
Article 18 as had been suggested Treat}’ base.
4.3: Searching fora Legal Base
Whereas the Treat} of Nice did not reduce the Treaty limitations in order to extend the personal 
scope of 1408/71, the Treaty of Amsterdam had already introduced important changes in the 
primary law premises for negotiating modernisation and simplification. The Amsterdam Treaty 
amendments made title IV on "Visas, Asylum. Immigration and other Policies related to the Free 
Movement of Persons'", and its Article 63, a possible Treaty base upon which to extend 1408 to 
non-Community nationals. Furthermore, the Treaty' of Amsterdam had already amended Article 42, 
which still required unanimity’, but granted the European Parliament co-dec is ion. The future 
negotiations on modernisation and simplifications thus counted an extra veto-player.
,3'  Presidency note on the extension of qualified majority voting o f 29 August 2000, and of 28 September 2000. In the 
first note, the presidency formulated the personal scope of Article 42 to cover "workers, self-employed workers and 
persons treated as such". In the second note, "persons treated as such" was spelled out to "students and pensioners"
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In addition to this, the European Council of Tampere. 15-16 October 1999. subjected the status of 
third country nationals to renewed political attention, and the member states politicali) committed 
themselves to work for a treatment of these people which was more equal to that enjoyed by 
Community nationals:
“The legal status of third country nationals should be approximated to that of Member Slates' nationals A pernii, 
who has resided legally in a Member State for a period of time to be determined and who holds a long-term 
residence permit, should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near us possible to 
those enjoyed by EU citizens; e g. the right to reside, receive education, and work as an empio)ee or self- 
employed person, as well as the principle of non-discrimination vis-à-vis the citizens of the State of rcwJcncc 
(Tampere Presidency Conclusions, point 21 ).”
With the Tampere conclusions, the Commission's proposal to include non-Community nationals in 
the personal scope of 1408 should have gained sufficient momentum for progress. Despite the fact 
that the Tampere conclusions mandated the Commission and the Finnish presidency to proceed with 
the work, the dispute on the legal basis continued to block any progress, Whereas the qualified 
majority of 12 member states were in favour of adopting the proposal on the basis of Articles 42 
and 308, as had been suggested by the Commission, the UK and Ireland were not, and instead 
argued that after the Amsterdam Treaty had come into force in May 1999. the appropriate legal 
basis was the new Article 63(4). Denmark announced that it would accept neither Article 42 in 
conjunction with 308, nor 63(4) as legal bases for extending 1408 beyond community nationals, and 
repeated its political problem with the extension, as such (Council document"’ 12X31/99. SOC 
394).
Denmark, the UK and Ireland opposed the use of the legal base that had. traditionally, been used for 
extensions of 1408. Relying on Article 63(4) as a legal base, however, meant that all three member 
states could stay outside the extension of 1408. Under the Protocol on the position of the UK and 
Ireland, these two member states had to opt in. to participate in title IV of the Treaty. Furthermore, 
the protocol on the Danish position excludes Denmark from participating in title IV. Examining the 
positions of the three states, it becomes clear that their reservations were differenti) motivated Both 
the UK and Ireland saw Article 42 as limited to EU nationals. Despite this reservation. Ireland 
emphasised, as early as in November 1999, that for it. it w as a question of the appropriate legal base
1,1 Council document of 12 November 1999.
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and that it would choose to ‘opt in' on the basis of Article 63.4. The UK also stressed that its 
problem was purely a legal one, and that, politically, it supported the extension (Council 
document134 12831/99, SOC 394).
From the outset, Denmark refused both the traditional legal base and die new one, and, politically, 
opposed any extension of Regulation 1408 to third country nationals (Council document135 
12830/99, SOC 393). However, a few months after the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
Article 63(4) was examined and rendered a sufficient legal base by the Council's legal service 
(Council document136 11043/99, SOC 306). Against this background, Denmark consented to re­
examine the use of 63(4), and, two years later, finally accepted it (Council document137 13186/99, 
SOC 414, Council document13* 13027/01, SOC 391). The Danish position changed as negotiations 
proceeded. Denmark's final decision to change its foot-dragging and isolated position, will be 
analysed in greater detail in chapter VII. However, it should be noted here that, due to the Danish 
exemption, such a change of position was politically free of charge.
Together, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere conclusions offered both a legal alternative and a 
political mandate. Regardless of the momentum this supposedly gave to the negotiations on the 
inclusion of third country nationals in Regulation 1408, the negotiations did not progress in the 
Council for the next two years. During that time, the Commission initiated improvements on the 
general status of non-community nationals, for example by proposing a partial free movement for 
long-term residents, mandated by the Tampere conclusions (COM (2001) 127).139
Among other issues, the question of third country nationals had pushed proposal COM (1998) 779 
into a deadlock of political and legal reserv ations. Faced with the improbability of a political break-
154 Council document o f 12 November 1999.
IJi Council document of 11 September 1999.
|1<' Council document of 17 September 1999,
, r  Council document of 22 November 1999. iT
118 Council document o f 25 October 2001.
I W Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the status o f third country nationals who are long term residents. COM 
(2001) 127 final, proposed 13 March 2001.
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through, the Commission and the Council decided to wait for a legal clarification of the dispute, 
which they assumed would occur with the Khalil case (Interview, DG Employment and Social 
Affairs. 13 September 2001, Council document140, 12296/01, SOC 362).
4.4: The Case-Law Solution of a Political Problem
On October l l ,h 2001, the Court decided in the Joined cases C-95/99 to C-98/99 and C-180/99 
Khalil ami others}*1 The concrete cases concerned whether Community law, as stated in 
Regulation 1408/71, entitled stateless persons to German child benefit and child raising 
allowance.xxv Stateless persons and refugees do not enjoy any right to freedom of movement under 
Community law, and German law142 makes foreigners' entitlement to family benefits dependent on 
their possession of a residence permit. Although not asked directly, the Court laid the preliminary 
reference out as if to examine w hether it was valid to include stateless persons, refugees and their 
family members in the personal scope of 1408/71, on the Treaty basis of Article 42, although they 
were not Community nationals. In this examination, the case became relevant to the question of 
whether Article 42 could be used as the legal base for the extension of 1408 to third country 
nationals, or whether the Article was limited to granting rights to EU nationals, since only they w ere 
entitled to free movement under Community law. The Court found that the inclusion o f stateless 
persons and refugees had to be considered in its historical context. The original inclusion of 
stateless persons and refugees took place in a historical context of international and European 
agreements, signed by the six original member states, in which the Geneva Convention143, the 
European interim agreements144, and the New York Convention145 formulated, as the norm, the 
granting of equal treatment to these groups of persons. The European convention on social security
140 Council document of 28 September 2001.
141 The Joined cases C-95/99 to 98/99 and C-l 80/99, 11 October 2001. M etren Khalil (C-95 99), hsa Chaaban (C-
96 99) and Has san Osaeili (C-97 99) v Bundesanstalt fiir  Arbeit and Mohamad Sasser (C~9S 99/ v iMndeshauptsiadt 
Sit mgart and Menem Addon (C-l SO 99) v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen. ECR 2001, p. 1-7413.
u : Bundeskindergeldgesetz (Federal Law on Child Benefit) and Bundeseiziehungsgeklgesetz (Federal Law on Child- 
Raising Allowance).
144 H ie Geneva Convention was signed on July 28* 1951.
144 The members o f the Council o f Europe signed the European interim agreements on 11 December 1953.
14' The New York Convention was signed on 28 September 1954.
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of 1957146, which to a large extent was replicated in Regulation no. 3, was prepared in this context 
and granted the principle of equal treatment, not only to the nationals of the contracting parties, but 
to stateless persons and refugees as well (paras. 50 & 51). Regulation 1408 later inherited both the 
personal scope of Regulation no. 3 and its embedded norm. On the basis of these historical 
considerations, the Court answered to the first question that its examination had not pointed to any 
factors making Regulation 1408's inclusion o f stateless persons and refugees invalid (para. 58).
The second question put forward by the referring German Court asked the Court whether stateless 
persons and refugees could rely on the rights granted by Regulation 1408, if they had moved to a 
member state directly from a third country, i.e. if they might rely on the protection of 1408/71 
without having moved within the Community. The Court's answer to the second question was fairly 
short. The ECJ referred to established case-law, which had concluded that Article 42 of the Treaty 
and the equal treatment provision o f Regulation 1408, did not apply to situations which happen only 
within the same member state.147 For the same reason, the Court concluded that stateless persons 
and refugees could not rely on 1408, if all aspects of their situations referred to one and the same 
member state (para. 72). The Court thereby affirmed that the Regulation could only be invoked 
when a Community cross-border movement had taken place.
4.5: Proposal Split in Two
On the basis of the Khalil judgement the Council resumed its discussions on the appropriate legal 
base for including non-Community nationals in Regulation 1408. Compared with previous 
considerations on the legal matter, its quick decision on the matter after Khalil notably stands out. 
At the Employment and Social Policy Council, 3 December 2001, the Council stated that, in light of 
the Khalil judgement, Article 42 did not appear to be the appropriate legal basis for extending 
Regulation 1408 to third country' nationals. At the same meeting, the Council instead agreed on the 
possibility of using Article 63(4) as an alternative legal basis (Council document148 15056/01, SOC
14(1 The European convention on social security was signed by the 6 member states o f the European Coal and Steel 
Community by 9,h December 1957. The convention was, how ever, never ratified. See chapter III, sections 4.2 and 4.3.
147 Among other cases, the Court referred to the C-l 53/91 Petit case, in which it had laid down that the principle of 
equal treatment did not apply to the purely internal situation. See endnote V below.
148 Council document o f 6 December 2001.
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530). The case-law decision had thus transformed a 12-15 majority in favour of the traditional legal 
basis of 1408/71, to an unanimous rejection of that same basis, and an agreement on the new Article 
63(4). It was decided that negotiations on third country nationals should be held separately.
Only 2 months after the decisive Council meeting, the Commission presented its second separate 
proposal on third country nationals, COM (2002) 59149, with the sole purpose of extending 1408/71 
to cover non-community nationals as well. By its quick actions, the Commission seemed to have 
dismissed all doubts -  which had been reflected in its own initial rejection of this possibility - about 
Article 63 as being the correct Treat}' base upon which to proceed with the inclusion of third 
country nationals. Furthermore, the argumentation in the explanatory memorandum had changed. 
The fact that the Commission viewed social protection as the other objective of 1408 had been 
omitted, and instead it w as stressed that, in light of the Amsterdam Treat}- and the recent case-law- 
o f Khalil, the question o f the Treaty basis had been re-examined with the conclusion that Article 
63(4) now appeared to be the appropriate base upon w hich to proceed.
By submitting to the new- Treat}’ basis, the Commission clearly compromised its original intentions, 
where one objective was to clarify a "muddied legal situation'" for third country nationals. As part 
o f the Treaty's title IV, the UK and Ireland had to ‘opt in’ to participate, whereas Denmark 
remained outside, The proposal therefore accepted a continuation of "multiple protection levels" by 
allowing variable consent.
The threat of vast complexity with 3 member states not coordinating social security rights for third 
country nationals w as, how ever, reduced, when the UK and Ireland in May 2002 announced their 
‘opt in* on the adoption and application of proposal COM (2002) 59 (Council document150 8482/02, 
SOC 216). The UK, which had opposed the extension of 1408 to third country nationals from the 
first proposal on, had finally changed its position.151
14i> Proposal for a Comic il Regulation extending the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 to nationals of third 
countries who are not already covered by these provisions solely on the ground o f their nationality. Proposal of 6 
February 2002.
Iî0 Council document of 2 May 2002.
151 For a detailed description o f the traditional position of the UK, see the work of Roberts (2000).
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Even though the Khalil judgement apparently silenced all the disagreements between the member 
states and the Commission on the legal basis, the European Parliament did not immediately accept 
this sudden conciliation. In the Parliament's report on proposal (2002) 59, it noted that it fully 
supported the original proposal, which had now been “withdrawn by the Commission under 
pressure from the Council'', and that it:
' is not convinced by the argument the Commission is now using, to the effect that it is compelled by the Khalil 
and others judgment (case C-95/99) to use a different legal basis” (EP Report A5-0369/2002!i:).
However, even though the proposal based on Article 63 (4) reduced the Parliament's competence 
from co-decision to mere consultation, the Parliament chose to behave pragmatically and allow the 
Council to ‘strike while the iron is hot'. The Parliament rapporteur recommended that the proposal 
be accepted by the Parliament, and thus prioritised political results over ‘legal hair-splitting'. The 
Parliament should:
"not indulge in legal hair-splitting which might impede the rapid resolution o f the matter at issue. Particularly 
since agreement now seems to have been reached in the Council on this proposal, the proverb "strike while the 
iron is hot” seems to apply more than ever” (EP Report, ibid).
Proposal COM (2002) 59 was finally adopted by the Council on May 15th 2003.153 Having been on 
the agenda since as far back as 1993, legally residing third country nationals were finally included 
within the personal scope of 1408/71.
Returning to the status of Community- nationals, the member states at the same December 2001 
Council meeting, adopted a text subdividing proposal (98) 779 into 12 parameters154, each dealing *21
1?- Report from EP Committee on Employment and Social Affairs of 5 November 2002. Approved by the Parliament on
21 November 2002.
15î Council Regulation (EC) No 859/2003 o f 14 May 2003 extending the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 
and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by those provisions solely 
on the ground o f their nationality'.
1M O f the 12 parameters, the 7 first were general ones, which applied horizontally to the whole Regulation and the 
remaining 5 treated specific topics. The 1** parameter concernai the general objective to simplify the Regulation, 
improve its readability and make it more accessible to the citizen. The 2ni parameter treated the personal scope o f  the 
Regulation. The 3rd parameter dealt with the material scope. Parameter 4 concerned the principle o f exportability. 
Parameter 5 dealt with posted workers, and parameter 6 allowed for the member states to continue making additional 
social security agreements between them, based on the principles and spirit of 1408. The last general parameter, the 7th 
one, specified that facts or events occurring outside the territory of the competent state should have the same legal effect 
as if  occurring within its borders. The 8* parameter was the first specific one and concerned the sickness chapter o f the 
Regulation, which had to be simplified. The Council should also consider whether the Regulation needed to be adapted
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with individual modernisation and simplification topics, which had been mandated at the Stockholm 
European Council in March the same year (Stockholm Presidency Conclusions, point 33).
In the text on the parameters, the Council stated the basic principles of coordination to be:
“Subject to the limitations and conditions which it lays down, the Treaty guarantees free movement o f European 
citizens within the European Union. This freedom can be fully utilised only if people who move betw een countries 
are certain that they will not lose their social security entitlements. Freedom of movement w as initially limited, in 
the history of the building of Europe, to workers and members of their family. Today it extends to the citizens o f  
the European Union" (Council document1”  15045/01, SOC 529, emphasis added).
The second parameter dealt with the personal scope. It stated that the personal scope should be 
extended to all European nationals, meaning that in the future, coordination would apply ‘to all 
those [Community' nationals] who are or have been insured by a social security sy stem in a Member 
State*. The adopted text pointed out that:
“The application of coordination to all insured persons also meets the need to adapt it [Regulation 1408/71] to the 
development of free movement within the Union, which has changed from a right in favour of workers only to a 
right anti a reality> fo r  all European citizens" (Council document ibid, emphasis added).
The parameter generalising the personal scope to all Community nationals was provisionally 
adopted during the Spanish presidency in the first half of 2002 (Interview, Danish Permanent 
Representation, 18 December 2002). Since then each parameter has been carefully negotiated by the 
Council (Interv iew, Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, 8 October 2003). On 26 January 2004, the 
Council finally managed to unanimously adopt a common position on the amendment proposal as a 
whole, thus concluding more than five years of intergovernmental negotiations. In the 
communication from the Commission to the European Parliament on the Council's common 
position, it stands out clearly that Regulation 1408 had been transformed from an instrument to 
ensure free movement to a social means in its own right, linked to the building of a 'social Europe 
“Since its adoption in 1971, the Regulation has undergone a considerable number o f  amendments (...) The goal 
pursued by coordination must also be adapted to changes in the European Union as a whole. Coordination rules
in the light of the more recent case lawr on the free movement of goods and services. Parameter 9 dealt with the 
Regulation’s chapter on social pension, and parameter 10 was on unemployment benefits, which should continue to be 
exportable in up to 3 months, but under facilitated circumstances. The 1101 parameter concerned family benefits, and, 
finally, parameter 12 dealt with transitional arrangements to be adopted to guarantee that more favourable acquired 
rights w ere maintained if a person moved to another member state's less favourable arrangement
Council document of 6 December 2001.
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are not just intended to ensure free movement of employed persons; they’ are also increasingly about protecting the 
social security rights o f all persons moving within the European Union. Coordination must therefore be seen from  
the perspective o f European citizenship and the building o f  a social Europe” (COM (2004) 44, final, emphasis 
added).
The ultimate step on the path to a generalised personal scope will involve negotiating the 
Parliament's amendment proposals on the Council's common position. That will presumably take 
place by April 2004, so that the amended Regulation can finally be co-dccided by the Council and 
Parliament before enlargement May 2004 (Interview, Danish Ministry o f Social Affairs, 9 February 
2004). Throughout the negotiations, the prospect of enlargement has constituted an important 
deadline.
By the forthcoming amendment, intra-European social security rights will definitively be detached 
from its link to market citizenship and extended to all citizens of the European Union. The objective 
of the Regulation will thus be three-fold: promoting free movement o f persons; adding substantive 
rights to European citizenship; and, in part, realising a ‘social Europe*. From a historical point of 
view the extension stands out as a milestone.
4.6: Negotiating the Borders o f a Personal Scope
By May 2004, Regulation 1408 should finally be extended to all European citizens (Interview, 
Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, 9 February 2004). Non-active persons and students will finally, 
and without exception, enjoy the right to intra-European social security. The future adoption marks 
a historical move from a privilege held only by workers “strie to sen su', to a right which reflects 
European citizenship, and, more over, one constituting a crucial clement in the construction of 
‘social Europe'. In theoretical terms, the fact that non-active persons will be granted the right to 
cross border social security' cannot be interpreted as just another step in the market-making process, 
but must instead be seen as a concrete and substantive contribution to the social security dimension 
of the European Union. This ultimate outcome of a long-drawn-out institutionalisation process 
could, by no means, have been intended in To, but has instead evolved out of numerous and detailed 
steps along the path to social security integration and has been furthered by the purposeful and 
skilful actions of the supranational organisations. With reference to its ideational and historical past, 
as explored in the previous chapter, this ultimate outcome is most astonishing.
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All the same, before generalising 1408’s personal scope to Community nationals, the Council 
adopted its extension to third country nationals. At first sight, the adoption of Regulation 859/2003 
seems to be a radical move towards a more egalitarian clarification of the question of who has 
access to cross-border welfare in the EU, which disregards a communitarian conception of welfare.
However, there arc decisive objections, which mean that the adoption is not a straightforward 
application of equal treatment between Community' and non-Community nationals. In fact, these 
objections mean that equal treatment of third country nationals in cross-border social security 
matters, remains merely an idea rather than a fact of life.
First o f all, legally' residing third country' nationals do not enjoy the right to free movement 
according to Community' law. On the contrary, Regulation 859/2003 emphasises that the application 
o f 1408/71 does not give third country' nationals "any entitlement to enter, to stay or to reside in a 
Member State or to have access to its labour market". Furthermore, the Regulation sets out 
explicitly that, 1408/71 is "not applicable in a situation which is confined in all respects within a 
single Member State". Only the small number of non-Community nationals who, due to national or 
international law, or bilateral agreements, move between member states will, therefore, be able to 
practice their newly granted rights. Thus, the right to intra-European social security appears rather 
meaningless, since third country' nationals lack the underlying right of free movement (Peers 2002). 
The status of third country nationals will, how ever, improve with the implementation of the recently 
adopted directive concerning long-term resident non-Community nationals.156 The directive, 
adopted by the Council on 25 November 2003, grants third country nationals, who have resided for 
five years in one of the member states, an EC statute oflong term resident. The statute will, under 
certain conditions, allow the long-term resident to move from one member state to another. The 
directive is adopted on the Treaty's Article 63 (3) and (4). The United Kingdom and Ireland have 
chosen to opt out, and the Danish protocol excepts Denmark from the agreement. The conditioned 
right of free movement for certain third country’ nationals, therefore, applies in a far from uniform 
manner throughout the Union. Multiple protection levels continue to cover non-Community 
nationals.
15(1 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third country nationals who are long 
term residents.
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Secondly, the position of Denmark remains unclear. Although Denmark has announced its 
intentions to commit itself to a parallel agreement, no formal actions have been taken (Jyllands- 
Posten 5 June 2002: Interview, Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, 8 November 2002: 15 May 2003; 
8 October 2003 & 9 February 2004). The Danish position will be examined in more detail in 
chapter VII.
Thirdly, the extension to third country nationals only applies to the ruling Regulation, and not to 
future amendments, meaning that non active third country nationals moving between member states 
will not be covered by 1408/71 (Interview, Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, 9 February 2004).
Finally, as noted by the European Parliament, it is not entirely clear how the Khalil judgement 
settled the dispute on the Treaty basis. In fact, the settlement of the matter appears to be based on 
the need to mask a pragmatic, and rather dubious political choice, by the apparent neutrality of law. 
The Khalil judgement did not say that Article 42 is inextricably bound to Article 39 of the Treaty, 
and thus to its nationality requirement. The answer to the case's second question, that 1408/71 
cannot be invoked if no movement between member states has taken place, could be argued to 
simply be an affirmation of precedent, and not a statement which tied the Treaty's Article 42 to the 
right to exercise free movement. The Court did not conclude that Community nationality was an 
absolute premise for inclusion in the personal scope of Regulation 1408/71, on the basis of the 
Treaty's Article 42. On the contrary, it made a contextual analysis, referring to international law, 
and concluded that the context and political commitment at the time when Regulation no. 3 w as 
formulated and adopted, made it a natural choice to include refugees and stateless persons in 1408's 
personal scope. The question is whether a similar contextual argument, which referred to the 
European Convention of Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the 
Tampere conclusions, would not, in the year 2003, be of sufficient validity to justify the inclusion 
of legally residing third country nationals in the personal scope of 1408/71, on the basis of the 
Treaty's Articles 42 and 308. However, essentially, that seems to have depended on political 
commitment.
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5.0: Concluding Remarks -  Extending Equal Treatment for an Ever  
W id er Personal Scope
The principle of equal treatment and the personal scope of Regulation 1408 ha\e been under debate 
and negotiation for more than four decades. With regard to the research question 'to w hat extent 
the analysis of this chapter has demonstrated that, when comparing To and T;. the Regulation's 
principles of equal treatment and personal scope have made a historical mo\c from a most restricted 
right to cross border social security, to a general one, With worker ‘stricto sensu' as the point of 
departure, the bits and pieces of a protracted integration process have, taken together, constituted a 
historical move, up to the point of including the non-active European citizen and the IcgalK residing 
third country nationals. In the present chapter, a specific integration story has been depicted in 
detail, in which the right to equal treatment and the scope of those entitled to cross-border social 
security, have been extended on the basis of flexible concepts and a dynamic perception of the 
Community's instruments, objectives and competences.
As regards to the research question ‘how \ the analysis has pointed out that it is the interaction 
between the Court, the Commission and the Council which has transformed and furthered the 
institution from intergovernmental output long before T«, to input in the subsequent 
institutionalisation process. From the chronological, process-tracing study which has been earned 
out, it is. however, clear that the Court, seconded by the Commission, from carh on took the lead in 
interpreting aims and means dynamically and extensively. Throughout the process, judicial ach\ ism 
and Commission persistency prepared the terrain for unanimous political decision-making, and thus 
succeeded in modifying national positions and preferences as lime unfolded
From the outset, the judicial activism of the Court extended the principles of equal treatment and 
amplified the meaning of ‘employed person*, and. at the same time, it interpreted the aim of the 
legal basis in a most extensive w ay. When the Council later brought in the sclf-cmplo>cd. it mcrcls 
codified what had already been ruled by the Court, and the member stales unanimously agreed that 
the aim of Regulation 1408 went even further than that which could be drawn from the most 
extensive reading of the Treaty's Article 51. The Treaty's Article 235 (now an 308) became the 
additional legal basis upon which to achieve new policy aims. The agenda-setting capacit> of the 
Commission once more assured that the collective perception of aims and means did not stagnate 
European citizenship became the next key-concept, substantiating new needs for reform and funher
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energizing the process. Proposing the generalisation of the personal scope of 1408 to all European 
citizens was not a fundamental departure from established reasoning, since Community nationals 
enjoy the underlying right of free movement. That is, however, not the case with third country 
nationals. By proposing that non-Community nationals be included in 1408‘s personal scope, the 
Commission attempted to introduce a path-breaking understanding of the regulatory aim, where the 
decisive factor was no longer the exercise of the right o f free movement, but the right to be insured 
under a social security scheme. The full consequences of such a break remain a matter of 
speculation, but were hypothesised by the UK government, which vetoed it on this basis. The 
intense dispute concerning the appropriate legal basis for including third country nationals can be 
interpreted as both a Commission defeat, and as an example of successful mediation. On the one 
hand, the Commission and the large majority of member states were finally forced to accept the 
Treaty's Article 63 (4) as the legal basis. The final choice o f Treaty basis shows that under the 
unanimity rule, the minority prevails. On the other hand, the Commission managed by 
compromising its own. and 12 member states initial preferences, to put an end to a long-lasting 
controversy and achieved the desired political result. In the end, such an outcome transcends a 
negotiating process which was characterised by political and legal reluctance.
To give a theoretical account, the analysis carried out here substantiates the idea that the institution 
of Regulation 1408 appears to develop according to its own logic, or as if it has a "life of its own*. 
Over time, the institution's principle of equal treatment and its personal scope, arc furthered by a 
path dependent processes of increasing returns, in which initial choices are reinforced, but gradually 
changed (Pierson 1998: 2000b, p. 251). From the statistical information, analysed in chapter III 
section 3.3. we know that institutionalisation takes place although transnational exchange in terms 
of migration has not increased correspondingly. Contrary to the proposition of Stone Sweet & 
Brunell (1998), progressive institutionalisation has not happened as a function of increased 
mobility. However, since its creation, the basic function or the raison d'etre of the institution was 
never re-questioned. The drive for change becomes a matter of interpretations of its efficiency, and 
dynamic readings of its rationale and its context. Due to these interpretations, the institution itself 
becomes dynamic. On this basis, it is in a constant process o f revision.
Interpretations on the instrumentality of the institution constitute a key-component which decides 
the path of its evolution. The analysis has demonstrated that interpretations are subjectively
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formulated, reversed, clarified and persisted with by the supranational organisations of the 
European community.
The analysis between To and T2 accentuates the Commission as the skilful actor, successfully 
coupling Regulation 1408 to the new dimension of European citizenship. In this act, the 
Commission demonstrates itself as the persistent actor, which, despite political opposition, 
maintains its course for decades, meanwhile using the institution of citizenship as a new policy 
window for change (Pollack 2003, p. 51). The Commission's campaign on the need to match intra- 
European social security with Union citizenship introduces, however, no new policy intensions, but 
rather rephrases old ones. All the way through, the Commission is ahead of the situation. At the 
same time, the analysis highlights that, although supranational organisations may pursue own 
agendas and develop own preferences, their scope of manoeuvre ultimately depends on their 
principals; the member states. Regarding third country nationals, the Commission's agenda is far 
more ambitious than the final institutional result. The Commission -  and with it, the great majority 
of member states -  is in no position to change rather marginalized, but equally persistent, political 
or legal preferences, and finally has to accept exactly those interpretations that it first refused.
Between To and T2 the voice of law resounds authoritatively. Concerning the Court's interpretations 
of the principle of equal treatment and 1408's personal scope, politicians accept its dynamic 
interpretations and innovative rulings. The legal path dependency which has been constructed over 
the decades is. in itself, a classic demonstration of how litigation may further integration. The 
member states do not rein in the Court. Instead the analysis exemplifies how they subsequently 
codify the legal overrule of national act (the case of Pinna). Furthermore, when the Court breaks 
with its established legal reasoning and extends the principle of equal treatment, no collective 
political response is mobilised (the case of Cahanis-Issarte). The multilateral effect of the new 
interpretative course will be analysed in further detail in the chapters below. At this stage, however, 
it is important to note that the Court deliberately limits the financial impact of the judgement by 
limiting its retrospective effect. Its immediate impact thereby relates to the individual lawsuit only, 
and a collective reaction appears as unnecessary or even irrelevant. According to a different logic, 
law has established a binding precedent, and politics has apparently consented with this (Alter 1998, 
pp. 130-132; 2001, p. 189). In general, the Court has issued generous, teleological interpretations of
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the institution and its aim. Through this process, law, rather than politics, has laid down the content, 
rationale and direction of the institution.
Case-notes
lv As emphasised by the Court in the early case 79/76, 31. March 1977. Carlo Fossi v Bundesknappschaft. ECR 1977, 
page 667. Fossi was an Italian national, residing in Italy. Between 1942-1943, he worked in the German mines in 
Sudentenland. In 1970, he applied for disability pension in the Federal Republic o f Germany with regard to his previous 
work in Sudentenland. The Court ruled that no discrimination against Mr, Fossi had taken place within the material 
scope of 1408/71. The competent institution that should have granted Mr. Fossi tire pension no longer existed, and the 
right to a possible benefit would be discretionally decided. The benefit could not be regarded as being in the nature of 
social security, and fell outside the material scope of the Regulation (paras. 7 & 8 o f the judgement).
v This restriction was laid down in case C-153/91, 22. September 1992. Camille Petit v Office National des Pensions 
(ONP). ECR 1992, page 1-4973. Petit was a Belgian national, who worked in Belgium, first as an employee, then as a 
civil servant. When refused a pension for employed persons from the Belgium national pension office, he brought 
action against tlie decision. His action was however formulated in French, but should, according to the procedural rules, 
have been formulated in Dutch. The preliminary questions addressed whether the principle of equal treatment in the 
Regulation and its Treaty basis was applicable in the domestic situation, and whether Article 84 (4) o f 1408/71, obliging 
member states to accept claims formulated in another member state language, also ruled in the situation where the right 
to free movement w as not exercised. The Court concluded that the principle o f equal treatment did not regulate the 
purely internal case: '‘As the Court has consistently held, the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement and the 
Regulations implementing those provisions cannot be applied to activities which are confined in all respect within a 
Single member state” (para. 8 of the judgement).
" That the principle did not rule outside the geographical scope o f the Community was laid down in case C-23/92,2. 
August 1993. Maria Grana-Novoa v Landesversichervngsanstalt Hessen. ECR 1993, page 1-4505. Maria Grana-Novoa 
was a Spanish national, who, however, never worked in her state o f origin, but both in Germany and Switzerland. 
Between 1979 to 1982, she had worked for 44 months in Germany and was subject to compulsory insurance during that 
period. Subsequently, she became permanently incapable of work. In 1983, she applied to the competent German 
institution for an invalidity pension. The application was turned down, since the national legislative requirement to 
qualify for the pension was 60 months o f insurance. I lad, however, Grana-Novoa s  insurance periods completed in 
Switzerland been taken into account, she w ould have qualified. The question was therefore whether Community law 
obliged Germany to aggregate the periods in Switzerland to the ones fulfilled in Germany, due to the concluded social 
security convention between Germany and Switzerland from 1964. The Court concluded that the term ‘‘legislation” 
referred to in Article 3 (1) and 1 (j) of 1408/71, did not cover provisions of international social security conventions 
concluded between the single member state and a non-member state. Tire only international social security convention 
that fell within tire field o f the Regulation was the one that had at least two member states as contracting parties.
™ In case C-28/92, 16. December 1993. Aiatie-Helene Leguaye-Neelsen v Bundesvensicherwigsanstaltß lr Angestellte. 
ECR 1993, page 1-6857. The Court made clear that for the principle of non-discrimination to apply, the two situations 
involved had to be comparable. Ms Leguaye-Neelsen was a French national, who paid compulsory contributions to the 
German Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte from 1971 to 1977, when employed in Gennany. From 1973, site 
also paid compulsory contributions to the French Civil Service Schemes. When returning to France, she applied for 
reimbursement for the contributions she paid into the statutory pension scheme in Gennany. Her application was, 
how ever, turned down, since she was entitled to keep paying voluntary insurance contributions and tins fact excluded 
her from the right o f reimbursement. From the written opinion submitted by the Gemian government to the Court, it 
appeared that a Gemian civil servant w ould be entitled to reimbursement of benefits paid, because she would no longer 
have the right to continue in the statutory insurance scheme on a voluntary basis, now being covered by a special 
scheme for civil servant. According to Article 4 (4) o f 1408/71, the schemes for civil servants are exempted from the 
Regulation. Leeguaye-Neelsen was therefore to be regarded as a German employee, insured under an ordinary scheme, 
and thus who retained the right to pay voluntary contributions. In this manner, the German legislation distinguished 
between the rights and obligations of the two personal categories; employees and civil servants. The Court stated that 
the rights o f the employee and the rights o f the civil servant w ere not comparable, and the German administrative action
166
did not discriminate according to Article 3 (1) of 1408. Under national legislation, an employee who entered the public 
administration might be granted reimbursement for contributions previously paid to an insurance scheme to make up for 
the fact that he lost the rights under that scheme. This situation was not comparable to a person w ho entered the public 
administration o f another member state, since here the person maintained the right to be affiliated in the previous 
scheme, and thus to pay voluntary contributions. That the national administration treated the two situations differently 
did not express discrimination, but two non-comparable case backgrounds,
v,u In case C-131 96 Romero, the Court found German practice discriminatory [Case C-131/96, 25 June 1997. Carlos 
Mora Romero v Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinprovinz. ECR 1997, page 1-3659]. Romero was a Spanish national, 
bom in 1965 and residing in Spain. I lis father died in 1969 as a result o f a work accident, while employed in Germany. 
Therefore Romero received orphan benefit from the German state, until he was called for military service in 1987. 
Being again in education the year after, payments were re-started. In 1990, Romero was, however, notified that he was 
no longer entitled to the benefits since he had reached the age of 25. According to the German national social security 
code, orphan benefits w'ere not payable after the age of 25. However, according to the same code, benefits were to be 
paid after the age of 25 for a corresponding period, if the person had to do statutory duties such as the military service. 
But this provision had always been interpreted by German courts as only concerning militaiy service in Germany. The 
European Court of Justice concluded that the outcome of German practice was discriminatory. A person such as 
Romero, in a survivors position, was covered by the Regulation and survivor's benefit was part of the material scope as 
expressed in Article 4 (1 )  (d). As laid down in Toia, the Court emphasised that the objective of the principle o f equal 
treatment was to eliminate direct as well as indirect discrimination; “ ...Article 3 (1) o f Regulation No. 1408/71 
prohibits not only overt discrimination based on nationality of the beneficiaries o f social security schemes, but also all 
covert forms of discrimination, which through the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead in fact to the same 
result” (para 32 of the judgement). To avoid indirect discrimination, military service in another member state must be 
assimilated with the same statutory obligation in the competent state.
“ The Pinna case concerned Pietro Pinna, an Italian national, who resided in France w ith his wife and two children, 
where he also worked. In 1977, the children went to Italy with their mother, and stayed there for an extended visit, 
meaning that the son stayed 3 months in Italy and the daughter stayed abroad 6 months. Thus, the competent French 
institution denied to pay family benefit within that period, arguing that it should be paid by a competent Italian 
institution, where the children had stayed in that period.
x Maria Masgio was an Italian widow, whose husband worked in the Belgian, as well as in the German mining industry. 
M r Masgio was entitled to an accident pension under Belgian legislation and a German old-age pension. The case 
concerned the method o f  calculating the old-age pension that Masgio received under the German pension scheme. The 
competent institution calculated the German pension on the basis of the gross amount o f the Belgian pension, w hereas if 
M asgio  had received both pensions under Gentian legislation, the old-age pension would have been calculated on the 
annual earning figures o f the other pension, and the outcome would have been higher.
“ Considering the principle of equal treatment, the Commission has brought infringement procedures against France 
[Case C-307/89, 11 June 1991. Commission o f  the European Communities v French Republic. ECR 1991, page 1-2903], 
which will be discussed in the next Chapter V, and against Belgium [Case C-326/90, 10 November 1992. Commission 
o f  the European Communities v Kingdom o f  Belgium. ECR 1992, page 1-5517]. In case C-326/90 against Belgium, the 
Commission took procedure against the Belgian residence requirements imposed on workers from other member states 
and their families in order to qualify for the allowances for handicapped persons, the guaranteed income for old people, 
and the Belgian legislation on the right to a minimum means of subsistence. In its argumentation, the Commission 
stressed that the Court had already ruled that the Belgian benefits for handicapped people [Case 157/73 Callemeyv v 
Belgium  & Case 7/75 Mr and Mrs Fracas v Belgium] and the guaranteed income for old people [Case 1/72 Frilli v 
Belgium] fell within the material scope o f Regulation 1408/71. Concerning the right to a minimum means of 
subsistence [Case 249/83 Hoeckx], the Court had, however, concluded that the allowance did not constitute a social 
security benefit within the meaning of 1408/71, but was instead regarded as a social advantage within the meaning of 
Article 7 (2) of Regulation 1612/68. The Commission found that the requirements of previous residence in Belgium w as 
“obviously disguised discrimination” and, although it applied irrespective of nationality; “ ...its primary or secondary 
effect is to exclude nationals of other Member States from the benefits o f the allowances in question, even if that is not 
the intended object. The result is different treatment for nationals of the host State as compared with nationals of other 
Community countries, w hich amounts to an objective obstacle to the exercise of the free movement for w orkers, a right 
w hich for every Community national, constitutes a right which does not allow o f any restrictions not objectively and 
legitimately justified" (ECR 1992, page 1-5521). When Belgium was due to argue its case, it complied and stated that it
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would amend the relevant legislation so that it was brought in line with Community law. In the judgement, the Court 
declared that the Belgian state had not fulfilled its obligations under Community law as expressed in the Treaty, in 
Article 7 (2) o f 1612/68, and in Article 3 of 1408/71.
In the Cabanis-Issarte case, the Advocate General Tesauro stated two opinions. In his second opinion, the Advocate 
General discussed the Kemiaschek case-law (Opinion on case C-308/93, Cabanis-Issarte, ECR 1996, p. 1-2111).
Among the cases restating the Kemiaschek line of reasoning are:
• Case 157/84,6 June 1985. Maria Frascogna v Caisse des depots et consignations. ECR 1985, p. 1739. In the case 
of Frascogna, the Court reiterated the authoritative line laid down in Kemiaschek (para. 15 of the judgement). Mrs 
Fmscogna was of Italian nationality but lived with her working son in France. She applied for French old-age 
allowance, but the application was rejected because she had not resided 15 years in France. The Court referred to 
Kemiaschek and concluded that in terms of 1408/71 as legal basis, Mrs Frascogna could not claim tire allowance 
because it was not a derived right (para. 17 of the judgement). The Court, however, added the consideration of 
Regulation 1612/68. The benefit constituted a “social advantage” as defined in Article 7 (2) of this Regulation, and 
should therefore be granted to the dependent family member.
•  Case 94/84,20 June 1985. Office national de l *emploi vJosze/Deak. ECR 1985, page 1873. The case concerned 
Deak, residing with his Italian mother in Belgium, where she worked. Deak did not have member state nationality, 
being Hungarian. The Court stated that due to the limits in the distinction between personal and derived rights of 
family-members, Mr. Deak was not entitled to the unemployment benefit on the basis of Regulation 1408/71.
How ever, EC-law* as formulated in art. 7 (2) of Regulation 1612/68 entitled Deak to the unemployment benefit, 
which the Court laid down to constitute a “social advantage”. The benefit could therefore not be refused to the 
dependent child, although he did not possess member state nationality.
•  Case C-243/91, 8 July 1992. Belgian State v Konshin Taghavi. ECR 1992, page 1-4401. Taghavi had Iranian 
nationality, but was the spouse of an Italian worker. The married couple resided in Belgium where Mrs Taghavi 
applied for disability allowance. Considering Regulation 1408/71, the Court followed the interpretive line 
expressed in the cases of Kemtascheck, Frascogna and Deak, according to which the family member was only 
entitled to the derived right. Despite being a family member to a Community worker, Taghavi was not entitled to 
the Belgian allowance for the handicapped w hich wras granted as a personal right (para. 12 of tire judgement). The 
Court interpreted moderately and w ent against the opinion o f the Commission. The Commission had argued that 
the allow ance constituted a “social advantage” within the meaning o f art. 7 (2) o f  Regulation 1612/68 (para. 10 of 
the judgement). The Court concluded to the contrary that in contrast with the cases o f Fmscogna and Deak,
1612/68 could not be used as legal basis to grant Taghavi the social security allowance. The reason was that 
Taghavi w as not a national o f a member state and according to Belgian law, a Belgian worker's spouse, w ho was 
not a member state national, could not claim the allow ance either (para. 11 of the judgement).
• Case C-310/91,27 May 1993. Hugo Schmid v Belgian State, represented bv the Minister van Sociale 1 'oorz. ECR 
1993, page 1-3011. The case of Schmid reaffirmed the interpretive approach, demonstrated in Frascogna and Deak, 
where Regulation 1408/71 was ruled out as legal basis, but right provision was extended, in any case, on the basis 
of Regulation 1612/68. As in the case o f Taghavi, the case concerned the Belgian disability allow ance, but here the 
Court concluded in favour of the family member. Mr. Schmid lived with his daughter in Belgium, where he 
worked. They were both of German nationality. M r Schmid applied for invalidity benefit to his daughter, but the 
application was refused on the grounds that the daughter did not fulfil the legislative conditions o f nationality and 
residence. The European Court of Justice based its ruling on the distinction between personal rights and derived 
rights as manifested in case C-40/76 Kemiaschek (para. 12 of the judgement). Mr. Schmid's daughter was not 
entitled to the Belgian disability benefit, being o f German nationality, since the allow ance was provided for by the 
national legislation as a right “in person w hich are not granted on the ground o f status as a member of a w orker’s 
family”(para. 10 o f the judgement). However, the Court considered Regulation 1612/68 as legal basis and found 
that the benefit constituted the “social advantage” as formulated in Article 7 (2). On this behalf Mr. Schmid's 
daughter had a right to equal treatment with Belgian nationals.
xm Mrs Cabanis-Issarte was the surviving spouse of a migrant worker. They both had French nationality. The couple 
had resided in the Netherlands since 1948 while tire husband worked there. While residing in the Netherlands, Mrs. 
Cabanis-Issarte was compulsorily insured according to the general Dutch old age insurance law. The married couple 
spent three years in France between 1960 and 1963, where the wife was still affiliated in the Dutch insurance scheme 
through voluntary contributions paid by her husband. After retirement in 1969, they moved permanently back to France. 
The case considered whether Mrs. Cabanis-Issarte had the same right to reduced contribution when stav ing outside the
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Dutch borders as Dutch nationals. According to the national legislation, this was a jvrscmal nght and tliereforc d»J not 
apply to the wife of the migrant w orker.
x,v The first preliminary question in the Cabanis-hsarte case addressed whether the principle of equal treatment for 
nationals and migrant workers, as laid down in Article 3 of 1408/71, also applied to the familv member m the caw of a 
reduction in contributions that nationals were entitled to. The second question raised concerns about whether 
discrimination against the family member in the concrete case was compatible with the object of free movanail of 
persons as expressed in particular in Article 48-51 of the Treaty.
xv The Advocate General Pergola discussed in his opinion whether the right to move and reside heck ui the Union 
Hows directly from tire Treaty. The German government argued that Mrs .Sofa was cocci vd b\ the residence dircvmc 
90/364/EEC, which gives the unemployed a right to reside in another member state, as long as he/die is not a burden 
to the social security system. The German state argued that Mrs Sola did not meet the conditions laid down in the 
residence directive, and thus could not claim any right of residence under Commumtv law Her nght to remain 
derived only from the international agreement applied in the German national provisions, which prohibited Gentium 
from repatriating her, At the hearings, this point of view was also held by the French and British governments I he 
three governments thus argued that Article 8A of the Treaty did not give any greater substance to the free movement 
o f persons. Advocate General Pergola argued to the contrary. Since Article 8A entered into force with the Maastricht 
Treaty, the right to reside freely could no longer be considered to depend on u directive It was no longer simple n 
derived right, but a right steaming directly from primary law and its expression of Union citizenship " Ihc right to 
move and reside freely throughout the whole of the Union is enshrined in an act of primary law and does not exist or 
cease to exist depending on whether or not it has been made subject to limitations under other provisions of 
Community law, including secondary legislation" (para. 18 of the opinion) Pergola tixtk his opinion further, 
concluding, on the right to equal treatment, that "the Union as conceived m the Maastricht Ireaty. requires that the 
principle prohibiting discrimination should embrace the domain of the new legal status of Common citizenship" 
(para. 23 of the opinion). The Court did, however, not discuss whether Mrs Sab s right of residence stemmed 
directly from the Treaty, but simply concluded that it was evident that she had u right to reside in Gentium and 
therefore it was not necessary to consider the issue any further (para. 60 of the judgement)
*'n Mrs Sala had lived in Germany since 1968, except for an interruption of two vears F rom 197<* to I Wo, she was an 
employee in Germany and again until 1989, however with some unemployed periods Since I98‘i. she received social 
assistance from the Nuremberg local authority. Until 1984. Mrs Sub obtained several residence permits When in l ‘>v3, 
having given birth to her second child, she applied for child raising allowance Ihc application was, however, refused 
from the competent office in the state of Bavaria on the ground that she was not a German national nor m |x>ssesMoti of 
a residence permit. The national court, however, found that according to the European Con van mn on Social and 
Medical Assistance of 11 December 1953, Mrs Sala could not be repatriated. Four prclumnurv questions were raised to 
the European Court of Justice on the issue. The first question addressed whether Mrs Sab  could classified as a 
worker, the second and the third whether the German child raising allowance fell within the meaning of familv benefit 
o f  Regulation 1408/71, the fourth whether the German requirement of a rcsidoicc permit for oilier manlier suite 
nationals to achieve the benefit was compatible with Community law.
XVM Before drawing too far-reaching conclusions on the European migrant’s right to equal treat mail m another manlier 
state, future case-law will have to clarify several points. The pending case C-l 38A)2 ( 'ollms is likelv to clanfv new 
aspects. So far, the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colonier has stated interesting viewpoints regarding tire social 
security rights o f the Union citizen in his opinion of 10 July 2003. where he considers the nianber state's competence to 
prevent ‘benefit tourism' (para. 75 of the Opinion). The Collins case concerns an American citizen, who also has Insli 
nationality. Collins moved from the US to the United Kingdom to seek work there 8 da> s alter arrival, he applied for 
job  seeking allowance without having any further connection with the UK. other than being a Cominunitv u tizai The 
application was turned down because he did not fulfil the habitual residence requiranait ui the British Act The 
Advocate General concluded in his opinion that a citizen of the Union cannot automatical 1 v relv on the Treat v s Article 
18 in conjunction with Article 12. According to the Advocate General it remained in compliance with Commumtv law 
when the member state assesses the applicant's connection with the state, such as when requiring habitual residence', 
or w hai considering his link to tire employment marked. The Advocate Gaieral concluded "Communm law as it now 
stands does not require that an income-based social security benefit, intaidcd for jobseekers, be provided to a citizen of 
the Union who enters the territory of a Member State with the purpose of seeking cmplov mail while kicking am 
connection with the State or link with the domestic employment market" (Conclusion of the Opinion)
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x'1'1 Those conditions have however been questioned regarding the student residence directive 93/96, by the recent case 
of Rud\> Gezelczyk [case C-l 84/99,20. September 2001. Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ortigtiies- 
louvain-la-Xeuve. ECR 2001, p. 6193], The case concerned a French national, studying in Belgium. During his first 
three years of study, he earned his living by various minor jobs. In his fourth year o f study, he applied to the Belgian 
authorities to grant him the Belgian Minimex allow ance (minimum means of subsistence). The minimex was first 
granted, but later withdrawn with reference to the nationality requirement in Belgian law. The Court first concluded, 
referring to the earlier case 249/83 Hoeckx, that the minimex constitutes a social advantage within the meaning of 
Regulation 1612/68. It then noted that a Belgian student, although not a worker according to 1612/68, but in exactly the 
same conditions as Grzelczyk, w ould qualify for the minimex. Discrimination solely on the grounds o f nationality 
therefore took place. Despite the conditions o f  the residence directive, stating that a student must be able to provide for 
himself; ‘‘Articles 6 and 8 of the Treaty preclude entitlement to a non-contributory social benefit, such as the minimex, 
from being made conditional, in the case of nationals o f Member States other than the host State where they are legally 
resident, on their falling within the scope o f Regulation No 1612/68 when no such condition applies to nationals o f the 
host Member State” (para. 46 of the judgement).
The Court laid down an extensive meaning of Regulation 1612's worker concept in the case o f Levin (case 53/81,23 
March 1985. Levin v. staatssecretaris van Justifies. ECR 1982, p. 1035], where the Court clarified that part-time work 
is not excluded from the definition. Even when part time work is insufficient to fully support the person, it may be 
classified as ‘effective and genuine'. The Court went even further in the case of Kem pf [case 139/85, 3 June 1986. R í l  
Kempf v. Staatsecretaris van Justitie. ECR 1987, p. 1741]. Kempf was a part time German music teacher, residing in the 
Netherlands, w ho supplemented his earnings from public benefit. The Court found his work ‘effective and genuine' 
even though it was only 12 hours a w eek, and concluded that the status o f worker could not be denied simply because 
the additional funds were public ones. Also in the case of Lawrie-Blum (Case 66/85, 3 July 1986. Deborah Lawrie- 
Blunt v. Land Baden-lVfirttemberg. ECR 1986, p. 2121 ], the Court took a broad approach, stating that although a trainee 
teacher only taught a few hours a week, sire was still classified as a worker. The Court mled that the essential 
characteristic o f an employment relationship is that one person performs an act or service for another person and is paid 
for it, For an in-depth description of the extensive interpretation by the Court of the worker concept see, among others, 
O'Leary (1999); Jacobs (2000).
“  Mrs Hoekstra (bom Unger) was residing in the Netherlands and had been compulsorily insured against sickness as a 
person w ith a contract o f employment. When she stopped working, she remained voluntarily insured. While visiting her 
parents in Germany, Mrs Hoekstra fell ill, and after her return to the Netherlands, she applied for her medical treatment 
costs to be reimbursed. She was, however, denied reimbursement with reference to a provision in the Dutch law, 
according to which the voluntarily insured could not have the costs of medical treatment reimbursed when treated 
outside the borders o f tire Netherlands.
xxl Case 7/75 Fracas was one o f the early case-law w here tire Court dealt with tire rights of family members (case 7/75, 
17 June 1975. A fraud  Mrs F. v Belgian State. ECR 1975, page 679]. Mr and Mrs Fntcas were Italian nationals, residing 
in Belgirun where Mr Fracas had worked since 1947. Their son was liand¡capped from birth, In 1973, the parents 
applied for handicap benefit under Belgian law. The application was, however, rejected on the grounds that the son was 
neither of Belgian nationality nor fulfilled the second criteria under national law; to have resided in Belgium for at least 
15 years after having reached the age of 20. In the written observation submitted by the Belgian government, the 
member stale stressed that the benefit was a personal right and not one that could be derived through the status as family 
member. In the judgement, the Court stated the contrary. The handicapped child had the right to enjoy the same benefits 
as nationals o f the residing member state. Tire Court also concluded that if the handicapped child could not himself 
acquire status as worker, the right to equality o f  treatment continued beyond the end of minority.
xx" The case C-2/89 Kits van Heijttingen dealt w ith how much the migrant worker had to work to qualify as ‘employed 
person' [Case C-2/89, 3 May 1990. Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank v G J. Kits van Hei/ningen. ECR 1990, 
page 1755]. Kits van Heijttingen resided in Belgium, but worked full-time in the Netherlands, where he also taught two 
hours twice a week. After he retired from his fulltime activity, he kept teaching. He claimed child allowances under 
Dutch legislation for his two children who were studying. The competent institution, however, refused the application. 
The Dutch general law' on child allowances administered under two criteria; that the claimant was a resident, or paid 
income tax for w ork preformed in the Netherlands. The Court concluded that the amount of time spent on a working 
activity was irrelevant for the inclusion in the personal scope of Regulation 1408/71 as long as the person was insured
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in a member state's social security scheme for employed persons. Compared with Regulation IM2A.X. ihc personal 
scope of 1408 was laid down even w ider, since the work activity did not have to be 'effective or genuine'
Mr Brack was a British national, residing in Britain and insured under the British national insurance scheme for 9 
years as an employed person, and thereafter for 17 years as a self-employed person In September 1974, linn k wait on 
holiday in France where he fell ill and received immediate treatment By the aid of (Xtnba 1974. be returned to die 
UK and claimed cash sickness benefit for the period when he was ill in France The claim was refused b\ the British 
insurance officer due to the relevant national Act, according to which “a person shall he diqualified for receiving am 
benefit ... for any period during which that person ... is absent from Great Britain ..." (Section 49(1) of the British 
National Insurance Act of 1965).
xsn Van Roosmalen was a priest of Dutch nationality who always worked outside of five geographical Unders of the 
Community . At the age of 22, he moved to Belgium to continue his studies A lta becoming a priest, he was sent to 
Belgian Congo (Zaire), where he remained for 25 years, only interrupted by three years on leave, which he sjvut with 
his parents in the Netherlands. During his stay in Zaire, he was supported by his parishioners, but he was. at the vnne 
time, voluntarily insured in the Netherlands. However, he did not pay income la\ lo the Dutch state while residing in 
Zaire. In January 1981, he became incapable of work and returned to Luropc. He settled temporarih ut the Netherlands 
and received invalidity benefit there. In June 1982, he established himself in Belgium, and since lie no longer fulfilled 
the residence requirement in the Dutch law, the competent institution decided to suspend his benefit The prelimuuirv 
reference to the European Court of Justice questioned whether van Roo.vtialai fell within the personal scojv of the 
Regulation and whether the residence requirement in national law was compatible w ith Community law
xxv All cases concerned third country nationals regarded as stateless persons under German law Mrs KImUI and her 
husband were Palestinians from Lebanon who had fled the civil war. They had lived contimioush in Gentium from 
1984 and 1986 respectively, but had not been recognised as political refugees Mr ( Ikuibait mid his wile w ac Kurds 
from Lebanon, who had tied the civil war as well. They arrived in Germany in 1985. where they had lived c out moons lv 
since, but had not been recognised as political refugees. Mr Osseili had a Lebanese travel document for Palestinian 
refugees. He and his w ife had stayed in Germany from 1986. They hud not been grunted as\ lum Also Mr .Vomit had a 
Lebanese travel document for Palestinian refugees. He and his family had stayed in Germany from I9K5. but had not 
been recognised as political refugees. In all four cases, child benefit had been stopped, because only foreigners 
possessing a residence permit w ac entitled to child benefit under the new version (entaed into force on I January 
1994) of the Federal Law on Child Benefit. Mrs Addon was an Algerian, who since 1988 had been living with her 
husband and children in Germany, whereto she had come from Algeria. Hie (until \ hud not been granted aw him Mis 
Addou had been refused child raising allowance, since she did not possess any residence permit which is a requirement 
under the Federal Law on Child-Raising Allowance,
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Chapter V: Social Benefits Beyond National 
Borders? Institutionalising the Principle of 
Exportability
This chapter continues the analysis of supranational institutionalisation between To and T2, 
exploring ‘to what extent' and ‘how ' the material scope of 1408/71 and its principle ofexportahility 
have been expanded. The analysis falls in three parts, investigating, 1) the institutionalisation of 
Regulation 1408*s material scope, 2) the dispute on the territorial demarcation or exportability of 
those special social benefits, which fall between social security and assistance, and finally 3) the 
specific institutionalisation process o f the right to foreign health care.
The empirical analysis will be conducted diachronicallv, aiming to link decision-making as it 
happens over time. On the basis o f the empirical results, certain theoretical assumptions on 
institutionalisation and the interaction of law and politics, as depicted in chapter II, will be re­
examined. From a theoretical perspective, the analysis traces how the reach and content of an 
institution are gradually transformed, and thus aims to explore the premises of institutional change. 
Since judicial decision-making has largely furthered this part of institutionalisation, the role of the 
Court is brought into focus, and the capacity of law to further integration contrary to the preferences 
of the member states, w ill be questioned. Furthermore, follow ing this, the political response to legal 
innovation will be explored. That is, the following examination of institutionalisation, seen as being 
determined by the interplay of law and politics, addresses both the dynamics of institutionalisation 
as well as moments of 'decreasing returns'. Returning to the model built up in order to analyse 
institutionalisation (chapter II, section 1), the analysis will trace how the material scope of the
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institution expands through a repetitive process of legal (re)interpretations and clarifications, and 
how the principle of exportability evolves and is conditioned through the interaction of law and 
politics over different stages.
Section one analyses the evolution of the material scope of Regulation 1408, which despite political 
status quo preferences has been dynamically extended through judicial activism. Section two 
explores, the legal-politics game involved in settling the status of 'special non-contributory’ 
benefits. Section three analyses intra-European health care as individual theme, and thus examines 
institutionalisation of a specific policy field in detail and over time. Finally, section four concludes 
with the analytical findings.
All three analytical sections do, in their own respects, draw the same picture. The generation of 
rules and rights is a continuous process. The clashes between Community law and national policies 
produce conflict and clarification. However, clarification is the more temporary state of affairs, 
which lasts until a new situation arises. Institutionalisation is indeed a dynamic process, the content 
and direction of which form only very gradually over time.
1.0: The Material Scope
On the face of it, the material scope of 1408 appears static. When adopted in 1971, the material 
content of the Regulation repeated that of the preceding Regulation no. 3, which applied to the 
traditional branches o f social security, as stated in ILO convention no. 102 of 1952. Since its 
adoption, the Council has only extended the material scope of 1408 once. That was when special 
schemes for civil servants were included in 1998.157 However, the recently adopted common 
position of the Council has furthermore announced that Regulation 1408's material scope will be 
extended to cover statutory pre-retirement schemes (COM (2004) 44).
From a historical comparative point of view, it could be argued that the substantial scope of 1408 is 
an institutional repetition, where only one amendment so far has managed to change a scope laid
1J" Council Regulation (EC)No 1606/98 of 29 June 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of 
social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members o f their families moving within 
the Community.
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down as far back as 1958, and defined as early as 1952. The early settlement of the material scope 
means that the understanding of ‘social security' as expressed in Article 4 of the present Regulation, 
dates back to the years when the European Coal and Steel Community was founded. At that point of 
time, the six original Community members shared between them a Bismarkian notion of social 
security, where social security meant social insurance, and had little in common with social 
assistance (Pieters 1997, p. 207). Social security schemes have, however, changed much since then. 
New member states have introduced other welfare traditions into the coordination system. At the 
same time, the traditionally Bismarkian welfare states have introduced new benefit types and other 
criteria for entitlement than contribution.
Despite an apparent institutional status quo, the material scope of 1408 has been extended 
dynamically. At the same time as the Council of Ministers has resisted change on the material 
substance, the European Court of Justice has expanded it all the same. Throughout the regulatory 
existence of 1408, the Court has attempted to up-date the institution, and to bring the Regulation 
into line with contemporary’ developments at the national level, with new interpretations of 
supranational primary law, and with its own jurisprudence. The material scope and limits have 
rather been set by the Court than by the Council, where the radical case-law interpretation of the 
former has compensated for the political inability or unw illingness o f the latter to revise a 50 year 
old understanding o f social security. Whereas 1408 does not acknow ledge a modem view’ of social 
security, the case-law interpretation thereof aims to do so (Igl 1997, p. 101).
The following sections analyse how the material scope and the principle of exportability of 1408 
has been incrementally extended -  not through gradual policy reforms -  but through piecemeal 
jurisprudence. Section one briefly pictures the legal attempts to define ‘social security'. The next 
three sections analyse how the Court has managed to integrate new’ welfare schemes into 1408's 
material scope, at the same time as the Council has neglected to do so. Section two treats the issue 
of special schemes for civil sen ants, three^ that o f family benefits and, four, that of long term care 
benefits. Section five turns to the political reply to proposals on the future material scope. Finally, 
section six concludes on the incremental generation of exportable European social security rights.
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1.1: Defining Social Security
Article 4 of Regulation 1408 provides us with an exhaustive list of the social security risks which 
arc materially covered. At the same time, the limits of the material scope arc laid down in Article 4 
(4), which originally stated that:
"This Regulation shall not apply to social and medical assistance, to benefits schemes Tor \ ktiins of war ct iu 
consequences, or to special schemes for civil servants and persons treated as such '
From the early case-law on, the Court was requested to draw the line between included'"’ and 
excluded*™' benefits. While it is clear that 'social security* benefits arc included, and that 'social' 
and 'medical assistance* arc not, the Regulation docs not. however, provide a definition of ‘social 
security* as opposed to 'social assistance*.158 Much of the political, legal and administrative dispute 
on the material scope of 1408 has concerned defining the boundary between these two benefit t> pcs 
Setting this boundary' concerns much more than clarifying conceptual disagreement It also decides 
to which benefits the principle of equal treatment and the principle of c\portability apply It thus 
decides which benefits the member states can limit to their own citi/cns or long term residents and 
can restrict to its own territory.
From the early case-law on. the Court has defined ’social security’ extensively Jurisprudence laid 
down that 'social security* benefits were benefits granted to a person on the basts of a legally 
defined position.*™" 'Social assistance', on the other hand, bad need as an essential criterion for its 
application.**1* Since some benefits might have dual characteristics, their nature depended on their 
'relating factors', and not on how they were described in national legislation:
"The distinction between benefits which are excluded from the scope of Regulation no I4ux/7t and bcncho 
which come within it rests entirely on the factors relating to each benefit, m paiticul.ir pmp"w and the 
conditions for its grant, and not on whether the national legislation describes the benefit as a social ■H\unt\ bench! 
or not" (summary of case 249/85 Hoeckx1'*).
So concluding, the Court emphasised its own role as the last instance for the authoritative 
interpretation of a social benefit's true character. However, whereas the Court, m its earlier ease-
Article 1 of 1408/71 generally defines the various concepts m the Regulation The Article goes no Jctimtion *>t 
social security versus assistance.
Case 249/83, 27. March 1985. I era Uoeckx v Openbaar Cenlnmi voor ShMncluippi’lijk II ct»/». knimtlumt 1(. !< 
1985, p. 973.
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law, circulated around defining a borderline between social securin', on the one hand, and social 
assistance, on the other, it never gave a precise definition. It was left up to individual cases to 
consider the relating factors of a benefit, its purpose and the conditions for its being granted. The 
original attempt to draw the border between the two benefit types has also at the same time, been 
overtaken by the continuously changing nature of welfare states. Social insurance systems o f today 
entail more means-testing, and social assistance is, to a greater extent, a legally enforceable right, 
with less space open for administrative discretion. Due to the changing character of the social 
security schemes at the national level, the would-be borderline between social security and 
assistance has lost much of its clarity over the years (Pieters 1997b, p. 188). In this context of 
multiple developments, it has primarily been the task of the ECJ to 'update' the material scope of 
1408 to contemporary' welfare schemes. The following three sections analyse such 'institutional 
update', with regard to special schemes for civil servants, new types of family benefits and long 
term care schemes.
1.2: First Institutional Update -  S pecial Schem es for C ivil Servants
Although Article 4(4), up until the late 1990s, explicitly stated that 'special schemes for civil 
sen ants' were excluded from the material scope, the Court has, however, considered the status of 
those schemes on two occasions. Between the early ruling of 1979 and the later one in 1995, a 
change of legal reasoning took place. Back in 1979, case 129/78 Lohmam160 confirmed the w ording 
of Article 4 (4), excluding ' special schemes for civil sen-ants" from the material scope of 1408,xxx 
In the early judgement, the Court emphasised that Lohmam? did not have the status as a worker, as 
he was a civil sen1 ant, and therefore could not rely on 1408/71. In the late 1970s. the Court found 
that Article 4 (4) was the logical consequence of Article 48 (4) of the Treaty, which exempted 
employment in the public service from the Treaty's objective of promoting the free movement of 
workers.
In case C-443/93 Vougioukas161, the Court, however, changed this point of view. Vougioukas was a 
Greek doctor who, when applying for retirement pension, requested the Greek competent institution
160 Case 129/78,8. March 1979. Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank, Amstenlam  v.4. E. Lohmann. ECR 1979, p. 
853.
161 Case C-443/93, 22. November 1995. loannis Vougioukas v Idrima Koinonikon Asphalisseon (IK.4). ECR 1995, p. 1- 
4033.
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to add his periodical employment in Germany into the calculation o f his pension.162 The Greek 
government, however, referred to the case o f Lohmcmn and argued that the exclusion of special 
schemes for civil servants was justified under Article 48 (4) o f the Treaty.
In contrast to the case of Lohmcmn, the Court first stated that the subject matter and aim of the 
Treaty's Article 48(4) and 1408's Article 4 (4) were different (Pennings 1998, pp. 59-60).163 The 
Court was furthermore requested to consider whether the exclusion in Article 4 (4) of the special 
schemes for civil servants, was contrary to Article 48 and 51 of the Treaty. The Court found that 
since the adoption of 1408/71, its context had changed. At the time of adoption, it might have been 
justified to exclude special schemes for civil servants, and persons treated as such, because of the 
profound differences between national schemes (para. 32 of the judgement). According to this new 
reasoning of the Court, the maintenance of the exclusion of these schemes from the material scope 
could no longer be justified by the technical difficulties of coordination. Especially not since the 
Commission had submitted its proposal to bring the schemes into the regulatory scope of 1408 
(para. 33 of the judgement).164 The Court openly reprimanded the Council for not having fulfilled 
its Treaty obligations:
“The Community legislature, however, has not yet adopted the measure necessary to extend the material scope of 
Regulation 1408/71 to special schemes for civil servants and persons treated as such, with the result that Article 4 
(4) of the Regulation leaves a considerable lacuna in the Community coordination of social security schemes. 
[...,] In any event it must be concluded that, by not introducing any measure for coordination in that sector [....1 
the Council has not fully discharged its obligation under Article 51 of the Treaty" (paras, 31 & 34 of the 
judgement).
The specific result of the jurisprudence was that Mr Vougioukos, as a doctor, was entitled to have 
his employment periods in Germany aggregated. The general result was that the Court instructed 
the Council to coordinate the special schemes for civil servants (Havcrkatc & Hustcr 1999, p. 105).
Less than three years later, the Council adopted Regulation 1606/98, which added special schemes 
for civil serv ants to the material scope of 1408. In the explanatory memorandum, the Council gave
162 Vougioukas had been employed in German public hospitals betw een 1964-1965 and subsequently 1966-1969.
163 Article 48 (4) aims to take into account the interests member states may have in reserving certain employment posts 
for their own nationals.
164 Hereby referring to COM (91) 528.
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its reasons for its legislative action with regard to the Vougioukas judgement. Due to the 
jurisprudence of the Court, the personal and material scope was extended to include special 
schemes for civil servants and people treated as such.165
The Vougioukas case still stands out as a landmark judgement. The ECJ underscored that certain 
rights stem directly from the Treaty, even though a specific provision which had been adopted -  and 
maintained -  by the Council stated to the contrary' (Quintin 1997, p. 234). By its judgement, the 
Court neutralised secondary' legislation which had been adopted politically. It is a landmark case 
because it was clear that the Community’ legislator had not yet agreed to coordinate these special 
schemes for civil servants. It, however, became bound to do so by the Court's interpretation of its 
Treaty obligations and its own respect for the rule of law. It is also a remarkable case because the 
discrepancies between the cases of Lohmann and Vougioukas illustrate that Treaty obligations and 
objectives are not definitively laid down, but are open to further interpretations. In a theoretical 
perspective, the case is an interesting illustration o f the interplay between Court, Commission and 
Council. Legal innovation became the justification, or the policy window, for the Commission to rc- 
proposc that the material scope was extended, and the background against which the Council 
accepted to do so.166
1.3: Second Institutional Update -  Fam ily Benefits
Later litigation on the material scope depicts in greater detail the encounter between newer national 
social policies and the co-ordination system. Due to 1408*s traditional understanding of social 
security, new forms of social policies could, qua national definitions and criteria, be placed outside 
the regulatory scope o f 1408. In the second half of the 1990s, such new benefit types appeared as 
points of conflicts.
w  Among other changes. Regulation 1606/98 amended parts o f Article 1, Article 2 (3) w as deleted and the part of 
Article 4 (4) excluding from the material scope “special schemes o f civil servants and persons treated as such” was also 
deleted.
lt* Regulation 1606/98 was agreed upon against the background o f the amendment proposal COM (91) 528, but only 
concerned its proposed part on special schemes for civil servants, and not the general extension of the personal 
category. The proposal had been subdivided by the Commission to create compromise. The compromise meant that 
non-active persons were not included as part of the personal, regulatory' scope (Note front the Danish Ministry of 
Labour to the European Parliamentary Committee, 22 May 1998, annex 293).
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The case-law discussion in the present and in the following section, illustrates the Court's capacity 
to modernise the co-ordination institution despite political unwillingness to do so. Family benefits is 
one policy-area which has gained importance as welfare policy, another is long term care benefits. 
Both policy areas represent national institutional responses which are intended to tackle more recent 
demographic developments.
Due to its non-contributory character, different policy objectives and territoriality, family benefits 
have been frequent areas of policy conflict for the co-ordination system. As the analysis of case 
41/84 Pinna and case C-185/96 Commission against Greece in chapter IV section 1.1 
demonstrated, the reasons why policies with national demographic aims should equally aim to 
increase the birth-rates of other member states have not been obvious to national governments or 
administrations (van Raepenbusch 1997, pp. 82-83). The cluster of case-law addressing family 
benefits have, however, repeatedly clarified that member states arc no longer in a position to adopt 
policies which respond to demographic developments, without taking the institutionalised principles 
of Regulation 1408 into consideration.
The case C-78/91 Hughes16 considered the case of British family credit, and to what extent it 
should be categorised as social assistance or as a social security benefit. The case concerned 
whether Mrs Hughes had the right to the British family credit, despite her residence in Ireland, but 
due to her husband's work in Britain.***1 Since the British act on family credit was based on the 
principle of territoriality, Mrs. Hughes did not qualify for the benefit. Before the Court, both the 
British and the German government defended the residence clause, arguing that family credit was a 
social assistance type of benefit.***“ That national classification was. however, overruled by the 
judgement. The Court repeated that the distinction between benefits which arc included and 
excluded, depended on the constituent elements, and not on the classification made by the 
individual state. It pointed to how it consistently had held that a benefit was a social security benefit 
if it was granted w ithout discretionary assessment of the personal needs, but on the basis of a legally 
defined position (para. 15 of the judgement).3“*111 The family credit was not granted on basis of an 
individual assessment of personal needs, and;
Case C-78/91, 16 July 1992. Rose Hughes v Chief Adjudication Officer, Belfast. ECR 1992, page 1-4839.
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“a benefit which is granted automatically to families meeting certain objective criteria, relating in particular to 
their size, income and capital resources, must be considered as a family benefit for the purposes o f  Article 4 (1)
( h ) ... (para. 22 of the Judgment)”
The principle of exportability in Community law entitled Mrs Hughes to the family credit, and set 
aside the residence requirement of British la\v.X3UUV
During the 1980s, several member states introduced different types of ‘child raising' allowances as 
a new' family benefit. A general aim of the benefit w'as to make it possible for one of the parents to 
slay at home with the child during its first years. However, neither national nor community law 
specified the relationship between the new social benefit and Regulation 1408 (Altmaicr 1995, p. 
86). The joined cases Hoever & Zachow!6S. C-245/94 & C-312/94 concerned the German child 
raising allowance, i.e. ‘Erziehungsgcld\ adopted in December 1985. This ty pe of child care benefit 
differed from the traditional German family benefit, i. e. ‘Kindergeld’, in its objective and 
qualifying conditions (Igl 1997, p. 97). From a German legal, political and administrative 
perspective, ‘Kindergeld" had traditionally been regarded as the only family benefit within the 
meaning of Regulation 1408 (Eichcnliofcr 1997, p. 450; Interviews: German Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs, 17 September 2001; German Bundcsanstalt fur Arbeit und 
Sozialordnung, 25 September 2001). The child raising allowance had, on the other hand, not been 
viewed as a classic family benefit, and had thus been regarded as outside the regulatory scope of 
1408/71. That point o f view was challenged and corrected by the case law of the Court.
The cases of Hoever and Zachow concerned two migrant families, residing in the Netherlands, but 
with the husbands working full-time in Germany. The wives applied for the German child-raising 
allowance, without personally being affiliated in the German social security system.5“*'’ The 
German social court asked the ECJ whether the ‘Erziehungsgcld* was a family benefit within the 
meaning of Article 4(1) (h) of 1408/71. And, if  so. could the wife of a migrant worker w ho did not 
possess a personal right to the benefit, claim the benefit with regard to 1408/71 ?
lhS Joined cases C-245/94 and C-312/94, 10. October 1996. Ingrid Hoever and Iris Zachow v Land Konirhein- 
Westfalen. ECR 1996, page 1-4895. The "Erzichimgsgeld” is governed by the German “Bundesgesetz über die 
Gewährung von Erziehungsgeld und Erziehungsurlaub”.
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Based on the principle of territoriality, the German law on child care benefit denied Mrs. Hoever 
and Mrs. Zachow any right to child raising allowance. Among other criteria, the national law 
specifies that to qualify for the child care benefit one must reside in Germany169 or, if not residing 
there, have worked at least 15 hours a week in Germany.170 Furthermore, one docs not qualify if one 
is in full employment.171 The German government did not find that its "Erziehungsgeld” was a 
family benefit included in the ratione materiae o f 1408/71, since its purpose was not to meet family 
expenses (referred in para. 24 in the opinion o f the advocate general Jacobs). In its opinion, the 
German government argued that the “Erziehungsgeld" is different from the "Kindergeld”. The 
intention of the “Erzichungsgcld" was argued to be to make it possible for one of the parents to stay 
at home in the first phase of the child's life, and to remunerate such a choice.
Answering the first question which was posed, the Court was clear and short. In its reasoning it 
referred especially to the case of Hughes, and the Court re-stated that it was the constituent 
elements of each benefit that decided its classification (paras. 17 & 18 of the judgement). Since the 
German "Erziehungsgeld" was granted automatically to persons fulfilling objective criteria without 
any individual or discretionary assessment o f needs, it was a family benefit within the meaning of 
Article 4 (1) (h) (para. 27 of the judgement). The second question which was posed concerned the 
rights of a family member who did not reside in the country where her husband was employed and 
where the competent institution was situated. She was also not personally subject to German social 
insurance. According to national law, the plaintiff must be personally eligible for the allowance, i.e. 
must personally fulfil the conditions. In observations given by the German, Spanish and French 
governments, they all referred to the line o f authority laid down in Kermaschek, and emphasised 
that the family member only had a derived right (observations referred in para. 31 of the 
judgement). However, the Court contradicted the stated opinions by re-stating its conclusions from 
case Cahanis-Issarte, which was analysed in chapter IV section 1.2. The scope of the rule laid down 
in Kermaschek was limited by Cabanis-Issarte to provisions which were only applicable to 
workers, and not to family members, such as unemployment benefit (para. 32 of the judgement). 
The Court concluded that the distinction between personal and derived right thus did not apply to *10
169 Para. 1 (1 ) of the "Bundesgesetz über die Gewährung von Erziehungsgeld und Erziehungsurlaub".
10 This exception is lonnulated as para. 1 (4) of the "Bundesgesetz über die Gewährung von Erziehung sgeld und 
Erziehung surlaub".
1,1 Para. 1 (1 ) of the ' ‘Bundesgesetz über die Gewährung von Erziehungsgeld und Erziehungsurlaub"'.
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family benefits, and Mrs Hoever and Mrs Zachow were therefore entitled to the child care 
allowance (para. 33 of the judgement).
The joined Hoever Zachow cases powerfully demonstrate a Court which is both willing and in a 
position to contradict national opinions and the formulated criteria of national law. In the cases, the 
Court overruled both the territorial principle of German law, and the criterion that one has to be 
personally eligible for the child care allowance. It demonstrates that it is a Court that is willing to 
rule against national preferences, despite the financial implication thereof. To extend 
'Erziehungsgeld' beyond German borders is a costly affair (Interview, German Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs, 17 September 2001). Finally, the litigation exemplifies how previous 
and future case law link up together in a cluster, through which new authoritative lines of reasoning 
generate new concrete rights for the migrant. The case of Hughes was one reference point for the 
Court when in-cooperating 'Erziehungsgeld' in the material scope o f Regulation 1408. Another 
reference was that of Cabanis-lssarte, which extended the principle of equal treatment to family 
members. In the reasoned opinions o f the member states, they requested the Court to reconsider its 
ruling in the Cabanis-lssarte judgement by referring to the Kermaschek case-law. The Court did not 
submit to this request, but applied the conclusions of the very specific case o f Cabanis-lssarte to the 
issue of family benefit. Furthermore, the Hoever & Zachow cases were the cases to which the Court 
referred in the case of Sala, analysed in chapter IV section 1.2, when concluding that also the non­
active Martinez Sala had a right to ‘Erziehungsgeld', despite the fact that she had no residence 
permit to stay within Germany. Both the Hughes and the Hoever & Zachow cases were replicated in 
the recent case C-333/00Maaheimo1 ", in which the Court considered w hether Finnish ‘home child­
care allowance' should be paid out abroad (paras. 22, 32, & 33 of the judgement).*^1 Previous 
case-law- formed the basis of the line of reasoning upon which the Court found that the Finnish 
residence requirement in its home child-care policy was inconsistent with Community law'. Once 
again, the Court set aside the national principle of territoriality.
This cluster of case-law has increasingly made it difficult for member states to disregard 
Community- law as clarified by the Court, when trying to territorialise family policies. The cluster of 
case-law underscores the binding precedent of the Court's previous rulings. On the basis of a
r :  Case C-333/00, 7. November 2002. Eila Paivikki Afaahemio . ECR 2002, p. 1-10087.
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patchwork of litigation, principles and aims arc applied uniformly to different cases concerning 
different social securin' schemes and welfare traditions.
1.4: Third Institutional Update - Long Term  Care Benefits
Long term care benefit represents a benefit which could not easily have been appreciated back when 
the material scope of 1408 was laid down. Its late inclusion into the Regulation and its stated 
exportability exemplifies a Court driven process, overruling political preferences and residence 
requirements.
Long term care has taken some time to find its name. Although ‘reliance on care* has always 
existed as a social phenomenon, long term care did not figure as an independent or conceptualised 
social security risk in European or international conventions at the end o f the 70s (Igl 1998; opinion 
o f advocate general Cosmas in Case C-160/96 Molenaar). Although by no means being a ‘new* 
social risk, it is a risk which, in some member states, has only lately become a part of public 
welfare, and has been institutionalised beyond the more immediate care provided by the family.
Germany adopted its ‘Pfiegevcrsicherungsgcsctz* as late as 1995, thereby recognising long term 
care as an independent social risk. Before the adoption of the care insurance law, long term care 
was publicly granted as a social assistance benefit, or privately provided and financed (Igl & 
Stadelmann 1998, p. 37). Today any person insured against sickness is compulsory insured in the 
long-term care scheme. The social insurance is funded from contributions from both worker and 
employer, and entitles a member173 reliant on care to care in a nursing home or in one's own home. 
If  one should desire home care, it is possible to choose either care as a benefit in kind, or as a 
monthly allow ance, i.e. ‘Pflegcgcld* where oneself purchase the care.
The monthly cash allow ance has turned out to be the preferred form of home care. From the outset, 
80% of those in home care chose the cash benefit (Igl 1998, p. 23). However, according to national
173 The member lias to complete an insurance period, which from the outset was one year, but then increased in stages to 
five years in 2000.
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legislation, the entitlement to the German ‘Pflegegeld* is suspended if one takes up residence 
abroad.174 *The ‘Pflegegeld* thus relies on the territorial principle.
Whether the territorial demarcation of the German ‘Pflegegeld’ contradicts Community law was 
examined in case C-l 60/96Moknaar1 5. The case discussed the right to ‘Pflegegeld* of Mr and Mrs 
Moienaar, a Dutch, German couple, working in Germany but living in France. They were both 
voluntarily insured against sickness in Germany and were, from January 1995, required to pay care 
insurance contributions, which they did. However, on application, they were informed by the 
competent German social security fund that they were not entitled to care insurance benefits due to 
their French residence.
The ECJ initiated its legal reasoning by referring to previous case-law, stating that a benefit was to 
be regarded as a social security benefit if granted “on the basis of a legally defined position and 
provided that it concerns one of the risks expressly listed in Article 4(1)*’ of 1408/71 (para. 20 of 
the judgement).176 It added that the list of Article 4 (1) was exhaustive, meaning that a branch of 
social security not mentioned there was not part of the regulatory' scope.177 Long term care, such as 
the German ‘PflegeVersicherung*, was to be regarded as a sickness benefit within the meaning of 
Article 4 (1) (a) of Regulation 1408. Having thus included the care allowance within the material 
scope of 1408, the Court continued by examining whether the residence clause of German law 
could be justified against the Community principle of exportability.
1408's Article 19 (1) (a) & (b)178 obliges the competent institution to export sickness benefits in 
cash, but not equally sickness benefit in kind (Huster 1999, p. 12). Although a monthly cash
1 4 The residence clause is laid down by § 34 ( 1 ) (1 ) of the Gennan Sozialgesetzbuch (Social Security Code) XI.
1 5 Case C -l60/96, 5. March 1998. Manfred M oknaar and Barbara Fath-M oknaar v Allgemeine Ortskrankenkas.se 
Baden-Württemberg. ECR 1998, p. 1-880.
1 '* The Court referred to case 249/83 Hoeckx, paras. 12-14; case 122/84 Saivner  paras. 19-21; case C-356/89 New ton 
and case C-78/91 Hughes para. 15.
r  In this point, the ECJ here referred to case C-25/95 One, w hich will be further mentioned below.
18 Article 19(1) states: “'Residence in a Member State other than the competent State -  General rules [...]:
(a) benefits in kind provided on behalf of the competent institution by the institution of the place of residence in 
accordance w ith tire provisions o f the legislation administered by that institution as though he w as insured with it
(b) cash benefits provided by the competent institution in accordance with the legislation which it administers [...]" 
(emphasis added).
184
allowance, ‘Pflegegcld’ was defined as a benefit in kind in German law. More specifically, the draft 
of the 'Pflegeversicheningsgesetz' defended the point of view that the care allowance constituted a 
‘benefit in kind-substitute’, a ‘Sachleistungssurrogaf (BT-Drucks 12/5262, p. 82; Zuleeg 1998, p. 
172). The ECJ did not accept the national classification, but ruled that the German care allowance 
was indeed a benefit in cash (para. 36 of the judgement). As a consequence thereof, the Court 
concluded that the residence clause in German law conflicted with the principle of exportability of 
Regulation 1408.179 The impact of the Molenaar case will be examined in more detail in chapter 
VII.
The Molenaar case is another case among the later jurisprudence, in which the Court corrected the 
ways in which national politicians classified a benefit. It is another case in which national policy 
had been drafted and adopted without -  at least openly - having taken Community social security 
coordination into consideration, and which was subsequently corrected by the ECJ. It is thus 
another case exemplify ing how social security policy cannot be autonomously' drafted, but is 
conditioned by the existing European social security law. The obvious attempt by the German 
government to restrict long term care benefit to its own territory, by classifying it as a ‘benefit in- 
kind substitute* failed. The Molenaar case demonstrates the Court's position in the social security 
field in the late 1990s. It demonstrates a Court capable of expanding the material and exportable 
rights of the migrant, despite national preferences, despite the financial implications that it may' 
have for the litigating member state, and despite the considerable political importance of that 
specific member stale. The legal activism that the Court carried out in the Molenaar case updated 
the material scope of 1408, and extended its provision of exportability.
1.5; Proposing the Updating o f the Material Scope
Since Regulation 1408 was put into place, the Court's litigation has incrementally extended its 
material scope. However, restrictive legal interpretations are the other part of the description. The 
case-law setting the material scope admit member states the competence to formulate the criteria for 
the qualification for a benefit, as long as these do not contradict Community law.xxxvn Case-law has 
also recognised that not each and every benefit which can be defined as ‘social security’ is part of
* As laid down by Article 19 (1) (b) of 1408/71.
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the material scope, if  it is not part of Article 4 (l) 's  exhaustive list. In case 25/95 Otte180, the Court 
thus ruled that a pre-retirement benefit was not part of 1408's material scope, since the Council of 
Ministers had not yet agreed on its inclusion.1™ 11 The Court's approach towards the Council of 
Ministers in the case of One appeared to be more obliging, than the rather confrontational style it 
adopted in the earlier case of Vovgioukas.
The inclusion of pre-retirement benefits has been debated for more than two decades in the Council 
of Ministers. Back in 1980, the Commission proposed revising the Regulation's chapter on 
unemployment and inserting provisions including pre-retirement benefits (OJ C no. 169, 9 July 
1980). Unanimity could however not be reached on this proposal, among other reasons because the 
issues of unemployment and pre-retirement benefits were linked in a single proposal (Comclisscn 
1997, p. 48). To reopen the discussions on both benefits, the Commission withdrew the original 
proposal and formulated two independent ones, on unemployment and pre-retirement benefits 
respectively.181 In the simplified proposal, the Commission, however, abandoned the strategy of 
treating pre-retirement as an separate issue. COM (98) 779 re-proposed that the benefit was 
included in the material scope, and the Council has recently adopted a common position on 
extending Regulation 1408's material scope to also cover pre-retirement benefits. In this way, 
political approval has finally been given to update the institution, and to embrace a more modem 
type of social benefit.
1.6: Increm ental Generation o f Exportable Social Security Rights
The expansion of the material scope does indeed support theoretical assumptions on legal 
autonomy. It is the legal activism of the European Court of Justice which has settled the material 
scope of 1408/71 and extended it incrementally. While the strict wording of the substantial scope 
has only changed once since 1958, rights have been added over the years through case-law, 
Jurisprudence is the mechanism which -  despite political reserv ations - updates the material content 
of the institution.
180 Case C-25/95, 11. July 1996. Siegfried Otte v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. ECR 1996, p. 1-3745.
181 COM (95) 734 concerned unemployment benefit. COM (95 ) 735 concerned pre-retirement benefits.
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In the case of Vougioukas, the Court interpreted both the Regulation, its context, and the Treaty 
dynamically. The lesson taught by the Court was that while politicians might prefer institutional 
status quo, that was not, from a legal point o f view, in keeping with the times. In concrete terms, 
status quo deprived the migrant of his rights, and could not be justified in the light of the Treaty's 
objective to promote the free movement of persons. The case-law neutralised Regulation 1408's 
exemption on ‘special schemes for civil servants', and thereby set aside what had been adopted 
politically. The innovative ruling was not only accepted by the litigant government, but by the other 
member governments as w ell. The individual case of Vougioukas led to a subsequently codification 
by the Council. Judicial decision-making thus dictated political action. This research finding has 
theoretical implications for the legal politics game, as described by Garrett, Kclcman and Schultz, 
since it exemplifies the outcome of an adverse decision, w hich is left out of their description. The 
Vougioukas case, first of all, broke with established legal reasoning (stage 1), secondly was 
accepted by not only the litigant government (in stage 2) but also by the other EU governments 
(stage 3). which, as a result of the judicial decision-making, amended secondary legislation. The 
member states chose to collectively codify the new principles laid down by the Court.
Child raising allowances represent one comer of family policy, which with its non-contributory 
nature and policy aims, does not straightforwardly fit into the classic co-ordination idea of social 
insurance. The Hoever-Zachow judgement must be seen as a key case in a longer line of cases, 
which together established binding precedent and generated new’ exportable rights for an extended 
personal scope. The cluster of case-law regarding family benefits demonstrates that member states 
can no longer formulate social policies to tackle specific developments, without taking the 
institutionalised principles of 1408/71 into consideration. The extended principle of exportability 
witli regard to family benefits is, in theoretical terms, another example o f the relative autonomy of 
the Court and its ability to act as a decision-maker, contrary to the preferences of the member states 
and the financial implications of its decision. The research findings thus reject simple assumptions 
about political power, whereby the Court should act cautiously towards the preferences of more 
powerful member states, as suggested by the work of Garrett et al. Its overrule of the territorial 
principles of British and German family policies, in fact, suggest that also the more powerful 
member states submit to the legal reasoning of the Court.
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That is further confirmed by the case of Molenaar. The German ‘Pflegcgeld* was formulated so as 
to rely on the principle of territoriality, but the ruling of the Court corrected the way in which 
national politicians classified a social benefit. Contrary to Conant's findings on the limits of 
European law, this analytical result suggests that even though member states may attempt to pre­
empt Community obligations when designing policies, such strategies are unlikely to be successful 
in the long run. The Molenaar case is therefore another example demonstrating that social policy 
cannot be autonomously drafted, but is very much conditioned by Community law.
The analysis of the material scope provides rich examples of how the Community principle of 
exportability may conflict with member states’ social policy preferences, which aim to limit 
benefits within their own borders. However, this clash has not discouraged the Court from 
modernising the institution of 1408/71. When analysing the incremental development of 1408's 
material scope, it becomes clear that the Court has not exerted self-restraint. Neither has it been 
restrained by the Council. On the contrary, legal innovation has taken place despite political 
preferences and despite the political, administrative and financial implication thereof.
2.0: De-territorialized Social Benefits?
One of the most controversial issues in the history1 of the coordination system has been whether 
benefits characterised as ‘special non-contributory* benefits are part o f 1408's material scope. And 
if they arc, are these ‘special* benefits exportable?
The analysis above on the material scope points out that much of the case-law deals with the 
classification of social benefits as either ‘social security ’ or as ‘social assistance', thereby settling 
whether concrete benefits arc in- or excluded from the regulatory- scope, and therefore are 
exportable -  or not. The dispute on definition intensifies with regard to ‘special non-contributory* 
benefits.
When Regulation 1408 was adopted, its substantive scope seemed reasonably clear. On the one 
hand there were the included social security benefits, exhaustively listed by Article 4 (1) of the 
Regulation. The prime characteristics of national ‘social security' schemes again seemed fairly 
obvious. The general characteristic of social security- was, and still is, that security from social risks
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is offered by public schemes through which specific categories of persons arc. compulsory or 
voluntarily, insured against defined social risks. The schemes arc general!} financed b> collect» d> 
paid contributions. The beneficial}’ of social security schemes is entitled to benefits according to a 
legally defined position, which mirror the individual contributions paid The lc\cl of benefits is 
likewise legally specified and is independent of income (van dor Mci 2002. p 55? i
On the other hand, there were the excluded 'social assistance ‘ benefits as laid down in Article 4(4» 
Social assistance was and is different in nature, being what the state offers its ctti/cns or long-term 
residents who arc not able to provide for themselves, and base no alternate financial means 
Social assistance is usually granted on a discretional} basis, within which a means test is likely to 
play a part. In contrast to social security, social assistance schemes arc non-contributor}, financed 
by tax-revenues. However, previous tax payment is not a criteria for entitlement (\an dcr Mci. ibid) 
Social assistance policies have traditionally been based on the principle of territoriality
The distinction between the two benefit types has become increasingly blurred o\cr the scars As 
national welfare systems have developed, they have increasingly combined aspects of the two 
benefit ty pes. The new mixed nature of some benefits means that today s social security mas lx* 
granted on the basis of a means test, meanwhile social assistance may increasingly be a legally 
enforceable right (Pieters 1997, p. 207).
The development at the national level is reflected supranational!). Supranational attempts to draw 
the borderline between 'security' and ‘assistance’ has not been helped much In the Regulation 
itself, which contains no definition (Pennings 1998. p. 62). The separation of the two concepts has 
therefore relied on the Court of Justice’s interpretations From the earliest case-law on. the Court 
has admitted that certain benefits may have a dual character, somewhere between social security' 
and ‘assistance’, while it has, at the same time, refused to draw an authoritatnc distinction between 
the two. The first ease treating this duality was the carl) ease of I-'nlh
“Although it may seem desirable, from the point of view of applying the Regulation, to establish a Je.ir 
distinction between legislative schemes which come withm social sevunt\ and those wludi come «rJim 
assistance, it is possible that certain laws, because of the classes of persons to winch tl»e\ appK. their ohuxiocs. 
and the detailed rules for their application, may simultaneously contain elements belonging to N»ih categoric* 
mentioned and thus defy any general classification” (para. 1? of the judgement i
18‘ Case 1/72.22. June 1972. Rita Fiilli v Belgian state. IX'R 197J. pace-157
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Due to their affinities with social assistance, member states have insisted that these 'hybrid' benefits 
arc not exportable. As a matter of fact, 1408's predecessor Regulation 3/58 contained an Article 10 
(2). which exempted certain non-contributory benefit from the general export clause (van dcr Mci 
2002. p. 558). That specific provision was, however, left out in 1408/71. A central part of the debate 
between the Court, individual states and the Council, addressed whether Regulation 1408's 
principle of exportability applied to these benefits of dual character.
This analytical section will cany out a process tracing study, which will identify an intense legal- 
political dispute on the defining character of individual benefits and their possible exportability. 
From a theoretical perspective, the study will trace certain propositions on institutionalisation as 
determined through the interaction o f law and politics. The status of "hybrid benefits' was initially 
set by innovative litigation, but later corrected politically. Contrary to the development on the 
material scope, as analysed in this chapter's previous section, the Council managed to mobilise a 
legislative overrule and reined in the interpretations of the Court. The Council's response was to 
legislate a 'special rule*, which lay down the non-exportability of so-called hybrid benefits. That, 
however, provided no immediate end to the controversy. The dispute went on. and the compatibility 
of the "special rule' with the Treaty text was questioned, as were the limits of the legislated 
exception.
The following analysis employs a "stage game' approach in an attempt to depict what happened 
during individual periods of time and what the subsequent reactions were. The individual stages 
correspond to the ones depicted theoretically in figure 3 of chapter II, as part of this thesis' model 
with which to analyse institutionalisation. Together individual stages constitute a development, 
running from To. over Tj, to T2. Section I discusses early legal innovation corresponding to stage 1. 
Section 2 takes us to the political reaction o f non-compliance, occurring in stage 2. Section 3 
depicts how the member states collectively restrained the Court and rc-tcrritorialiscd these benefits 
of dual character in stage 3. Finally, section 4 corresponds to ‘beyond stage 3* and includes the 
latest jurisprudence on the matter. The section concludes on the course o f development, w hich has. 
by no means, been linear nor automatically given.
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2.1: Stage 1 - Legal Innovation
One of the first benefits which came up for examination in the legal, political dispute on ‘special 
non-contributory' benefits, was the Italian social aid pension. The relevant case dealt u uh the rights 
o f Mrs Pisciteffo183 184, an Italian national who, from 1973, had received social aid pension from the 
Italian state. The Italian competent institution had. however, stopped payment when she moved to 
Belgium in 1975 to live with her family.1*4 The Italian court now asked the ECJ whether the social 
aid pension came within the material scope of 1408 and, if so. whether the Community waiver of 
residence clause applied.
Italian authorities claimed before the Court that the social aid pension fell outside “the spirit, 
purpose, terms and objective of the Treaty of Rome" (ECR 1983, p. 1431) From their point of 
view, the right to export a benefit was exclusively related to compulsory social insurance, based on 
paid employment. The social aid pension could therefore not be interpreted as an old age benefit 
within the meaning o f the Regulation. In addition, the Italian government emphasised the necessity 
to distinguish between 'social security* and 'social assistance* by drawing out the different 
functions of the various benefits and the different conditions for their grant. The UK government 
also submitted an observation, and equally requested the Court to come up with a distinction 
between ‘social security* and 'assistance*. It warned that if the principle of cxportabihtv was 
imposed on social assistance benefits, it would upset the national systems, since no Community 
mechanism existed to apportion the costs between the member states (ECR 1983. p. 1434)
The national opinions were overruled by the Court. Despite the member states* warnings about the 
financial implications o f exportability, the Court concluded that the social aid pension w as an old- 
age benefit within the meaning of 4 (1) (c) of Regulation 1408. The benefit was granted on 
objective, legally defined criteria, and was therefore as an old-age benefit exportable beyond Italian 
borders. The ECJ admitted that the benefit had hybrid characteristics, but this did not interfere w ith 
its conclusions. In common with social assistance, a fundamental criterion for entitlement w as a 
lack of means, and that periods of employment or insurance were not part of the requirements It
18:' Case 139/82, 5. Mav 1983. Paoia Pisciiello v Institute Xazionak della Ptv\hh-nza S ochiIc tIXPSt, 1'CR 1'iNV p 
1427.
184 By the time o f the legal dispute, Italian law granted “pen sione sociale" to even Italian cin/cns more than 65 w ars 
old, residing in Italy and whose income from all sources fell below the minimum income as fixed b\ law Ihc m kuI 
pension is provided for in Article 26 of Law No 153 of 30 April 1969
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was, however, still concluded to be part of the supranational regulators- scope, since entitlement was 
not made conditional on any discretionary, individual assessment (para. 13 of the judgement). In 
answering the second question, the Court stressed that the regulatory aim of 1408/71 was to 
promote the free movement of workers and family members. The waiver of residence clauses 
applied for the Italian pension, and Mrs. Piscitello had, as a family-member of a migrant worker, 
the right to export her allowance to Belgium.
The legal, political confrontation over the nature of ‘special non-contributory' benefits culminated 
with the assessment of the French supplementary allowance (Eichcnhofcr 2001, p. 80; Christensen 
& Malmstedt 2000, p. 82). The conflict was expressed in the joined cases 379 to 381/85 and 93/86 
Giktti et al.l8S from February 1987.*1 The ordinary French pension scheme is contributory and 
work-related, and exportable according to 1408/71. However, if the earned pension does not amount 
a certain level, the pensioner can receive a supplementary allowance from the French ‘'Fond 
national de solidarité''. The supplementary allowance is awarded to people regardless of former 
employment, and is tax-financed. When the dispute occurred, French policy on its supplementary 
allowance did not discriminate against foreigners. However, the French code specified that the 
benefit ceased if the recipient moved outside the territory of the French republic.
The French court preliminary asked the ECJ to clarify whether the supplementary' benefit classified 
as social security and, if so, did Community law oblige its exportability. The French competent 
institution and the government found that the nature of the benefit was that of assistance. They' held 
that the benefit could not be classified as social security , because 1) it was not financed by 
contributions, but by public funds, 2) it was not related to occupation, but was a matter of national 
solidarity, 3) the objective of the national allowance was to alleviate a state of need and, therefore 
took the personal income of the receiver into consideration.
Despite this clear political and administrative attempt to define a benefit and the policy objective 
behind its adoption, the ECJ disregarded the national observations. The Court stated that, although 
the benefit was financed out of tax revenue and aimed to provide a minimum level of income for the
185 Joined Cases 379 to 381/85 and 93/86, 24 Februaiy 1987. Caisse régionale d'assurance maladie Rhone-Alpes v 
Anna Giletti, Directeur régional des affaires sanitaires et sociales île Lorraine v Domenico Giardini. Caisse régionale 
d'assurance maladie du Nord-Est v Federico Tampon andSeverino Severini v Caisse primaire centrale d'assurance 
maladie. ECR 1987, p. 955.
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recipient, it was an old age benefit as listed in Article 4 (1) (c) of 1408/71. The reason for its 
inclusion was that it was granted as a legally protected right. Considering the second question, the 
Court concluded that a right to a benefit could not be denied because the person did not reside in 
France. The Court therefore overruled the French principle o f territoriality . In accordance with 
Community law the supplementary allowance was exportable.
2.2: Stage 2 - Non-Com pliance
However, despite the Court's conclusions, France still refused to comply, and the dispute on the 
supplementary allowance went on. France's initial response to the adverse decision by the Court 
was non-compliance. Due to the overt evasion of Community obligations, the Commission initiated 
infringement procedures against France. After Gilctii et al., the Commission reasoned two opinions 
under art. 169, and finally brought France to the Court. The first case considered the exportability of 
the allowance. The second case the principle of equal treatment.
At the same time as France, politically and administratively, continued to violate its Community' 
obligations, and while infringement procedures were pending, the Commission sought to find a 
compromise in the situation. In 1985, the Commission submitted an amendment proposal to 
1408/71, where certain non-contributory benefits were covered by the Regulation, but were made 
non-exportable (ECR 1990, pp. 3166-3167). France responded by further challenging the situation, 
blocking progression in the Council, while continuing to argue that its supplementary allowance did 
not fall within the regulator)' scope o f 1408.
Against this background, the Commission continued its procedure against France. In the 
infringement procedure case, C-236/88 against France186, the Commission requested the Court to 
consider the residence clauses in the French legislation. The Commission outlined the history of the 
legal and political confrontation. French law on supplementary allowance had, for a long time, 
disregarded the migrant's right to intra-European social security-. The history of French non- 
compliance went as far back as 1974, to the case of Biason* 18 \  upon which the Commission, five
l8t' Case C-236/88, 12 Julv 1990. Commission o f  the European Communities v French Republic. ECR 1990, page I 
3163.
18 Case 24/74,9 October \97A. Caisse regional d ’assurance de Maladie de Paris v Biason. ECR 1974, page 999.
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years later, for the first time requested France to bring its legislation into line with Community law. 
On this account, in 1980 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion under Article 169, which it, 
however, suspended one year later, presumably due to the drafting o f the amendment proposal as 
was proposed in 1985. Confronted with the French refusal to support the compromise proposal in 
the Council, the Commission informed the French government by letter, in April 1988, that it had 
decided to go on with the infringement procedure that it had suspended back in 1981 In this light, 
France apparently changed attitude, informing the Commission two months later that it would lift 
its reservation for the amending proposal on 1408/71. By then, the case had however been admitted 
by the Court.188
As the case unfolded, the controversies between the two parties cased. The Commission noted that 
the French government no longer challenged the applicability o f its allowance to 1408/71. France, 
on the other hand, emphasised in its wrritten observation that it had changed administrative practice 
in accordance with the case-law of the Court. In November 1987, the government had informed its 
authorities by ministerial circular that all Community nationals residing in France were entitled to 
the supplementary allowance on the same conditions as French nationals.189 190
The Court did, however, not find French compliance sufficient. Its litigation was clear, and less 
forthcoming than the more compromising position of the Commission. The Court declared that the 
French Republic failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 10 of the Regulation, and the fact that 
an amending proposal had been submitted could not relieve a member state from implementing 
Community law in force.
The French evasion was further examined in the proceedings of case C-307/89 against France290. 
which ran parallel to C-236/88. In this judgement of June 1991, the Court again ruled against 
France, concluding that the French allowance did not live up to the principle of equal treatment, 
since two criteria conditioned entitlement to the allowance.191 A reciprocal international agreement
188 The dispute background is described in the Case's report for the hearing, ECR 1990, pp. 1-3166-3167,
189 Circular no. 1370 of 5 November 1987.
190 Case C-307/89, 11 June 1991. Commission o f  the European Communities v French Republic. ECR 1991, page I- 
2903.
191 The conditions as laid down in Article L 815 o f the French Code de la Sécurité Sociale.
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had to be signed between France and the state in which the person concerned resided. Furthermore, 
a national legislative amendment of January 1987 required that the pensioner must have resided in 
France for a specified period.
The Commission reasoned its infringement procedure by the fact that France had continued to 
administer its legislation in a discriminatory manner. France initially responded to the reasoned 
opinion of the Commission by noting that the grant of the supplementary allowance no longer 
depended on a reciprocal international agreement, and that the relevant administrators had been 
instructed to comply with Community law by the ministerial circular of November 1987.192 The 
Commission was, however, not satisfied and in a letter, from April 1988, it observed that the French 
legislature had now made entitlement depending on residence, arguing that, in consequence, the 
new conditions were contrary to the principle o f equal treatment in Community law. The French 
reply came two months later, stating its commitment to administer according to the Commission's 
observation and Community law. The person concerned in the specific case mentioned by the 
Commission would receive the supplementary' allowance. Despite these declared intentions to 
change administrative practice, in April 1989 another concrete incident was brought to the 
Commission, in which a person had been refused the supplementary allowance on the ground that 
she was not a French national. The French authorities replied that this was due to an administrative 
error.
The infringement procedures against France seemed to have had the intended outcome. In its 
written observation, France declared that it had initiated a process of policy reform, where several 
provisions on health and social security would be brought in accordance with Community law. The 
judgement of the Court, however, considered that the new French approach was not a sufficient 
fulfilment of its Community obligations. The Court stressed that the fact that France had maintained 
its incompatible legislation, even though the law might be administered differently, put those 
subject to the law in a state of uncertainty', not knowing to what extent Community law could be 
relied upon.
ig; The background of the proceedings is described in the report of the hearing, ECR 1991, pp. 2905-2906,
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2.3: Stage 3 - Politicai Overrule
The exportability of the French supplementary allowance did not last long. On the 30 April 1992, 
the Council of Ministers unanimously adopted Regulation 1247/92193. which overruled the Court's 
extension o f exportability. The collective political response stood out clear. The interpretations by 
the Court went too far beyond political intentions. The Council managed to overcome the 
significant threshold of unanimous political action, and the unintended case-law development was 
reined in.
Regulation 1247/92 amended 1408/71, and added a ‘special rule' to the coordination system. The 
'special rule* meant that special non-contributory benefits were included in the material scope of 
Regulation 1408, and rights awarded between member states could thus be aggregated, 
Additionally, the principle of equal treatment applied to these certain benefits. However, by virtue 
of Article 10a (I) the benefits remain bound to the territory of the competent state and cannot be 
exported. For a benefit to be coordinated according to the ‘special rule' it has to be listed in annex 
Ha of the Regulation. Its inclusion in the annex has to be approved by the Council. Among other 
benefit types, annex Ila lists the French supplementary allowance from the National Solidarity- 
Fund194; the Italian social pensions for persons without means195; the British attendance 
allowance196, disability living allowance197 and family credit (see Appendix 5).
The non-exportability of these benefits of dual character has introduced a special co-ordination 
system within the system. The amendment corrected the expansionary course taken by the Court. 
However, the fact that the Court could litigate against collective political intentions for almost two 
decades illustrates that, in the absence of a specific provision stating general or particular political 
objectives, the Court was left free to interpretate the legislative gap. and did so in line with what it 
laid down as the interpreted general regulatory purpose. Moreover, the fact that legal innovation
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1247/92 o f 30 April 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application 
of social securiw schemes to employed persons, to self- employed persons and to members of their families moving 
within tile Community.
11)4 Law of 30 June 1956.
lQi Law no 153 of 30 April 1969.
Both as formulated in the Social Security Act 1975, section 37A and 35.
,g Disability Living Allow ance and Disability Working Allowance Act 1991.
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proceeded for almost two decades illustrates that collectively restraining the Court was indeed a 
very complicated affair, with significant thresholds to overcome. Legislative overrule thus appeared 
more as a last solution than as an immediate one.
A political correction of a legally established line of reasoning is. however, not necessarily the last 
word in the matter. The legislative correction has to be formulated in accordance with the Treaty 
text and its spirit, which ultimately is for the Court to decide. Soon after the adoption of the 'special 
rule', the Court was requested to consider whether it contradicted the Treaty’s Article 51.
The case of C-20/96 Snares198 of 4. November 1997, questioned the compatibility of the special 
rule and Article 51 of primary' law. Concretely', the case concerned a British national, yvhosc 
continued right to disability* living alloyvance was made dependent on his residence yvithin British 
territory.** 1’ The case questioned yvhethcr the territorial binding of the benefit yvas not setting aside 
the essence and purpose of Article 51; to promote the free movement of migrant yvorkers.
The Snares judgement demonstrates how the Court accepted the previous political correction, 
codified by 1247/92. The ECJ pointed out that the waiver of residence clauses should be taken into 
account, unless "otherwise provided in this Regulation" (para. 39 of the judgement). The Court 
reiterated existing case-law, and emphasised that Regulation 1408/71 did not aim to harmonize 
social security matters and that it yvas the sole competence of the member state to define the 
conditions for granting social security' benefits, as long as these were non-di seri minatory' (para. 45 
of the judgement). It is remarkable that the Court went one step further in clarifying member states* 
competencies and. although not asked to do so. it added that a person like Mr Snares could actually 
be refused the right to residence, because he did not fulfil the criteria of sufficient means as laid 
down by Article 1 in Council directive 90/365/EEC (para. 50 of the judgement).
Case C-297/97 Partridge''*9 on 11 June 1998 followed up on the Snares case, questioning the nature 
of another British disability allowance, the attendance allowance, which is a care benefit ayvarded to 
dependent persons. The preliminary- reference concerned whether the answer given by the Court in 
the case o{ Snares also applied to a benefit type such as the attendance allowance, and concretely
^  Case C-20/96,4 November 1997. Kelvin Albert Snares v Adjudication Officer. ECR 1997,p. 1-6057.
1'*) Case C-297/96, 11 June 1998. Vera A. Partridge v Adjudication Officer. ECR 1998, p. 1-3467.
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the case treated the situation of Mrs Partridge, whose attendance allowance had been withdrawn 
when she went to live with her son in France. The British social security commissioner noted that if 
Mrs Partridge had been awarded her benefit and had transferred residence before 1247/92 entered 
into force, she would have been entitled to take her allowance with her. Before 1247/92, the 
attendance allowance was treated as an invalidity benefit within the meaning of 1408/71, Article 4 
(1) (b) (ECR 1998, p. 3470). The judgement o f  the Court reaffirmed the standpoints taken in 
Snares. The attendance allowance was a special non-contributory benefit, exclusively governed by 
the rules laid down in Article 10a, and w as therefore not exportable outside the territory of the UK.
2.4: Beyond Stage 3 - Rule-discovery and Further C larification
With the adoption of 1247/92 and the legal approval thereof, in the cases o f Snares and Partridge, 
‘special non-contributoiy' benefits seemed to have been definitively rc-tcrritorialized. Together the 
Commission, Court and Council institutionalised that the regulatory text can permit new deviations 
from the general -  but not absolute - principle of exportability. In the absence of political guidance, 
the Court exerted judicial activism in stages 1 and 2, but its line of interpretation was met by 
political restraints in stage 3. It subsequently exerted a certain degree o f self-restraint.
Temporarily, the special rule seemed to have satisfied all parties and indeed became a popular 
political solution. When examining the specific development of annex Ha over the years, its initial 
impact varies to a great degree between the member states. As illustrated in the Appendix 5 
“Adding to annex Ha over the years", some member stales reacted promptly, and listed a large set 
of benefit in the annex, thus protecting the residence clauses of their policies. Belgium, Spain, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK all made prompt, and quite 
intensive, use of the new rule. Over the years, they added benefits to it, and whereas Denmark and 
the Netherlands from the outset had no ‘non-contributory special benefits', they have also come to 
make use of the ‘special rule' of non-exportability. The only remaining member state without 
benefits listed in annex Ila is Germany. Adding benefits to annex Ila has made it possible for 
member states to evade exportability, and, as some governments have intensively used the 
opportunity, they have prompted others to do the same (Interviews, the Danish Ministry of Social 
Affairs 4. April 2001; The National Social Security Agency 5. April 2001). The praxis of adding
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benefits has its own expansionary logic, and ultimately reflects the member states' defence of the 
territorial principles of their social policies.
However, despite the political overrule and the creation of another exception, the dispute has 
continued beyond stage 3. In COM (98) 779, the Commission initially proposed an explicit and 
rather narrow' description of ’special non-contributory' benefits, while the general principle of 
exportability gained an even more central position in the Regulation, as its scope of application was 
extended (Christensen & Malmstedt 2000, pp. 88-89).200 According to the formulation of the 
parameters, the Council seems to have accepted that whereas the 'special rule* will continue to exist 
in the future, the category of hybrid benefits needs to be delimited and clearly defined (Council 
document201 15045/01, SOC 529), Also litigation has called for further clarification of what actually 
constitutes a ’special non-contributory’ benefit. Whereas the Court in Snares and Partridge 
accepted political restraints, recent cases have called for its rc-supcrvision of the member states* 
administration of their ’special’ benefits. On this later date, the Court has not acted cautiously.
In the recent cases of Jauch20' and Leclere203, the Court was requested to clarify the scope of annex 
Ila. The case o f Jauch concerned a German national, residing in Germany, but who had worked in 
Austria where he was affiliated to the social security scheme. The competent Austrian institution 
had denied him long term care, since he was not usually residing in Austria, and since the care 
allowance was listed in annex 11a of 1408/71 and thus non-exportable (sec Appendix 5). The 
Austrian government argued before the Court that because the benefit had been admitted in annex 
Ila, the residence clause of Austrian lawr did not contradict Community law. The government 
supported its viewpoints by referring to the previous cases of Snares and Partridge. The Court's 
deduction was. however, reasoned in another established reasoning, laid down by the judgement of 
MoJenaar.
*00 In the new proposal, the principle o f expoitability is placed as Article 5 and the principle is proposed extended to all 
social security benefits, except where the Regulation states to the contrary.
"0I Council document o f 6 December 2001,
Case C-215/99,8 March 2001. Frederick Jauch v Pensionsversicherungsamtalt der Arheiter. ECR 2001, p. I-J 901.
■0? Case C-43/99, 31 May 2001, Ghislain Leclere and Alina Deaconescu v Caisse nationale des prestations familiales. 
ECR 2001, p. 1-4265.
199
i‘"...while care allowance may possibly have a difterent legal regime at the national level, it nevertheless remains 
of the same kind as the German care insurance benefits at issue in Molenaar, and is likewise granted objectively 
on the basis of a legally defined situation” (para. 26 o f the judgement).
The Court thus ruled that the character of the Austrian care allowance was no different from the 
German 'Pflcgegeld'. The Austrian care allowance was therefore to be classified as another 
sickness benefit in cash, for which reason it was, according to Regulation 1408's Article 19 (1) (b), 
exportable and had invalidly been listed in annex Ha. In the case of Jauch, the Court put aside not 
only the Austrian government's definition of its benefit, but it also overruled the praxis of the 
Council, which had unanimously agreed to list the care allowance in annex Ha.
Furthermore, the Leclere case also delimited the scope of annex Ila. The case interpreted the rights 
of Mrs Lech re, whose husband had formerly worked in Luxembourg, whereas the couple resided in 
Belgium. The husband was the victim of an accident at work in 1981, and thereafter received an 
invalidity pension paid by the Luxembourg social security services. With the birth of their child, 
they applied for various allowances in Luxembourg, among which was the maternity allowance. 
The application was turned down, since the couple did not fulfil the residence requirement for the 
benefit, which was one of the benefits explicitly listed in 1408/71 ‘s annex Ila (sec Appendix 5). 
Again the Court ruled that the maternity allowance had been invalidly placed in the annex and. 
contrary to the opinion o f the Luxembourg government, its maternity benefit had to be exported 
according to Article 19 (1) (b) of Regulation 1408.
2.5: Institutionalisation and its  Lim its
The rulings of Jauch and Leclere promise new clarifications on the actual scope o f annex Ila. The 
cases demonstrate that, although it is a political decision which benefits to list in the annex, and 
although the tendency over the years has been to add benefits, the political autonomy to do so is not 
free of judicial supervision.
With Regulation 1247/92's creation o f the 'special rule', complexity was added to the coordination 
system. By the amendment, politics overturned previous judicial activism. So far, the 
institutionalisation process corresponds to Garrett, Kelcmcn and Schultz's point about how member 
states may collective restrain the Court through an amendment of secondaiy legislation (stage 3),
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The subsequent expansion of national benefits adopted in annex 11a furthermore suggest that the 
path of "decreasing returns' or de-institutionalisation was increasingly politically sustained and the 
impact of the special rule thus expanded. Evidently, this finding fundamentally refutes the 
assumption o f self-sustaining dynamics, and instead proves that when political preferences arc 
strong and fairly homogenous, the Court's scope of manocu\rc is reduced (Stone Sweet & 
Sandholtz 1998, pp. 4-5; Garrett. Kelcmcn & Schultz 1998, pp. 150-151) In her work. Conant 
substantiates her argument on the limits of European law with, among other findings, that of 
Regulation 1247/92, and suggests it is a final political act which reins in previous legal innovation 
(Conant 2002, pp. 192-194). According to Conant, the adoption of 1247/92 verifies the hypothesis 
that the Council ultimately masters decision-making and the outcome of legislation Although the 
research findings of the present section similarly demonstrates that, in the end. legal innovation 
needs to be politically sustained, they nevertheless also point out that, when analysing 
institutionalisation over an extensive period of lime, the path may break anew and a legislative 
overrule be re-questioned. Due to the fluidity of policy -making, political restraint is unlikely to be a 
definitive act. The complexity and dy namic character of institutionalisation mean dial the processes 
of (re)dcfining and (re)clarifying the rule of law continue far beyond a given stage 3, and a 
legislative act may in fact be vulnerable to further legal challenges and domestic developments, as 
demonstrated by live Jauch and Leclcre rulings. Likewise self-restraint by the Court may be 
provisional rather than general or lasting.
3.0: Health Care Beyond National Borders
“The most comprehensive system of access to cross-border care in die field of international mki.i! law is, w about 
contest, the social security co-ordination system in place within the European 1 )mon It is the inhumation of an 
historic process of agreements between States and of the construction of the ' Common Market", die first Mage m 
the construction of Europe’' (Palm et al. 2000, p. 28).
One of the specific social risks regulated by 1408/71 is that of sickness Chapter T™ of the 
Regulation lays down the provisions concerning sickness and maternity. From the outset, the 
provisions entitle the migrant worker and her/his family to receive immediate medical treatment, if 
she/he falls sick outside her/his own member state, or to be authorised for treatment in another 
member state paid for by her/his competent institution. This means that the individual member 204
204 Chapter 1 of Regulation 1408/71 consists of Articles 18-37.
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states place their health care system at disposal of 1408/7l*s personal scope (Neumann-Duesbcrg 
1999, p. 25). However, apart from the acute health care need, the right to foreign care has to be 
authorised beforehand by the competent national institution. At first sight, control and discretion 
therefore remain national. The questions o f to whom, whether and under what conditions, health 
care should be authorised abroad have been the centre of dispute between national health care 
institutions and interpreters of Community law. How Community law over time has permitted -  but 
at the same time conditioned -  national authorisation policies will be the focus of the follow ing 
analysis. The argument is that authorisation policies bridge the territorial principle of national health 
care and the free movement principles of the Community'. On the one hand, prior authorisation 
constitutes a most powerful means with which to restrict health care within a country's own 
borders, and is indeed an instrument of national control. Cross-border care is not unlimited, but 
cautiously planned. On the other hand, authorisation policies arc not autonomously defined, but 
challenged, justified and compromised by Community law.
For decades, the right to health care abroad has primarily been related to Regulation 1408 and the 
free movement of w orkers. As emphasised in the quote above, 1408/71 has. over time, constructed 
the most comprehensive and, without doubt, the most extensive, system of access to foreign health 
care within international social law. Recent case-law has, however, compromised that 
comprehensiveness by laying dow n that intra-European health care is to be seen in the light of the 
free movement o f goods and services. Meanwhile, adding complexity’, the Court has -  at a 
preliminary stage - opened the internal market to the patient.
While national policies still hinder the creation of an internal health market as such, it is eminently 
clear that the policy domain of health care is not an c11ot impermeable a l'influcncc du droit 
communautaire'*.205 The meeting between national and supranational health policy and law marks 
tensions and contradictions:
"Health care policy in the European Union has, at its centre, a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, recent 
Treaties, which are the definitive statements on the scope of European law, state explicitly that health care is a 
responsibility for Member States. On the other hand, as health systems involve interaction with people (staff and 
patients), goods (pharmaceuticals and devices) and sendees (health care funders and providers), all o f  whose
:oi As formulated by the advocate general Tesauro in the 1998 cases o f Decker and Kohll, which w ill be analysed in 
section 3.4 below.
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freedom to move across borders is guaranteed by the same Treaty , it is increasingly apparent that many of their 
activities are subject to European law'" (Mossialos et at. 2001, p. 11).
The following sections analyse in detail how the national autonomy to determine authorisation 
policies over time has been restrained, re-established, challenged, justified and compromised by 
Community law. Each section depicts a specific political-legal dispute at different points of time. In 
a theoretical vein, the analy sis depicts another 'stage gamc\ where cross border health rights arc 
gradually institutionalised through the interaction of law and politics. The first section lays down 
the Community provision granting conditioned access to European health care. Section nw  
describes the first meeting between national authorisation policies and Community law as 
interpreted by the Court. At this early point of institutionalisation, legal activism limited 
administrative discretion. The political reaction to this legal innovation is subsequently analysed in 
section three. The Council restrained the praxis of the Court and even extended discretionary 
autonomy. Thereafter, the legal-political dispute stood still for almost two decades. Section four 
examines the 1998 Decker-Kohll case-law as a turning point, as it ruled that authorisation policies 
were a barrier to the free movement of goods and sen ices. In section jive  that development is taken 
up to the more recent case-law, where the Court has expanded on its logical deduction, justifying, 
but also compromising, the control instrument of prior authorisation. Section six brings in the last 
incident on the legally established path dependency; the ruling on an internal market for non­
hospital care. So far, no collective political response has been voiced in the long aftermath of 
Decker-Kohll, The Court has solely added to the rights of the European patients. Finally, section 
seven concludes on this development and its implications.
On the whole, institutionalisation of intra-European health care between To and T2 is a most unique 
and illustrative piece of the path to integration of the ‘less likely case*.
3.1: Authorisation -  Conditioned Access to European Health  Care
First of all, the established co-ordination of health care protection means that European migrants 
have access to care in another member state of residence, as a result of the principle of equal 
treatment. Secondly, European migrants enjoy a conditioned right to access health care outside their 
state of residence.
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Article 22 of Regulation 1408 concerns the right to receive treatment outside one's own competent 
member state, meaning the state where one is affiliated to the social security scheme. The Article 
thus treats the scope of the principle of exportability within the policy field of health and. over time, 
several o f its dimensions have been debated before the Court.*1" Due to early Court interpretations 
and the later Council amendment, the right to health care abroad is more extensive than the general 
personal scope of Regulation 1408. The Brock ruling of 1976, analysed in chapter IV section 2.4. 
granted to the actual self-employed a right to immediate health care outside the stale of 
residence.*1“1 Almost 20 years later, the Council extended the entitlement to acute and authorised 
health services abroad to all European nationals and their family members, who arc socially insured 
in one of the member states.206 The extension adopted specifically concerned the rights granted qua 
Article 22 (1) (a) and (c), and was thus an early generalisation o f the personal scope, but was 
exclusive to health care. Furthermore, third country nationals have, with the recent amendment 
Regulation 859/2003, been included among those with access to cross-border health care in all 
member states, with the exception of Denmark. Again, it has to be emphasised that third country 
nationals do not, in general, hold the underlying right of free movement.
Exportability, as stated in Article 22, is not an absolute principle, but a conditioned one and 
therefore, to a certain extent accommodates the national principle of territoriality. Article 22 (1) (c) 
lays down that if one wishes to be treated in another member state, one must obtain a prior 
authorisation from the competent health institution, certifying that it will meet the costs after 
treatment.207 The challenge of Community law to national authorisation policies is reflected in the 
degree of discretion that the competent institution is allowed to exert when deciding on 
authorisation. Discretion is a matter of Article 22 (2). which defines the situation where 
authorisation cannot be refused. *20
:tMl Council Regulation (EC) No 3095/95 of 22 December 1995 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. The 
Regulation amendment inserted a new Article 22a, saying: ’"Notwithstanding Article 2 of this Regulation, Article 22 (1) 
(a) and (c) shall also apply to persons who are nationals o f a Member Slate and are insured under the legislation of a 
Member State and to tire members of their families residing with them".
20 Besides Article 22 (1) (c), 22 (1) (a) entitles the personal scope of 1408/71 to "immediately necessary care” if falling 
sick outside ones own competent state. The person in need receives treatment at the expense o f the competent state, 
which is certified by form El 11, issued by the competent health insurance institution. 22 (1) (b) gives right to health 
care at the expense of the competent institution, if  transferring residence to another member state. lire right is certified 
by form F. 128. Finally, that authorisation has been given to receive treatment in another member state at the expense of 
the competent state according to Article 22 (1) (c) is certified by form E 112.
Article 22 (2) originally read as follows:
“The authorisation required under paragraph [22] 1 (c) may not be refused where the treatment in question cannot 
be provided fo r  the person concerned within the territory o f the Member State in which he resides" (emphasis 
added).
Article 22 (2) soon became a matter of contention, and its meaning was questioned before the Court 
in the earlv cases of Pierik.
3.2: Discretion Lim ited
In the Pierik'08 cases, the Court was requested to rule on the situation of Mrs. Pierik. Mrs. Pierik 
resided in the Netherlands where she received an invalidity pension. The Dutch competent health 
insurance institution refused to reimburse the costs of a hydrotherapy treatment that Mrs. Pierik had 
received in Germany. Prior authorisation had not been granted, since hydrotherapy was not a 
treatment which was offered by the Dutch health system. The cases addressed whether authorisation 
could be refused on the basis of Article 22 (2), when the specific treatment was not a part of the 
health security package of the competent state.
The /^«¿judgem ents indeed became controversial rulings. The Court disregarded the far-reaching 
consequences which were depicted in member states' opinions. In Pierik /, the British government 
argued that if  Article 22 (2) of the Regulation meant that the competent institution was obliged to 
pay for the costs of a treatment abroad, which was not provided by its ow n law, then the;
“scope of those provisions would be distorted since they would have the effect o f creating an independent social 
security law o f the Community instead o f merely co-ordinating the social securin’ law of the member states” 
(ECR 1978, p. 831).
Despite such political warnings on harmonisation effects, the Court ruled that, independently of 
whether the treatment was part of national policy or not, a competent institution was obliged to 
authorise a treatment in another member state, if the foreign treatment had been recognised as 
necessary and effective.
:08 Case 117/77, 16 March 1978. Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland v. G. Pierik. ECR 1978, 
page 825 & Case 182/78, 31 Mav 1979. Bestuur van het Algemeen Ziekenfonds Drenthe-Platteland v. G. Pierik. ECR 
1979, page 1977.
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"‘The duty laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 22 (2) to grant the authorisation required under Article 
22 (1) (c) covers both cases where the treatment provided in another Member State is more effective than that 
which the person concerned can receive in the Member State where he resides and those in which the treatment in 
question cannot be provided on the territory o f tire latter State77 (Para. 22 of Pierik I, emphasis added).
The Court did not change position in Pierik II,209 With both Pierik judgements, the Court 
interpreted the decisive element of the authorisation procedure to be the person's state o f  health. 
and not whether the relevant treatment was part of the health care scheme in the individual member 
state. The decisions thus potentially opened up the possibility’ of ''regime shopping" (Ferrera 2003, 
p. 634). The judgements stand as a very- early legal recognition of the patient's right to travel around 
in the Community* for health care. By limiting the discretionary authorisation power of the 
competent institution, the long term consequence could have been harmonisation at the highest 
lev el. This was a possible scenario, since patients shopping around Europe at the expense of their 
competent state would indirectly encourage member states to establish the same kind of treatments 
(Eichcnhofcr 1999, p. 52).
Such 'top up* effects of the Pierik cases, however, never happened, due to the political reaction. 
Among the more immediate and direct consequences of the Pierik cases were limited health policy 
autonomy and the likelihood of large-scale financial implications. The rulings called for a political 
response.
3.3: Collective Political Response
The Court's decisions in the Pierik cases went far beyond political intentions. By obliging national 
health insurance institutions to send, at their own expense, patients abroad, even if the necessary- 
treatment was not a part of the national health package, the Court very directly limited the 
autonomy to set authorisation policy’, and even to define autonomously’ what health care to provide. 
The legal innovation exerted in Pierik I  efr 11 clearly demonstrates that competencies can be 
redefined by individual lawsuit (Bicback 1990, p. 178).
:rw The Dutch national Court was not convinced by all aspects of the Pierik I, and thus requested the F.CJ for another 
preliminary ruling by Pierik II. The ECJ did not modify its previous conclusions, but simply restated that the competent 
institution had a duty to authorise treatment abroad where a such was recognised as more effective than the ones 
provided inside own borders, as well as w h a t a treatment could not be provided by the competent slate itself (paras. 9 & 
lO of/’ieriA-ƒ/).
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On the other hand, the prompt Council reaction to this demonstrates that, if such individual 
litigation goes too far in terms of financial and political implications, the member slates will try to 
mobilise joint actions against the Court's interpretative course. In this case, the Council succeeded 
in re-establishing the discretionary power of national authorities. Only two years after the second 
Pierik ruling, the member governments unanimously adopted Regulation 2793/81.: 10 The 
amendment directly corrected the Court's interpretation, by inserting a new Article 22 (2) 2. which 
granted a w ide discretion for the member states in defining their authorisation policies (Nlossialos ct 
al. 2001, p. 44). The new Article clarified the political intentions, and 2793/81 rc-balanccd 
competencies in favour of the member state. The Article thus reformulated is the ruling proMsion 
today, and specifics that the competent institution is only obliged to authorise treatment abroad, 
when it is administratively and medically considered necessary. and when that treatment is part of 
the health care package provided nationally. Article 22 (2) 2 came to read as follows;
’The authorization required under paragraph I (c) may not he refused where the treatment m question m amt mg 
the benefits provided fo r  by the legislation of the Member Slate on whose territory the person concerned resides 
and where he cannot be given such treatment within the time normally ni'cesuiry for obtaining the treatment in 
question in the Member State of residence, taking account of his current state of health and the probable course of 
the disease (emphasis added).”
Having initiated the establishment of a supranational system of heal ill care beyond the control of the 
member state, and having tried to undermine the member state's ability to decide on the content of 
national health care, the Court was politically restrained. For almost two decades, national 
authorisation policies seemed sacred, with an established balance between national and Community 
competencies. That was before the Decker Kohl! ruling of 1998.
3.4: Authorisation Policies Before the Internal Market
1998 marked a turning point for the right to intra-European health care. Until 1998. cross-border 
health care in the Community had generally been based on the free movement of workers and w ith 
reference to the instruments of Regulation 1408/71 and 574/72. Apart from those institutions. 
Community law was generally assumed not to bring about greater entitlement to health care abroad
310 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2793/81 of 17 September 1981 amending Regulation ( E l d  No 1408/71 on the 
application of social security schemes to employed persons and ihetr families moving within (lie Community and 
Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 fixing the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71
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The established order between national health policy and Community law was seriously upset with 
the rulings of D ecker11 and K ohlf12 in 1998, and not least by their aftermath. The Decker Kohll 
eases were landmark rulings, clarifying that the Community principles on free movement of goods 
and services also regulate national health policies. The importance o f the rulings has been stressed 
widely, by academics and by national presses, whereas the majority o f member states have so far 
met the judgements with official silence (Eichenhofer 1999b, p. 102; Eichcnhofcr 2001, p. 237; 
Hervey 2000, p. 40; Kotter 2000, p. 28; Maydell 1999, p. 9; Mossialos et al. 2001, p. 45; Novak 
1998, p. 366; Palm 2000, p. 105). Their full impact is still impossible to detect, since subsequent 
cases provide answers to some o f the questions raised by the Decker/Kohll procedure, while 
themselves posing new ones. Furthermore, a collective political response is still awaited.
The cases of Decker and Kohll concerned two Luxembourg citizens who went abroad to purchase 
respectively a pair of corrective spectacles and a dental (orthodontic) treatment. They subsequently 
claimed for the costs to be reimbursed by their health insurance in Luxembourg, although a prior 
authorisation had not been given. Both corrective spectacles and dental treatment arc benefits 
reimbursed by the Luxembourg sickness insurance fund when bought within Luxembourg. 
However, the sickness insurance fund refused to reimburse Decker for his pair of spectacles bought 
in Belgium, since he had not obtained the prior authorisation required according to Luxembourg 
law. In the case o f Kohll. the insurance fund equally refused reimbursement of the dental treatment 
that Mr. Kohll's daughter had received in Germany, because the treatment was not considered 
urgent and could have been obtained in Luxembourg.213
In the cases before the Court, Decker and Kohll argued together with the Commission, that the 
Luxembourg requirement of prior authorisation constituted a barrier against the free movement of 
goods and services. On the other hand, the Luxembourg government submitted that its prior *12
“n Case C-I20/95, 28 April 1998. Nicolas Decker v Caisse tie Maladie des Emplovés de Privés. ECR 1998, page I* 
1831.
112 Case C-158/96, 28 April 1998. Raymond Kohll v Union des Caisses de Maladie. ECR 1998, page 1-1931.
:B Mr. Decker had not asked for prior authorisation before buying his spectacles in Belgium, whereas Kohll had applied 
but was turned down. Mr. Kohll, acting on his daughter’s behalf, decided to go ahead anyway.
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authorisation policies had been formulated in accordance with Article 22 ( 1 > (c> of Regulation NOS 
Luxembourg thus held that if its prior authorisation policy infringed the Treat) principles on free 
movement of goods and services, so did Regulation 1408.
The political and legal importance of the Decker and Kohll cases is clear from die many member 
states who decided to join action with Luxembourg, and delivered opinions Apari from 
Luxembourg, no less than 8 member governments submitted opinions in the cases21 *14 The starting 
point for the joined opinions was that the free movement principles concerned had no influence on 
the policy field of social security.215 Furthermore, the governments justified their tie»point by 
arguing that the prior authorisation procedure was a necessary instrument in order to (Mossialos ct 
al. 2001, p. 46 and as discussed in the opinion of advocate general Tcsauro. para 44-46).
• Maintain the financial equilibrium of the health care system;216
• Ensure the general quality of the health goods and services provided, thus protecting public 
health;217 218
• Ensure the maintenance of a balanced medical and hospital scrv ice open to all211
The first point to be discussed by the Court was therefore whether internal market law applied to the 
field of social security', which has been traditionally understood as the competence of the member 
state. The ECJ initiated its line of reasoning by stating that "Community law docs not detract from 
the powers of the Member States to organise their social security systems” (para 17 KohU, para 21 
Decker). That being admitted, the Court nonetheless dismissed that the basic principles of free 
movement should not apply to the policy field of social security (paras 20-21 KohU, paras 24-25
211 In the Decker case, Luxembourg, lielgium, Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands and the t'rated Kingdom gave
written opinions and in the KohU case, Luxembourg was joined by Greece, the United Kingdom. Gemum. I tarac and
Austria.
2,5 So argued by the governments of Luxembourg, Belgium, France and United Kingdom m the cave of/>r<Lr ijvtra
20) and by Luxembourg, Greece and United Kingdom in the case of Kohll (para 16)
216 That argument is based on the rule of reason (Palm ct. al 2(HX), p IIS)
21 Based on Articles 30 and 46 of the Treaty (Palm et. al 2000, p 118)
218 This justification was not aroused in the case of Decker. The member governments hereby referred to a derogation 
under Article 46 of the Treaty, created by the ECJ itself in the case of ( a tm  </«■ D ijon  | t ‘,w  U-l2<U*x. 2(| 1 ebruarv 
1979. Rewe-Zentral AG r  Bwulesntonopolverwaltung ftir BivuntMem. LCR 1979. p M ‘J| (Palm el al pp 117- 
118).
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Decker). From the outset, the legal reasoning made clear that member states did retain the discretion 
to organise the policy domain of social security, but only within certain limits (Palm ct al. 2000, p. 
70). Next, the Court dismissed the governmental justifications for the prior authorisation procedure, 
since;
• The reimbursement was requested at the level of national tariffs. It could therefore not have 
negative impacts on the financial equilibrium of the health care system (para. 40 Decker, para. 
42 KohU).
• The general quality of public health could not be regarded as being threatened by purchasing 
goods and services in another member state, since quality has been ensured by the mutual 
recognition o f diplomas and the harmonisation efforts on training requirements for most medical 
professions (para. 42 & 43 Decker.; para. 47 - 49 KohU).
• Finally, no proof was provided that general access to the medical and hospital service was really 
threatened (paras. 52 & 53 KohU).
Against this background, the Court concluded that the Luxembourg requirement o f prior 
authorisation was an unjustified barrier to the principles of free movement. The system of prior 
authorisation discouraged insured persons to seek health goods and services beyond national 
borders (para 36 Decker; para. 35 KohU). Moreover, the Court did not support the Luxembourg 
argument, that to challenge its national authorisation policies was to call the validity' of Regulation 
1408's corresponding provision into question. The Court simply stated that the authorisation 
procedure of 1408/71 laid down one possible way of purchasing health care abroad, but which did 
not take precedence over the Treaty itself. After having regulated intra-European health care for 
decades. Regulation 1408 should merely be considered as one possible means with which to obtain 
health care goods and services abroad (Mossialos et. al. 2001, p. 47). The Court thereby emphasised 
that a national provision may be consistent with secondary European law. but at the same time may 
contradict the principles of the Treat}’. As seen in previous case-law, discussed above, the ECJ 
could have chosen to annul secondary legislation inconsistent with the Treat} .219 It could also have 
chosen simply to ''neutralise' secondary legislation, by applying Treaty Articles directly.220 In the
As in case C-24/75 Peironi and case C-41/&4 Pinna.
As in case C-443/93 I ougioukas.
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Decker and Kohll cases, the Court neither annulled nor neutralised Article 22 (1) (c) of 1408, but 
accepted its continued existence (Palm et. al. 2000, pp. 135-136).
Nevertheless, the judgements accentuated a conflict between primary law and secondary legislation. 
In the aftermath of DeckerlKohll, two procedures of how to access EU cross-border health care 
exist. The authorisation procedure o f Regulation 1408 remains, but an alternative procedure has 
been created by the Court whereby the Treaty principles on the free movement o f goods and 
sendees allow the patient to claim reimbursement for certain, but still undefined, unauthorised 
health purchases (Mossialos et. al. 2001, p. 47).
The confusion and complexity of a dual system is clear. Before the DeckerlKohll judgements, the 
Commission presented its intention to adapt Regulation 1408 to the rulings (COM (97) 102). 
However, so far these intentions have not been followed up by a proposal. The continued silence of 
both the Commission and the Council is remarkable. Meanwhile, experts have pointed to the need 
to amend Regulation 1408, as a consequence of the DeckerlKohll procedure (Langcr 1999, p. 537- 
539; Eichcnhofcr 1999b, 1999c, 2001).
The intermediate outcome of the now-famous rulings was a new set of questions, which called for 
administrative, political and legal responses (Schaaf 1999, p. 280; Palm et al. 2000, p. 105; 
Mossialos et al. 2001, p. 48). What autonomy did the member states now have to condition access 
to health care abroad? Could prior authorisation under Article 22 (1) (c) of 1408/71 be considered a 
justified barrier to the free movement of goods and services? Did the conclusions apply to all the 
different social security systems, or only to systems of reimbursement like Luxembourg? Did the 
conclusions also apply to hospital services?
While awaiting a reactive political standpoint, new cases were brought before the Court.
3.5: Authorisation Policies Justified, but Compromised
The Decker and Kohll cases concerned sendees outside the hospital sector. Furthermore, the cases 
treated the specific Luxembourg health insurance system, which is characterised by its subsequent
211
reimbursement o f costs for certain serv ices. Ever since the date o f the Decker-Kohl! rulings, the 
reach of the established procedure has been questioned, and further legal clarification is awaited.
Meanwhile, the Smits-Peerbooms221 case of July 2001 clarified some of the aspects which were left 
open. Case C-157/99 treated the cases of Mrs. Smits and Mr. Peerbooms and, like the Pierik cases, 
addressed Dutch authorisation policies. Suffering from Parkinson disease, Mrs Smits applied to the 
Dutch competent institution to reimburse her for the costs o f a specific, multidisciplinary treatment 
which she had received in a German hospital. The competent institution refused reimbursement, 
arguing that a satisfactory and adequate treatment for Parkinson disease was available in the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, it was not evident to the institution that the German treatment provided 
an additional advantage, for which reason no medical justification for the treatment abroad was 
found. The German treatment was regarded by the Dutch sickness insurance as 'non-standard'. Mr 
Peerbooms, on the other hand, fell in a coma after a car accident. He was first treated in the 
Netherlands but, on the recommendation of his Dutch neurologist, he was sent to an Austrian 
hospital to undergo a special therapy of intensive neurostimulation. Intensive neurostimulation 
therapy is a know n treatment in the Netherlands, but is only used on an experimental basis, and is 
only provided for patients less than 25 years old. As he was 36 years old when the accident 
occurred, Peerbooms was not allowed to undergo the therapy in his own country. Although the 
Austrian treatment proved to be very effective for Peerbooms, who came out of his coma, the Dutch 
sickness insurance refused to reimburse the costs of care. The competent institution based its refusal 
on the fact that Dutch health policy considered the therapy to be experimental, and that no scientific 
evidence of its effectiveness w as provided.
Both the case of Smiis and the case of Peerbooms concerned treatments w hich were not considered 
"standard* by Dutch health policy, and consequently were not covered by the national social 
security system. According to Dutch law, prior authorisation for treatment abroad is given if two 
conditions are fulfilled; 1) the proposed treatment must be among the benefits for which the 
competent institution assumes responsibility, meaning that the treatment must be regarded as 
"normal in the professional circles concerned*' and, 2) that the required treatment is necessary and 
not available w ithout "'undue delay" in the Netherlands. In the cases, the Dutch government held the
" l Case C -157/99,12 July 2001. B.S.M. Gemets-Srnits v Stichting Ziekettfotuh VGZ andli.T SL  Peerbooms v Stichring 
CZ Groep Zorpyerzekeringen. ECR 2001, page 1-05473.
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opinion that its refusal to authorise was justified on the basis of 1408's Article 22 (2), because the 
treatments were not part of the health package in the Netherlands.
The Court was requested to clarify three aspects of the relationship between Community law and 
national health policy. Did the freedom to provide services apply to hospital care? And, if  so, did 
the national prior authorisation policy violate the Treaty provision? Finally, if affirmed, could the 
authorisation system still be justified?
As in the Decker!Kohll cases, the cases of Smits and Peerbooms received great political attention 
from the member states. No less than 10 member governments stated their opinions before the 
Court.2"  A fundamental aspect of the opinions, which was also found in the opinion of the advocate 
general, was that the member states did not regard hospital care as a service within the meaning of 
Article 50 (ex. art. 60) of the Treaty. The opinion advanced was that, since hospital care was an in- 
kind sen ice, free of charge, it did not constitute an economic activity within the meaning of the 
Treaty, where remuneration was part of the exchange (paras. 48-49 of the judgement).223
The Court did not uphold the national argument. On the contrary, it was stated as settled case-law 
that medical activities fell within the scope o f  Article 50 o f the Treaty, without distinction to 
whether the services were provided inside a hospital environment or outside (para. 53 of the 
judgement).224 The Court thereby confirmed that the DeckerlKohll procedure applied, in principle, 
to all forms of health care, w hether based on in-kind benefits or on reimbursement (Mossialos ct. al. 
2001, p. 49). The Court thus clarified that the alternative procedure o f Decker Kohll did have a 
general scope.
The member states delivering opinions were the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, 
Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the EE A states of Iceland and Norway gave opinion.
2:’ The member states relied in particular on the case o f  Humbel, paras. 17 to 19 [Case 263/86, 27 September 1988. 
Belgian State v Rene 1 ¡umbel and Marie-Thihvse Edel. ECR 1988, p, 5365], and the case Society for the Protection o f  
Unborn Children Ireland, para. 18 [Case C-l 59/90,4 October 1991. The Society fo r  the Protection o f Unborn Children 
Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan and others. ECR 1991, p. 1-4685].
224 The Court referred among other case-law to case C -l 59/90 Society fo r  the Protection o f  Unborn Children Ireland, 
para. 18, and Kohll, paras. 29 and 51.
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The ECJ next made it clear that the requirement to apply for a prior authorisation constituted a 
barrier to the freedom to provide services (para. 69 of the judgement) 225 However, having 
concluded thus, the Court found that there might be justifications for maintaining national 
authorisation policies. According to the Court, prior authorisation could in fact be justified as a 
'necessary and reasonable' instrument to guarantee a balanced and assessable hospital sector, which 
depended on planning and contracting (paras. 76-80 of the judgement). The conclusions of the 
Court were clear and did not interfere with the basic right of the member state to maintain prior 
authorisation as a means of control;
% ..]it is clear that, i f  insured persons were a t liberty>, regardless of live circumstances, to use the sendees o f  
hospitals with which their sickness insurance fund had no contractual arrangements, whether they were situated in 
the Netherlands or in another Member State, all the planning which goes into the contractual system in an effort to 
guarantee a rationalised, stable, balanced and accessible supply> o f  hospital sen*ices would be jeopardised at a 
stroke" (para. 81 o f die judgement, emphasis added).
However, the subsequent line of reasoning o f the Court conditioned that basic right. The national 
authorisation policy must be based on objective criteria that do not discriminate against providers 
established in other member states (para. 89 o f the judgement). The Court compromised the 
discretionary autonomy of the competent institution, when it emphasised that, for a prior 
authorisation scheme to be justified, it must "be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria 
which are known in advance, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national 
authorities' discretion, so that it is not used a r b i tr a r i ly Furthermore, for a decision on 
authorisation to be objective and transparent, it must be made within "reasonable time" and 
"refusals to grant authorisation must also be capable o f  being challenged in judicial or quasi- 
judicial proceedings'' (para. 90 of the judgement, emphasis added).
On this basis, the Court found that the decision on what constituted a "normal'' treatment must be 
based on "international medical science", and not just on what is the dominant point of view in 
national medical circles (para. 108 of the judgement). The Court reasoned this part of the 
conclusion by arguing that if the scientific views on what is a "normal'’ treatment is determined 
only by a national medical viewpoint, it is "likely that Netherlands providers of treatment will 
always be preferred in practice” (para. 96 of the judgment).
Among other cases, the Court referred to Kohll, para. 35 on this point.
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The second Dutch condition for authorisation for treatment abroad - that the necessary treatment 
cannot be delivered in the Netherlands without ’undue delay" - was furthermore interpreted on a 
non-discriminatory basis by the Court. The ECJ concluded that;
’ once it is clear that treatment covered by the national insurance system cannot be provided by a contracted 
establishment, it is not acceptable that national hospitals not having any contractual arrangements with the 
insured person's sickness insurance fund be given priority over hospitals in other Member States" (para. 107 o f 
the judgment, emphasis added).
In other words, the Court hereby clarified that, once it is evident that a treatment cannot be provided 
by a contracted provider in the Netherlands, the Dutch sickness fund cannot favour a non-contractcd 
provider established in the Netherlands over a provider in another member state (Mossialos ct al. 
2001, p. 53). When purchasing treatment beyond the contracted providers, the principle of non­
discrimination rules. Furthermore, when determining whether an effective treatment can be 
provided without "undue delay" from a contracted provider;
’'the national authorities arc required to have regard to all the circumstances o f each specific case and to take due 
account not only of the patient’s medical condition at the time when authorisation is sought but also of his post 
record" (para. 104 o f the judgement).
With the Smits-Peerbooms ruling, the Court confirmed and extended the Decker-Kohll procedure to 
the hospital sector as well as to social security systems based on benefits in kind. Whereas the Court 
confirmed the member states competence to control the provision of services through the instrument 
of prior authorisation, it, at the same time, emphasised that the borders of supply must be “fair, 
objective, transparent and open to challenge" (Mossialos et. al. 2001, p, 52). In this sense, the Court 
intervened in the national autonomy to set authorisation policies. The ruling limited the discretion 
of the member states to refuse authorisation and favoured the position of the patient. Among other 
aspects, the Court emphasised that authorisation policies must be "objective and non- 
discriminatory", and that a refusal to authorise must be transparent and open to challenge. 
Moreover, that the conviction of national medicine could not alone decide which treatment was to 
be regarded as “normal" and that non-contractcd providers, established nationally, could not be 
preferred at the expense of care providers in other member states.*11'  Although, in essence, 
justify ing authorisation policies, the Smit-Peerbooms case is a powerful demonstration of judicial 
activism discreetly intervening in, conditioning and compromising the political scope of 
manoeuvre.
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3.6: The Evolving Internal Non-Hospital Health C are M arket
The recent case o f 13 May 2003, C-385/99 Muller-Faurc <£ Van Riet226, like the other cases on
national health care and Community7 law, had been long awaited (Interview, Danish Interior and 
Health Ministry, 12. December). Again, as estimated by the number o f member stales which gave 
opinions, the case was given high political priority.227 The Miiller-Faure & Van Riet case continued 
the considerations on Dutch authorisation policy. The referring social court had, after the Smit- 
Peerbooms ruling, been asked whether it wished to continue the case. The national court wished to 
maintain its reference, since it found that the Smit-Peerbooms ruling did not specifically consider 
the characteristics of the Netherlands sickness insurance system, which was a benefit-in-kind 
system based on agreements.
The Miiller-Faure & Van Riet ruling indeed went one step further, as it considered authorisation 
policy in the case of non-hospital care versus hospital care. Miiller-Faure was another case about 
dental treatment which had been purchased abroad without prior authorisation, and for which reason 
the competent institution refused to reimburse the costs. Van Riet, on the other hand, had purchased 
hospital care at a Belgian hospital without prior authorisation. The Belgian hospital provided an 
arthroscopy and subsequently an ulnar reduction, much sooner than it could be offered in the 
Netherlands. In both cases, the Dutch sickness fund refused to reimburse the medical costs, arguing 
that the necessary and appropriate medical care could have been obtained in the Netherlands, w ithin 
reasonable time.
The Court restated much of its previous findings. Dutch authorisation policy deterred, or even 
prevented, insured persons to have health care provided by another member state. The national 
policy was thus a barrier to the freedom to provide services. The Court confirmed its reasoning 
from Smits-Peerbooms, that such a barrier could be justified by the necessity of cost-containment 
and planning. However, the Court added to its previous rulings that when laying down upon which 
criteria such a barrier is justified, a distinction should be drawn between hospital care and non-
226 Case C-385/99, 13 May 2003. Mitller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen and I an 
Piet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zotg^'erze keringen. ECR 2003, p. 1-04509.
2r The Netherlands, Belgian, Danish, German, Spanish, Irish, Italian, Swedish, British, Icelandic and Norwegian 
governments gave opinions in the case.
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hospital care. The Court thus went one step further in clarifying its reasoning from Decker Kohl!, as 
well as in Smits-Peerbooms. In the case of hospital care, it repeated its conclusions from Smits- 
Peerbooms, stating that the requirement of prior authorisation was justified on the condition that it 
was exercised proportionally and that national authorities had no scope for acting in an arbitrary 
manner. The Court explicitated its point of view, stating that;
"prior authorisation may be refused only if  treatment which is the same or equally effective can be provided to the 
patient without undue delay in a contracted establishment. National authorities must take account not only of the 
patient's actual medical condition and, where appropriate, the degree of pain or the nature of the patient's 
disability, which might, for example, make it impossible or extremely difficult for him to carry out a professional 
activity, but also of his medical history” (Court Press release, 13 May 2003, no. 36/03).
By restating its reasoning from Smits-Peerbooms, the Court emphasised that it was not just 
considering an individual lawsuit, but in fact laying down binding precedent.
Concerning non-hospital care, the MiiUer-Faure & Van Riet ruling indeed clarified some of the 
aspects left open by Decker Kohll. The Court concluded that a removal of the prior authorisation 
requirement for non-hospital care was not likely to;
“give rise to patients travelling to other countries in such large number, despite linguistic barriers, geographic 
distance, the cost of staying abroad and lack o f  information about the kind o f care provided there, that the 
financial balance of the Netherlands social security system would be seriously upset and that, as a result, the 
overall level o f public-health protection would be jeopardised -  which might constitute proper justification for a 
barrier to the fundamental principle of freedom to provide services (para. 95 o f the judgement, emphasis added).
The Court thus reasoned contextually, considering the political arguments in the light of their socio­
economic background, and refused the national justification for maintaining the control instrument 
of prior authorisation in the case of non-hospital care. Furthermore, the "might" in the last sentence 
indicates that what ultimately justifies a barrier to the freedom to provide services has, by no means, 
been finally settled, but is likely to be up for further clarification in future cases.
Whereas the applicability’ of the Decker KohJl procedure may initially have been doubted by the 
member governments, the MiiUer-Faure ct Van Riet ruling has not left much margin in which to 
continue to deny that internal market rules apply to non-hospital health care in general, and that the 
same rules force member states to make some adjustments to their previously autonomous decisions
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on authorising hospital care abroad. The Court's conclusions must impact on the large majority of 
member states:
“it has not been established that removal o f  the requirement fo r  prior authorisation would undermine the essential 
characteristics o f  the Netherlands sickness insurance scheme. The principle o f freedom to provide serv ices 
therefore precludes legislation such as the Netherlands legislation, which requires the insured to obtain prior 
authorisation, even under a benefits-in-kind scheme, in the case o f  non-hospital care provided in another Member 
State by a nan-contracted provider' (Court Press release, 13 May 2003, no. 36/03, emphasis added).
The Court has, by its cluster of case-law, made decisive steps on its path to establishing precedent. 
On the one hand, it admits that the health policy is in the competence of the member states, but, at 
the same time, it increasingly compromises this very same competence. Legal action has driven 
integration to the fore, and so far no collective political response has been formulated.
3.7: Institutionalising Free M ovem ent fo r Patients in the European Union
The development on access to care outside one’s member state of residence has not been a linear 
expansion of Community competencies. Secondary law, as clarified by the Council in 1981, granted 
the member state a wide discretion on when to authorise health care abroad. Furthermore, the 
Treaty states that health care is the responsibility of the member states. However, at the same time, 
recent legal interpretations have delimited the national ability to control and plan the policy- domain 
within its own borders.
After the initial legal innovation introduced by the Pierik judgements, and the subsequent political 
restraint, the Community- provision on prior authorisation favoured the discretionary autonomy of 
the national competent institution. Hoyvevcr, the established legal-political reconciliation was much 
disturbed by the case-layv of Decker-Kohl I. For the first time, it yvas clearly laid down that the 
economic rules of the free movement of goods and services do apply to social security policies.
Binding precedent yvas further established by the recent case on Smits-Peerbooms, which clarified 
that hospital care is also a service within the meaning of the Treaty and that the Decker-Kohl! 
procedure also applies to health care systems based on benefits in kind. Yet. while the Court 
confirmed that authorisation policies are barriers to the free movement of sen ices, they are not
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unjustified. Prior authorisation was held to be a necessary and reasonable national instrument with 
which to guarantee a balanced and assessable hospital sector.
That being admitted, the case-law nevertheless restricted the member states’ discretion to determine 
their own authorisation policies. Discretionary’ autonomy was compromised on several aspects;
• In order to be justified, authorisation policies must be objective, transparent and non- 
discriminatory.
•  Decisions on what is a “normal” treatment cannot be based on national medicine alone, but must 
rely on “international medical science”.
•  When a necessary treatment cannot be delivered without “undue delay”, the insurance fund 
cannot discriminate between non-contracted providers established inside its own borders and 
care providers in another member state.
The Miiller-Faurè & Van Riet ruling took one further step, by confirming the justified, but 
conditioned, use of prior authorisation policies for hospital care, but clarifying that the fundamental 
principle of the freedom to provide services precludes the authorisation requirement, even under 
benefits-in-kind systems, for non-hospital care. Whereas the national instrument is still justified for 
hospitalisation, member states can hardly oppose the establishment of an internal health market for 
non-hospital care.
Interpreted theoretically, the path dependency institutionalising access to foreign health care 
contains three sequences. First, one of legal innovation. Secondly, one of political overturn. Thirdly 
-  and almost two decades later - one disturbing the established equilibrium by a critical juncture 
(Krasner 1984; Hall & Taylor 1996). The judicial interpretation, laying down that the free 
movement of goods and services applies within the policy field of health care, constitutes a legal 
spill-over, which could not possibly have been anticipated by the politicians adopting Regulation 
1408/71 and its Treaty’ base (Stone Sweet & Bruncll 1998, p. 72; Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998, 
pp. 4-5; Pierson 2000a, p. 482). As an unanticipated consequence, the impact of these other internal 
market principles demonstrate the issue-density7 of the EU as well as the limits of rational 
institutional design (Pierson 1998; 2000a). The direction that institutionalisation has taken since the 
late 1990s indeed substantiates the relative autonomy of the ECJ as a decision-maker. It also 
exemplifies the complexity of its actions, being capable of acting both cautiously and ambitiously
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(Craig & de Bürca 1998, pp. 78-79). In fact, as detailed in the analysis above, this equivocal 
behaviour occurred in the same case, where the Court not only justified the means of national 
authorisation, but compromised it at the same time (Smits-Peerbooms). From the case itself, it 
therefore remains difficult to deduct its political and financial impact. Complexity may be one 
premise that extends the Court's scope of manoeuvre, rather than ‘the mask of law* as suggested by 
Burley and Mattli (Burley & Mattli 1993, p. 44). According to the proposition that politics and law 
accord to different logics, politicians may find no immediate or medium-run effect of the individual 
ruling and therefore do not respond, whereas lawyers see a doctrine in formation (Alter 1998, pp. 
130-132; Alter 2001, p. 189). Analysing the later line of case-law on foreign health supply as a 
chain of successive legal reasoning, makes it clear that it is only from case to case that the full 
extent of the doctrine in formation is revealed (Hartley 1998, p. 79). Whether the Court can 
continue to define autonomously the scope and content of an internal health market, depends on an 
eventual political response.
In the meantime, legal clarifications are likely to continue. As with Dccker-Kohli, the newest case- 
law have left gaps for future clarification. The issue of definition is a primary source of confusion. 
What is meant by "international medical science*'? Is it a matter of consulting the international 
medical literature to track down an apparent international consensus on what constitute a “normal" 
treatment? Is there any such thing as a European-wide consensus on what is an "experimental” and 
what is a “normal'* treatment? If a member state is the only one to classify a treatment as 
experimental, can it still refuse to authorise such treatment abroad? Or will such a refusal contradict 
the dominant European medical opinion and thus be against Community law? On this basis, it could 
be argued that, in the absence of definition and clarity, the Pierik procedure has been revitalised, in 
the sense that Smits-Peerbooms re-question the autonomy of the member states to determine the 
material scope of their health package. Furthermore, the Court did not provide any legal definition 
of “undue delay”. The question is whether “undue delay" is still to be defined by national 
authorities alone, or if the member states will have to agree upon some common definition. If the 
latter is the case, but does not occur politically, a legal norm may be established by the Court. The 
question of what constitutes “undue delay" is highly relevant in relation to the problem of waiting 
lists in the health sector, and has been brought by the Court onto the European agenda. The Court 
seems merely to have initiated legal interpretations of an open-ended problematic. Finally, the new 
legal course places the transnational rights o f the patient at its centre, but without defining what is
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meant by the obligation to consider the patient's “past records” when granting or refusing treatment 
abroad. Such ‘‘past records'’ can hardly be sufficiently considered adm ini strati vely. The wide scope 
of administrative discretion which was politically put in place by Regulation 2793/81 is thus 
challenged anew by the Court.
All these aspects call for political reaction, or even proactive strategies on how to integrate foreign 
health care supply (Mossialos et. al 2001, p. 54). During the Danish presidency in autumn 2002. the 
Council negotiated parameter 8 of COM (98) 779 on the regulation's sickness chapter. The concrete 
negotiations turned out to be quite difficult (Interview. Danish Interior and Health Ministry, 12 
December 2002). The recent case-law was on the agenda, but the member states did not agree on its 
general impact, and on what should be the collective political response. However, negotiations 
reached one important result regarding prior authorisation. In the future, the practice behind 
granting or refusing authorisation would not be based on administrative discretion, but would only 
be medically reasoned (Interview, ibid). On this aspect, judicial activism has been codified 
politically, since the member state's discretion to decide on authorisation has been restricted This 
first political response suggests that the Council admits to the legal interpretation Nevertheless, all 
other aspects still call for political consideration. Should the Council continue the practice of 
silence, it will be for future legal actions to map the terrain and autonomously decide in the absence 
of a political v oice.
4,0: Concluding Remarks - Expanding Exportable Social Security Rights
Supranational institutionalisation of social security rights and their «portability has. in its 
individual sequences, been much characterised by ambiguity.
On the research question 'to what extent the analysis has demonstrated that the material scope lias 
been extended from covering traditional social security benefits, to covering more contemporary 
forms of these benefits. The institutional update has. however, been mainly legally conducted To 
what extent the principle of exportability has been extended is disputable For special schemes for 
civil servants, family benefits, long term care and health care, it has dearly been extended But for 
special non-contributory benefits it has not, although the territoriality of certain benefits have 
recently been questioned anew. The analysis points to the fact that, from the 1990s. die national
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principle o f territoriality versus the Community principle of exportability stands out as the bone of 
contention between member states and supranational organisations.
On the research question 'how ’, we are taken to the judicial activism of the Court which for long 
periods has autonomously decided on the scope and exportability of social security rights. However, 
concerning 'hybrid' benefits and access to foreign health care, politics has collectively reined in the 
Court. Thus the interaction of law and politics has been decisive for both the scope and direction of 
institutionalisation in its entirety.
From the outset, it has been the task of the Court to up-date the material scope of Regulation 1408, 
and bring it in line with the contemporary social policy developments at the national level. While 
the non-activism of the Council would have led to a static institution, the Court's contextual reading 
of 1408/71 has continuously expanded its material scope. The empirical findings on the 
institutionalisation o f the material scope refutes the theoretical propositions of the political power 
approach as presented by Garrett ct. al. Instead the analysis points to a relatively high degree of 
legal autonomy, where the Court acts as decision-maker in its own right. It points to a dynamic 
institution which develops as if according to its own logic, but where the path of institutionalisation 
is decided by the continual interpretations by the Court of its meaning and reach. It also 
demonstrates a Court capable of interpreting against the explicit preferences of the member states, 
including the more powerful of them, and despite the financial implication of its rulings. 
Concerning the material scope, the Court has not exerted self-restraint, nor has it been restrained. 
On the contran-. its legal innovation has meant a successful expansion o f exportable intra-European 
social security rights.
However, a conclusion that emphasises legal autonomy at the expense of politics does not apply to 
the issue of 4special non-contributory' benefits. The analysis on the institutionalisation of these 
'hybrid' benefits demonstrate a receptive Court. The Court could have interpreted the 'special rule', 
adopted by the Council, to have contradicted the Treaty. It could have chosen a confrontational 
style. Instead it accepted the political restraint, and permitted an exception to the principle of 
exportability. Analysed in an isolated fashion, the collective restraint supports a political power 
approach o f Garrett et al. Nevertheless, bringing in the very recent case-law suggests that the 
'special rule’ is up for another legal -  political dispute. Nevertheless, the specific institutionalisation
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process of ‘hybrid’ benefits is foremost a challenge to the theoretical assumptions of Stone Sweet et 
al. The political response in 1992 substantiates that institutionalisation is not driven by a 
straightforward progressive logic, or by a virtuous cycle as suggested by Stone Sweet and Brunei 1 
(1998). In fact, the adoption of the ‘special rule* exemplifies the de-creasing returns on the path to 
cross border social security rights. Rather than being self-sustained, the dynamics of 
institutionalisation needs ultimately to be politically sustained.
On the face of it, the analysis of the specific policy field of health care points in the same direction. 
Again the Council managed to collectively restrain a Court, which had gone too far beyond political 
intentions But most certainly, this was an intermediate result. The T0 -  Tj analysis carried out 
shows that national authorisation policies arc anew challenged by Community law. The Court 
authoritatively ruled that the internal market rules on free movement of goods and services did 
apply to the policy field of social security-. At the same time, it justified, but compromised, the 
control instrument of prior authorisation. In addition, recent legal deductions have taken a decisive 
step towards establishing an internal market for non-hospital care. So far, the Court has been able to 
autonomously establish precedent. Politics has not interfered. Voices have been heard, but not in 
unison. In the absence of political guidance, the Court has continued to decide autonomously on the 
scope and limits of an internal health market. The institutionalisation of the right to access foreign 
health care thus not only demonstrates a high degree of legal autonomy, but it also exemplifies that 
what appears as a reconciliation between law and politics, an established institutional equilibrium, 
may suddenly be disturbed by a legal spill-over, caused by internal market dynamics and which 
further energizes the process. A development which could not possibly have been anticipated in To 
(Stone Sweet & Bruncll 1998; Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998; Pierson 2000a). Not only may 
rational institutional design be limited by the short-sightedness of the political actors, but control 
may equally escape politicians by the dynamism and fluidity- of the institution itself, as well as by 
the complexity- and embeddedness of the whole European institutional construct.
As depicted in chapter II's model which was constructed to analyse institutionalisation, the analysis 
w hich has been conducted on Regulation 1408‘s material scope and principle of exportability has 
demonstrated institutionalisation to be a repetitive process, the final output of which initially 
appears as being impossible to predict, but the contours of which are gradually drawn. Furthermore, 
the direction has not been linear, but decided by continuous disputes between national courts, the
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ECJ and the member states, which sets the course back and fourth. The content of 
institutionalisation is laid down along the path consisting of individual stages 1, 2, 3 and much 
beyond. When a direction seems to have formed, the path may be broken by a new reading of the 
Treat)-, by a different institutional emphasis, by a national policy change, or by a collective political 
response. However, precedent is established along that path. So far the path taken has expanded, 
although not progressively, exportable social security rights for the European migrant, while 
holding out the prospect of further clarification and the further generation of rights.
The two following chapters will explore the impact on domestic institutions of the supranational 
institutionalisation process which has been identified.
Case-notes
XXVI In the early cases, the Court laid down a broad understanding of sickness and unemployment benefits.
• In case 69/79 Jordem-fosters, the Court considered the characteristic of "sickness” benefits within the meaning of 
Article 4 (1) (a) o f  Regulation 1408/71 [Case 69/79, 10. January 1980. JV. Jonhms-fosters v Bestuur van de 
Bedrijfsiv renighig voorde Leder- ett Ledetverwerkende Industrie. ECR 1980, p. 75], Mrs Jordan-l asters resided 
in Belgium, but worked in tire Netherlands between 1966 and 1970. In 1970, she became incapable of work and 
was granted ail invalidity benefit from tire competent Dutch institution. In 1973, Mrs Jonlan-fosters stayed in a 
hospital clinic in Belgium and between 1973 -  1974 she had significant medicine expenses. She applied for tire 
reimbursement of the costs from the Dutch institution, which, however, refused to reimburse the expenses, even 
though Mrs Jordan-fosters received the pension for the incapacity of work. The Court slated that the words 
"sickness and maternity benefits’*  also applied to medical provisions even if they were set out in legislation on 
invalidity benefits, for which reason the competent institution was obliged to reimburse tire costs.
•  Judgement 375/85 Campana laid down an extensive understanding o f unemployment benefit [Case 375/85,4. June 
1987. Angelo Campana v Bundensanstalt fu r  Arbeit. ECR 1987, p. 2387[. The case considered whether assistance 
for vocational training was to be regarded as unemployment benefit within the meaning of 4 (1) (g). Campana was 
an Italian national who worked in Germany from 1964 to 1977, and from then until 1980 in Italy. In the late 
summer o f 1980, he was again employed in Germany, where he applied for vocational training. The competent 
German institution turned down the application, on the argument that Campana had not carried out an activity 
subject to compulsory contributions under the German employment law for a period of two years, nor had he 
received unemployment benefits. Tire European Court o f Justice found the rejection inconsistent with Community 
law , since Article 4 (1) (g) did not state that "unemployment benefits*’ relate only to benefits, granted because of 
present unemployment. Article 4 (1) (g) must be read in the context o f the fundamental aim of Article 51, "w hich is 
to establish the most favourable conditions for achieving freedom o f movement and employment for Community 
workers within the territory of each member state’* (para. 8 of the judgement). According to the Court, it would 
therefore be against the aim of Article 51 to exclude a benefit from the material scope of the Regulation lire aim of 
which was to prevent future unemployment. Article 4 (1) (g) included assistance for vocational training, granted to 
a person still in employment but facing the risk o f  becoming unemployed.
5WVU In several cases amongst the earlier case-law, the Court interpreted the material scope restrictively.
•  As in Campana, case 39/76 MoutUaan considered the extent of "unemployment benefits” within tire meaning of 
Article 4 (1) (gX but this time the Court interpreted restrictively [Case 39/76, 15. December 1976. Bestuur der 
Bethijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid v L. J. Mouthaan. ECR 1976, p. 1901]. Mouthann was a Dutch 
national, who worked in the Netherlands until 1972. He then became employed for a Dutch firm in Germany, but 
still resided in the Netherlands. At the end of 1972, he lost his job after financial difficulties for the firm. Being 
unemployed, he claimed unemployment benefit from the relevant Dutch institution, as well as a specific benefit
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paid to the workers of an insolvent employer, who owed pay. Having first paid Mouthaan the ordinary 
unemployment benefit, the competent institution in the Netherlands demanded him to repay the amount, with the 
argument that he had no rights to draw' the benefits, having not been insured in German) while working there, 
although subject to German law'. The first question asked by the national court concerned the definition of w orker, 
and asked whether a worker who became unemployed could still be regarded as a worker within the meaning of 
Article 1 (a), even though he had not been insured under German law. The European Court of Justice answered that 
the worker did not actually have to be affiliated in a social security schemes to be employed, but be eligible for one:
. the said provision [Article 1 (a) o f 1408/71 ] does not seek to restrict the status of worker within the meaning of 
that Regulation to persons who are in fact insured under one of the abovementioned schemes but is intended to 
define as a worker all persons to whom such schemes are applicable” (para. 8 of the judgment). Thus possessing 
the status of worker, Mouthaan could claim ordinary unemployment benefit under the national legislation o f  the 
state where he resided and where he w'as available for work, i.e. the Netherlands, although his last employment was 
in Germany. The restrictive part of the Courts interpretation concerned the benefit paid under Dutch law to 
compensate for the non-paid wage to workers o f an insolvent employer. This benefit type did not constitute an 
unemployment benefit within the meaning o f Article 4(1) (g).
•  70/80 1 ’igier was another earlier case which considered the material scope in connection with the status as a worker 
[Case 70/80, 27 January 1981. Tamara Vigier v Bundewersicherungsanstalt ftir  Angestellte. ECR 1981, p. 229). 
Mrs. Tamara Vigier was bom in Germany in 1922 but left the country' at the age of 10 due to persecution by the 
Nazi regime. She received compensation for loss o f educational opportunities from Germany. As an adult, she lived 
and worked in France, where she was affiliated in the social security system. In 1975, she applied for the 
authorisation to pay contributions to the invalidity and old-age insurance under the special German scheme for 
reparation of injustice committed under national socialism. The German court questioned whether the reparation 
law fell outside the scope of the Regulation as part of Article 4 (4), and w hether Vigier had status as an insured 
person. In the initial part of the judgement, the ECJ stated that although the reparation law aimed to case the 
injustice caused by national socialism, it did not fall outside the scope of the Regulation as part o f Article 4 (4), 
because it was not granted on basis of a discretionary assessment of the personal situation or because of 
consideration of individual needs (para. 16 of the judgement). It was therefore a social security benefit. But this did 
not give l ’igier tire right to pay contributions. The German reparation law specified that in order to have the status 
as an insured person, one must have paid at least one contribution as worker to a German social insurance 
institution. The Court referred to its jurisprudence as formulated especially in 110/79 Coonan, and confirmed that 
where national legislation made affiliation to one specific scheme dependent on prior affiliation in another social 
security scheme, 1408/71 did not compel the member state to treat contribution periods fulfilled in another member 
state as equivalent to those which had been completed in the national territory (para. 19 of the judgement). 1 ’igier 
could therefore not claim the status as an insured person on the basis of 1408/71, and since the member stale set the 
conditions for affiliation, she did not have a right to pa)1 contributions on behalf of Community law.
Two cases among the earlier jurisprudence confirmed that benefits for victims of war were held outside the material
scope of the Regulation as laid down in Article 4 (4).
•  Paulin Gil lard was a Belgian citizen, residing in Belgium, but who worked in France [Case 9/78, 6. July 1978. 
Directeur Regional de la Sdcurite Sociale de Nancy v Paulin Gillanl and Caisse Regionale d ‘Assurance Maladie 
du Nord-Est, Nancy. ECR 1978, p. 661). Between 1940 and 1945, he was a war prisoner in Germany as a member 
of the Belgian armed forces. When he became 60 years old, he received a partial pension from the French 
competent authorities, reflecting his periods o f  employment in France. However, had Gillard’s pension from 
France been calculated on the basis o f  the French law' on old-age-pensions to former prisoners of war [French law 
no. 73-1051 of 21 November 1973], he would have received double the amount. The Court considered whether tins 
French old-age benefit should be considered a social security benefit within the meaning of Article 4 (1) (c) or fell 
under 4 (4). The Court concluded that it agreed with the French competent institution that the benefit was not a 
social security one within the meaning o f 4 (1) (c), since its essential purpose was to provide for former prisoners 
o f war. It thus remained outside the substantive scope of 1408/71, as formulated in Article 4 (4). The Court 
emphasised that the distinction between included and excluded benefits rests entirely on the relating factors o f a 
benefit, in particular its purpose and the conditions for its grant.
•  Case 207 '78 Even drew' on the conclusions in Gillanl and confirmed these [Case 207/78, 31. May 1979.3 Unistere 
Public v Gilbert Even and Office National des Pensions pour Travailleurs Salaries (O.N.P.T.S.) ECR 1979, p. 
2019]. Gilbert Even was a French national, residing in Belgium, but who received a 10% invalidity pension in 
France because o f a wound he got as a soldier in 1940. When he became 60 years old, he applied for an early 
retirement pension in Belgium. As he had worked in France and Belgium, the pension was calculated by 
aggregation. His Belgian pension became 25% less than a full pension would have been. Even claimed that he was 
entitled to a full early retirement pension, since Belgian legislation [The Belgian Royal Decree of 27 June 1967]
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specified that reduction did not apply to persons o f Belgian nationality, who served in the allied forces between 
1940 and 1945, and were receiving an invalidity pension for their war service. The Court restated the essence of the 
Gillard case, i.e. that the distinction between included or excluded benefits relied on the relating factors of each 
benefit, especially the purpose and conditions for its grant (para. 11 of the judgment). In the present case, the 
objective of the benefit was to offer a '"national recognition of some of the hardship suffered" from action of war 
(para. 12 o f the judgment). In the viewr of the objective, the benefit fell outside the material scope of the Regulation 
and constituted a benefit for victims of war as formulated in Article 4 (4). Moreover, the Court concluded that a 
scheme based on national recognition o f an act, did not fulfill the essential characteristics of a "social advantage” 
within the meaning o f Article 7 (2), Regulation 1612/68.
Besides the benefits, which are held outside tire material scope as a consequence o f Article 4 (4), the Court affirmed that 
a private agreement is not part of Regulation 1408/71.
♦ In case 313 82 AT" Tiel-Utrecht Schadeversekering, the Court concluded that a relationship which exists between an 
insured person and a private insurance company on a purely contractual basis did not fall within the substantial 
scope o f 1408/71 [Case 313/82, 15 March 1984. AT Tiel-Utrecht Schadeverzekering v Gemeenschappelijk 
motorwaarborgfonds. ECR 1984, p. 1389]. The case considered the situation o f Mrs Kenis, a Dutch national who 
resided in the Netherlands, but was injured in a car accident in Belgium. She was insured by a health-care insurance 
policy from the private insurance company AT' Tiel-Utrecht Schadeverzekering. Tiel-Utrecht reimbursed Kenis’ 
medical expenses. However an unidentified car was involved in the accident in Belgium. The private insurance 
company Tiel Utrecht sued the Belgian Burgerlijke Rechtbank for the reimbursement of the expenses, relying on 
the Belgian law of 9. August 1963. In the judgment, the Court defined the term "institution” in Article 1 (n) as the 
member state "body or authority responsible for administering all or part o f the legislation” (para. 14 of the 
judgment). It did therefore not apply to the private body, which did not have legislative administering responsibility 
or authority.
xxvm j Callemevn w as one of the first cases w here the Court considered w hether a benefit w as to be characterised 
as social security or social assistance [Case 187/73, 28 May 1974. Odette Callemevn v Belgian State. ECR 1974, p. 
533], The case concerned Mrs Callenieytt's right, as a French national residing in Belgium, to the ordinary Belgian 
benefit for handicapped persons [as set up under Belgian law7 of 27 June 1969]. Although suffering from a permanent 
incapacity to work, Mrs Callemevn’s  application for the Belgian invalidity benefit was turned down, because she did 
not fulfil the nationality7 requirement laid down by Belgian law. The national Court questioned whether the benefit for 
handicapped person was included as a social security7 scheme within the meaning of 4 (1). The European Court of 
Justice emphasised that some benefits fell between social security7 and assistance, and that ambiguous characteristics of 
a benefit might be due to its class of persons, its objectives, or maimer of application. Such an ambiguity made it 
difficult to draw a clear distinction (para. 6 o f the judgement). The features o f the Belgian benefit for handicapped 
persons might, in some aspects, make it akin to social assistance, having need as an essential criterion and since the 
benefit w as not granted upon previous periods of employment, of membership or o f contribution. Yet other features 
might bring it closer to social security', such as when the benefit was granted to the person on a legally defined position 
(para. 7 of the judgement). The Court ovemiled the Belgian definition of its invalidity benefit. The legally protected 
right of Callenteyn to the benefit was the determining factor that made the benefit fall within the material scope of 
Regulation 1408/71 (para. 15 of the judgement). The nationality requirements in Belgian law were thus ruled as being 
incompatible with EC-law and its principle of equal treatment.
XXLX This was emphasised in the important case 249/83 Hoeckx, which concerned an unemployed Dutch national, who 
although bom in Belgium, and until 1981 habitually residing there, was denied the Belgian minimum means of 
subsistence. In April 1983, Mrs Hoeckx returned to Belgimn after a stay in France. On her return, she applied for tire 
minimum means of subsistence, also known as tire Tninimex’. Although the grant o f the minimex had been extended to 
Community7 nationals by a royal decree o f 1976, her application was turned down. The refusal of the competent 
institution was reasoned by the conditions in Belgian law' that Community nationals must have lived five years in 
Belgium immediately before the ‘minimex’ could be awarded. This was, however, not a requirement for Belgian 
nationals. The Court interpreted the defining features o f the minimum allowance. On the one hand, the minimex was 
granted on the basis of a legally defined position, which gave it a similarity to the social security benefit. On the other 
hand, it was granted to persons w ho had inadequate means. Need w as therefore an essential criterion for its application, 
which is a characteristic o f social assistance. Having these dual characteristics, the minimex could not be classified as a 
social security risk under Article 4(1)  (para. 14 of the judgement). However, the Court classified the minimex as a 
social advantage within the meaning of Article 7 (2) o f Regulation 1612/68 (paras. 20, 21 & 22 o f the judgement). It 
stressed the principle o f non-discrimination to be the fundamental principle in the context of free movement, as
formulated in 1612/68 as well as the Treaty's Article 48 (2). The right of the foreign worker to the Belgian minimex 
was thus granted on the basis of 1612/68, and the prior residence requirements as an extra condition for the foreign 
worker was ruled out as discrimination by the Court.
“The residence requirement is an additional condition imposed on workers who are nationals of a member state
but not national workers. It therefore constitutes a clear case of discrimination on the basis of the nationality o f the
workers" (para. 24 o f the judgement).
Mrs Hoeckx was thus entitled to the hybrid benefit on the same conditions as the national worker qua the regulatory text 
o f 1612/68.
The controversies on the minimex were, however, not finally settled by the Hoeckx case. The requirement of five years 
residence for Community' nationals only were further disputed in the later case 122/84 Schvner where the conclusions 
made by the Court in Hoeckx were restated [Case 122/84, 27. March 1985. Kenneth Schvner and Carol Cole v Centre 
public d'aide sociale de Chastre. ECR 1985, p. 1027J. The residence requirements were - many years later -  removed 
front Belgian law after the Commission brought infringement proceeding against the member state [ Case C-326/90, 10 
November 1992. Commission o f  the European Communities v Kingdom o f  Belgium. ECR 1992, p. 1-5517], For a short 
discussion of this infringement procedure, see endnote xi above in chapter IV.
*** Lohmann was an official o f a municipality in the Netherlands. In 197!, he received an invalidity pension. In 1974, he 
moved to Belgium to reside there, but his daughter stayed in the Netherlands, where site studied. Lohmann applied to 
the competent Dutch institution for family allowances for his daughter. The application was however rejected, with the 
argument that he did not reside in the Netherlands and could not rely on 1408/71, since he did not possess status as a 
worker.
Mrs Rose Hughes resided with her husband and three children in Ireland, but held no employment. I ler husband was 
a British citizen, who worked in Northern Ireland. In 1988, she applied for the British family credit. Her application 
was, however, refused by tire adjudication officer, since she did not satisfy' the residence requirement fonnulated in the 
British legislation.
XXX11 The British government clarified that the main purpose of the family' credit, which is a weekly’ non-contributory 
cash benefit, w as to supplement the incomes of low-paid workers w hose income would otherwise be lower titan if  they’ 
were unemployed. The aim of the benefit was to keep low paid workers in employment, for which reason the 
government did not find that it was a social security benefit.
XXJU" The court referred in particular to case C-356/89, 20 June 1991. Roger Stanton A ewton v Chief Adjudication 
Officer. ECR 1991, p. 1-3017; the joined cases 379/85 to 381/85 & 93/86 Gilettr, and 249/83 Hoeckx. The Giletti case 
will be analysed in greater detail in section 2.1 below. The case of Hoeckx was discussed in endnote xxix above.
XXX1V Also C-66/92, the case of Accatdi, discussed the reach of Community law when the family resided in another 
member state than the state of work [Case C-66/92, 2 August 1993. Genato  Accianfi v Commissie Beroepszaken 
Administmtieve Geschillen in de Provincie Koord-Holland. ECR 1993, p. 1-4567]. The case oï Accordi considered the 
Dutch law on income for unemployed workers, who are elderly or suffer from a partial incapacity to work, the IOAW. 
Accordi was of Italian nationality, living in the Netherlands, where he used to be employed. His wife and son lived in 
Italy. From July 1987, he received the IOAW allowance. Under the IAOW, he had, however, been classified as a single 
person, because his wife and child resided outside the Netherlands. According to the IOAW, an unemployed person 
yvith a child was entitled to 90% of the net minimum wage as benefit, w hereas the single person only got 70% o f the net 
minimum wage. Article 5 of the IOAW spelled out the IOAW as conditioned by residence in the Netherlands for the 
worker him/herself as well as the dependent family. The Dutch government held that the IOAW fell outside the material 
scope of 1408/71 as part o f Article 4 (4), since its objective was to guarantee a minimum level o f subsistence to the 
elderly unemployed or those partially incapable of work. The Court disagreed yvith this interpretation. It admitted that 
the IOAW varied according to the income o f the plaintiff and the spouse, but this was an objective and legally defined 
criteria (para. 15 of the judgement). Furthermore, the Court stressed that it yvas irrelevant that the scheme was financed 
by the public authorities. Article 4 (2) o f the Regulation specifies that it applies to non-contributory benefits as well. 
The IOAW thus constituted an unemployment benefit within the meaning of 1408/71, and even though the family yvas 
residing in another member state, they yvere still to be taken into account when the payable amount was being 
calculated.
***' The case dealt with Mr and Mrs Hoever and Mr and Mrs Zachow of German nationality who had been residing in 
the Netherlands since the 1980s. Mr Hoever and Mr Zachow worked full time in Germany. Mrs Hoever had had 10 
hours work a week in Germany, but had never been subject to German social insurance. Mrs Zachow had never been 
employed. When both wives applied for the Gemían “Erziehungsgeld”, the applications were rejected with reference to 
the residence requirement o f  German law in the case o f  Zachow and the 15 hours work a week rule, concerning Hoever.
xxxv> According to Finnish law' no. 36/1973 on Day Care o f Children, parents who choose not to claim a day care place 
are entitled to home child care allowance (under art. 11(2) o f national law). That allowance is, how ever, subject to a 
residence requirement in Finland. When Ms Maaheimo went to stay with her husband working in Germany together 
with her children, the Finnish authorities stopped the payment o f home child care allow ance, reasoned in the residence 
requirement o f national law.
wwn jn tjie joined cases C-88/95, C-102/95 and C-103/95 Losada, Balado and Paredes, the Court made it clear that it 
was for the national legislators to decide the conditions for granting a social security benefit [Joined cases C-88/95, C- 
102/95 and C-103/95, 20 February 1997. Bernardina Martinez Losada and Others v Instituto A'acional de Empleo 
(litem) and Instituto Nacional de la Secundad Social (LXSS). E C R 1997, p. 1-869], All three cases concerned the right to 
the Spanish unemployment allowance, for persons more than 52 years old, for three migrant workers who had made no 
employment based periods o f contribution to the Spanish social security' scheme, but had spend most of their working 
life in Germany and the Netherlands respectively and made social security contributions there. The former migrant 
workers later settled in Spain. Spanish law lays down that in order to be eligible for unemployment benefit, one must 
have paid 6 years of unemployment insurance contributions and in order to be granted retirement pension one must 
have made at least 15 years o f contributions, o f which two must be in the foregoing 8 years. The Court's answer to the 
l” question, was that the fact that the Spanish government had listed the special unemployment benefit in its 
declaration, referred to in Article 5 of 1408/71, was proof enough that it wras a social security benefit within tire 
meaning of 1408/71 (para, 21 of the judgement). However, the 2“  and the 3rd questions concerned to what extent tire 
competent institution could claim that contributions must have been paid to be entitled to the benefit. The Court 
admitted that w hile Article 51 o f the Treaty laid down the principle o f aggregation, it did not define the expression 
"periods of insurance’’ (para. 33 of the judgement). However, this was done in Article 1 (r) of 1408/71 where ‘‘periods 
of insurance” was defined as “periods o f contributions or periods of employment” (para. 34 of the judgement): 
"Consequently, a Member State is entitled to make the award of unemployment allowance conditional on the person 
concerned having last completed periods classed as “periods of insurance” or “periods of employment" under its own 
legislation” (para. 36 of the judgement).
xxxvl" Case C-25/95, One discussed if the German “Anpassungsgeld” was an old age benefit or an unemployment benefit 
within tire meaning of Article 4 (1), or a pre-retirement benefit outside llie material scope of the Regulation. Mr Otte 
had Dutch nationality, but had, as a migrant worker, been employed for long periods in die German mining sector, and 
been insured in Germany under the miners’ sickness and invalidity insurance scheme. In February 1988, he applied for 
the Gennan adaptation allowance, available for workers in the mining sector until they reach retirement age. In January 
1988, he had, however, also received invalidity pension from the Netherlands general social security scheme. In August 
1988, the IJundesamt fixed the payable amount of the adaptation allowance, taking both his contribution periods in 
Germany and in the Netherlands into account. When learning in May 1989 that One also received an invalidity pension 
front the Netherlands, the Bundesamt reduced the amount of the allowance and required him to reimburse the sums 
which in the meantime had beat unduly paid to him. One appealed against this decision, arguing that the calculation 
methods of the Bundesamt were against Article 51 o f the EC Treaty. The response from the national Court was, 
however, that the adaptation allowance constituted a pre-retirement allow'ance and therefore fell outside the material 
scope of the Community's social security Regulations. The European Court o f Justice was questioned whether the 
Gennan allowance could be regarded as a social security benefit w'ithin the meaning o f 1408/71. In the opinion of the 
German government the “Anpassungsgeld” fell outside the material scope, because it was a pre-retirement pension, 
which the duration of was limited in time and its grant was closely linked to the present economic situation. The 
judgment of the Court examined the nature o f the benefit. First of all, the adaptation allow ance differed from the old- 
age benefit within the meaning of Article 4 (1 )  (C), since it pursued an objective directly related to employment policy 
(para. 31 of the judgment). Furthermore, it differed from an old-age benefit regarding the granting condition. The 
adaptation allowance “is neither financed nor acquired on the basis of contributions from the recipients themselves” 
(para. 32 of the judgment). ITie employment policy objective and the conditions for its grant made it in some respects 
similar to a pre-retirement benefit, which is not yet covered by 1408/71 but had been proposed included by the 
Commission in 1980 and 1996 (para. 33 of the judgment). Secondly, the Court concluded that the allow ance w as not an 
unemployment benefit, within the meaning o f  Article 4 (1) (g) because the recipients o f the allowance did not have to
228
make themselves available for the labour market, i.e. register as job-seekers. The employment policy aim, to remove 
laid off workers from the sphere of unemployment insurance, made it differ from the usual characteristics o f 
unemployment benefit.
Xxxix Case 1/72 Frilli interpreted Regulation 3/58. The case concerned Mrs Friffi, an Italian national living in Belgium, 
where she received retirement pension. The ordinary retirement pension did, however, not cover her minimum living 
costs, for which reason Frilli applied for the Belgian guaranteed income for old people. Her application was turned 
down on grounds of her nationality. The Court found that although the Belgian guaranteed income for older people had 
some affinities with social assistance having need as an essential criteria for entitlement, it was to be classified as social 
security’ since the benefits was not granted discretionary, but on basis o f a legally defined position. On basis o f these 
reflections, the Court concluded that the allowance fell within the material scope of 3/58.
** All four cases dealt with Italian nationals receiving the French supplementary allowance, but who did not have the 
right to export it back to their country of origin. Mrs. Giletti received a widow’s pension from France, where her 
husband worked from 1930 to 1961. After he died, she moved back to Italy. In 1981, she applied for the supplementary 
allowance, but her application was rejected because she did not reside in France. In the cases of Gianltni and Tampan t 
they both received the ordinary French pension and the supplementary one. When they informed their competent 
institution that they wished to move back to Italy, the response was that in that case it would be without the 
supplementary allowance. Severini received both invalidity pension and supplementary allowance. However, the latter 
was withdrawn when he moved back to Italy.
xl‘ Albert Snares was a British national, who as an employee paid contributions to the British social security scheme for 
almost 25 years. In 1993, he suffered a serious accident and obtained the British disability living allowance. Shortly 
after, he decided to leave the UK to live with his mother in Tenerife, Spain. The competent institution informed him that 
by moving to Spain, he was no longer entitled to the disability allowance. The preliminary questions raised by the 
British Court first addressed whether the disability living allowance was part o f the material scope of 1408/71. 
Secondly, the reference questioned the validity of the new special rule codified by 1247/92.
5ju The much debated cases of Paletta will not be discussed here, since they did not deal with authorisation policies. The 
Cases C-45/90 Paletta I  [Case C-45/90,3. June 1992. BrennetAG v Vittorio Paletta. ECR 1992, p. 1-3423] & C-206/94 
Paletta II [Case C-206/94,2. May 19%. BrennetAG  v Í ittorio Paletta. ECR 1996, p. 1-2357] questioned whether wage 
maintenance benefits paid by the employer to the employee in the event o f illness constituted a sickness benefit within 
the meaning o f Article 4 (1), and furthermore whether the competent institution was obliged to accept a medical 
certificate stating the illness, when the certificate had been issued in another member state. The Court concluded that 
since the wage maintenance benefit was granted only in the event o f illness, it was incontestably a sickness benefit 
w ithin the meaning of Article 4 (1) (para. 17). Furthermore, the Court concluded that the competent institution was 
obliged by Community law' to accept the medical findings o f the doctors abroad.
x*“* Case 17/76 Brack [Case 17/76,29. September 1976. SI. L. E. Btack. widow ofR . J. Brack v Insurance Officer. ECR 
1976, p. 1429] was the first ruling on the Article to interpret the concept of w orker in relation with Article 22, and laid 
dow n that also the self-employed were entitled to immediate treatment in another member state. By the Brack ruling, 
the Court issued an early, generous inteipretation o f who enjoyed the right to health care abroad. The case has been 
analysed in section 2 .4 o f chapter IV.
xllv The Smits-Peerbooms case did not explicitly deal with Regulation 1408, and therefore did not decide on the future 
relation between primary and secondary law. As in Decker-Kohll, the ruling confirmed a dual system of how to access 
health care abroad. The Vanbraekel case, ruled at the same date as Smit-Peerbooms, was a further legal confirmation of 
this duality* [Case C-368/98, 12 July 2001. Abdon Vanbraekel and others v Alliance Rationale des Mutalites 
Chretiennes (A.WIC). ECR 2001, p. 14)5363]. The Vanbraekel case concerned the level o f reimbursement for health 
care purchased abroad, concretely regarding the reimbursement tariff for an operation that the Belgium resident, Ms 
Descamps, had had carried out in France. According to Article 22 (1) (c) of 1408/71, health care abroad is paid as the 
price of the treatment provided, i.e. as the tariffs in the member state of treatment. The Decker-Kohll procedure, on the 
other hand, reimburses costs according to tariffs set by the competent state. In the I anbraekel case, the Court concluded 
that Regulation 14U8 did not prevent the competent state from reimbursing according to its own tariffs when these were 
more favourable (para. 36 o f the judgement). The Court even found that the more favourable reimbursement was a 
necessary condition for the free movement o f services: ’I n  the present case, there is no doubt that the fact that a person
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has a lower level of cover when he receives hospital treatment in another Member State than when he undergoes the 
same treatment in the Member State in which he is insured may deter, or even prevent, that person front applying to 
providers o f medical services established in other Member States and constitutes, both for insured persons and for 
service providers, a barrier to freedom to provide services” (para. 45 of the judgement). As in Smits-Peerbooms, the 
I anbraekel case favoured the position of the patient in order to ensure non-discrimination, when a foreign treatment 
was found necessary. The Court considered a specific aspect of 1408 and the newly established procedure, and 
confirmed that 1408/71 was not exhaustive. Still, however, the recent case-law merely indicated details on (lie 
relationship between Treaty provisions and secondary7 legislation, and much was left open by the individual judgement 
of 1 anbraekel.
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Chapter VI: Adaptive Pressure on National Social 
Security Schemes
This chapter initiates the analysis of the domestic impact of the European institutionalisation of 
social security rights. It should be read in conjunction with the following chapter VII. which is also 
concerned with addressing this thesis' research question, 'with what impact \ Both chapters concern 
the second layer of institutionalisation. The present chapter identifies the adaptive pressure on the 
Danish and German welfare models emerging from the possible incompatibility between the 
principles of the European institution and those contained in national social security institutions. 
Chapter VII continues the analysis focusing on national response to, and the domestic impact of, 
supranational institutionalisation.
‘Adaptive pressure* can be defined as being constituted by the degree of compatibility (the 'fit') 
between the principles and obligations of a given European integration process and those of national 
institutions (Risse. Cow les & Caporaso 2001, pp. 6-7). The extent o f adaptive pressure is therefore 
not only determined by supranational institutionalisation, but equally by how that process relates to 
established national institutions. To examine adaptive pressure thus requires that both the specific 
integration process and national institutions arc identified. Since national institutions are 
particularly diverse among the member states of the European Union, European integration docs not 
exert the same degree of adaptive pressure:
"A countiy whose domestic institutions are perfectly compatible with Europeanisation experiences no
adaptational pressure. In such a case, we expect no domestic institutional change" (Risse, Cowles & Caporaso
2001, p. 2).
Then on the other hand:
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“The lower the compatibility (fit) between European institutions, on the one hand, and national institutions, on the 
other, the higher the adaptational pressures” (Risse Cowles & Caporaso 2001, p. 7; Bórzel & Risse 2000, p. 6).
However, although adaptive pressure is exerted against national institutions, it may not cause 
significant domestic impact in terms o f change, since national actors may not respond in accordance 
with the adaptive pressure (Risse Cow les & Caporaso 2001, p. 2; Goetz 2001, pp. 214-215, 227). 
To the extent that we find no straightforward connection between adaptive pressure, adaptive 
response and impact, such a finding points to the fact that, when implementing supranational!) 
institutionalised obligations and rights, the member states enjoy a considerable degree of national 
autonomy. In that case, implementation may indeed constitute the second stronghold of national 
control. Such a finding shall, however, be examined both in the short run and in the long run, 
assuming that the time variable influences adaptive response and therefore impact.
According to the above definition of ‘adaptive pressure', the identification thereof requires a 
mapping of the relevant process of European integration. That has been conducted in the previous 
chapters III, IV and V, w hich detail the main principles of the Regulation, the gradual extension of 
its personal scope, and the institutionalised compromise between the Community principle of 
exportability and national principles o f territoriality. The analysis of supranational 
institutionalisation demonstrated the dynamic characteristic of the Community Regulation. In the 
present chapter, the analysis identifies the principles and criteria of national institutions in order to 
lay down howr these may, or may not, clash with the identified supranational institutionalisation 
process.
The examination of adaptive pressure in the present chapter w ill contain both an institutional and a 
de facto component. In institutional terms, the characteristics of national social security institutions 
will be identified for the Danish and German member states respectively. The identification will, in 
brief, examine the historical reasoning o f national welfare, the organising principles and 
boundaries for welfare in the two countries and, finally, lay down the institutional outlook of the 
four contemporary social security schemes o f statutory pension, public health care, long term care 
and family benefits. In a de facto account, actual EU-related immigration into the two member 
states between 1985 and 2000 will be analysed. The argument for including the de facto component 
is that adaptive pressure and impact cannot only be assessed on an institutional account, but
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ultimately depends on how many EU migrants exercise their supranationally established right of 
free movement into specific countries.
The chapter begins by setting up four hypotheses on the domestic impact of European integration. 
Three of them are general and derived from theoretical propositions. One specifically addresses the 
difference between the residence-based and the insurance-based welfare state. Furthermore, the 
choice to compare the Danish and German member states is substantiated. The second section of the 
chapter turns to the identification of adaptive pressure, by detailing the national institutions in place; 
their historical reasoning as a means o f national integration; their organising principles and their 
boundaries for welfare. The third section sets out the contemporary institutional characteristics of 
the four social securin' schemes of statutory pension, public health care, long term care and family 
benefits. The section depicts how contemporary schemes concretely express organising principles 
and welfare boundaries. The ways in which supranational institutionalisation has impacted on these 
specific schemes will be analysed in the following chapter. The fourth and final section analyses 
adaptive pressure in de facto terms, comparing EU-related immigration into the two member states. 
The de facto examination profoundly challenges the hypothesis of ‘welfare tourism*, and the 
assumption that the residence-based welfare state should experience a greater adaptive pressure. 
Such hypotheses, however, remain alive and well, as will be demonstrated in chapter VIl's 
examination of national response.
1.0: Hypothesis on Domestic impacts and the Choice of Comparative  
Cases
In general, legislation on social security is amended more frequently than most other types of 
legislation. There is a consistent need to adapt to minor changes in the domestic context, such as, 
for example, wage levels, new treatments, etc., and, from time to time, there will be a more 
profound reform of policies as a response to demographic change, economic situation, efficiency 
calls, etc. (Becker 2000, p. 40). To estimate how European institutionalisation may affect national 
social security policies and have a direct or indirect impact on national legislation would ideally 
require one to isolate its effect from the effects of other domestic, ideological or international 
factors. As the policy field of social security is a domain that is constantly adjusted or changed, it is 
almost an impossible task to estimate the precise impact of Europeanisation, fully purged of other 
factors.
233
The following analysis and its conclusions should not be read as having dismissed the importance 
of other factors. It does not state that European integration, in general, has become the major force 
driving domestic social security change (Goetz 2001, p. 220). Far from it. However, the analysis 
docs demonstrate and conclude that European institutionalisation exerts adaptive pressure on 
existing national institutions, requires an adaptive response and is a variable causing change.
1.1: Three G eneral Hypothesis
The theoretical discussion carried out in chapter II depicted competing views on the impact of 
European integration. Furthermore, the dominant schools on European integration do not provide 
detailed theorizing on what happens subsequent to supranational political and judicial decision­
making. For that reason, a classic neo-functionalist versus intergovemmcntalist theoretical 
discussion is insufficient, to the extent that it disregards the actual consequences o f integration on 
national policies and to the extent that it concentrates on what is still the generation o f abstract 
rights, without considering the process of national implementation where these are translated into 
enforceable ones.
However, chapter IPs discussion on 'what is the national impact o f supranational 
institutionalisation' makes it possible to formulate three general, but competing, hypotheses on the 
national response to, and impact of, supranational institutionalisation.
Hypothesis 1 and 2 are placed on each side o f a continuum stretched out between ‘full impact' and 
'no impact'. Hypothesis 1 refers to neo-functionalism and its modified variants, including the 
approach on 'Institutionalisation o f Europe' as formulated by Stone Sw eet et al. and hypothesis 2 
refers to a classic intergovcmmentalist viewpoint. Hypothesis 3 is an attempt to formulate an in- 
between standpoint, which draws on the comparative tradition of historical institutionalism. *
* Hi'. Supranational institutionalisation is loyally transposed into national legislation and thus 
implies a corresponding policy change. When the scope o f  integration increases, it will produce 
a greater uniformity in national policies. The adaptive pressure o f integration will thus 
gradually force national policies to converge.
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• Hy Member states respond strategically to supranational institutionalisation and thus largely 
manage to neutralise its effect. National actors control the effective outcome o f 
institutionalisation, both at the supranational and at the national level. Supranational 
institutionalisation only changes the status quo o f national institutions to the extent that it is in 
the national interest to do so.
• Hy National implementation constitutes the reactive part o f  decision-making, through which 
the effective meaning o f  an institution is established. Supranational institutionalisation ma\' be 
an independent variable o f  change, but national implementation steps in as an act o f 
governance, translating supranational rules according to national institutions and perhaps 
preferences. The impact is therefore not \perfect, universal or constant \
To assess the hypotheses requires an analysis which, 1) identifies the adaptive pressure exerted by 
supranational institutionalisation, and, on this basis, 2) analyses the national response to. and impact 
of, supranational institutionalisation. This will be the task of the present and the following chapter.
In general the study of impact invite us to cam' out a comparative analysis. Against this 
background, the following analysis is comparative, investigating the adaptive pressure, the national 
response and the impact of supranational institutionalisation on the member states of Denmark and 
Germany respectively.
1.2: The Choice o f Com parative Cases and a Fourth Hypothesis
Regulation 1408/71 co-ordinates the social security schemes of 15 member states, each o f which 
has a distinct welfare tradition. Understood as the cause or independent variable, European 
institutionalisation of social security rights must be assumed to exert a different adaptive pressure 
on each of the 15 welfare models. If the adaptive pressure varies, so must the adaptive reaction of 
the member states. In order to account for the differences in adaptive pressure and European 
impacts a comparative approach has been chosen.
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1It has often been stated that, since the coordination framework was established by the founding 
fathers of the EC SC and the European Community, its principles were laid down in accordance with 
their welfare tradition. Apart from a few exceptions, the social security systems o f the six original 
member states were based on the exercise of work activity and built up as Bismarkian oriented 
social insurance schemes (Comclissen 1997, p. 35; Pieters 1997, p. 190). It w as therefore a natural 
choice that lex loci laboris became a ruling principle of the Regulation, when deciding the 
applicable legislation. Furthermore, the Regulation laid down a distinction between contributory 
and non-contributory financed, i.e. tax-financed, social benefits, where the latter traditionally were 
held outside the material scope (Ketscher 2002, p. 194).
Assessed against the definition o f 'adaptive pressure', the core rationales of the Regulation have 
been held to Tit' the social insurance welfare model and, it has been argued, to 'misfit' the 
principles of the residence-based welfare model (Banke 1998, p. 30; Ketscher 1998, 2002; 
Abrahamson & Borchorst 2000). On the basis of this comparative assessment, the present study 
compares the adaptive pressure, national response to, and impact on, the Danish and the German 
welfare states respectively. The two member states represent diverging welfare schemes. The 
Danish welfare state is predominantly tax-financed and residence-based, whereas German welfare 
tradition is basically contribution financed, and linked to the exercise of a work activity. In addition, 
it is held to be likely that the apparent Tit' between Community obligations and German welfare 
institutions had been influenced by the fact that Germany as a Community founding father took part 
in the original formulation of the regulatory text, whereas Denmark, which became a member in 
1973, took over the acquis communautaire, and thus its embedded rationale.
The ‘misfit* between institutionalised intra-European social security rights and the residence-based 
welfare state has been debated in sections o f Danish academia as w ell as in public debate. Even the 
Danish central administration has, from time to time, contributed to the argument that an extension 
of Regulation 1408 might cause 'welfare tourism'. The argument is trenchant and has successfully 
influenced the recurring Danish debate for or against further integration, and for or against Union 
membership. Its effective impact therefore reaches much beyond the isolated scope of 1408. 
Concretely, it has been argued that, when considering intra-European social security and residence- 
based welfare, wc face two contradicting philosophies. Free movement and Regulation 1408 favour 
an individualistic insurance principle and will gradually force the residence-based, non-contributary
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welfare state to change, i.e. to converge with the dominant social insurance pattern of the EU 
member states (Ketscher 1998, 2002; PI Lige Lovligt, 26 November 2003). According to the 
argument, the adaptive pressure exerted may cause welfare autonomy to be a thing of the past.
‘In  a long-term perspective, it cannot be doubted that Union membership increasingly will influence the 
designing of Danish social legislatioa That applies to both the designing o f  individual rights and to the 
financing of the social security. Concerning individual rights, it must be envisaged that these to a greater degree 
Mill become labour market related, but that correspond to the general development in Danish social law. 
Furthermore, it may be envisaged that rights will be more insurance-based, in which the relation between 
contributions and benefits becomes more direct. In any case, a process seems already to have started in which 
social benefits develop differently from traditional tax-financing. [...] it should therefore be concluded, that a 
greater pressure on the Danish model must be envisaged, because it is very little suited to participate in a 
Community built on the principle of free movement. That will in itself cause a greater harmonisation o f the 
social protection in the Union” (Ketscher 2002, pp. 221-222, own translation from Danish).
The assumption quoted above is a more specifically applied version of the convergence hypothesis, 
stated as Hi. In a comparative light, such a hypothesis invites us to think that the insurance-based 
welfare state would face significantly less adaptive pressure and would feci less the impact of 
European integration. The choice of comparing two contrasting cases should make it possible to 
explore variations in adaptive pressure and ultimately domestic impact.
On this basis, a fourth specific hypothesis is formulated:
• Hy. The institutionalisation o f  intra-European social security' exerts adaptive pressure and 
impacts primarily on the residence-based welfare state and may gradually force it to converge 
with the dominating social insurance pattern o f the EU member states. The social insurance 
welfare state, on the other hand, enjoys the compatibility betw een the coordination system and 
national i ns ti in lions in place, and therefore does not experience any significant adaptive 
pressure nor European impact.
2.0: Tw o  Welfare Models in a Historical, Institutional Light
Welfare policies have traditionally been held to be the exclusive competence of the member state. 
Member states decide on the content and scope of their individual policies. EU interference in this 
policy realm is therefore limited to ‘coordination’, as a conceptual contrast to ‘harmonisation’. 
However, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, the exact border between the two
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concepts is far from given, but it is clear that 'coordination' is not an insignificant, but rather an 
intervening, policy tool (Christensen & Malmstedt 2000, p. 14). It is furthermore clear that there is 
no exact separation of national and community social competences, when internal market rules 
overlap with national prerogatives.
The policy means to favour ones own citizens or long term residents in welfare matters and to 
demarcate social benefits within one's own borders, have deep-rooted historical and organisational 
explanations. Against its historical background, the need to defend welfare autonomy may be 
stronger compared with other policy areas, and European impact on national social institutions may 
be especially sensitive.
2.1: W elfare as Means of National Integration
The institutionalisation of the modem welfare state mirrors a national process of integration 
(Fcrrcra 2003). By the last decades of the 19th century, an institutional watershed began to take 
form. Previously, protection against social security risks had been attended to by families and local 
communities but, in the late 19th century, western European nation-states gradually began to adopt 
national social legislation (Mossialos et al. 2001, p. 1 2 ; Ferrera 2003, pp. 622-623)
Germany and Denmark were both pioneer welfare states, being among the first countries to adopt 
the four constitutive pillars of social security: covering industrial accidents, sickness insurance, 
pension and unemployment (see appendix 3, tabic 3). Germany passed its law on sickness insurance 
in 1883; in 1884, the law on industrial accident insurance: and in 1889, the law on pension 
insurance. Denmark followed closely after, adopting its pension scheme in 1891; its law on sickness 
insurance in 1892; and the law on industrial accident insurance in 1898. Denmark was one of the 
first western European states to have adopted all four constitutive social security pillars, when it 
agreed on unemployment benefits in 1907. Germany completed the four pillar structures 2 0  years 
later, passing its law against the unemployment risk in 1927.
The rise of the modem welfare state has been explained in many ways, since different aspects of a 
complex political, societal, economical and cultural phenomenon point to different sources. Among
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such explanations are those emphasising the innovation of modem social security as means of 
national integration.
In the 19th century, both the German states and Denmark were societies in transformation. These 
transforming societies were characterised by the disintegration o f traditional social ties, caused by 
interlinked and separate processes of industrialisation, population growth, increased mobility, 
emigration, economic crisis and a political fear of socialism. Encouraged by industrialisation, parts 
of the population sought work opportunities in the bigger cities or industrial areas, and were thus no 
longer protected by the possible support from family, local employer or community. Between 1850 
and 1925, the distribution of the German population that lived respectively in the country and in the 
cities changed fundamentally (Lampert & Althammer 2001, p. 27).228 Moreover, the German states 
experienced dramatic population growth in the 19th century.229 To escape the poverty o f pre- 
industrial life in the country', migration took place on a large scale.230 Besides the migration 
between the German states, 4.4 millions emigrated abroad between 1851 to 1900 (Lampert & 
Althammer 2001, p. 28). In Denmark, the deep economic crisis that hit the agricultural sector in the 
1870s and 1880s was a major factor in the transformation of traditional society (Petersen 1985, p. 
42). The agricultural crisis forced a large amount of workers to migrate either to the cities, or to 
emigrate to the United States in an attempt to escape poverty (Johansen 1986, p. 297). Meanwhile, 
Germany and Denmark experienced the beginning o f the political organisation of the social 
democratic party, and agitation from the left intensified.231 Established society and its 
representatives feared socialism to such an extent that social policies were discussed as an effective 
safeguard against social unrest (Monrad 1930, p. 26; Lampert & Althammer 2001, p. 67).
::s In 1852,67.3 % of the population in the German stales lived in villages w ith less than 20(H) inhabitants, whereas 6 % 
lived in cities of 20.000 to 100.000, and only 2.6 %  lived in large cities with more than 100.000 inhabitants. In 1925, the 
distribution had changed to 35.6 % of the population in villages with less than 2.000 inhabitants, 13.7 %  in cities 
between 20.000 and 100.000, and 26.8 % lived in large cities with more than 100.0(H) inhabitants (Lampert & 
Althammer 2001, p. 27).
In 1816, the German population was 24,8 millions, in 1855, it had increased to 36.1 millions and the population 
almost doubled until 1910, where it reached 64,5 millions (Lampert & Althammer 2001, p. 26, Eichenhofcr 2000).
3,0 The migration from the country to industrial growth areas was an east to west movement. East and West Prussia, 
Pommern, and Polish migration to the Berlin area and the Ruhr region.
iJ1 The German socialist party, “Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei" was founded in 1875, but its organisation goes back to 
the foundation of the “Algemeinen Deutsche Arbeiterverein'' in 1863, and the “’'Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei" in 
1869. The Danish social democratic party was founded in 1871 as a Danish fraction of “The First International" and 
won representation in the Danish lower chamber, the Folketing, for the first time in 1884.
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Societies at 19th century's ‘Fin du Siecle’ were socially and politically fragmented and 
differentiated. Poverty and the search for opportunities intensified migration to an extent never seen 
before. Unemployment in the country-side and migration to the city created a "surplus' population 
which was not integrated into employment or social structures. Poverty, increased mobility and the 
growth in the number of marginalized persons without traditional social protection raised new 
social questions.
The granting o f national social security rights became one way of integrating a marginalized 
working class into society, initiating social solidarity and expecting loyalty in return (Eichenhofer 
1999, p. 45). Initially, social security schemes addressed the worker specifically, but were gradually 
extended "up-wards' to new groups of persons within the nation and to new types of benefits 
(Fcrrera 2003, p. 623). In this way, the process of welfare nationalisation began. Further 
institutionalisation extended schemes to the wider personal scope, until social security in some 
states became a universal, but nation-bound, citizenship right.232 Self-employed and agricultural 
workers were generally among the last category' to achieve social security protection, but by the 
1950s they had finally been included in the many different schemes and the “idea of national 
solidarity" seemed to have become "'the core principle of social security" (Flora & Alber 1981, p. 
54).
Gradually social security became a material right, creating stronger ties between the nation-state 
and its citizens, between national politicians and voters. It can be argued that from the very 
beginning, welfare w as tactically motivated by the need to create an ordered relationship between 
nation state and citizen, to integrate the marginalized, and to avoid social unrest.
l~2 Generally, industrial accident insurance was first limited to workers in dangerous work positions. T hai it was 
gradually ext aided to new personal categories and occupational risks. Sickness insurance was also initially limited to 
industrial workers and a few: categories o f employees below a specified income level. After the initial period, it was 
extaided to groups such as agricultural workers or employees with higher salaries. Between 1930 and 1945, the 
sickness schemes were extended to family members, and about a decade later, pensioners were included as well. The 
self-employed generally marked the last inclusion after 1950. The pension insurance was in the initial years granted to 
workers and some other categories of employees, but then opened up to survivors and self-employed. However, the 
pension schemes o f the Scandinavian countries made the whole population eligible for pension from the beginning but 
not necessarily entitled to receive it, w hile other countries did not provide general protection against old age before after 
World War II. Unemployment benefits follow s the pattern of the other social security pillars. The scheme was initially 
limited to industrial w orkers or specific industries and then extended to wider groups (Flora & Alber 1981, pp. 52-53).
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Eichenhofer has stressed that one important reason why Germany became the first social security 
state w as the foundation of the German state in 1871. The German rulers needed instruments of 
national integration, and the initiation o f the social security laws by Otto von Bismarck had strong 
political, tactical motives. By granting the worker pension, health security' and industrial accident 
insurance, Germany' had the means to create lasting bonds between the state and its working class 
citizens. Social security thus became a part of German nation-building (Eichenhofer 1999, p. 45). 
Bismarck's political, tactical motives are evident in the fact that his plans were inspired by 
Napoleon III and the French program "Extinction du pauperisme". Before the adoption of the old 
age insurance in 1889, Bismarck declared in the Reichstag;
“I have lived long enough in France to know that the loyalty that most Frenchmen have to the Government, which 
is there, and which every' time has the advantage, also when it governs poorly [...], essentially has to do with the 
fact that most Frenchmen are pensioners of the state, by small, often by very small amounts" (Eichenhofer 2000, 
p. 20, own translation from German2” ).
Lidegaard’s argument about the Danish welfare state has a certain similarity' to Eichenhofer's 
interpretation, as it stresses welfare as a means of building up the nation (Lidcgaard 2003). The 
argument is, however, different since, in the Danish case, we are speaking about granting new rights 
to an established, but defeated, nation. Lidcgaard argues that the institutionalisation of the Danish 
w elfare state w as a matter of the survival o f the nation. In 1864, Denmark lost another battle against 
Prussia and the Southern part o f Jutland became Prussian territory. The loss caused a national 
trauma, but the response was that "‘what has been lost externally, must be won internally*' 
(Lidegaard 2003, p. 153). The state should invest in - and w in - the nation.
“The welfare reforms became a weapon in the battle for the population's unconditional loyalty towards the state 
and the nation" (Lidegaard 2003, p. 155, own translation from Danish).
Generally, the modem welfare has been proposed, created and institutionalised by the nation, and 
aims at national integration and coherence;
“the welfare state has always been a national state and this connection is far from coincidental. One of the main 
factors impelling the development o f welfare systems has been the desire on the part o f governing authorities to
The German text reads as follows; “Ich habe lange genug in Frankreich gelebt, um zu wissen, dass die 
Anhänglichkeit der meisten Franzosen an die Regierung, die gerade da ist, und die jedesmal den Vorsprung hat, auch 
wenn sie schlecht regiert, oder doch schliesslich auch die an das Land, wesentlich damit in Verbindung steht, dass die 
meisten Franzosen Rentenempfänger vom Staat sind, in kleinen, oft sehr kleinen Beträgen" (Eichenhofer 2000, p. 20).
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promote national solidarity. From early days to late on, welfare systems were constructed as port o f a more 
generalized process of state building. Who says welfare state says nation-state" (Giddens 1994, pp. 136-137).
European coordination of social security challenges this historical meaning o f the welfare state. 
Welfare was, and is still, closely linked to the nation and the national territory. The historical 
justifications for constructing and extending the welfare state constitute the long perspective of the 
adaptive pressure exerted by intra-European social security.
2.2: The Organising Principles o f Tw o W elfare States
As typologies, the Danish and the German welfare state represent two different models. Typologies 
have for long been used as comparative tools in welfare research. Back in the 1950s, Wilcnsky 
developed the distinction between the residual and the institutional welfare state. In 1971, the 
distinction was extended by Titmuss, when he added the performance-oriented scheme as a third 
model. In 1990, Esping-Andersen emphasised the ideological link of the three welfare ideal-ty pes, 
and placed them in their broader political-economic contexts. The residual welfare state referred to 
the liberal ideology, represented by the US and United Kingdom among others. The institutional 
welfare state was mainly formed by social democracy, and was represented in the Scandinavian 
states. The performance-oriented model was found in countries where conservative ideology had 
dominated such as in Germany, Austria, France and Italy'. The criteria for Esping-Andersen's 
distinction between welfare models was the extent of ‘dc-commodification* that each state granted 
its citizens. The "dc-commodification' degree is the degree to which the social security of the 
individual is independent of market performance. A dc-commodified welfare stale will thus grant 
social rights on the basis of citizenship rather than on the basis of performance.
“The outstanding criteria lor social rights must be the degree to which they permit people to make their living 
standard independent o f pure market forces. It is in this sense that social rights diminish citizens status as 
“commodities"" (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 3).
From a more abstract point of view, Denmark and Germany have institutionalised two distinct 
welfare models with distinct degrees o f de-commodification. The Danish welfare state has 
historically stretched dc-commodification to the middle class, and in its attempt to institutionalise 
universal social solidarity, it has minimised the importance of the market participation in the 
granting of social rights. In contrast, a key characteristic in the German welfare state is the
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preserv ation of status differentials, where previous contributions decide the level of social security 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, pp. 27-28).
For analytical purposes here, and due to their different financial forms and criteria for granting 
social security; the following outline will label the Danish welfare state as a residence-based model, 
and the German w elfare state as a social insurance model.
A main characteristic of the residence based welfare model is that social rights are granted on the 
basis of residence (Comelissen 1997, p. 32). A person is entitled to welfare because she/he is a 
citizen or a habitual resident, and not qua individual contributions paid to a specific scheme. The 
institutionalisation of welfare has moved in the direction of ‘social citizenship* as criteria for 
entitlements and the residence based model has traditionally vested its citizens “with a basic right to 
a very broad range of services and benefits which, as a whole, is intended to constitute a democratic 
right to a socially adequate level of living*’ (Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1987, pp. 42-43). Most 
welfare benefits are universally granted. The ‘openness* of the system is therefore relatively high, 
generally giving access to the whole population (Hansen 2 0 0 2 , p. 9). Rights are mainly granted on 
an objective, legal basis and not on a discretionary one (Goul Andersen 1999, p. 44) . 234 The model 
may, however, positively discriminate and grant additional benefits or services to defined, normally 
low-income, groups (Goul Andersen 1999, p. 47). Another key-characteristic of the residence 
model is that benefits are generally not based on contributions, but are tax financed. Yet, tax 
payment is not a requirement to receive a specific social benefit (Kctchcr 1998, pp. 254-255). Apart 
from when benefits express positive discrimination, they arc granted as flat-rate payment which do 
not reflect previous income, tax-payment or contribution. For that reason, a person who has never 
contributed to the Danish economy or paid considerable taxes will enjoy the same rights as 
someone who has been a regular tax payer all through his working life. For the large part of welfare 
schemes, work position is irrelevant.
A main characteristic in the social insurance model is that market participation gives access to a 
social security scheme, and the degree of this participation decides the level of social entitlements. 
Those who hold a German w ork position are compulsorily insured against social security risks. The 
principle of ‘lex loci laboris* is therefore what decides where to be socially insured, and not
234 If rights were generally granted on a discretionary basis, the model would tilt towards the residual one.
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residence (Altmaier 1995, p. 77). The individual earns his social rights qua paying contributions 
(Goul-Andersen 1999, pp. 42-43). Contributions are calculated according to one's income as, for 
example, employee, self-employed or employer. As contributions are related to earnings, benefits 
will be related to previous income. The equivalence between individual contribution and right is 
therefore high. For example, an aim of the pension scheme is to link the pension level with the 
previous income level and thus make the maintenance of living standard possible in old age 
(Schmahl 1991 & 1992). The social insurance scheme is inter-temporally redistributive over the life 
cycle, and minimises the cost of a social security risk at the individual level. The scheme is, 
however, also interpersonally redistributive, which makes it differ from private insurance (Schmahl 
1992, pp. 6-7).
The organising principles of the two welfare models have proven remarkably persistent, although 
not static. Core principles have demonstrated continuity for more than a century, but as the welfare 
state has developed, new methods have been introduced making the borderline between the two 
models increasingly blurred (Pieters 1997, p. 190). In terms of continuity in Germany, a tax- 
financed pension system was proposed at several historical moments of change, but the institutions 
in place were defended and no change was introduced (Schmahl 1992).235 Also the German 
adoption in 1994 of the long-term care scheme as a compulsory, insurance primarily for all 
employees is a continuation of the tradition, whereas the post-w ar development of family benefit as 
tax-financed w elfare exemplifies the mixed characteristics of the social insurance model. Equally, 
Denmark has amplified its principles as a residence-based, tax-financed welfare model, based on 
social citizenship. The pension scheme, the accidental insurance scheme and the unemployment 
scheme have maintained their founding features for more than a century. Furthermore, tire sickness 
scheme has been reformed along the same path. Whereas it was founded as an insurance scheme, it 
changed into a publicly administered and financed scheme for all residents, thus becoming a 
universally accessible scheme for all citizens or residents just like the pension scheme (Sonne 
Norgaard 1999, p. 18). However, more recent welfare developments have brought change. In 1994,
235 For example after the First World War, Germany had an intense discussion about reforming the pension system to a 
tax-financed one. The ideas were expressed and supported especially by the socialist political spectrum but did not gain 
sufficient support. In 1946, the allied forces presented a plan integrating the different social security branches into an 
uniform organisation, which was to cover nearly all employees and benefits. The general scheme was to be financed by 
an integrated contribution for all branches, and the plan w as clearly influenced by the Beveridge report from 1942. One 
argument against the plans for institutional change was that in a time of radical, general change, the German social 
security system represented a positive tradition (Schmahl 1992, p. 9). In general, the post war years came to reinforce 
the traditional principle behind the German scheme.
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social security contributions were introduced. Employees, self-employed workers and employers 
are now obliged to contribute with 8% of their wages to the Labour Market Fund. However, the 
contributions paid do not influence entitlement to benefits, but were introduced as a new general 
method to finance state spending on sickness, maternity and unemployment benefits. The 
institutional change does not therefore introduce an equivalence principle into the Danish welfare 
model, but rather a new financial composition.236
No matter how accessible welfare may be for the working or residing population, it remains a 
conditional and restricted right. We will now consider how the boundaries of welfare limit rights to 
a defined set of beneficiaries, thus making social solidarity' conditional on personal and territorial 
belonging.
2.3: Boundaries for W elfare; the Principles o f Territoriality and Social 
Citizenship
The formation and consolidation of modem social policies took place within the territorial borders 
of the nation-state. State formation and nation building were thus the initial stages of the long 
history' of the modem welfare state that regulates today. Social policy was, and remains, closely 
associated with the idea of the nation-state (Eichenhofer 2001, p. 55). The welfare state inherited its 
sovereignty’ and strong emphasis on territoriality. Traditionally, the welfare state has autonomously 
defined who qualifies as its social beneficiaries, targeting benefits for its own citizens, residents or 
workers. Furthermore, it has been in a sovereign position to exercise spatial control, insisting that 
social benefits and sendees should be consumed within its own territory (Lcibfricd & Pierson 
1995). Social citizenship and territoriality have been the demarcating principles for the reach of 
welfare.
‘Social citizenship' was originally conceptualised by T.H. Marshall as part of an evolutionary- 
description of citizenship, through which societal coherence w as created (Marshall 1950). Marshall 
depicted modem citizenship as having developed in three stages, where "social citizenship* was the
2,e In 1996, approximately 69 % of  the social expenses w ere financed by taxes in Denmark, whereas it for Germany w as 
only 30%. In ¡990, the tax financing in Denmark was, however, 80%. From 1990 to 1996, the employees’ part o f the 
financing via insurance rose from app. 5% to 15% in Denmark (Abrahamson & Borchorst 2000, p. 226). In the longer 
institutional perspective, the financing distinction between the two models was thus minimised over a period of 
relatively few7 years.
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culmination o f a long-running process. Civic citizenship rights of the 18,h century were 
supplemented by the political participation rights of the 19th century, which were finally concluded 
by the social citizenship rights of the 2 0 ,h century.
However, throughout all stages, ‘citizenship' required membership which was and remains a 
national one. Concepts such as equality' and solidarity' were not unlimited, but to be understood 
alongside the original restriction of policies to members of the nation.
“‘Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members o f a community. All who possess the status are 
equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (Marshall 1992 (1950), p. 18).
The status of citizen has been one traditional condition for social entitlements. Another condition is 
expressed by the principle of territoriality. Traditionally, social benefits and serv ices o f the welfare 
state have been confined within the nation's own territorial borders (Eichenhofer 2001, pp. 55-56; 
Mossialos et al. 2001). Social responsibilities were not meant to reach beyond them. Generally, 
social legislation in both Denmark and Germany remain based on the territorial principle, and the 
spatial application of welfare has therefore a clearly defined reach (Haverkate & Huster 1999, p. 
1 15).237 In a globalised world, the territorial principle still finds its justification. Social benefits and 
services are designed to fulfil domestic policy aims and correspond to domestic living conditions 
and costs (Tegtmcicr 1990, p. 29; Clever 1992, p. 300). Above all, the principle serves as an 
effective national instrument of control,
• The principle of territoriality' is a means to ensure budgetary control. When only those residing 
and consuming within own borders are entitled to supplied benefits and services, costs arc 
reduced and are more easily controlled.
• The principle of territoriality is a means of framing the intended policy, and to ensure that it is 
actually pursued. To ensure, for example that long term care benefits arc used for actual care, 
that supplied family benefits meet policy intentions, and that the unemployed are available for 
the domestic labour market. *
*r  Altmaier defines the territorial principle in a German context, writing: “Zum einen umschreibt das 
Territorialitütsprinzip die Tatsache, dass staatliche Hoheitsgewalt nur innerhalb des eigenen Staatsgebiets ausgeübt 
werden darf, der räumliche Bereich der Anwendung des deutschen Sozialversicherungsrechts sich somit in der Regel 
auf das Deutsche Hoheitsgebiet beschränkt. Es handelt sich hierbei um eine Regel des Allgemeinen Völkerrechts, die 
nicht nur auf den Bereich des Sozialrechts Anwendung findet” (Altmaier 1995, p. 73, emphasis added).
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• The principle o f territoriality is a means of controlling the quality of the supplied services, since 
standards are nationally defined.
• The principle of territoriality is a means of facilitating the capacity for planning in the health 
sector. If health services can only be consumed within national borders, consumption is 
nationally controlled and foreign supply does not have to be integrated.
The traditional condition for entitlement to welfare protection in Denmark has been Danish 
citizenship. The nationality clause is maintained in parts o f the social legislation. This applies to the 
law on social pension, whereas for benefits regarding sickness and maternity, habitual residence is 
the requirement.238 However, to comply with European and international obligations, national law 
makes an exception to its own nationality’ clause. If not a Danish citizen, years of residence in 
Denmark or the periods of reference, i.e. the periods in which the applicant has been covered by 
Danish legislation, are taken into account (Banke & Borker Rasmussen 1998, p. 14). The main rule, 
regulating Danish social policy today is periods of residence. Although residence appears as a non- 
discriminatoiy criteria, it clearly favours citizens when long-term residence is required in order to 
receive a full benefit, as for example, is the case for social pensions. The emphasis on territoriality’ 
in the residence based welfare state is strong. As a general rule, one has to reside in Denmark to 
receive social benefits (Ketschcr 1998, p. 261; Den Social Sikringsstyrelsc, Hxfte 1,1997, p. 28).
Denmark has traditionally differentiated legally between Danes and foreigners, thus operating with 
two welfare demarcations, i.e. that of nationality' and that of territoriality. The post war social 
security code in Germany has not made a distinction between Germans and foreigners, but 
demarcated rights through the link to the German labour market, or, if one docs not hold 
employment, through habitual residence (Willms 1990, p. 58, Havcrkatc & Hustcr 1999, p. 116). 
The territorial principle for social policy in Germany is concretised in the “Sozial Gcsctzbuch" IV, 
§ 3, in which the personal and spatial application of German social insurance law is settled.239 The *12
358 See Law on Social Pension § 2 (Lov om Social Pension) and Laws on Health Insurance (Sygesikrmgsloven) § 1 and 
Hospital Treatment (Sygehusloven) § 5.
3J9 The general expression of the German principle o f Lex Loci Laboris and territoriality is found in Sozialgcsctzbuch 
IV, § 3, and reads: ’ Persönlicher und räum licher Geltungsbereich. Die Vorschriften über die Versichcrungspflicht 
und die Versicherungsberechtigung gelten,
1. soweit sie eine Beschäftigung oder eine selbständige Tätigkeit voraussetzen, filr alle Personen, die im 
Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzbuchs beschäftigt sind oder selbständig tätig sind,
2. soweit sie eine Beschäftigung oder eine selbstständige Tätigkeit nicht voraussetzen, filr alle Personen, die ihren 
Wohnsitz oder gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt im Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzbuchs haben".
principle of lex loci laboris, however, comes before residence in Germany, which means that where 
a person works in Germany, but lives abroad that person will still be entitled to certain social 
benefits in German)'. Where the person lives in Germany, but works abroad, he/she w ill be covered 
by the social legislation of the state of work. It is only w hen a person resides in Germany but is 
unemployed, that one can be covered by German social insurance, w ithout a w ork position (Schaaf 
1999, p. 275).
The table below' compares the different organising and demarcating principles of the Danish and 
German welfare state.
T able 6: O rg a n is in g  Principles o f a n d  B o u n d aries  fo r W elfare
)e n m a rk G erm any
Citizenship or residence 
Lex Loci Domicili
Labour market related contributions 
Lex Loci Laboris
Principle o f social citizenship 
Principle o f territoriality
Market citizen 
Principle of territoriality
Taxation Income, earning related contributions
Exemplified by pension; guarantee the 
basic income of citizens in old age
Exemplified by pension: maintenance 
o f living standard
Primarily interpersonal Primarily intertemporal
The organising principles and boundaries o f w elfare find their concrete expression in contemporary 
social security schemes. The section below depicts some relevant features for the social security 
schemes of old age, public health care, long term care and family benefits in Denmark and German) 1 
respectively. These schemes' encounters with Community law and policy will be analysed in the 
subsequent chapter.
3.0: F o u r  Contem porary Welfare Institutions
Welfare models and their general organising principles have their concrete expressions in 
contemporary schemes. Typologies and principles, explained by history, are operationalised in 
concrete, contemporary institutions, in which beneficiaries, financial form, granting conditions and 
Dther defining characteristics are specified.
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This section describes the contemporary schemes of statutoiy pension, public health care, long term 
care and family benefits as prov ided for by legislation in the Danish and German welfare state, in 
the year 2000.24° In general, the schemes reflect their historical trajectory and persistent patterns, 
but they also illustrate how politics have responded to more recently posed social questions, which 
hav e been either met by institutional consistency or change, as exemplified by long term care and 
family policy.
3.1: Statutory Pension
All Danish nationals, as well as EU citizens covered by Regulation 1408/71, who have resided in 
Denmark more than three years, are eligible for the statutory retirement pension (folkcpcnsion) .240 41 
Foreigners from third countries are eligible for the public pension after 10 years of residence. The 
minimum residence period to access the right to ‘folkepcnsion' thus discriminates between 
nationals and persons covered by Regulation 1408 on the one hand, and third country nationals on 
the other. Close to 100% of all persons who arc 65 years or older, residing in Denmark, receive a 
public old age pension (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2000, p. 25). The pension is entirely tax 
financed. To be granted a full pension, the pensioner must have resided 40 years in Denmark 
between the age of 15 and 65 (67).242 The scheme is a universal and purely residence-based scheme. 
The criterion for access to the scheme is residence and the pension is also calculated on the basis of
240 Where nothing else is referred to, the following figures and contrasts are drawn from the comparative work of the 
European Commission, General Directorate o f Employment and Social Affairs, as printed in “MISSOC 2000 -  Social 
protection in the EU Member States and the European Economic Area, Situation of 1 January 2000" and “Your social 
security rights when moving within the European Union" 2002 update.
211 In addition to the national public pension, Denmark has a statutory labour market related supplementary pension 
(ATP-pension), which entered into force in 1964. The supplementary pension covers all persons between 16 and 66 
years of age, who are employed in Denmark. The supplementary scheme is financed out o f contributions. The 
contributions are, however, not very high, but did in 2000 (MISSOC) amount to DKK 223,25 (EUR 30) monthly, of 
which the employee paid 1/3 and the employer 2/3.
242 The retirement age has been changed in Denmark. Persons w hose 60* birthday falls on or after 1 July 1999 will be 
entitled to pension at 65. For others, the age of retirement remains 67. Besides the basic amount o f the public pension, 
the pensioner is entitled to a pension supplement. The pension supplement is, however, granted dependent on income. A 
maximum statutory pension thus consists of the basic amount, the pension supplement and the supplementary pension. 
In 2000 (MISSOC), a maximum statutoiy pension would after 40 years of residence in Denmark make the basic pension 
amount 49 560 DKK (EUR 6667,65) a year, the pension supplement 22 536 DKK (EUR 3031,93) without other income 
sources, and the supplementary pension, if insured by the ATP scheme since it came into existence in 1964 and w orking 
full time since then, would be of 18 972 DKK (EUR 2552,44).
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residence periods.243 The national public pension is fully liable to taxation in the same way as 
wages. However, to be or have been a tax-payer is not a requirement to be eligible for pension.244
The statutory retirement pension (die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung) is the biggest individual 
social security scheme in Germany, under which employees and certain groups of self-employed are 
compulsory insured.245 The scheme is financed from contributions paid by employees and the 
employers and from state subsidies.246 The minimum qualifying period for membership before 
entitlement to benefits is 5 years. The pension amount will depend on the amount of social security 
contributions that the member has paid throughout his insurance life, and the equivalence between 
contributions and benefits is relatively high. The actual income in old age thus varies considerably 
from person to person. In principle, the pension benefits arc partially taxed, but often income tax is 
not paid because the taxable amount docs not exceed the tax-free minimum income level.
!4i For each year, the resident earns a 1/40 fraction pension.
~u The Danish public pension scheme exerts interpersonal redistribution. The replacement rate o f the public pension for 
high income groups is relatively low in Denmark being 42%, whereas it for low -income groups is 70%. The situation is 
vice versa in Germany, where tire replacement rate for tire public pension is 81% for high-income groups and 70% for 
low-income groups (Ministry of Economic AtTairs 2000, p. 26).
In 1998, the statutory retirement pension had 43,4 Mio. compulsory insured members (Lampert & Allhammer 2001, 
p. 257). Besides the compulsory insured, tire insurance scheme counts voluntarily insured members. Employees who 
work less than 15 hours a week and have a monthly earning of less than DEM 630 (EUR 322) are exempted from the 
compulsory insurance. High income groups are exempted from compulsory insurance as well. The contribution ceiling 
was, in 2000, a monthlv earning of 8600 DEM (EUR 4397) in tire old Länder, and 7100 DEM (EUR 3630) in the new 
Länder (MISSOC 2000).
*4t> The contribution in 2000 was 19,30% o f the wage from which the employee and the employer each paid 9,65% up to 
a certain ceiling fixed each year, which year 2000 amounted DEM 8600 (EUR 4397,11) ("Your Social Security Rights 
When Moving Within The European Union”, Update 2002).
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T able 7: O rg an is in g  Principle fo r  S ta tu to ry  Pension
Denmark Germany
Beneficiaries Persons who have resided a defined set of 
years in Denmark
Compulsory insurance for employees and self- 
employed. Dependants. Voluntarily insured
Financing Tax-financed Contributions and state subsidy
Conditions Danish citizens and persons covered by 1408: 
3 years of residence
Third country nationals: 10 years of residence
5 years of insurance
Taxation Liable to taxation Partially taxed
Other Basic pension: Not income graduated 
Pension supplement: Income graduated 
Pension entitlement does not depend on 
previous or contemporary status as taxpayer
Not income graduated. Relatively high 
equivalence betw een contribution paid and benefit 
received
3.2: Public Health  Care
All persons, who have resided 6  weeks in Denmark, are entitled to the benefits provided by the 
public health service. Denmark has two categories of health coverage. The insured person chooses 
if he wants to belong to group 1, under which he is entitled to free medical care, but only from an 
assigned doctor, or from a specialist assigned by the generalist. If the person wants to belong to 
group 2, he chooses the doctor and specialist freely, but has to pay a part of the costs himself. Group
1 is the most popular choice. Only about 1.6% of the residents in Denmark arc insured under group
2 (Interview, the Danish Ministry of Health, 3. April 2001; Danish Report on the Dccker/Kohll 
cases 1999, p. 37). The public health system in Denmark is tax-financed. However, there is no 
requirement to be a tax-payer or employed person in order to benefit from the system, neither are 
there any requirements of insurance periods or contributions.247 Except for sickness and maternity 
benefits, Danish health care is offered as a benefit in kind. Generally, the patient is treated free of 
charge, and the costs for public medical consultation and hospitalisation are paid by the public 
health insurance. If the patient chooses to be treated by a non-approved private establishment, 
she/he generally has to pay all costs. Furthermore, the patient insured in group 2  will pay part of the
2i‘ Also cash sickness benefits are mainly tax-financed, but the employer pays for the two first w eeks of illness.
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expenses, and the insured person in group I pays partially for preventive dental care, for treatment 
by physiotherapist or chiropractor and for pharmaceutical as well as other health care products.248
The public German health care is organised as a compulsory insurance scheme (die gesctzliche 
Krankenversicherung). The compulsorily insured are foremost employed persons with earnings 
below a defined limit, but also includes a wide set of other personal categories.249 Besides the 
persons directly insured, ‘dependent' family members are provided for from the public health 
scheme.250 The scheme docs not cover persons in low paid employment, who work less than 15 
hours a week. Although not a universal scheme, the public health care scheme has a wide coverage. 
Close to 90% of the German residents are covered by the public health insurance.251 Employed 
persons, who earn more than the legally defined income ceiling may join the scheme as voluntarily 
insured, but in general they have to have been compulsory insured members before.252 253*Public health 
insurance is financed out of contributions paid by employee and employer,255 There is no 
requirement of previous periods of work or membership to gain access to the scheme. A main 
characteristic of the German public health care is that services are offered as benefits in kind 
(Neumann-Duesberg 1990, p. 84; Mrozynski 1999, p. 222). In general, the insured person docs not 
pay fees for medical treatment, neither that given by a doctor nor by hospitalisation, except for a
248 The persons insured in group 2 pays the part o f  the costs, which exceeds the amount fixed by the public scheme for 
group 1. Prosthesis, spectacles and hearing aids are among the other health care products for which the insured person 
in group 1 pays a part.
244 Among other personal groups, the scheme counts persons in vocational training, unemployed persons receiving 
unemployment benefit, students of recognised higher education, pensioners with a sufficient period o f  insurance, 
trainees in vocational rehabilitation, fanners, handicapped persons in sheltered employment as well as artists and 
writers.
250 The rule is that the depending family counts as the spouse and children under 18 years o f age. However, the 
dqx'iidency of the children can be extended up till 23 years, if they are not active on the labour market and till 25, if 
they are in vocational training or studying.
251 In 1999,29.3 Mio. employees and 15.3 Mio. pensioners w ere compulsory health insured. 6.3 Mio. w ere voluntary* 
insured, and 21 Mio. were covered as dependent family members (Lamport & Althammcr 2001, p. 238). That is all 
together 71.9 Mio. persons out of a total population o f 82 Mio. Besides the 90% o f German residents covered by the 
public health scheme, 7-8% are covered by private insurance. Hie remaining part of 2-3% have no cover at all 
(Interview , Deutsche Verbindungsstelle, 18. September 2001).
2' : If annual earning is beyond DEM 77 400 (EUR 39574) in the old Länder and 63 900 DEM (EUR 32572) in tire new 
Länder, the person is exempted from compulsory insurance, but may join on a voluntary basis (MISSOC 2000).
253 The contribution varies according to the concerned insurance, but w as, in 2000, on average 13% of the wage up to a
certain limit fixed each year (DEM 6450 (EUR 3297,83) per month in 2000). H alf of tire contribution is paid by the
employer (“Your Social Security Rights When Moving Within The European Union”, Update 2002).
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partial payment for physiotherapy, denture, pharmaceuticals and a small fee for hospitalisation, 
calculated per day o f stay.254 Although a main organising principle for the public health system is 
benefits in kind, legislative change in 1997 made it possible for the sickness funds to introduce cost 
reimbursement for services, instead of the general principle of offering benefits in kind (Lampert & 
Althammer 2 0 0 1 , p. 253, die Sozialgesetzbuch V, § 64)255 The principle of cost reimbursement for 
insured persons, who first pay for a medical consultation, treatment or purchase, is known from the 
health insurance systems of Luxembourg, France and Belgium, as well as private health insurance 
in Germany (Langer 1999, pp. 257-258).
Table 8: O rgan ising  Principle» fo r  P ublic  H ea lth  Care
Denmark Germany
Beneficiaries All residents Close to 90% of German residents
Financing Tax-financed Contributions
Conditions 6 w eeks of residence No period of w ork or membership required
Characteristic Sen ices offered as benefits in kind Services offered as benefits in kind
Other Group 1 insured: General free medical care, 
restricted choice o f doctor and specialist 
Group 2 insured: Parts of the treatment costs paid 
by the insured, free choice o f doctor and specialist
In general, no fees paid by the beneficiary for 
services
3.3: Long Term Care
Danish long term care is provided as a social assistance benefit in kind. Long term care such as 
house-hold assistance or residence in public residential homes for elderly persons arc tax-financed 
social sen ices, for which the beneficiary pays no contribution. All residents in Denmark in need of 
long-term care are entitled to the assistance (Schultz 1998. p. 100). The benefit in kind is thus a 
subjective right granted on the basis of a discretionary medical assessment of need. Long term care 
is regulated as part of the law on social seniccs. The law grants a wide set of sen ices, which 
traditionally have been regarded as social assistance. Among the senices arc; benefits to parents
3M The partial tee for hospitalisation per day of stay is up to a maximum of 14 days {M1SSOC 2000).
One aim of the legislative change, adopted in June 1997, w as greater self-administration for the sickness fund: "Erste 
und zweite Gesetz zur Neuordnung von Selbstverwaltung und Eigenverantwortung in der gesetzlichen 
Krankenversicherung".
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who chose private child care256; parental leave benefits257; compensation for loss of income in order 
to care for a handicapped child258; sickness care contributions259; compensation for additional 
expenditures caused by sickness or invalidity260; compensation for the loss of income due to caring 
for dying relatives261. These benefits represent alternatives to traditional public services., offered as 
benefits in kind by public institutions. Such social alternatives were introduced in the 1980s. 
originating in the broader policy idea to offer forms of private service supply and to make it 
possible for the beneficiary to choose an alternative to the public supply (Christoffersen 1998, pp. 
14-15).
German long term care insurance (Pflcgcversicherung) was introduced in 1995 as the fifth social 
security pillar, added to the four constitutive ones of pension, sickness, accident and unemployment 
insurance. Long term care had been politically debated for decades in Germany, with increased 
intensity (Igl & Stadelmann 1998, p. 37). The organisation of long term care became a political and 
administrative theme from the 1970s and onwards, due to the very high costs of long term care and 
the question of its financing. Before 1995, long term care was financed in two ways, cither out of 
personal income or savings, or granted as social assistance on the basis of a means-test. It was 
politically agreed that both financial forms were insufficient, and a political solution was thus 
sought. Furthermore, the long term care problem was intensified by increased life-expectancy 
(Lampert & Althammcr 2 0 0 1 , pp. 284-285).262 The demographic perspective and financial 
problems thus called for a long term political solution in Germany, and the decade-long political 
discussion centred on how long temi care should be supplied and financed. The options proposed 
ranged from a private insurance, a public service financed out of tax-revenue, or a long term care 
insurance (Lampert & Althammer 2001. ibid.). In May 1994. the long term care insurance was
Law on Social Services §§ 26,26a.
2,7 Law on Social Services §§ 27,27a.
258 Law on Social Services § 29.
Law on Social Services §§ 76,77.
2(10 Law on Social Services § 84.
2M Law on Social Services §§ 104-106.
2l': The German population over 60 years of age was 15% in 1950, in 1990 20%, in 1995 21%, and in 2040 it is 
expected to be 35% (Lampert & Althammer 2001, pp. 284-285).
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decided upon as an independent social security scheme. Established traditions of the social 
insurance welfare state were thereby continued (Igl & Stadelmann 1998. p. 38)263 The SPD, which 
was able to block its adoption in the Bundesrat, initially favoured a tax funded solution, entitling all 
residents to the benefit, but finally agreed, after negotiations, on the compromise of a separate long 
term care insurance (Clasen 1997, p. 77). Long term care in Germany thus became a compulsory’ 
insurance scheme, where the persons insured in the compulsory health insurance became obligatory 
members of the long term care scheme, i.e. around 90% of the German residents (Lamport & 
Althammer 2001, p. 287). The financial form is contributions, with half paid by both employee and 
employer.264 The qualification for entitlements is an insurance period of at least 5 years. The main 
forms of long term care benefits are basic nursing and household assistance by non-residential care 
institutions, nursing allowances, and partial or full residential care in a care institution. Services are, 
however, not necessarily offered in kind, but may be granted as cash-benefit, after which the 
insured person has to pursue the preferred form of caring and pay for it him/herself.265 This long 
term care benefit is named “Pflegegcld" and its exportability7 has been questioned before the ECJ in 
the case of Molenaar, as examined in chapter V section 1.4.
:M The “Pflegeversicherungsgesctz'” was decided the 26th Mav 1994, and formulated in its own “Sozialgcsetzbuch" no. 
XI.
The contribution in 2000 was 1.7% of the wage from which the employee and the employer each paid 0.85% 
(MISSOC 2000). The contribution ceiling is the same as for health insurance.
' 6i The benefit amount depends on the degree to which the person needs care and on whether it is provided by a nursing 
home or by a person, chosen by the person in need of care. The amount in 1999 ranged from approximately 400 DEM 
(EUR 205) pr. month to 2800 DEM (EUR 1432) per month (MISSOC 2(X)0, internet edition; 
hup: //europa. eu. int/comm/employ ment_sociaPsoc-prot/mi ssoc99/english/f_main.htm).
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Tabic 9: O rg an isin g  Principles fo r L ong T e rm  C are
D enm ark G erm an y
Beneficiaries Residents in Denmark in the need of long-term Compulsory insurance lor the members of the
care public health insurance
Financing Tax-tinanced Contributions
C onditions Granted on basis of a discretionary medical 
assessment oflong-term care need
5 years o f insurance
O ther Social assistance benefit in kind May be granted as benefit in cash, whereby the 
insured person purchases the preferred form o f  
long term care.
3.4: Fam ily Benefits
The Danish child benefit (bomefamilieydelse) is paid to parents with children under 18 years. The 
family allowance is tax-financed. The general condition for entitlement is that the child must reside 
in Denmark, and the person w ith custody must be fully liable to taxation in Denmark. Additionally, 
to receive child allowance (bometilskud), the child or the parent must be a Danish citizen or have 
been ordinarily residing in Denmark.266 The citizenship or residence condition is, however, waived 
if the parent is a national of another EU member state, but employed in Denmark. If the child 
resides in another member state, but the parent w-orks in Denmark, the entitlement to Danish child 
benefit is maintained.267 The child allowance is not subject to taxation, neither is it income 
graduated.268 However, family benefits exemplify positive discrimination, where the single parent 
and parents who arc pensioners are granted a supplementary allowance.
Family benefits are granted in Germany either as a child benefit (Kindergcld) or as a child raising 
allowance (Erzichungsgeld). In contrast to German social securin’ schemes in general, family 
benefits are universally granted and are not conditioned by previous contribution. The scheme is
The residence period for entitlement is one year to receive the ordinary' child allowance, and three years to receive 
tile special children's allowance.
:t> However, if the other parent works in the member state where the child lives, child benefits should primarily be 
granted from the state o f residence.
268 In 2000 (MISSOC), the monthly amount for each child was 975 DKK (EUR 131) for children between 0-3 years, 
883 DKK (EUR 119) for children between 3-7 years, and 700 DKK (EUR 94) for children between 7-18 years.
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tax-financed. Family allowances are granted from the 1st child to parents residing in Germany, or 
possibly to parents residing in another EU state, but who pay tax in Germany. The parents normally 
receive child benefits until the child is 18 years old.269 German child benefits arc not taxed and arc 
furthermore granted independently of income.270 The other family benefit, child raising allowance, 
is granted upon the condition that the parent docs not work more than 19 hours a week. The paid 
amount depends on the family income.271
Table 10: O rgan ising  Principles fo r  Fam ily  Benefits
D enm ark G erm any
Beneficiaries Parents with children under 18 residing in 
Denmark, or parents paying tax or working in 
Denmark
Parents residing in or paying tax to Germany
Financing Tax-financed Tax-financed
Conditions Child must be a Danish citizen or the parent. Or 
they must have habitual residence in Denmark. 
These conditions are waived for the personal 
scope of 1408/71
Child benefit: granted to parents residing in 
Germany or liable to taxation in Germany with 
children under 18 years o f age 
Child raising allowance: Parent working less than 
19 hours a week. The child is wider 2 years of age
O ther Granted independently of income Child-benefit: Granted independently of income 
Child-raising allowance: Income dependent
3.5: Adaptive Pressures on Contem porary Schem es
Statutory pension and public health care were schemes adopted as the constitutive pillars of the 
welfare state. Since then, their organising principles have been reformulated, clarified and 
confirmed. From the period of their origins, pension and health care have shaped and expressed the 
welfare identities of the two states. The two Danish schemes no longer exclusively favour low- 
income groups, but are now universally inclusive, according to long-term or short-term residence
The age limit is, how ever, prolonged to 21, if  the child is unemployed. If the child is in vocational training or takes 
up further education, the age limit is extended to 27. For handicapped children, there is no age limit.
270 The monthly child benefit allowance for 2000 (MISSOC) was for the first and the second child 270 DEM (EUR 
138), for the third child 300 DEM (EUR 153), and for the fourth and subsequent children 350 DEM (EUR 179).
r i  The maximum child-raising allowance is 600 DEM (EUR 307) a month. The amount is granted for a maximum of 
two years after the child's birth.
criteria. The two German schemes remain exclusive, and do not include the entire population, but 
the exclusivity has been minimised, and the beneficiary is no longer only the 'market citizen'. The 
financial forms o f the two schemes have been clarified over the years, and in the Danish case it has 
been confirmed that tax-financing is the general principle of the Danish model.
The younger schemes of long term care and family benefit are examples of the formulation of new 
social questions and the responsibilities that have been undertaken to respond to them, and mark the 
welfare state as a responsive entity. The two later social policies were adopted when the 
institutional setting of the general models was in place, thus having institutional points o f emulation 
from which to evolve. The Danish schemes stick largely to the tradition, however, making long 
term care subject to discretionary medical assessment. The adoption of long term care insurance in 
Germany shows how new social questions can be met by the well-known institutional solution, thus 
confirming tradition. On the other hand, the granting of family benefit in Germany has introduced 
flat-rate, tax-financed benefits into the social insurance model, thus blurring the contrast between 
the two welfare typologies.
For more than a century, the general characteristics of the German and Danish welfare state model 
have remained largely intact, defining its members of the social community exclusively, as well as 
the reach of social legislation. European integration, however, challenges the exclusive national 
demarcation of welfare policies. European institutionalisation of social security rights has extended 
the borders of welfare wide beyond the national community, initially entitling the worker 'stricto 
sensu* to intra-European social security, but gradually including new personal categories and 
welfare policies.
Depending on the principles and criteria of national social security schemes, supranational 
institutionalisation means more or less adaptive pressure. Those welfare schemes based on social 
citizenship have experienced adaptive pressure against the Community principle of equality. 
Equally, those institutions demarcating rights by territoriality are, in principle, incompatible with 
European obligations. Furthermore, the financing principles behind a scheme become decisive for 
the extent of adaptive pressure. Those schemes financed in part by contributions are more 
compatible with the individualised principles of the coordination system, which promotes mobility. 
Whether adaptive pressure results in a corresponding adaptive response and whether impact
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diverges for the Danish and German welfare state as a result of diverging adaptive pressure will be 
analysed in chapter VII.
However, before that, an analysis of the EU related immigration into Denmark and Germany will be 
carried out. In the end, the de facto adaptive pressure on the Danish and German welfare will 
depend on how many persons exercise their European right to free movement and become migrants 
on foreign territory.
4.0: Adaptive Pressure Expressed as Actual Migration
Eurostat data on EU-immigration to Denmark and German}- provide us with a numerical insight 
into how many persons from other member states have resided in the two member states between 
1985-2000. Concerning Denmark, table 11 below tells us that in absolute figures, and as a 
percentage of the population, EU-immigration to Denmark has remained low. That is compared 
with third country nationals residing in Denmark and with intra European migration in general, as 
was discussed in chapter III, section 3.3. Whereas intra-European migration in general between 
1985 and 1998 was 1.5% to 1.6 % of the entire Community population, Denmark only hosted 0.71% 
to 1.01% EU immigrants as a percentage o f the Danish population between 1985 to 2000.
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Table 11: EU-Immigrants and Third Country Nationals Residing in Denmark and Germany
D e n m ark  ____  ______________  G erm any
E U -na t272 % 273 TC N 274 % 275 E U -nat176 % 277 T C N 278 •z. 279
1985 36.244 0,71% 71.482 1,40% 1.576.600 2,03% 2.787.300 3,59%
1986 36.509 0,71% 80.440 1,57% 1.549.600 2 ,0 0 % 2.828.900 3,64%
1987 37.583 0,73% 90.670 1,77% 1.560.300 2 ,0 1% 2.952.000 3,80%
1988 37.817 0,74% 98.360 1,92% 1.408.571 1,81% 2.831.961 3,64%
1989 37.381 0,73% 104.635 2,04% 1.449.706 1,85% 3.039.399 3,88%
1990 37.476 0,73% 113.168 2 ,20% 1.516.842 1,92% 3.329.040 4,21%
1991 38.403 0,75% 122.238 2,38% 1.644.800 2,06% 3.697 700 4,64%
1992 39.189 0,76% 130.336 2,52% 1.698.800 2 ,12% 4.183.500 5,21%
1993 40,529 0,78% 139.574 2,69% 1.719.200 2 ,12% 4.776.600 5,90%
1994 42.391 0,82% 146.623 2,82% 1.750.211 2,15% 5.127.906 6,30%
1995 44.610 0 ,8 6 % 152.095 2,92% 1.779.854 2,18% 5.210.656 6,39%
1996 46.531 0,89% 176.222 3,36% 1.811.748 2 ,2 1% 5.362.118 6,55%
1997 48.946 0,93% 188.700 3,58% 1.839.700 2,24% 5.474.300 6,67%
1998 51.224 0,97% 198.349 3,75% 1.850.032 2,25% 5.515.801 6,72%
1999 53.195 1,0 0% 203.081 3,82% 1.854.321 2,26% 5.465.272 6,66%
2000 53.822 1,0 1 % 205.535 3.86% 1.858.672 2,26% 5.484.919 6.68%
However, in absolute figures, as well as in percentages o f the population, there has been an almost 
steady growth in EU-related immigration to Denmark, as is seen in graph 7 below. The graph 
compares EU-immigration to Denmark and Germany respectively as a % of the total population.
* ' Nationals from other EU member states residing in Denmark. 
rJ  Nationals from other EU member states residing in Denmark as a %  of the total population residing in Denmark. 
: 1 Third country nationals residing in Denmark.
375 Third country nationals residing in Denmark as a % of the total population residing in Denmark.
: 6 Nationals from other EU member states residing in Germany.
37' Nationals from other EU member states residing in Germany as a %  of the total population residing in Germany, 
3 8 Third country nationals residing in Germany.
279 Third country nationals residing in Germany as a % of the total population residing in Germany.
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Graph 7: EU-immigration as a % of the total population to Denmark and Germany 1985-2000
Germany (G) Denmark (D)
Table 11 and the graph above depict a relative higher EU-immigration to Germany than to 
Denmark. In 1985, Germany hosted 2.03% EU-immigrants of the total population. That had 
increased to 2.26% in 2000. Although higher than on average in the EU and although more than 
twice as high as EU-relatcd immigration to Denmark, it could be argued that the number of EU- 
immigrants in German}’ is low compared with immigrants from third countries.
The table and graph above clarify- that, from a comparative point of view, EU-immigration to 
Denmark remained low up till 2000. On a North-South divide, both Denmark and Germany 
represent richer northern member states, which for this reason alone, is held to attract immigrants. 
The aggregated data docs not distinguish between the various personal categories under Regulation 
1408 and it is therefore not possible, on basis of the data provided, to estimate how many citizens 
from other member states benefit - and in which way - from the social security' sy stems of their 
new member state of residence. However, on the basis alone of the low number of EU-immigrants. 
the hypothesis of ‘welfare tourism* should be refuted. Contemporary migration figures do not 
support that there should be a de facto adaptive pressure on the Danish and German welfare state. 
Furthermore, contrary to the assumption of hypothesis H4 stated in section 1.2 above, EU- 
immigration figures point to higher de facto migratory pressures on the insurance based welfare 
state, than on the residence based one. Should the residence based welfare state face a relatively
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Fhigher adaptational pressure, it must be on the institutional component, as will be examined in 
chapter VII.
5.0; C oncluding Remarks
Defined as the degree of compatibility/incompatibility (TitV'misfiO between the principles and 
obligations of the supranational institutionalisation of social security rights and those of national 
welfare institutions, it is clear that the Danish and German member state face different adaptive 
pressure. It is equally clear that adaptive pressure diverges depending on which principle or specific 
institution we consider.
In a historical light, there is a fundamental incompatibility between the European institution and the 
national ones. The former aims to coordinate social responsibilities across national societies, the 
latter historically aimed to fortify national belongings.
Considered on an institutional account, the demarcating welfare principles of both the residence 
based and the insurance based welfare model face adaptive pressure from the European 
institutionalisation process. However, the principles and criteria o f the residence-based welfare state 
lead us to assume that it faces a relatively stronger adaptive pressure. Hypothesis H4 furthermore 
advances that such adaptive pressure will lead to a corresponding stronger impact.
For the residence based welfare state, the above identification of the principles and criteria of 
individual social security’ institutions points to an incompatibility between the national principles of 
social citizenship and territoriality and the Community’ principles of equal treatment and 
exportability. National principles are mirrored in the welfare typology, in its historical reasoning, as 
well as in contemporary social security schemes. In addition, a coordination system, where rights 
were thought to follow' the individual on the basis of work position, appears to be incompatible with 
a national welfare system, w here rights arc granted universally independent of work position, and 
financed by taxation. The residence based model does not require that the beneficiary also 
contributes, but relies on the stability of the social community* and on a strong element of 
interpersonal redistribution, where unproductive periods of the individual arc compensated by later
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productive periods or - in case they are not - by those of other community members. On the face of 
it. the reliance on a stable, and defined, community is incompatible with the idea of mobility.
However, from the identification of the principles and criteria of the insurance-based welfare state, 
it is clear that this social security- model is not necessarily a more compatible way to organise 
national welfare. The model equally faces adaptive pressures from supranational institutionalisation. 
First of all, it demarcates rights according to the principle of territoriality-. In addition, it has 
likewise institutionalised universally granted, tax-financed social benefits. Furthermore, although 
the majority- of social security institutions have contribution as the fundamental criteria for 
entitlement, such schemes also contain an element of interpersonal redistributions and are thus not 
purely individualised social insurance schemes. Contributions may not equal benefits. Therefore, 
although the model docs not have social citizenship as a demarcating principle, it still relies on long 
term contributors, which mobility and mobilised welfare in principle challenge.
Finally, when we consider de facto EU-immigration into Denmark and Germany respectively, 
Denmark stands out as a member state which, in fact, attracts relatively little EU-immigration. 
Whereas the residence based w-elfare state may face a somewhat stronger institutional adaptive 
pressure, it docs not do so in de facto terms. In the end, actual EU-immigration should decide 
national responses to and the impact of intra-European institutionalisation of social security rights. 
That will be addressed in the analysis offered in the next chapter on the second lay-cr of 
institutionalisation. The analysis will describe in detail how impact has been perceived, national 
competences defended, judicial impact initially denied, but gradually admitted. The second layer of 
institutionalisation is another process of subtle steps, how ever, one which unfolds more discretely, 
less systematically and perhaps even more time-dcpcndently than the supranational one.
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Chapter VII: Response to and Domestic Impacts of 
Intra-European Social Security Rights
The present chapter continues the analysis of the domestic impact of the supranational 
institutionalisation of social security rights. In this part, on the second layer of institutionalisation, 
the analysis focuses on the national response to and impact o f  established intra-European social 
security rights.
The chapter aims to explore how those established cross-border welfare rights become concrete 
enforceable ones through the process of national implementation, and how they have aflccicd 
national institutions. As with the analysis, which has been conducted on the supranational 
integration process, a diachronic analysis will be carried out. on the assumption that impact may not 
reveal itself immediately and that perceptions of impact, which decide national response, may 
change gradually. The following findings on domestic impact will indeed point out that to study 
integration as a two layered process, is to study the interplay between two dynamic processes, 
w hich make it difficult, if not impossible, to deduce any simple cause -  effect relations. Impact may 
occur with decades of delay, and it may vary strongly between member states, despite having the 
same cause. Impact may appear more discrete and less systematic in some member states than in 
others, however, still taking place, but depending much on the national response. This more discrete 
impact is more difficult to identify and may therefore tend to evade our analytical and theoretical 
attention.
As on adaptive pressure, the member states o f Denmark and Germany have responded differently to 
supranational institutionalisation, as it has impacted differently on the social security institutions of 
the two countries.
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The definition and identification of adaptive pressure in chapter VI lead us to expect that 
supranational institutionalisation has had a stronger impact on the residence-based welfare state, 
since its welfare institutions arc less compatible with the principles and criteria of the Community 
Regulation. This is furthermore the essence of hypothesis H4, which advances that a relative 
stronger adaptive pressure on the residence-based member state will lead to a correspondingly 
stronger and perhaps converging impact. Hi supports H4 from a theoretical point of view, as both 
assume that supranational institutionalisation will cause a greater uniformity in national policies. H2 
assumes the contrary. National strategic response will neutralise the effects of the adaptive pressure. 
Finally, H3 hypothesises that since the effective meaning of an institution is established through 
national implementation, it will be performed as much in line with national institutions as possible.
The following analysis will demonstrate that the compatibility between national institutions and the 
European one does not alone decide impact, but, in the same way, nor docs national response. 
However, the analysis will also demonstrate that national response varies significantly across 
member states, and over time. Thus, the same cause impacts differently across member states, their 
institutions and at different points of time.
The analysis is divided into three main sections. The first section analyses how perceptions of 
impact, and thus political responses, may’ change fundamentally over time and as supranational 
institutionalisation proceeds. The section concerns the case of Denmark. The analysis is based on a 
detailed study of, primarily, the Danish government's documents to the Danish Parliament's 
European Affairs Committee, and substantiates the argument that over time Denmark has changed 
position from being the actor in defence of the status quo to gradually accepting intra-European 
social security rights as a substantive part of European citizenship. The second section continues the 
analysis of the Danish case. It investigates how political- and judicial decision-making over time 
have impacted on the four w elfare institutions of statutory pension, family benefits, long term care 
and health care. As in chapter V, special attention will be paid to the impact on health care. For all 
four national institutions, impact is identifiable, but it generally appears with a certain delay and 
less systematically than what would be expected from a straightforward cause-effect relationship. In 
between ‘cause' and ‘effect*, national actors translate the effective meaning of the institutions and 
transpose supranational decision-making in accordance therewith. The third section then turns to
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Germany. Here, the analytical results are puzzling on the face of it. Whereas the institutional 
features of the German welfare state apparently are compatible with the main principles of the 
coordination system, Germany is the member state which has had the second highest number of 
lawsuits before the European Court o f Justice, regarding Regulation 1408 (see chapter II, section 
4.5). Germany has, in contrast to Denmark, tested and questioned the scope and impact of the 
institution by preliminary references, and impact has thus appeared as direct legal injunctions. The 
legal confrontation has produced a large set of cases, in w hich national policies have been ruled to 
contradict supranational law. The domestic impact on the four German welfare institutions of 
statutory pension. family benefits, long term care and health care will be examined in turn. In the 
concluding remarks of the chapter, the analytical results are summed up and considered against the 
four hypothesis set up in chapter VI.
1.0: Perceptions o f Im pact
European institutionalisation of social security rights stands out as a remarkable example of hcnv 
Danish welfare became accessible for workers and citizens from other EU member states and how- 
emigrants from Denmark came to preserve acquired rights and access other member states' social 
security schemes. That is, of course the case only for those who enjoy the underlying right of free 
movement; those who, due to the Danish exemption from the Treaty's title IV, possess Community 
nationality, and those w ho fulfil certain requirements as formulated in national law. And it could of 
course be questioned what exactly ‘Europe* adds, since bilateral agreements also make a certain 
accessibility possible, irrespective of the EU.280 The answer thereto is that ‘Europe* over time has 
added a supranational dimension to social security-, which most presumably would never have been 
established and reinforced without the European polity. The concrete impact of bilateral agreements 
and a supranational right dimension can hardly be compared. The content of the former is decided
■80 Before and after Denmark joined the European Community, it has concluded various international social security 
agreements: • BKI no. 47 of 22/11/1952 Demnark-France, Paris 30 June 1951. • BKI no. 44 of 7/10/1954 Denmark- 
Germany, Copenhagen 14 August 1953. • BKI no. 37 o f 28/6/1958, additional protocol to the agreement with France. • 
BKI no. 14 o f 2/3/1960 Denmark-United Kingdom, 27 August 1959. • BKI no. 44 of 30/6/1978 Dcnmark-Tuikey, 22 
January 1976. • BKI no. 76 of 12/6/1979 Denmark-Turkey, amendments to the agreement o f 22 January 1976. • BKI 
no. 87 of 9/71979 Denmark-Yugoslavia, 22 June 1977. • BKI no. 75 of 19/8/1983 Denmark-Pakistan, 1 March 1982. • 
BKI no. 18 of 6/3/1984 Denmark-Switzcrland, 5 January 1983. • BKI no. 107 o f 11/11/1986 Deimiark-Canada, 12 April 
1985. • BKI no. 87 of 22/8/1988 Dcnmark-Austria, 16 June 1987. • BKI no. 99 of 14/9/1989 Denmark-Quebec, 13 
November 1987. • BKI no. 83 of 8/9/1994 Denmark, Finland, Island, Norway and Sweden, joining of Greenland and 
the Faeroe Islands, 15 June 1992. • BKI no. 84 o f 8/9/1994 Administrative Agreement to the Nordic Social Security 
Agreement, 18 August 1993. • BKI no. 147 of 30/11/1995 Denmark-Chile, 8 March 1995.
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by the national interests and the respective relationship of two partners. The content of the latter is, 
on the other hand, decided in a multilateral context, which despite unanimity is likely to dissolve the 
purely national interest or the perception thereof. Furthermore, in the EU context, the Commission 
and the Court are supranational bodies w ho guard the rights of the European migrant against the 
national interests of the member state. The analysis in Chapter IV and V has proven that the 
activism of the two supranational organisations has had a fundamental impact on the scope, content 
and enforceability of intra-European social security rights.
For such reasons, European coordination of social security rights has a tremendous impact for a 
person migrating into or outside the Danish territory. The accessibility and preservation of rights are 
not decided by national law alone.
This section first depicts the EU-citizens granted access to Danish welfare qua Regulation 1408. 
The analysis then turns to a detailed examination of the Danish national response towards 
supranational institutionalisation of social security rights, highlighting how perceptions of impact 
have changed gradually over time and therewith the Danish bargaining position in the Council. The 
analysis of Danish perception will be conducted chronically so as to explore change over time. The 
examination is divided in six successive sections.
Denmark has indeed responded reluctantly towards further integration, claiming the exposed nature 
of Danish welfare. It remains the awkward partner, outside the recently adopted agreement to 
include third country nationals in the personal scope. However, towards other personal groups, the 
more dramatic perceptions of impact have been played down, allowing a more ‘European* and 
constructive bargaining position.
1.1: EU-Citizens Entitled to  Danish W elfare
Due to its universality, Danish social security legislation docs not define employed or self- 
employed persons in order to describe those w ho are entitled. Therefore, regarding 1408/71, Danish 
authorities have defined employed and self-employed persons in annex 1 of the Regulation. Any 
person, who is covered by the supplementary pension scheme (ATP) is defined as an employed 
person. The self-employed person is covered by the law on cash benefits by sickness or maternity 
(Den Sociale Sikringsstyrclse, haefte 1, pp. 23-24). The definition of ‘employed person* has not
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been static. In 1977, it was narrowed from including those covered by the legislation on accidents at 
work and occupational diseases to those covered by the ATP scheme (Interview, the Danish 
Ministry of Social Affairs, 5 April 2001).
However, in 1997 the Danish Social Appeal Authorin', ‘Den Socialc Ankelstyrelse’, widened the 
scope of the definition of who qualifies as an ‘employed’ person. Before 1996, the national practice 
was that one had to have been insured under the ATP scheme for at least one year to qualify as an 
employed person. In the national case SM P-11-97, the Social Appeal Authorin’ laid down that the 
condition of at least one year o f ATP insurance constituted discrimination against citizens from 
other member states, since Danish citizens did not have to meet the same condition. The Social 
Appeal Authorin’ thus interpreted and strengthened Regulation 1408/71 ‘s principle of equal 
treatment in relation to national law. The interpretation exemplifies how the European obligation 
becomes manifest through the interpretation of a national authorin’, however with a time-lag of 
about two decades:
“Thus, it was a sufficient basis for equal treatment with Danish citizens that the applicant had been employed in
Denmark for a period" (SM P-11-97, own translation).
Those who are covered by the personal scope of 1408, and who fulfil the Danish requirements, arc 
granted equal access to a wide range of Danish social securin' benefits; medical care281, hospital 
treatment282, maternity care283, cash benefits for sickness and maternity284, rehabilitation assistance, 
benefits for accidents at work and occupational diseases285, early and standard retirement pension 
including pension by invalidin’286, supplementary pension287, death grants288, unemployment
"Sl Law no. 311 of 9 June 1971 on the public health service.
283 Lawr no. 324 of 19 June 1974 on hospital services.
383 Law' no. 282 o f 7 June 1972 on pregnancy hygiene and childbirth assistance.
284 Law' no. 262 o f 7 June 1972 on daily allowances in cases of sickness or childbirth.
28‘ Law no. 79 of 8 March 1978 on insurance against occupational risks.
28t> Law no 217 o f 16 March 1984 on social pensions.
' 8 Law no. 46 o f 7 March 1964 on supplementary pensions for employed persons.
288 Law no. 311 of 9 June 1971 on the public health service.
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benefits289 and family benefits290 (European Commission “Your Social Security Rights when 
Moving within the European Union”, 2002 update, pp 23-33). In 1986, Denmark published its last 
declaration about which of its social benefits and services were included in 1408‘s material scope. 
The declaration remains the official list of 1408's Danish coverage. The old declaration means that 
it has been disputed w hether Denmark really has an updated list, in line w ith both supranational and 
national developments. According to the list, the Danish law on social services is not part o f 1408's 
material scope, nor is the law on active social policy. From the academic side, it has been argued 
that Denmark tries to evade its Community obligations by only announcing a limited material scope 
(Ketscher 1998, p. 259). The question on the adequate implementation of the material scope will be 
discussed further in the section 2 on domestic impacts below. However, before that, we analyse how 
Denmark has responded to the collective negotiations in the Council on the coordination of social 
security rights. The following analysis of the Danish national response to the incremental 
development of intra-European social security rights demonstrates a national position, which at its 
point of departure forcefully defended the status quo, but which gradually changed both national 
perceptions and preferences.
1.2: Danish National Response
One of the key characteristics, which has defined both the Danish debate on, and its position 
towards the coordination system has been the belief prevalent in political circles, in the 
phenomenon of 'welfare tourism’. The reasoning runs as follows; since Denmark is a residence- 
based welfare state, offering generous social benefits and services without requiring cither 
contributions or tax-payment in return, it is likely to attract 'welfare opportunists'. For that reason, 
Denmark has traditionally met proposals on extending the regulator}' scope of 1408 reluctantly, and 
has defended the status quo. The idea of 'w elfare tourism* remains alive and well, and has recently 
been brought to the fore in relation to enlargement and potential immigration from Eastern Europe 
(Interministerial Report “Danish Social Benefits in the Light of Enlargement”, 11 April 2003; 
Berlingske Tidende, 28 April 2003; DR Nyheder, 15 September 2003; Information, 7 November 
2003; PI Lige Lovligt, 26 November 2003).
Law no. 114 of 24 March 1970 on employment services and unemployment insurance.
m  Law no. 350 o f  4 June 1986 on family allowances and advances on maintenance pensions due to children & law no. 
147 of 19 March 1986 on single payment family pensions.
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Another key characteristic o f the Danish response towards supranational institutionalisation has 
been the absence of preliminary rulings by the European Court of Justice on Danish compliance, as 
requested by national courts. Denmark stands out among its counterparts for being a member state 
with only one preliminary reference291 to the European Court of Justice regarding Regulation 1408 
(see chapter I, section 4.5).292 This was a preliminary ruling, which did not question the core of the 
Regulation, such as its personal or material scope, exportability or equal treatment, but instead 
addressed the application of 1408's Article 93 (l).293 Danish national courts have thus contributed 
very little to enhancing the scope of Community social security law. A detailed examination of why 
Danish national courts have not addressed EU related social security questions to the ECJ falls 
beyond the scope of the present study. It is, however, important to point out that instead o f 
assuming that it mirrors high Danish compliance with the European acquis communautaire, it is 
likely to have to do with various factors such as; the litigiousness of Danish society; that Danish 
lawyers do not plead EU points of law before national courts, which likewise do not refer EU points 
of law before the ECJ; and the fact that Denmark lacks social courts but instead has a Social Appeal 
Authority, which considers the implementation and compatibility of national law and administrative 
practices. Furthermore, Denmark has had no infringement procedures on 1408/71 or its Treaty 
basis.
Against this background, Denmark seems to have concentrated its action on the political scene, 
using the tool of unanimity, but to have subsequently accepted and implemented decision-making, 
to the extent that no infringement procedure or judicial epilogue have been necessary. Nevertheless, 
as the subsequent analysis demonstrates, over time the Danish political response has undergone 
significant change, from being the member state acting in defence of welfare sovereignty to one 
accepting the Commission agenda on extending 1408 to all European citizens and even possibly 
bevond.
^  Case C-128/92,2 June 1994. Deutsche AngesteUten-Krxmkenkasse v Lœrerstandens Brandforsikring G S. ECR 1994, 
Page 1-2259.
2Q2 For the examination of the difference in preliminary rulings and infringement procedures on the basis of Regulation 
1408/71 between the member states, see chapter II, section 4.5.
^  Regulation 1408/7l 's  Article 93 (1) concerns “Rights of institutions responsible for benefits against liable third 
parties’'.
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1.3: In Defence of Status Quo
As far back as 1976, Denmark marked its defensive position on extending the personal scope of 
1408. Denmark expressed its reservations in the case o f Brack294y warning about the consequences 
for the residence-based welfare state, if 1408's personal scope would be enlarged to include the self- 
employed. In its submitted observation, the Danish government drew attention to the fact that the 
legislation of the three new member states differed on important aspects, covering either all persons 
resident in the territory of the competent state or the entire national population irrespective of 
employment. The Danish government found it unacceptable that the Regulation should also apply to 
self-employed persons who had formerly been workers. Such an extension of the personal scope 
would, according to the Danish government;
‘'bring about an unreasonable extension o f the area of application o f the Regulation in that most nationals o f  the
Member States ha\’e been Markers at one time or another" (ECR 1976, p. 1443, emphasis added).
As analysed in chapter IV, the Court extended the meaning of worker and thus overruled the Danish 
viewpoint. In the late 1970s, Denmark continued its reservations on the personal scope. When the 
Commission, in December 1977, proposed that Regulation 1408 be extended to the self-employed, 
the original proposal also entailed non-active persons.295 Denmark strongly opposed such an 
extension and vetoed the proposal for about two years (Interviews, Danish Ministry of Social 
Affairs, 5 April 2001; Danish Permanent Representation, 18 December 2002).
Denmark based its veto-position on the use of the Treaty 's Article 235 as an additional base. The 
governmental documents of that time clearly stated that Denmark found that to include non-active 
persons on the basis of Article 235 would be beyond the competence of the Community and its 
economic aim. Furthermore, the governmental fear was that granting non-active persons access to 
intra-European welfare might have a consequential effect on their residence-rights.296 The early 
Danish stance on the use of Article 235 and thus on the purpose of Regulation 1408 stood out very
: 4^ Case 17/76, 29 September 1976. M. L. E. Brack, m U I o w  ofR. J. Brack v Insurance Officer. ECR 1976, p. 1429. See 
chapter IV, section 2.5 for a more detailed discussion of the Brack case.
!S5 See OJ C 14/9 o f 18 January 1978, proposed to the Council 31 December 1977.
As pointed out by the Minister of Justice in the Government's Internal Market Committee (Regeringens 
Fsellesmarkedsudvalg), 29 March 1979 (referred in Judgement o f the Supreme Danish Court in the Maastricht case, 6 
April 1998, Ilojestcrels Domme 1998, p, 842).
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clearly, when the government was asked to describe the borders of Article 235 by the Market 
Committee of the Danish parliament297:
“Art. 235 may be used where a Community action is necessary to realise one of the Community’s aims within its 
scope, and where the Treaty has not provided the necessary powrer. The question about non-active persons' right 
to social security benefits is not within the Community's objective or scope, since it has no relation to the 
economic activities, encompassed by the Treaty'. [...] It has been stated that the number of non-active persons 
which has nowf been proposed to be covered by Regulation 1408/71 is very small and that for this reason non­
active persons can be covered by Regulation 1408/71. That it is only a modest number of persons does not, 
according to the Danish opinion, justify deviating from the conditions o f the Treaty. Moreover, provided that the 
Council decided on using art. 235 to regulate the case in question, it cannot be excluded that non-active persons 
could also be granted rights in different matters by virtue o f  the Treaty's profusions. [....] Such a development 
would in reality residt in an interpretation o f  art. 235, which would make the cotiditions in the provision illusory" 
(Note from the Danish Foreign Ministry to the Market Committee o f the Parliament, 21 November 1979, own 
translation, emphasis added).2**8
Both the Danish observation in the Brack case, and the informational note, emphasised the Danish 
point of departure as characterised by a non-elastic reading o f 1408's purpose, as w ell as of the 
competences of the Community'. Instead of a more flexible approach, Denmark accentuated the 
limits of Community' competences. Moreover, the member state justified its own rigidity by the 
likelihood that, if giving in on social security matters, the next Community step would be to grant 
non-active persons free movement rights. The early national response was thus not explained as an 
isolated interpretation of 1408*s scope, but also in the context of a wider web of possible 
consequences and derived effects, and in view of more tactical considerations:
' i f  Denmark -  after more than half a year having rejected the use o f the Rome Treaty's Article 235 as the basis for 
a Community solution -  should abandon its position up till now' towards the use of Article 235 -  the other member 
states may doubt tire importance o f this matter for Denmark. That will without doubt complicate our position in 
future cases where Denmark w'ould be alone with its view of Article 235’s applicability” (preparatory note from 
the Danish government's EC-Committee to a meeting in the Government's Internal Market Committee 
(Regeringens Faellesmaikedsudvalg), 15 November 1979, own translation).2^
2g'  As a consequence of tire Maastricht Treaty, ‘the Market Committee’ o f  the Danish Parliament changed its name to 
'the European Affairs Committee’ in 1994.
21)8 Referred in Judgement of tire Supreme Danish Court in the Maastricht case, 6 April 1998, Hojeslerets Domme 1998, 
pp. 842-843.
^  Referred in Judgement o f the Supreme Danish Court in the Maastricht case, 6 April 1998, Hojesterets Domme 1998, 
p. 842.
272
After the Commission formulated its second proposal, from which non-active persons had been 
removed, Denmark and the other member states finally accepted the inclusion of the self- 
employed.300 By its adoption, Denmark had diverged from its former opinion as formulated in the 
Brack observation. For the inclusion o f non-active persons it would take a lot longer.
1.4: The Perception o f Financial Impact
In the 1980s no new proposals on the personal scope were formulated. With the proposal COM (91) 
528 negotiations on non-active persons were resumed. The research carried out on government 
notes to the Danish Parliament's European Affairs Committee between 1990 and 2002 reveals that 
the Danish position continued to be one full of reservations, although these were no longer justified 
by reference to the appropriate use o f Article 235, but on an estimation of the financial impact of 
such an extension. The analysis of the national response to both COM (91) 528 and (98) 779 thus 
demonstrates that the focus of concern had shifted from that of community competencies to that of 
the eventual impact on the national budget. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that the estimation 
of financial impact underwent a crucial change over time.
The government first informed the Parliament's European Affairs Committee that:
“The proposal [COM (91) 528] will have a discernible impact on the public finances, especially due to groups of 
non-active citizens in other member states that will more easily gain access to the Danish pension fund’’ (Note 
from the Danish Social Ministry to the Parliament's European Affairs Committee, 4 July 1997, own translation, 
emphasis added).
The financial impact consisted in the fact that, according to existing law, non-active EU citizens 
gained access to a pension after 10 y ears of residence in Denmark, in line with other foreigners, 
whereas the new proposal would grant them pension rights after 3 years of residence. An adoption 
of the proposal would oblige Denmark to extend the principle o f equal treatment to non-active EU- 
citizcns as well. However, the government also noted that not many' non-active EU-citizens had 
residence in Denmark and that the pension amount they would be entitled to after less than ten years 
of residence would only be a smaller fraction of a pension.
300 Regulation 1390/81.
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The Danish government's response to COM (91) 528 was that of modest concern. 'A discemable 
impact’ is not a ‘significant impact'. The domestic debate and negotiations on the latest 
Commission proposal, COM (98) 779, marked a change from the previous moderate view. The 
initial Danish analysis of COM (98) 779's national impact cautioned about its consequences and 
considered it in the light of potential future movements. During the first two years o f negotiations, 
Denmark argued strongly against the proposals and warned especially about the consequences of an 
extended personal scope on the residence-based welfare state and its financial balance. The core o f  
the status quo argument was against including non-active persons and third country nationals. In 
March 1999, the government informed the Parliament that:
“The proposed extension of the Regulation's personal scope is estimated to have large consequences fo r  public 
spending, since non-active persons front other member states will get access to social security and other 
residence-related social benefits to an unpredictable extent without contributing to the financing o f  the benefits 
through the payment o f  taxes. In addition, the proposal is estimated to cause an increase in the public spending on 
medical treatment fo r  persons insured under the Danish rtdes in other member states, especially in connection 
with the extension of the personal scope entitlement and as a consequence of the easing o f the citizens’ right to 
health care authorisation in other member states. The proposal to extend the personal scope to also cover third 
country nationals is estimated to cattse an additional expenditure, especially i f  this group later becomes entitled to 
free m o v e m e n t (Note from the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs to the Parliament's European Affairs 
Committee, 16 March 1999, own translation, emphasis added).
The initial cautious Danish reaction was founded on the perception of the special and exposed status 
of the Danish welfare state. The inclusion of non-active persons challenged the solidarity idea in 
Danish welfare, since they would get access to social schemes without contributing through taxation 
of income. Furthermore, the Danish position towards third country nationals was not so much based 
on the likely impact of the proposal in question, but on its future potential w hen they might be 
granted the underlying right of free movement. Regarding non-active persons, the social pension 
was the main focus. Regarding third country nationals, the concerns were mostly future-oriented.
1.5: National Im pact of an Enlarged Principle of Equal Treatm ent
A later government note, concerning COM (97) 561, elaborated on the political reservations
concerning the extension to third country nationals. The note concerned the impact of an extended 
principle of equal treatment. The Regulation in force did not grant third country nationals individual 
rights, but only derived rights as family members. The note emphasised the crucial difference 
between individual and derived rights;
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‘‘third country nationals cannot rely on the principle of equal treatment and earn the right to a Danish pension, 
since the right to a social pension in Denmark is an individual right. A third countiy national can also not apply 
for -  or receive -  a Danish pension, when he resides in another member state, since the principle of exportability 
does not apply " (Note from the Danish Ministry of Labour to the Danish Parliament's European Affairs 
Committee regarding the forthcoming Labour- and Social Council, 19 November 1999, p. 14, own translation).
The government note illustrates the national impact of an enlarged principle of equal treatment. The 
Danish position in 1999 was that if third country nationals were only covered indirectly by 1408 as 
family members, national legislation could still discriminate between them on the one hand and 
Danish citizens and 1408's ‘direct' personal scope on the other hand. It should be noted that, at this 
point in time, the Danish position disregarded the judicial extension of the principle of non­
discrimination to cover family members as developed by the Cabanis-Issarte case-law (sec chapter 
IV, section 1.2).
In the same note, the government stated that the financial impact of including third country 
nationals was rather uncertain, since their current and future pattern of movement was neither 
documented nor foreseeable, and depended much on whether they would be granted the right to free 
movement. Nevertheless, an enlarged principle of equal treatment would hav e an immediate impact, 
since the principle could be interpreted as entitling third countiy nationals to aggregate Danish 
insurance periods with periods from other member states, and thus open access to the Danish social 
pension within less than three years (ibid, p. 16). Applying the Regulation's principle of 
aggregation would thus mean that also on behalf of third country nationals. Community law could 
overrule the condition of three years of residence in Denmark to open access to a social pension, as 
formulated in Danish policy.
In the press, the Danish position was clear. Despite the Tampere conclusions. Denmark would veto 
1408's extension to third country nationals (Information. 30 November 1999).
The Danish government substantiated its political reservations in the beginning of 2000. The Danish 
Parliament's European Affairs Committee requested the government to analyse the consequences 
should COM (98) 779 be adopted (question no. 66, 3. December 1999). The governmental response 
was a very dense analysis of the impact of a simplified and modernised Regulation, especially 
focusing on the political and financial impact of an extended personal scope on Danish social
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policy, substantiated by rich examples. The analysis initially noted that the proposal would extend 
the principle o f equal treatment to both non-active EU-citizens and legally residing third country 
nationals, and thus grant them individual rights. The impact on national social policies particularly 
concerned residence-related benefits, to which one would be entitled on the basis o f residence 
alone. Social pension as the greatest item o f expenditure was again the focus o f attention:
“If the personal scope of the Regulation is extended to cover non-active persons, this will mean that citizens from 
other member states will be able to earn right to a Danish social pension, irrespective o f previous employment in 
Denmark. This is due to the fact that the principle of equal treatment in the Regulation grants citizens of other 
member states tire same rights as Danish citizens. It is therefore not possible to reserve the right to earn a Danish 
social pension to Danish citizens, since citizens from  other member states according to the Regulation are entitled 
to equal treatment. Example: an Irish citizen resides four years in Denmark for study purposes and thereafter 
returns to Ireland and begins employment. According to current law in part II of the Regulation, the student has 
never been covered by Danish legislation on social security. According to the proposed extension, the student will 
at the age of retirement be entitled to 4/40 o f a Danish social pension" (Answer by the Danish Minister of Social 
Affairs to question no. 66 by the Danish Parliament's European Affairs Committee, 3 February 2000, p. 11, own 
translation, emphasis added).
Concerning third country nationals, the government re-emphasised that the proposal would mean 
non-discrimination between non-community nationals and Danish citizens. They would not only be 
entitled to a social pension after three years of residence in Denmark, but also to aggregate 
insurance periods from other member states to fulfil the condition of three years. Among other 
illustrations, the analysis gave the following example:
"A Turkish citizen has lived and worked 35 years in Denmark and earned the right to a Danish social pension 
during this period. By the age of retirement, he moves to Spain, where he receives 35/40 of a complete Danish 
old-age pension. In addition, he receives a smaller German pension calculated on the basis o f seven years of 
employment in Germany. Since he has been covered by Danish legislation for a longer time than Gennan 
legislation, he is entitled to receive health care in Spain paid by Denmark. When staying in Denmark, he is also 
entitled to receive the necessary health care here. According to existing rules, the Turkish citizens would not he 
entitled to receive a Danish pension in another member state'' (Note from the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs to 
the Danish Parliament's European Affairs Committee, 3 February 2000, p. 23, own translation).
The text is filled with examples o f how amended community law would overrule the discriminatory 
leftovers in Danish social policies. The press referred to this analysis, and clarified to their readers 
that the government had stated a clear 'no ' to the proposal (Politiken, 12 March 2000).
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1.6: A  Danish Dilemma -  Negotiating the Treaty Base
The arguments based on this analysis were reiterated during the Danish debate leading up to the 
Nice Intergovernmental Conference. Together with art. 137, the negotiations on amending art. 42 to 
QMV attracted most attention in the domestic debate (Interview, Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 4 April 2001). Denmark did not approve the original Commission proposal. However, lack 
of flexibility- would not favour Denmark in the general negotiations. Neither could Denmark simply 
be sheltered by the United Kingdom and rely on its veto, since it was unsure if the UK would 
maintain its opposition to the very end (Interview, Danish Permanent Representation, 18 December 
2002). The delicate Danish position was therefore to enter negotiations constructively and not place 
itself in an unpleasant 14 against 1 situation, but at the same time leave the impression back home 
that it did not simply ‘sacrifice’ Danish welfare. The fear of ‘welfare tourism' was a central part of 
the political rhetoric, as expressed by the Danish no-parties, and the background upon which the 
parties required the government to exercise its veto (Politiken, 4 October 2000). Furthermore, the 
Danish government could not possibly become too flexible, as it was politically bounded by its own 
remarks in defence of Danish welfare during the debate on the EMU referendum 28 September 
2000 (Aktuclt, 14 October 2000; interviews).301 The widened access to Danish welfare, as 
highlighted in the analysis of the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, would be rendered definitively 
beyond national control by the adoption of QMV (Borsen, 10 October 2000). In the public debate, 
an eventual extension of 1408 on the basis of QMV to third country nationals was pointed out as 
the main problem. The arguments against such an extension came to a head, which is here 
expressed by the head of the international section in the Ministry of Social Affairs:
“Will they [third country nationals] stay where they are, or will they go for greater social benefits in Denmark. We 
have no idea. And this is precisely why we need to maintain unanimity . . .  It may be that this group is less rooted 
and therefore moves more for social benefits than others . . . They [the Commission] will argue that it does not 
make sense to give immigrants a right to export social security, if they do not have residence- or work permits, 
The Commission does not like to admit it, but I know- that they have a proposal on the extension of residence 
rights ready. It is the tactic of salami slicing" (Politiken, 25 October 2000, own translation).
This rather political remark of a government representative substantiated the hypothesis of welfare 
tourism and widened its likelihood in the case of third country nationals. The status quo must be
301 Denmark held its referendum on the single currency the 28 September 2000. Although not directly related, the future 
of the welfare state in relation with the EU became a central theme, among which was the impact o f Regulation 
1408/71.46.1% voted ‘no’ against40.5% voting ‘yes'.
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defended due to two unknown factors; the actual mobility of third country nationals and the next 
supranational step regarding their free movement.
By November 2000, it was clear that Denmark supported the French compromise where QMV 
would be the procedure for simplification of the Regulation, but unanimity would be maintained for 
substantial amendments to its personal or material scope (Börsen. 6 november 2000; Börsen, 10 
November 2000). The Danish dilemma between, on the one hand, being a constructive partner in 
negotiations and, on the other hand, a domestic debate restraining the scope of manoeuvre, was 
thereby solved. However, the Danish balancing act could have been spared since the UK in the end 
decided to veto the French compromise.
1.7: New Perceptions o f Im pacts and Recent Negotiations
The Danish estimation of COM (98) 779's financial impact had clearly changed by mid-2001. The 
financial impact of the proposal, first considered to be Marge’, was now 'limited'. Where the 
uncertainty about the intra-European movement of non-active persons had previously caused a 
defensive reaction, the Danish approach was now to give non-active persons the benefit of the 
doubt. Moreover, the question of which Treaty base should be used to include third country 
nationals, and the Danish opt-out, allowed for new Danish perceptions:
“It is difficult to anticipate the financial impact o f the extension o f the personal scope to non-active persons, since 
it is not possible to anticipate how many 11011-active persons from other member states will apply for Danish 
pension benefits. It has previously been estimated that the Commission 's proposal would have considerable 
financial conseepiences. That was because the proposal entailed an extension of the personal scope to third country 
nationals and non-active persons. It was estimated that a certain number of the third country nationals would be 
non-active, so that this could have financial consequences. Since Ute proposal to extend tire personal scope to third 
country nationals will not be binding on Denmark, it is estimated that the financial consequences will be limited' 
(Note from the Danish Ministry of Labour and the Ministry' of Social A flairs to the Danish Parliament's European 
Allairs Committee regarding the forthcoming Labour- and Social Council, 25 September 2001, p. 32, own 
translation, emphasis added).
Furthermore, the note underlined that the proposal would, almost exclusively, have an effect on 
social pension spending. Provided that the proposal was approved without restrictions, non-active 
persons would be entitled to a social pension after 1 year o f residence in Denmark, i.e. with 
aggregated periods from other member stales. However, Denmark later succeeded in negotiating
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that non-active persons will only gain the right to a social pension after a minimum 3 years of 
residence, as will be detailed below. In December 2001, Denmark proclaimed anew:
“Since the present proposal takes into consideration the member states that have residence-based social security 
schemes, it is now estimated that the financial consequences will be lim ited' (Note from the Danish Ministry of 
Labour and the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Danish Parliament's European Affairs Committee regarding the 
forthcoming Labour- and Social Council, 4 December 2001, pp. 24-25, own translation, emphasis added).
The quotes thus mark a decisive change in the governmental perception on free movement and 
welfare. It no longer based its analysis on the hypothesis of welfare tourism. Moreover, it 
temporarily sheltered itself behind the opt-out on Justice and Home Affairs, for which reason it was 
no longer relevant to consider the impact of an extension to third country' nationals.
The two quotes were formulated by two different Danish governments, the first by' the social 
democratic coalition government and the second by the liberal-conservative coalition government, 
which came to power 27 November 2001. The change of position thus happened independently of 
ideology, and other factors must have been decisive. Such a factor is most likely to be that the 
ongoing negotiations in the Council gradually changed Danish reservations. Concerning non-active 
persons, the initial Danish position did not find support and the prospect of being a lone member 
state in an unpleasant spotlight blocking negotiations, is likely to have made Denmark change its 
stance. Concerning third country,' nationals, the choice of the new Treaty base was certainly 
convenient for Denmark, bearing in mind its previous statements on the impact of granting non- 
community nationals equal treatment.
However, recent negotiations demonstrate that the difference between the original proposal that 
Denmark declared itself so strongly against, and the outcome that it will in the end commit itself to. 
may in practical terms be insignificant.
During the Greek presidency of spring 2003, Denmark negotiated the actual content of the special 
considerations that should be taken into account concerning residence-based schemes regarding 
non-active persons. The Danish aim was to have an annex adopted to the Regulation, which would 
lay down that to gain the right to a Danish social pension, one would have to have resided a 
minimum of 3 years in Denmark (Interview, Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, 15. May 2003). 
That meant a deviation from the general principle of aggregation. As a starting point, Denmark
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wanted the deviation to apply to non-active persons, and pensioners receiving a pension from 
another member state as well as family members o f  employed and self-employed persons. That 
was, however, not accepted in the Council nor by the Commission, which pointed out that such a 
discrimination against family members would be against the case-law' extension of the principle o f  
equal treatment. Denmark therefore had to accept that the deviation from the principle o f  
aggregation would be for non-active persons only, who as a matter of definition are persons who 
have never worked in a member state (Interview', ibid). In real numbers, ‘non-active* persons 
according to this definition cannot be a large number. The negotiation process is thus another 
example of the impact on national policy and preferences of a judicially strengthened principle o f  
equal treatment (see case C-308/93 Cabanis-Issarte, analysed in chapter IV, section 1.2). The 
special conditions for how Community non-active persons can gain access to the right to Danish 
social pension will be inserted in annex XI of the amended Regulation (COM (2004) 44).
Moreover, Denmark has announced its intentions to commit itself to a parallel agreement, according 
to which the same rights and obligations would apply to third country nationals moving to or from 
Denmark as in the other 14 member states (Jyllands-Postcn 5 June 2002; Interview, Danish 
Ministry of Social Affairs, 8 November 2002; 15 May 2003; 8 October 2003 & 9 February 2004). 
Whether or not the announced political commitment w ill be followed up by political action remains 
unclear, but if a parallel agreement turns into a future reality, Denmark would certainly have moved 
far aw ay from its original standpoint.
1.8: Changed Perceptions and Preferences
Despite the fact that EU-related immigration to Denmark remains low from a comparative point of 
view (see chapter VI, section 4), the idea that Denmark would be especially exposed to 'welfare 
opportunists’ has successfully influenced the debate for or against further integration. Despite the 
fact that Regulation 1408/71 is ‘only’ an Community instrument coordinating social security rights 
across borders, it has been a very disputed regulatory instrument in the Danish debate on European 
integration. The long-lasting Danish opposition to extending the regulatory scope of 1408 should be 
seen within this context.
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The analysis o f Danish perceptions on the impact of the European legislation has demonstrated that 
national convictions and preferences may be tenacious but, in the long-term perspective, they are 
not static. The Danish point o f departure was a very non-elastic reading of 1408’s purpose as well 
as of the competencies of the Community, which changed into a reluctant and finally conditional 
acceptance to grant non-active persons equal rights. Although Denmark officially has changed its 
political objection to an equal status for legally residing third country nationals, legal reservations 
hinder the practical effect of this. Denmark stands out as the only member state not granting intra- 
European social security rights to third country nationals who actually manage to move across 
borders, and that is despite its announced commitment to the contrary.
Although Denmark gradually has been obliged by European law to open up its welfare borders, the 
official Danish stance has not been expressed in favour of the migrant. Instead of viewing the 
migrant as a short term quest or long term resident who takes an interest in and contributes to the 
Danish community and, on this basis, merits equal rights, the Danish position has been formulated 
out of the convinced need to defend national welfare and to limit Community competencies in this 
respect. The historical and symbolic embeddedness of national welfare is part of the explanation. 
However, even such strong embeddedness has had to yield to the gradual manifestation of European 
rights, as was evidenced by the gradual diminishing of Danish resistance towards transnational 
European welfare, and will be evidenced if Denmark grants right to third country nationals by a 
parallel agreement. In a theoretical light, such a change of position substantiates the dynamism of 
national preferences (Pierson 1998) and suggests that the progressive supranational 
institutionalisation, in part, causes such a change of position.
2.0; Dom estic Impacts on the Residence-based Welfare State
Ch er the more than three decades that 1408 has regulated intra-European social security*, Denmark 
has responded in the Council on the basis of political convictions and perceptions. Its gradual 
change of political standpoint demonstrates that there has been no definitive or rational national 
interest behind this.
When it comes to the domestic impact, Denmark has adapted national policy in accordance with the 
political- and judicial decision-making of the European polity. But adaptation has not been passive,
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neutral, or always immediate. In its implementation of political decision-making, Denmark has 
amended national law, both in order to meet its Community obligations, as well as in order to lim it 
its effects. Since Denmark has had only one minor preliminary ruling before the ECJ, its 
implementation of judicial decision-making exemplifies how member states, other than the referring 
state, subsequently interpret the general premises of an individual lawsuit. The domestic impact that 
the ECJ’s rulings have had on Danish policies, set out in the research conducted below, therefore 
demonstrate the multilateral effect o f Community law, its effectiveness and eventual uniformity 
(sec the discussion on the binding precedent of Community law, chapter II section 4.3).
The following analysis of the domestic impact on the residence based welfare state will, in the two 
first sections, explore the impact of supranational decision-making on the Danish statutory pension, 
and then on family benefits. Next, the analysis will investigate the possible exportability of certain 
Danish social services. The last four sections examine in greater detail the impact o f supranational 
institutionalisation on national health care policy.
2.1: Im plem enting the Acquis Com m unautaire -  Statutory Pension
When Denmark joined the European Communin' in 1973, it had to make a fundamental change to 
its national law on social pension. Adopting the acquis communautaire on intra-European social 
security meant that Denmark, with the implementation of the principle of equal treatment, had to 
waive its own condition of Danish citizenship ("indfodsreO for the personal scope of 1408/71, as 
well as having to allow for the exportation of social benefits (Sakslin 2000, p. 24; Den Sociale 
Sikringsstyrelse 1997, hæfte 1, p. 26). Danish citizenship and residence in Denmark were, and arc, 
the two general conditions for entitlement to a social pension. Adopting the acquis thus meant that 
Denmark could no longer specifically favour its own citizens, but had to grant equal access to its 
most costly social security scheme to EC nationals covered by 1408. moreover it could not exert 
spatial control over the consumption o f benefits. The immediate adoption of the acquis overruled 
both the Danish principle of social citizenship and the principle of territoriality'.
Whereas Denmark initially only had to see "social citizenship* extended to a limited scope of 
migrant workers, the gradual extension of the Community's principle of equal treatment and 1408*s 
personal scope made it increasingly difficult for national policy to "fav our* nationals. As the
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analysis above demonstrates, access to social pensions will soon also be open to EU students qua 
1408. Under the present formulation of 1408, the principle of aggregation regarding the acquisition 
of the right to be eligible for a social pension as expressed in 1408's art. 45, docs not apply to 
family members (Den Sociale Sikringsstyrelse 1997, pp. 23-24 & 34). This means that family 
members will have to reside 3 years in Denmark before they can have the right to a pension. 
However, when the simplified Regulation is adopted, the principle of aggregation will apply 
generally (Interview, Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, 15. May 2003). On that account, Denmark 
will no longer be able to discriminate against family members. In the negotiations on the Danish 
annex on the social pension, requiring a minimum stay of 3 years in Denmark to acquire pension 
rights, Denmark did not mange to include all categories of non-active persons, i.e. family members, 
in particular, The Commission pointed out to Denmark that such a deviation from the principle of 
equal treatment would not be coherent with the case-law development (i.e. Cohams-lssarte, see 
section 1.7 above). In the future, it will only be Community nationals who have never been 
employed and who are not family members of a covered Community national, who will have to 
have resided 3 y ears in Denmark to gain access to a social pension. However, they still hold a very 
privileged position in comparison with other foreigners, who arc required to have 10 years of 
residence for access to the same benefit. The gradual enforcement of equal treatment in the 
Community means that apart from non-active persons, all other community nationals residing in 
Denmark will start to earn a Danish pension after 1 year of residence.
2.2: Im plem enting Judicial Decision-Making -  Statutory Pension
Community law has thus had both a more immediate impact and a gradual one. Political decision­
making causes an immediate impact, to the extent that national policy and practices arc amended in 
accordance with the amendment of supranational law. Gradual or "indirect* impact is, however, 
likely to be just as important when it comes to the generation of rights. Evidently this more discrete 
impact is more difficult to detect analytically. At first sight, it could be concluded that Community- 
social security Jaw has only impacted on the Danish case when the member state originally adopted 
the acquis and when it had to implement new political decisions. However, the Danish case richly 
illustrates examples of impact where the national administration has gradually accommodated 
practices and law- in accordance with the legal interpretations of the ECJ.
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Regarding the social pension, decisions from the Danish Social Appeal Authority (‘Den Sociale 
Ankestyrelsc') have incrementally changed administrative practice and have considered the impact 
of the European Court of Justice's judgements on Danish law. In an early decision, the Social 
Appeal Authority interpreted 1408’s text restrictively, stating that a person, who had earned pension 
rights both in Denmark and the United Kingdom, would have to chose between either a full Danish 
pension or a pro-rata pension from both Denmark and the United Kingdom. But the decision 
concluded that due to the Regulation’s prohibition of overlapping benefits, he was not entitled to a 
full pension from both countries (SM P-24-96302; Sakslin 2000, p. 36). In two later decisions, the 
Social Appeal Authority’ changed its restrictive approach and thereby authoritatively amended the 
national interpretive practice. Decision SM P-19-02 laid down that a pensioner maintained acquired 
pension rights from both member states, even if both together amounted to more than a full 
pension.303 The later decision annulled the more restrictive decision, SM P-24-96 from 1996. The 
new practice was confirmed in the recent decision SM P-16-03, which restated the right to receive 
more than a full pension due to acquired rights from two member states.304
The changed interpretation of the prohibition of overlapping benefits lays down a new Danish 
administrative practice, regarding cross border pension rights. The development illustrates that the 
reading of Community- lawr in relation to national policy is dynamic, and that whereas the full 
impact of supranational rights may not be implemented at the outset, a national authoritative 
decision may entail a new reading of a Community' obligation and thus the adoption of national 
administrative practices, albeit with a certain delay. National adaptation may require national 
interpretation and therefore may not take place instantly. Furthermore, the changed Danish 
reasoning indeed demonstrates how ‘Europe* adds to the right of the migrant, and that it may even 
be an advantage to piece pension rights from different member states together.
302 Date o f decision; 9 February 1996.
303 Date o f decision; 17 July 2002. The Social Appeal Authority' concluded that a pensioner w ho though now residing in 
the United Kingdom had acquired Danish statutory pension by being employed in a Danish firm, had a right to Danish 
old age pension without deduction o f those periods where he earned English pension. The pensioner had earned 38 
years o f pension from Denmark and 3 years of pension from the United Kingdom, which together amounted more than 
a full pension.
304 Date o f decision; 25 June 2003. The decision considered the complaint from a Danish pensioner. By reference to 
decision SM P-19-02, the pensioner complained that his Danish fraction pension only amounted 21/40 and did not 
include the years between 1945-1977 in which he worked for a Danish firm in the United Kingdom and Finland The 
Danish Appeal Authority supported his complaint although he also received statutory pension from the United Kingdom 
and Finland.
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Another very recent decision shows how the national Appeal Authority and the National High Court 
(Vestre Landsret) have interpreted the impact of European judicial decision-making on the question 
of who has a right to a Danish social pension (Decision SM P-17-03)305. The decision is of great 
analytical importance since it substantiates the argument that judicial decision-making has a 
multilateral effect. At the same time, it points out that subsequent national interpretation of the 
scope and meaning of an individual lawsuit is unlikely to go beyond the conclusions of the 
European Court o f Justice, but will echo the conditions and limits of its impact on national policies 
and practices as laid down by the ECJ. Although the Social Appeal Authority and the National High 
Court (Vestre Landsret) did not find that the person concerned was entitled to a Danish old age 
pension, their line of reasoning reflects how supranational case-law is considered to take precedence 
over national law. Furthermore, the conclusions will influence future cases.
The decision concerned a pensioner, residing in Portugal, who applied for a Danish old age pension 
due to her previous residence in Denmark. At the time of application, the person was a Canadian 
citizen, married to a Danish citizen. The applicant had previously been a Danish citizen. In 1968. 
she moved to Canada and became Canadian citizen in 1973. In 1983, she moved back to Denmark 
but retained Canadian citizenship. Two years later, she married a Danish citizen, with whom she 
moved to Portugal in 1989. Still residing in Portugal, she applied for a Danish old age pension in 
1999. The Danish Social Security Board (den Sociale Sikringsstvrelse) initially refused the Danish 
pension due to her being a Canadian citizen and therefore not part of 1408's personal scope. 
Against this background, the Social Appeal Authority was requested to consider the case and decide 
whether the applicant had a right to a pension either individually or as the family member of an 
employed person. In its decision, the Social Appeal Authorin’ concluded that the applicant did not 
have an individual right to a Danish pension due to 1408. In the first period of residence in 
Denmark, i.e. up till 1968, 1408 did not apply since it was before Denmark joined the European 
Communin’, neither did it apply in the second period of residence, i.e. between 1983-1989, since 
she no longer held Communin* nationality. The Social Appeal Authorin' referred to the ECJ cases 
10/78 Belbouab306 and C-105/89 Buhari Haji30 , which laid down that Communin’ nationality is
m  Date of decision; 29 April 2003. The case involved two decision. The first decision by the Social Appeal Authority 
was SM P-24-01 o f  18 October 2001. The National High Court later decided in SM P-17-03 which annulled SM P-24- 
01.
J<*Case 10/78, 12 October 1978. Taveb Belbouab v Bundesknappschaft. ECR 1978,p. 1915.
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required when rights are earned and not necessarily at the time of application (see chapter III, 
section 1.2). Concerning the right as a family member of a Danish citizen, the authority likew ise 
rejected that this status entitled her to a Danish social pension. The Appeal Authority reasoned its 
rejection by reference to judgement C-308/93 Cabanis-Issorte, according to which;
“family members due to previous practice alone achieved derived rights and not individual rights, but by the 
judgment a certain modification has taken place. However, it emerges from the judgement, point 2) that it cannot 
be invoked to support a claim concerning benefits for periods before the date o f the judgement, i.e. 30. April 1996. 
The application concerned exclusively periods before 30. April 1996” (SM P-17-03, page 2, own translation, 
emphasis added).
The decision of the Appeal Authority was subsequently brought before the National High Court 
(Vestre Landsret), which, however, supported the previous decision to refuse the pension.307 08
Although the decision in itself did not extend rights, it should establish a different future practice on 
the equal treatment of family members. Denmark had previously held that Cabanis-Issorte did not 
have a general effect and did not impact on Danish practice, since it conccmcd t en ' specific case 
circumstances (Interviews, Danish Ministry of Social Affairs & Nationals Social Security Agency, 
5 April 2001). The early interpretation was that the scope o f the judgement was limited to the 
individual lawsuit. However, by SM P-17-03, Denmark has come close to admitting that a 
distinction between individual and derived rights cannot be maintained for social pensions. 
Although, the Cabanis-Issorte judgement passed relatively unnoticed, w'hen it was given, it is about 
to abolish the previous basis upon which discrimination in national policy has been justified. Years 
after the Cabanis-Issarte judgement, member states are incorporating its principle into national 
practices and have come much closer to recognising its effect as a binding precedent beyond the 
individual lawsuit and similar cases.
307 C-105/89, 14 November 1990. Ibrahim Buhari Haji v Institut national d ’assurances sociales pour tnavailleurs 
independents. ECR 1990, p. 1-4211.
308 The High Court added that the husband could not be regarded as an ‘employed’ person according to Regulation 
1408, since this status implied that employment had been held in more than one member state. The husband had during 
his working life held employment in Denmark and Greenland. Concerning its conclusions on tire requirement to have 
worked in more than one member state, the National High Court referred to Case C-189/00, 25 October 2001. Ruhr v 
Bundesanstalt Jiir Arbeit. ECR 2001, p. 1-08225. Para. 23.
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2.3: Non-Com pliance and Subsequent Application -  Family Benefits
The policy of family benefits is another domain where Denmark has had to change its organising 
principles and entitlement criteria, in order to comply with Communin’ law. The policy behind the 
relatively generous child benefit and allowances clearly has both demographic and redestributive 
aims. The conditions favour 'members' of Danish society, requiring that the child must reside in 
Denmark and that the parent must be fully liable to pay Danish tax. To receive the additional child 
allowance, the child or parent must furthermore be a Danish citizen or have habitual residence in 
Denmark ("Your social security rights when moving within the European Union" (2002 update), p. 
31). Although both the territoriality and citizenship clause arc waived regarding I408's personal 
scope, the Community obligation of exportability and non-discrimination have not readily been 
fully manifested in Danish administrative practice.
Due to a restrictive national practice, Denmark came close to an infringement procedure before the 
ECJ. The case concerned a British citizen who worked for a Danish employer on a drilling rig in the 
North Sea. The worker paid tax in Denmark, but his children resided in the United Kingdom. 
Denmark refused to pay child benefit, reasoning its refusal by the fact that in Danish social policy 
there is no connexion between tax payment and social entitlements (Borsen, 22 June 1999). The 
Commission found that Denmark did not comply with Community law and required Denmark to 
explain its practice. The government subsequently gave the reasons for its practice before the 
Commission and announced that it was ready to have its case heard before the Court (Borsen, ibid). 
However, it never came that far. By November 1999, it was clear that Denmark was now willing to 
comply in order to avoid having the case brought before the Court. Granting social rights to a 
British citizen working for a Danish employer but outside Community territory had previously been 
described as having '"incalculable financial impact and may ultimately cause an erosion of the 
Danish social system'* (Governmental note to the Parliament's European Affairs Committee, quoted 
from Borsen, 15 November 1999, own translation). Officially, the perception of impact had now 
changed and had been interpreted in a limited way. The new interpretation was explained by a 
senior official in the Danish Ministn* o f Social Affairs as being due to the fact that Denmark had 
only specifically admitted new rights for workers at Danish drilling rigs (Borsen. 15 November 
1999). However, such an argument would most likely not hold if a new case came up, concerning a 
similar situation, such as a Danish employer established in a third country, employing Community
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workers. In the concrete case, Denmark chose non-confrontation and, so far, a restrictive 
application o f the Community obligation.
2.4: Exportable Social Services?
Long term care and social services arc policy domains where the recent development o f  
Community law has increasingly impacted on the national principle of territoriality'. Long term care 
in Denmark is part of the national law on social sendees. According to the Danish list on national 
legislation included in the material scope of Regulation 1408, social sendees fall outside the 
regulatory scope and are, thus, not exportable ('Tour social security rights when moving within the 
European Union" (2002, update), pp. 23-33; Sakslin 2000, p. 11; Christoffcrsen 1998, p. 12; 
Ketschcr 1998, p. 259). Case C-160/99 Molemar was concluded to have no effect on the Danish 
sendee, as it concerned a 'benefit in cash' and Danish long term care is granted as a ‘social benefit 
in kind* (Schultz 1998; Intcnicw, Danish Ministry of Social Affairs, 4 April 2001). The 
jurisprudence o f the Court was thus interpreted in the Danish institutional context and found to have 
no impact. While it is clear that Community law and the Court's interpretation thereof, in both 
Molenaar and C-215/99 Jauch, do not oblige Denmark to pay for long term care sendees for 
Danish pensioners in the South of Europe, it is currently being considered administratively the 
extent to which recent case-law has an impact on other types o f social sendees, which until recently 
were argued to be outside the regulatory’ scope of 1408/71 (Intenicws, the Danish Ministry o f  
Social Affairs, 8 October 2003 & 5 February 2004). The recent development of legal reasoning, 
expressed in the line of cases Molenaar, Jauch, C-43/99 Leclere & Deaconcscu and C-333/00 
Maaheimo among others, essentially question the territorial restriction of social sendees such as; 
benefits to parents who chose private child care or their own child care; parental leave benefits; 
compensation for loss of income in order to care for a handicapped child; sickness care 
contributions; compensation for additional expenditures by sickness or invalidity; compensation for 
the loss of income due to caring for a dying relative (see Chapter VI, section 3.3). For example, it is 
clear that the Finnish child care benefit, which the Maaheimo judgement made exportable, strongly 
resembles the Danish child care benefit, legislated in the law’ on social sendees §§ 26-26a. The 
central administration has indicated that, the Molenaar, Jauch, Leclere and Maaheimo line of 
judgements brings further into question the non-cxportabilitv o f the above mentioned types of social 
sendees (Inten iew, Ministry of Social Affairs, 15. May 2003). Should these considerations result in
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exportability, it substantiates once again the fact that individual judgements may constitute a 
binding precedent and have an impact far beyond the scope of the individual lawsuit.
Both the examples of family benefits and social services suggest that Denmark, when faced with the 
prospect of having a lawsuit brought against it, chooses to comply beforehand. Danish response to 
the development of Community law appears to be characterised by a certain, but initial, inclination 
towards non-compliance or restrictive application, which is later corrected so that Community 
obligations are fulfilled. Denmark appears to prefer non-confrontation and, over lime, accepts the 
‘erga omnes' and ‘ultra partes' effect of ECJ case-law, adapting national policy and practice in 
accordance therewith.
2.5: M edical Treatm ent Beyond National Borders
Access to Danish health care is generally supplied within Danish borders. Further characteristics 
are that health care is supplied by the national health service as benefits in kind, and the only 
requirement for entitlement is Danish residence. The patient is generally treated free of charge.
Although dividing European health models into archetypes hardly docs justice to the mam* nuances 
of each individual model, it is a useful way of emphasising how national health institutions diverge 
across Europe, and places the Danish and German models respectively in comparison with their 
European counterparts. Furthermore, the division into archetypes helps explain the different impact 
of European institutionalisation. Although both Denmark and Germany provide health care as 
benefits in kind, they represent two distinct models due to their financing form:
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Table 12: Health Care Supply in EU-15309
Social In su ran ce N ational H e a lth  Service
Reimbursement Benefits in K in d Benefits in K in d
•  Luxem bourg •  Germany • United Kingdom,
•  Belgium •  Austria • Ireland
• France •  N etherlands • D enm ark
• Sweden
• F inland
• Spain
• Portugal
• Italy
• Greece
Under certain circumstances Denmark waives the general principle of territoriality' and grants 
access to foreign health supply to those who have health care insurance. It is here important to 
clarify that it is not only European law which may entitle a person to foreign health care, but also 
national legislation. For example, even’ person insured for health care in Denmark -  disregarding 
nationality -  is entitled to foreign treatment during one month o f stay abroad. Furthermore, national 
law has traditionally allowed necessary, highly specialised treatments to be carried out in other 
states (Interview, the Danish Ministry o f  Health, 3. April 2001).
However, Europe has added to such national rules, granting now to all European nationals, their 
family members* 310 and legally residing third country’ nationals311 (i.c. except for third country- 
nationals residing in Denmark), a conditional right to enjoy health care access outside their stale of 
residence. Article 22 (1) (a) of Regulation 1408 obliges Denmark to pay for urgent health care 
provided in another member state.312 The Regulation's Article 22 (1) (c) entitles those who fall
w  The division by archetypes or typologies correspond to the division carried out by Langer (1999, p. 358) and by 
Palm (2000, p. 17). The archetype division by Langer is based on the MISSOC 1998 data.
310 Granted by Regulation 3095/93.
311 Granted by Regulation 859/2003.
312 Certified beforehand by form E ll 1. The entitlement to urgent health care outside Denmark is conditional on the fact 
that the stay is temporary and does not exceed one year (Sakslin 2000, p. 20). Furthermore, tire treatment ot a chronic
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within 1408*s personal scope to treatment in another member state which has been authorised by 
the national competent institution beforehand.313 As analysed in chapter V section 3, the question of 
when European law obliges national institutions to authorise treatment in another member state and 
when national authorisation policies are barriers to the free movement principles of the EU has 
indeed been a bone of contention between the member states, on the one hand, and the ECJ on the 
other. Although, no individual case involving Denmark has arisen, it has been an active participator 
in these disputes.
Authorisation of treatment in another member stale is generally rcstrictively applied, and is only 
accorded for very specialised treatments and only after all possibilities of national treatment have 
been exhausted. The governmental executive order lays down the formal procedure for such 
application, specifying314:
• the patient must be examined or treated in a Danish hospital with the most specialised 
knowledge within the field,
• the hospital must consult the National Health Board (Sundhcdsstyrelsen) before authorisation is 
given.
The restrictive application is underlined by the low numbers of annual authorisations. Around 40-50 
authorisations arc given pr. year, whereas some 15 arc rejected (Palm 2000, p. 50). The reasons for 
rejection are either that the treatment is available in Denmark, or that the treatment demanded is 
considered experimental.
Traditionally Denmark has only authorised ‘standard* types of treatment abroad, meaning 
treatments whose effect were recognised by national medicine, and not carried out on a research or 
experimental basis.315 Danish health policy has. however, recently opened up the possibility that 
patients with life-threatening diseases may be authorised to receive foreign research-related
illness is not regarded as urgent in Denmark, and 1408 does therefore not oblige Denmark to pay for such treatment 
abroad.
M1 Certified beforehand by El 12.
According to executive order (bekendtgorelse) in force no. 564 of 20/06/2003, §§21.1 and 21.2.
,!- See historical executive order (bekendtgorelse) no. 69 of 17/02/1983, § 2.2 & historical executive order no, 1132 of 
16/12/1999, §21.
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treatments316 or treatments carried out on an experimental basis317. It will be further discussed 
below whether this change of national policy may be seen as an indirect reaction to the recent case- 
law of the ECJ.
2.6: First S tep  Towards an In ternal Health M arket
The 28,h April 1998 was the date on which the ECJ stated its two landmark rulings, C-120/95 
Decker and C -158/96 Kohll. It was also the date from which it was irrevocably clear that the free 
movement principles of goods and services did affect the policy field of health care.
In Denmark, the judgements contradicted the Danish perception at that time that internal market 
rules did not affect health benefits and services. The rulings thus raised a long line of questions 
concerning their scope and impact on national authorisation policies (Interview, Danish Ministry o f 
Health, 3 April 2001). Against this background, it was decided politically to set up an inter­
ministerial working group318 to analyse the reach of the judgements and their possible future 
consequences for Danish health policy. The working group came out with its report in September 
1999, titled ‘"Consequences of The European Court of Justice rulings in the Decker'Kohll cases -  
statement by the working group".
In its report, the working group admitted that the rulings were based on general premises for which 
reason their scope went beyond the individual lawsuits and also had implications for other health 
systems than that of Luxembourg and other health goods and sen ices than those of a pair of 
spectacles and dental treatment (Danish Report on the Decker Kohll rulings 1999, p. 22). It thus 
remained for the report to clarify the limits of such general premises and to interpret what the 
judgements did not state explicitly, namely under which circumstances national authorisation 
policies may constitute barriers to the free movement principles of goods and services.
316 See historical executive order (bekendtgorelse) no. 299 of 13/05/2002, § 25.
317 See historical executive order (bekendtgorelse) no. 1162 of 16/12/2002, § 26.
318 The working group consisted of representatives from the Danish Ministiy o f Health, the Ministry of Justice, the 
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, the Ministry o f Social Affairs and the Negotiating Committee o f the Public Health Security 
Service.
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The working group found that the consequences of the Decker/Kohll rulings were that access to 
health care in another member state should be allowed without authorisation, if two criteria were 
met (Danish Report on the Decker/KohU rulings 1999, p. 24):
• the health care service must be provided with a view to making a profit and the patients pays the 
greater part o f the costs,
• a fixed reimbursement is offered according to fixed rates.
The Danish interpretation thereby conditioned its concept of service. For a service to be a serv ice 
according to the meaning o f the Treaty's art. 50 (ex. art. 60) there had to be an element of 
remuneration:
“It is the view o f the working group that if, on the other hand, the treatment had been taken care of by the public 
hospital sector, the Treaty's .Article 49 would not lun'e applied. The reason is that Article 50 defines services, as 
services normally carried out in return fo r  remuneration [...]The characteristic o f  a service is thus that a senice  
provider offers a service in return fo r  remuneration” (Danish Report on the DcckerKohll rulings 1999, p. 23, own 
translation, emphasis added).
The restrictive interpretation of the working group, according to which there had to be an element 
of private payment for a service to constitute a service within the meaning o f the Treaty, was 
deduced from the Kohl! judgements para. 29319 and previous ECJ judgements regarding services.320 
On the basis of a re-interpretation of previous case-law, the Danish officials came up with their 
(re)definition of services, allowing the whole public hospital sector to be exempted from the sen ice 
concept, together with all other health services provided free of charge.
3I<> Para 29 of the Kohl! judgement stated: “The dispute before the national court concerns treatment provided by an 
orthodontist established in another Member State, outside any hospital infrastructure. That service, provided fo r  
remuneration, must be regarded as a service within the meaning o f Article 60 of the Treaty, w hich expressly refers to 
activities o f the professions (emphasis added).
320 In its considerations on the service definition within the meaning of the Treaty, the w orking group referred to case C- 
159/90,4 October 1991. The Society' fo r  the Protection o f  Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan and others. 
ECR 1991, p. 1-4685, para 18, regarding abortion and to the cases 293/83, 13 February 1985. Françoise Grenier v Ci tv 
o f Liège. ECR 1985, p. 593; 263/86, 27 September 1988. Belgian State vRenè Humbel and Marie-Thérèse Edel. ECR 
1988, p, 5365, para 19 and C-l 09/92, 7 December 1993. Stephan M ax f firth v Landeshauptstadt Hannover. ECR 1993, 
p. 1-6447, para 17, all regarding the education.
293
Based on its conclusions, the working group stated that sen ices under the Danish Hospital Act were 
not affected by the EC obligations on free movement of sendees, nor were a long line of other 
health care sendees which were provided free of charge.321
However, the interpretations o f the working group marked a very central break with traditional 
national reasoning, namely in admitting that the internal market principles -  under certain 
conditions -  equally applied to health care sendees. Furthermore, to open the system up to a certain 
integration of foreign supply was a central break with the principle that public Danish health care 
only regulated domestic supply (Interview, Danish Ministry of Health, 3 April 2001).
This central break meant that health sendees, for which the insured person personally paid one part 
and the competent institution the other, were held to fall under the sendee concept of the EC Treaty. 
The conclusions in the report led to a policy-reform, which entered into force on 1 July 2000 and 
which allowed certain sendees to be purchased abroad with subsequent fixed reimbursement from 
the Danish competent institutions.322 The policy-reform furthermore concluded that if one had 
purchased one o f the following sendees in another member state within the last 20 years before 1 
July 2000, and the purchase could be documented, one would still be entitled to reimbursement. The 
policy-reform thus applied retrospectively. The sendees included:
• Dental assistance, except certain preventive sendees and certain sendees to the 18-25 years old.
• General medical treatment for persons covered under group 2.
• Specialist medical treatment for persons covered under group 2.
• Physiotherapy, except for certain types of physiotherapy free of charge provided to disabled
persons.
• Chiropractic treatment.
321 Other acts excluded on the basis o f the working group's interpretation were: The Dental Care Act (concerning 
primarily dental care for children under 18 years o f age): the Act on preventive Health Care for Children and Young 
People: the Act on Free Vaccination against Certain Diseases; the Act on Home Nursing Schemes; the Act on Prenatal 
Care and Maternity Care; the Act on Sterilisation and Castration; the Act on Induced Abortion (Danish Report on the 
Decker Kohll rulings 1999, p. 27).
322 The policy-reform entered into force by law no. 467 of 31 May 2000 and BEK no. 536 of 15 June 2000. The policy 
reform was followed up by an informative note from the Danish Ministry o f  Health by 1. January 2001, describing the 
new entitlements; “lia r  du faet liehandling mv. i Udlandet? Maske kan du 13 Tilskud fra Sygesikringen,\
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The report deferred the decision on whether to include pharmaceuticals on the list. The deferral was 
explained by the relatively low pharmaceutical consumption in Denmark and thus explained by a 
desire to control consumption (Danish Report on the Decker KohlJ rulings 1999, p. 8). 
Reconsideration of the deferral has, however, been initiated in autumn 2003 (Interview, the Danish 
Interior and Health Ministry, 9 October 2003).
From the parliamentary debate on the governmental amendment proposal, it was clear that the 
development initiated by the Decker/Kohll rulings not only addressed what to do with foreign 
supply, and how far to integrate it, but might also have repercussions for domestic politics. Ex- 
spokeswomcn on health and member o f the liberal, now governing party' ‘Venstre', Tove Fcrgo 
emphasised:
“We would very much have liked the proposal to go further so that it also applied to hospital treatment and for the 
citizens in health insurance group 1. We would also have liked that it applied to pharmaceuticals” (Tove Fergo, 1” 
reading o f proposal in the Danish Parliament, 2 march 2000, own translation).
In the second reading, Tove Fergo continued her argument in favour of a greater liberalisation of 
health care, however, now turning the argument internally, arguing that Decker KohU and the 
Danish reform initiative should in addition have other consequences for domestic policy:
“During the work with the proposal, it has appeared that one can export services to any EU member state, and that 
one can export those irrespective of w hether it is to a private hospital or a public hospital. The only thing required 
is that it is an authorised health provider. That is fantastic. At last there is a proposal which gives a free choice 
between public and private hospitals. It is only that citizens in Denmark cannot bring along the same services to a 
private hospital in Denmark. That means that in reality one is treated differently, should one desire a treatment in 
Denmark" (Tove Forgo, 2nd reading of proposal in the Danish Parliament, 18 May 2000, own translation).
The now governing party Venstre thus welcomed the proposal, but used the opportunity to criticise 
its restrictive application and the distinction in domestic politics between public and private 
hospitals.
The Decker KohU case-law indeed involved innovative rulings, and marked a turning point. On 28 
April 1998, the Court took an initial step towards the construction of a precedent, and -  according 
to the interpretation of some -  towards the construction of an internal market in health care. The 
subsequent dispute between the ECJ and the member states, between law and politics, further 
concerned the definition of services and how to agree on the conditions under which national
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authorisation policies might be justified. On an initial account, only Denmark, Luxembourg and 
Belgium changed its national policy as a reaction to Decker Kohll (Mossialos ct al. 2001, p. 48). 
Austria already had a system of reimbursement beyond national borders and thus already complied 
with the legally developed Community obligations (Palm ct. al 2000, pp. 80-81). The remaining 
member states announced for different reasons that the rulings did not apply to them, as will be 
exemplified by the German case in the analysis offered in section 3.6 below.
2.7: The Im pact o f Judicial Decision-M aking
In the C -157/99 Geraets-Sniits and Peerbooms case, the Court went one decisive step further in 
clarifying the applicability of the internal market rules to health care policies.
Denmark was among the governments which delivered an intervening submission in the case. The 
Danish opinion restated the conclusions o f the Decker'Kohll report (Interview, Danish Ministry of 
Health, 3 April 2001). The argument was that, due to the absence of remuneration, hospital 
treatment did not constitute a service within the meaning of the Treaty's art. 50 (Report for the 
Hearing, 76-77) .323 Besides this point of view, Denmark further argued that another precondition for 
a service to be Treaty related was that the service must be provided with a view to making a profit 
(Report for the Hearing, 78).324
The Court, however, overturned these national assessments and stretched the notion of 
'remuneration' in the Treaty's Article 50 to also cover indirect payments such as those transferred 
by the social security' funds to cover health care costs (Hatzopoulos 2002, p. 693). On the basis of 
this partially revised definition of services, most health care sendees, including free hospital care, 
came to constitute sendees w ithin the meaning of the Treaty, and were therefore not exempted from 
the rules of freedom to provide serv ices.325 Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Decker Kohll 
rulings applied to health care systems in general, i.e. including systems based on benefits in kind 
and not just those based on reimbursement.
323 The member states here relied on the previous case-law 263/861lumbal, para 17-19 and C-l 59/90 Gmgan, para 18. 
See footnote 320 above.
324 That point o f view relied on 293/83 Guctvier & C - l09/92 ll'irth. See footnote 320 above.
Hatzopoulos argues that the judgement may be seen as a partial revision of tire judgement in case 263/86 Humbel, 
due to the stretched notion o f ‘remuneration’ (Hatzopoulos 2002, p. 693).
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However, as radical as this step seemed, and as openly as it overruled the opinions of the member 
governments, the subsequent reasoning o f the Court still appeared to be a compromise between law 
and politics. At the same time as the Court ruled prior authorisation policies to be barriers to the 
free movement o f serv ices, it found that such a barrier may be justified by the need for cost- 
containment and for capacity' planning through contracts with providers. Thus, while not overtly 
disqualifying the national means of control, the Court stated that prior authorisation policies arc 
only justified under certain conditions. The criteria for granting authorisation must be objective, 
non-discriminatory and known in advance, so that the discretion of national authorities is not 
exercised arbitrarily (see furthermore the analysis of chapter V, section 3.5).
The impact of the Smits-Peerbooms ruling on the diverging health care schemes has been debated 
collectively as well as in the individual member states, but still remains to be clarified (Interview, 
Danish Interior and Health Ministry*, 12 December 2002 & 9 October 2003). So far, the effect of the 
ruling remains somewhat abstract, since there has been no collective political stance, nor clear 
indiv idual reactions. On the other hand, contradictory* analysis of its eventual impact has caused 
considerable confusion.
Such confusion was represented by the dispute between a professor of social law, Kirsten Ketscher 
and head of section in the Danish Ministry* of Health, John Erik Pedersen. Ketscher did not hesitate 
to announce that the ruling in principle -  and only w ith few exceptions - had institutionalised a free 
hospital choice in the European Union (Ugcskrift for Larger, September 2001; Politiken 20 
December 2001; Jyllands-Postcn 26. May 2002; Politiken 6. June 2002). Her interpretation was 
immediately rejected by Pedersen, w ho as the government's representative had a much more literal 
reading of the ruling (Pedersen 2001; Politiken 20 December 2001; Jyllands-Postcn 26 May 2001): 
"Contrary to w hat has been said in the press, the judgement does not oblige the member states to finance hospital 
treatment outside the planned and agreement covered scope -  also not abroad. On the contrary, the essence of the 
judgement is that access to hospitals outside the planned scope can be conditioned by a prior authorisation, but 
that tire rules on authorisation have to be based on objective criteria and be non-discriminatory, that is hospitals in 
other EU-member states shall be treated equally with domestic hospitals, which are outside the planned scope" 
(Pedersen 2001; pp. 6009-6010, own translation).
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As also emphasised by Pedersen, the different interpretations o f the impact of the judgement 
seemed to be due to confusion or disagreement as to what were the general premises o f the Court’s 
conclusions and which were specifically addressing Dutch legislation. The judgement considered 
the two Dutch conditions for granting authorisation for a treatment abroad; that the treatment should 
be regarded as "normal' within the medical circles concerned, and that authorisation is only given if 
it appears that appropriate treatment cannot be provided without "undue delay’ in the Netherlands. 
Thus, the Court concluded that the specific Dutch conditions could only have "ultra partes’ effect if 
such conditions were equivalent with conditions in the national legislations of other member states.
The government official took the view that the judgement's impact on Danish policy was to be 
found primarily in its potential. According to Pedersen, the judgement did not question Danish 
authorisation policy in itself, since it was explained by the need for cost-containment and capacity- 
planning. At the time of judicial decision-making and the more immediate subsequent dispute, 
Danish health policy did not have any condition equivalent to the Dutch one that treatment had to 
be offered without "undue delay'. The senior official therefore rejected the view that this part of the 
legal reasoning had any impact on Danish policy. However, regarding the other Dutch condition, 
that a treatment had to be considered "normal’, it was admitted to have certain similarities with the 
Danish rule, at the time at which he w as writing (October 2001), that authorisation would not be 
given to ‘experimentar treatment abroad.326 The impact o f the Court's reasoning would therefore be 
that what nationally was held as "normal', on one hand, and as ‘experimental’ on the other, should 
rely on international medical science and not only on Danish medical considerations. The senior 
official and later the Minister of Health, however, refused to agree that Danish praxis was not 
already founded on international medical science (Pedersen 2001; Answ er by Danish Minister for 
the Interior and Health, to § 20 Parliamentary Question no. S 1946, 26 February 2003).
Nevertheless, it seems probable that this second premise of the ruling over time has had a derivative 
effect on Danish authorisation policy. Cher the years, Denmark has had cases before the 
administration, the social appeal authority and national courts concerning patients who had been 
denied authorisation or cost reimbursement for treatments abroad, because of the treatment's 
"experimentar status (Answer by the Danish Minister of Health 10. January 2001 to Parliamentary 
Question no. 1010; Interviews, Danish Ministry of Health, 3. April 2001 & 12 December 2002;
3> According to historical executive order no. 31 o f 19/02/2001, §21.
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Jyllands-posten 26 May 2002). A derived impact of the SmitsPeerbooms ruling may be that the 
border line between what constitutes a ‘normal' treatment as opposed to an ‘experimental' one, has 
been blurred and is no longer solely nationally defined. If the majorin’ of other member states 
consider a treatment ‘standard', but one or a few member states define it as ‘experimental*, does 
this then mean that the latter disregard the stance of ‘international medical science’? By questioning 
the objectivity of definitions, the judicial reasoning thus gave new flesh to a national dispute, 
exemplified in the cases where Denmark had denied reimbursement of treatment costs for stereo 
tactical radiation treatment in Sweden, which according to Denmark is an ‘experimentar treatment, 
but which in Sweden and Italy counts as ‘standard' (Jyllands-Posten 26. May 2002; Answer by the 
Danish Minister of Health 10. January 2001 to Parliamentary question no. 1010). By the recent 
change in the Danish authorisation policy, according to which patients whose lives arc at risk may 
receive experimental treatment at a private Danish hospital or in a hospital abroad, Denmark has 
opened up its system to non-standard foreign health supply.327 With this policy reform, Denmark 
has institutionalised an opportunity to avoid litigation with regard to its definition of ‘experimental' 
and ‘standard' treatment by legislating to allow the former. This policy-reform, and the previous 
one which allow ed research-related treatments abroad328, break fundamentally with recent Danish 
praxis. Against this background, it is interesting to sec how the Minister of Health recently linked 
the judicial decision-making in Smits-Pcerbooms and the national policy-reform:
“The Dutch rule has similarities to the Danish rule, according to which a highly specialised treatment abroad 
cannot be authorised, if the treatment is experimental or alternative. It must be assumed that the European Court 
of Justice would reason that also this rule should be interpreted on the basis of international medicine. In 
Demnark, it is the National Board of Health which decides or gives its opinion in such cases based primarily on 
Danish expertise, but the foundation thereof is international medical science. [....] Besides, I note that the latest 
amendments o f the Danish rules have opened up the possibility that Danish patients in certain cases on the basis of 
a recommendation front a second-opinion-panel can be authorised to have experimental treatment abroad. The 
panel may include foreign expertise" (Danish Minister for the Interior and Health. Lars Lokke Rasmussen, 
answering § 20 Parliamentary Question no. S 1946,26 February 2003, own translation).
Besides this indirect link, the Smits-Peerbooms ruling has had a more direct impact on Danish 
policy formulation. As part of the liberal/conservative government's programme, patients have, 
since 1 July 2002, had a right to treatment outside the contracted public hospitals, if these cannot
3r See executive order no. 564 of 20/06/2003 in force, § 26 and historical executive order no. 1162 of 16/12/2002, § 26.
3:8 Historical executive order no. 31 of 19/01/2001, § 22.
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provide the necessary treatment within two months. The intentions behind the policy reform were to 
reduce the waiting lists and ensure the patient a certain free choice, in the case of insufficient public 
health supply. By this health policy reform, Denmark institutionalised an obligation to refer patients 
to non-contracted health care providers, if public care could not be provided within the specific time 
limit o f two months. Danish health policy thereby institutionalised a criterion resembling the Dutch 
one of ‘undue delay". The ECJ’s judicial decision-making had thus conditioned national policy- 
formulation, by laying down that once a treatment cannot be provided by the contracted national 
provider, the member state must not favour a nationally established non-contracted, i.e. private, 
provider over a provider in another member state. Remarks in the proposal o f this national policy- 
reform clearly indicate its relation with EC-law:
The European Court of Justice has in a judgement dated 12 July 2001 (C-l 57/99) taken a stand on certain EU 
judicial questions regarding hospital treatment. The Court has stated that hospitalisation is part of the EC-Treaty's 
provisions on free movement o f services. The need for planning and cost-containment can, however, justify 
certain restrictions on access to treatment paid by the public health service or health insurance. Such rules shall, 
however, be objective, proportional and non-discriminatory. Supposedly, that implies that when access to publicly 
paid treatment is given to independent' hospitals outside public control and planning, as is the case in the present 
legislative proposal, there has to be given access on an equal footing w ith hospitals in other EU member states. 
The legislative proposal is in conformity therewith (Legislative proposal L 64, proposed 29 January 2002. 
Adopted 19 March 2002. Own translation.).
The adoption of this policy reform and its national re-interpretation demonstrate how the ECJ 
decision intervened upon national autonomy to decide on the spatial consumption of health care. In 
its policy formulation, the Danish government re-interpreted its Community obligations to stipulate 
that free access to private, nationally established hospitals could not be favoured over hospitals in 
other member states. Furthermore, the national compliance with the Court's decision-making 
furthermore demonstrates that the impact need not be immediate, but may appear when new policy 
initiatives are formulated. New policies which have been formulated in accordance with EU 
obligations cause a greater compatibility over time between supranational and national institutions, 
thus reducing ‘adaptive pressure'. The impact appears more discrete but is equally effective as 
when for example it appears as a preliminary reference or as the result of an infringement 
procedure. As the effectiveness of EC law increases, such indirect impacts arc more likely to occur, 
but which may, due to their more discrete appearance, evade our theoretical and analy tical attention. 
They may, however, be veiy influential on future policy formulation:
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‘i t  is of course a completely political question whether a general free choice of private Danish hospitals shall be 
introduced but should that be the case, the judgement may imply that a free choice of hospitals in other member 
states on equal conditions will have to be introduced" (Pedersen 2001, p. 6010, own translation).
2.8: An Internal Health Market fo r Non-Hospital Care
Since member governments respond to judicial decision-making with a certain delay’, it is hardly 
surprising that the MiiUer-Faure & Van Riet judgement of 13 May 2003 has so far had no 
identifiable impact on national legislation. The Courtis reasoning here is indeed interesting since it 
answers not only some of the national confusions and questions raised in the wake of the 
Decker-Kohll procedure, but also issues raised by the Danish policy reform in this regard and the 
Smit-Peerbooms ruling. On the one hand, the MiiUer-Faure e£ Van Riet case rejects the idea that the 
previous judicial precedent has institutionalised a free hospital choice within Europe, which had 
been suggested in academic circles as well as in the press (Ketchcr 2002: Jyllands-Postcn 26 May, 
2002; Information 27 May, 2002). However, on the other hand, the provisional conclusion of this 
cluster of judgements regarding national health service and Community law makes clear that:
• The fundamental principle of freedom to provide services applies to all health care systems, 
including those based on benefits in kind. The Danish residence-based, public health care 
system, providing benefits in kind and financed out of taxes is thus not exempted from the 
Court's conclusions.
• There need not be an element o f remuneration or profit for a service to be a health care service 
within the meaning of the Treaty. Thus, it is clear that the restrictive application of the 
Decker Kohll ruling, as laid down in the Danish report and the subsequent policy’ reform, is no 
longer in line with Community obligations.
• The Decker Kohll ruling applies in general to non-hospital provision of health care.
Thus, the conclusions of the MiiUer-Faure Van Riet case arc a serious blow to the national refusal 
to reimburse costs for non-hospital care. In the Danish case, this means that the conclusions of the 
Decker Kohll report and the national change of law will have to be revised. It can hardly be upheld 
that persons insured in group 1 should not enjoy the same freedom as those in group 2 to purchase 
non-hospital care outside Danish territory, including the long line of health services that the report 
at first excluded on the basis of its conditional definition of services (see footnote 321 above). The 
list of health care services which can be purchased in another member state without prior
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authorisation should therefore be extended. However, as was evident from the parliamentary debate 
regarding the restricted application of the Decker/Kohll procedure, that should be fully in line with 
the ideological preferences of the Danish government now in power. Liberalising health care 
provisions across national borders should therefore involve less conflict nowadays, than when the 
original step towards an internal health market was taken.
2.9: D om estic Impact Readdressed
The gradual institutionalisation of intra-Europe an social security has impacted on the accessibility 
and scope of Danish welfare in a most fundamental way, by setting aside the national principles of 
social citizenship and territoriality.
The effective meaning of institutionalisation as transposed through national implementation has, 
however, not been immediate nor systematic. Since Danish implementation has not been contested 
by preliminary references, judicial decision-making should, according to the Conant hypothesis of 
’contained compliance*, have no significant effect, since preliminary references have no *erga 
omnes' (generally binding) or ‘ultra partes* (beyond the parties) effects (Conant 2002, p. 63).
My analysis o f the impact on the Danish member state, however, points to the contrary conclusion. 
If analysed over time, judicial decision-making became part o f national legal reasoning as well as of 
national administrative practice. That is, among other examples, proven by the multilateral effect of 
the Cabanis-Issarte ruling, which is likely to. in part, cause the exportability of certain social 
services which previously were held to be outside the material scope of 1408 and demarcated within 
Danish borders. The multilateral effect of ECJ ruling is furthermore substantiated by the Danish 
acceptance of the Decker Kohl! procedure's general premises, although the procedure has been 
initially' rcstrictively applied.
The domestic impact of a given political or judicial decision cannot be denied on the basis of a 
short-term analysis of cause and effect. As in the case of supranational institutionalisation, the 
domestic impact reveals itself gradually and, at times, very discretely. The time variable stands out 
as significant since its effective meaning through national implementation may, in one extreme 
case, be established after a delay o f 20 years. As the effectiveness and precise meaning of
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Community law institutionalises and becomes more concrete, its impact will likewise increase. In 
between the original cause and the ultimate effect is the decisive layer of national 
institutionalisation, in which political and administrative reinterpretation, in the context o f national 
institutions, transforms the sometimes abstract meaning of supranational institutions into concrete 
enforceable rules.
3.0: D om estic impacts on the insurance Based Welfare State
Germany has indeed responded differently from Denmark to the supranational institutionalisation of 
social security rights. As a founding father of the Community, Germany took part in the original 
negotiations on the very restricted liberalisation of labour movement and cross border social 
security entitlements that those very few workers of ‘proven qualification' could receive (see 
chapter III). Since then, German governments, national courts and German migrants have been very 
active in influencing the development o f intra-European social security rights.
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In this section, the German response to, and the impact of. the supranational institutionalisation 
process will be analysed. First, the personal and material scope of cross border German welfare will 
briefly be depicted. Second, the German response to supranational institutionalisation will be 
examined. The German response differs from the Danish response since it contains a very important 
judicial dimension. German courts have been among the most active formulators of preliminary 
references to the European Court o f Justice, which is likely to have influenced the impact of 
supranational institutionalisation on German welfare institutions. The next four sections will 
specifically discuss the European impact on German welfare institutions. The third section concerns 
pension policy, the fourth family benefits, ihc fifth long term care benefits and the final analytical 
section compares the impact of the Dccker/Kohll ruling on German health care policy with that of 
the Danish.
3.1: Cross Border German W elfare
An ‘employed' person has a most extensive meaning according to the definition given in German 
legislation. All persons compulsorily or voluntarily insured in the German sickness scheme qualify 
as an 'employed' person according to Regulation 1408. As described in chapter VI, section 3.2, 
such a definition entitles a wide set o f personal categories to the protection provided by 1408, i.e.
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around 90% of the German population. Students and persons employed only a few hours a week in 
Germany are covered by 1408/71 (Haverlate & Huster 1999. p. 97). Therefore, in comparison with 
Denmark, Germany never faced the same political problem or financial impact o f extending the 
Regulation to new personal categories, such as, for example, students, since they were already 
included (Interviews, German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 17 September 2001 ; 
Deutsche Verbindungsstelle, 18 September 2001). Furthermore, German legislation docs not in 
principle distinguish between Germans and foreigners (Zulecg 1985, p. 300). German welfare 
schemes are therefore not organised along the same nation-based principle of social citizenship as 
certain Danish schemes, for which reason extensions to the personal scope may not have been as 
politically problematic for the German government.
Nevertheless, some of the most important case law of the European Court has concerned the 
personal scope, as implemented in German legislation. Decisive cases such as C-85/96 Sala and the 
joined cases C-95/99 to C-98/99 Khalil and others, discussed in chapter IV, have addressed the 
conditions defined in German law for foreigners' entitlement to the universally granted child benefit 
and child raising allowance. The cases highlight that while foreigners, in principle, enjoy equal 
rights, they may still have to fulfil additional conditions, such as the possession of a residence 
permit. Applying the principle of equal treatment, that condition was overruled by the Court in the 
Sala case, but permitted in the cases of Khalil and others, since there had been no movement 
betw een member states.
Those persons who, according to the German definition, qualify as 'employed' and fulfil the 
German conditions for entitlements arc granted equal access to a w ide range of social security 
benefits: medical care: hospital care: cash sickness benefits; long term care: benefits for accidents at 
work and occupational diseases; invalidity pension; death grant; normal retirement pension; early 
pension; old age pension for women; survivors benefits; unemployment benefits: child benefits and 
child raising allowance (European Commission; "Your Social Security Rights w hen Moving Within 
the European Union” (2002 update), pp. 34-43). A long line of preliminary references before the 
European Court of Justice and cases before national courts have rendered more precise the material 
scope according to German legislation. The main point of controversy, as will be demonstrated in 
the analysis below, has clearly been the contradiction between the Community principle o f
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exportability and the national principle of territoriality, as formulated in German social security 
policies.
3.2: Judicial Requests by Germ an Courts
In the context o f a Danish - German comparison, the two countries differ most remarkably in their 
record of referring preliminar)’ questions to the European Court of Justice. In contrast to Denmark, 
German national courts have continually tested and questioned the scope and content o f Regulation 
1408/71 by preliminary references, and thus, from time to time, have been forced to admit rights 
due to a direct legal injunction. However, as pointed out in section 1.2 of the present chapter, this 
may not simply reflect a higher Danish compliance with its Community obligations, but rather a 
more litigiousness German society, a greater legal tradition of referring EU points of law to the 
ECJ, and the fact that Germany has social court at all levels of the federal state. Such cultural and 
institutional differences must produce a different reference record.
On a political account, Germany likewise contrasts with the Danish case. Germany has generally 
been in favour of further integration and has been supportive of the Commission's proposals to 
extend the personal and material scope of the Regulation. The German government thus supported 
the extension o f the regulatory scope to include third country nationals and did not make any 
political or legal objections to the original proposal COM (98) 779 (Interviews, Deutsche 
Vcrbindungsslcllc, 18 September 2001; Bundcsministerium fiir Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 17 
September 2001). In like manner, the German government has supported the remaining dimension 
of the simplification proposal, and has thus been in favour of the parts of the proposals that have 
been controversial for Denmark, such as the inclusion of non-active persons and prc-rctircmcnt 
benefits.
Although this political stance gives the impression that cross border welfare has been an 
unproblematic issue for Germany, the impression left by its preliminar)7 reference record points to 
the contrary. As demonstrated in the analysis carried out in chapter II on the European Court of 
Justice's judgements which concerned Regulation 1408/71, Germany holds the second largest 
number of preliminar)’ references and infringements procedures of all member states between 1971 
and 2002. In total, there have been 338 judgements between 1971 and 2002 in which 1408 was
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concerned as an instrument. Out of these 338 judgements, 85 were preliminary references by 
German national courts and 1 judgment was an infringement procedure against Germany. 25% of 
all the case-law was against Germany. Only Belgium outdoes Germany with 32.5% (see chapter II, 
section 4.5).
This means that German national courts have taken a most active part in questioning and enhancing 
the scope, impact and effectiveness o f EC-law. Appendix 2 depicts the German share of ECJ 
litigation with reference to Regulation 1408. The details of the 86 cases are listed in the appendix: 
that is; the year of judgement, the referring court, and the Article of 1408/71 referred to in the case. 
Furthermore, those cases concerning Articles 2, 3, 4, 10 and 22329 have been analysed in more 
detail, in order to find out whether the ECJ concluded in favour of the migrant or not. This analysis 
on the basis of these five selected Articles should give us an insight into what extent the European 
Court generally rules against national legislation and administrative praxis, and finds in favour of 
the migrant. The cases concerning the five Articles are emphasised in the appendix.
0 \e r the three decades in which 1408 has applied, German national courts have persistently 
questioned the scope and content of the Regulation, as well as the consistency between national 
policies and European obligations. Migrants and German national courts have played a vital role in 
enhancing the effectiveness of EC law and generating concrete intra-European social security 
rights, as appendix 2 and graph 8 here belo\v illustrate:
Article 2 concerns the personal scope o f Regulation 1408/71. Article 3 the principle of equal treatment. Article 4 the 
material scope. Article 10 the waiver of residence clause. Article 22 concerns medical treatment beyond national 
borders.
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Graph 8: German References and Procedures regarding 1408/71
However, a closer examination of the German preliminary reference record regarding 1408/71 
challenges the theoretical propositions put forward by scholars examining the relation between law 
and politics. The analytical findings o f the present study questions the theoretical deductions given 
by Conant, Stone Sweet et al., as well as by Garrett et al., which were discussed in chapter II.
Firstly, it is not correct that due to its ‘fit' between contribution-based social insurance and the 
logics of Regulation 1408 Germany should have ‘"fewer conflicts with European obligations related 
to social security", as argued by Conant (Conant 2001, pp. 112-113). Conant's assumption is based 
on the data base compiled by Stone Sweet according to which Germany only accounts for 8% of all 
European litigation in the field of ‘social security' (Conant 2001, p. 111). What the label ‘social 
security' includes is not specified, but looking at Regulation 1408/71 as the core regulative 
legislation on social security in the Community, the conclusion is not correct. My findings therefore 
ultimately question whether the distinction between ‘fit'/'misfit', or ‘compatible'/*incompatible' is 
very useful when it comes to the instrument of preliminary references. At least, in the context of a 
Danish/Gcrman comparison, the distinction misleads rather than accounts for the extent to which 
citizens and national courts refer issues to the European Court of Justice. Although the principles 
and criteria of Danish welfare institutions appear to be more incompatible with European 
obligations than the German ones, German courts have referred the second highest number of 
preliminary references. Danish courts, on the other hand, have taken no active part in the 
enhancement o f European law regarding social security. Instead of assuming that differences of
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adaptive pressure between national and European institutions make it possible to explain the 
varying use of the instrument of preliminary references across member states, it seems more likely 
that such a difference relates to other factors such as the litigiousness of society, legal traditions of 
referring EU points of law, as well as the existence and accessibility of social courts.
Secondly, the analysis of the Court's conclusions regarding the five Articles does not suggest that a 
preliminary reference generally means that national policies or administrative practices are deemed 
to be incompatible, and that European competencies in this regard are extended. Thus, preliminary 
references may not be the core component which triggers the ‘virtuous cycle', or the self-sustaining 
dynamics towards ‘more Europe’, as has been argued by Stone Sweet et al. (Stone Sweet & 
Sandholtz 1998, pp. 4-5, p. 16; Stone Sweet & Brunei1 1998, p. 64, p. 72). Out of the 86 German 
cases, 36 relate to one of these five Articles. As has been argued in the introduction to this thesis, 
the present study on European institutionalisation of social security rights has chosen to examine the 
development of precisely these five Articles, because they represent the core contents and principles 
of the Regulations and directly challenge the organising welfare principles of the member state. 
However, the examination of these 36 rulings do not support Slone Sweet ct al.'s theoretical 
proposition on self-sustaining dynamics in the relation between law and politics. Out of the 36 
cases. 18 were ruled in favour of the migrants, which thus found national law or practice 
inconsistent w ith European obligations, but, in the other 18 cases, the Court did not rule in favour of 
the migrant. Such an empirical finding points to the fact that dispute resolution certainly docs not 
always lead to deeper integration. Therefore -  at least in the field of social security -  there is no 
simple self-sustaining dynamic between transnational exchange, judicial activity and rule 
production. Judicial activism may in fact confirm national rules and practices, thus taking a reactive 
stance and confirming the status quo.
However, that being said, litigation against Germany contains some of the most important cases in 
the history of European coordination of social security rights, such as, C-10/90 Masgio: C-45/90 
Paletta; C-245/94 & C-312/94 Hoever &- Zachow\ C-131/96 Romero; C-160/96 Moienaar, and C- 
85/96 Sala. They were all rulings in favour of the migrant, and some of the cases questioned 
fundamental aspects of German law and its organising principles. These cases furthermore 
enhanced the general scope of intra-European social securin' law. Therefore the ECJ's social 
security' litigation against Germany likew ise refutes the theoretical assumption that the Court tends
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to act cautiously towards the more powerful member states, as has been put forward by Garrett 
(Garrett 1992; Garrett 1995). In social security matters, the Court has overtly ruled against the 
express political preferences of the member state.
In several cases, the ECJ has ruled against the territoriality of the insurance-based welfare state and 
challenged conditions, formulated in national law, defining who has a right to German welfare. 
Over the decades, the impact of EC-law has become much more obvious in national policies. When 
national policies have been constructed so as to evade Community obligations, the national courts 
and the European Court have subsequently brought them into line. In the formulation of national 
social policy initiatives, the impact of Community law is increasingly likely to be taken into 
account, since compliance is subsequently monitored through cases brought before the Court. The 
impact may, however, also be felt by the omission of particular policy options when alternatives are 
being considered. The next section demonstrates how Community law came to influence the 
German discussion on a minimum pension.
3.3: Im pact on Domestic Policy Reforms -  a Germ an Supplementary Pension?
The case-law of the European Court of Justice has had a major impact on the interaction between
German and European social law. As will be demonstrated below, German politicians have 
constructed national legislation in such a way as to evade Community obligations and have, from 
time to time, spoken out strongly against the judicial activism of the Court. Likewise, politicians 
have pointed to the integrative praxis of the Court as an argument against new social initiatives 
(Langer 1999c, pp. 54-55).
As was seen in chapter VI section 2.2, a minimum pension has recurrently been debated in 
Germany. In the late 1980s, a supplementäry pension scheme was proposed (Conant 2002, p. 194). 
The aim was to allow pensioners, whose income fell below the social assistance level, a supplement 
to their old-age pension, and thus for them not to depend on social assistance (Zuleeg 1988, pp. 
621-622). Initially' the proposal enjoyed broad support from both the Social Democrats and the 
Christian Democrats. The proposal formulated that that all persons with habitual residence in 
Germany would be entitled to the allowance, but that the principle of territoriality would also apply 
(Zuleeg 1988. p. 622). The proposal thus clarified that the benefit could not be exported. At the 
same time as its content w as being debated, the European Court of Justice initiated its course of
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legal innovation where certain benefits with characteristics which fell between social security and 
social assistance were ruled to be exportable (see chapter V, sections 2.1 & 2.2). The German 
government was notified that if a scheme o f supplementary pension allowance was adopted, the 
applied principle of territoriality would most likely be found to contradict Community law (Zulccg 
1988). The prospect of having to make the benefit exportable beyond national borders made the 
German government abandon its initiative. The gradual clarification of Community law concerning 
benefits which fell between social security and social assistance, initiated by the Court, thus 
restricted German policy options. The fact that the innovative ruling of the Court was later 
overruled politically only substantiates the fact that the relation between Community law and 
national policies establishes and clarifies itself gradually. It furthermore demonstrates that the 
domestic impact o f Community law may vary over time and thus also the autonomy to formulate 
national policies according to political preferences.
3.4: Judicial Injunction -  th e  Issue o f Family B enefits
One of the social policy areas where Germany has had most confrontation with the European Court 
of Justice has been concerning family benefits. The special nature of the policy scheme within the 
social insurance welfare model is part o f the explanation. German family benefits arc granted 
universally on a non-con tribu tory basis (see chapter VI, section 3.4). As a scheme, family 
allowances contradict a ‘Bismarkian’ notion of social security, and therefore also the general 
principles of 1408.
The national institutionalisation of family benefits constituted an important part of the post-war 
development of welfare. Parallel institutionalisation patterns arc to be found in other member states. 
German child benefit was introduced in 1955. The grant o f the benefit originally depended on work- 
position and residence in Germany, and was only granted from the third child onward. In 1961, it 
was extended to the second child. In 1964, the condition of work-position was abandoned and the 
grant depended only on German residence. From 1975, child benefit was granted from the first 
child (Interviews, Bundcsanstalt fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 25 September 2001). The principle 
of territoriality was maintained all through the national institutionalisation process. In 1986, the 
German child raising allowance became the other family benefit scheme. The grant of a child- 
raising allowance was also in national policy, made dependent on residence within Germany.
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As emphasised in the general description of access to German welfare (sec section 3.1 above). 
German welfare policies are not organised on the principle of social citizenship. However, since 
1994, the universal family benefits has clearly restricted accessibility. From January 1994 onwards, 
the Federal Law on Child Benefit and the Federal Law on Child Raising Allowance, have required 
foreigners to possess a residence entitlement or permit in order to be eligible for the two family 
benefits. The insertion of that requirement means that family policies indirectly favour German 
citizens. % ,
On the other hand, the ECJ's litigation concerning German family allowances has generally 
favoured the European migrant and has led to various groundbreaking rulings -  from which it has 
become increasingly clear that national conditions and principles have to be formulated in 
accordance with Community law. As discussed in detail in chapter IV, section 1.2, in the Sola case, 
the Court found the residence requirement incompatible with Community law for a non-active 
Community national with legal residence in Germany. Taught by experience. Germany has 
specified, in the recent amendment of 1408 to third country nationals, that only third country 
nationals with a residence permit arc entitled to the German family benefit (annex to Regulation no. 
859/2003). The German insertion of this specific condition marks its general cautiousness 
concerning its universal, non-contributory allowance and the historical experience of when case-law 
overruled the political intention behind the allowance.
One important case before the Court was 191/83 Salzano330, in which German administrative 
practice was found to be inconsistent with its Community obligations. The Court concluded that, 
although the family stayed in another member state, the migrant worker was entitled to child benefit 
in Germany, since the mother did not fulfil the conditions for entitlement to family allowance from 
her member state (Italy) of w ork and the residence place of the children.
Two other notable cases were C-228/88 Bronzino331 and C-12/89 Gatto332. The cases laid down that 
child benefit granted for unemployed youth should not only be paid out within Germany, but also in
3,0 Case 191/83, 13 November 1984. F. .1. Salzano vBundesanstaltfurArheii - Kindergeldka.sse. ECR 1984, p. 3741.
331 Case C-228/88,22 February 1990. Giovanni Bronzino vKimlergehikasse. ECR 1990,p. 1-0531.
332 Case C-12/89,22 February 1990. Antonio Gatto v Bundesan.staltft'ir Arbeit. ECR 1990, p. 1-0557.
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other member states. According to German legislation, unemployed youth are entitled to family 
benefit if the young person remains available for employment through an unemployment office in 
Germany. The cases affirmed the de-territorialising effect of the Regulation’s Article 73 concerning 
family benefit, laying down that the unemployed young person of a migrant worker was still 
entitled to child benefit even though he/she looked for employment in another member state (in this 
case in Italy) and registered with an unemployment office there (Interviews, Bundesanstalt fur 
Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 25 September 2001; Comelissen 1997, p. 38; Altmaier 1995, p. 84). The 
political intention behind granting child benefit to the unemployed youth of workers was to fight 
youth unemployment and, as pointed out by Steinmeyer, it had hardly been German policy intention 
to fight also youth unemployment in other member states (Steinmeyer 1995, p. 90). The ruling of 
the Court is another illustrative example of how Community law restrain policies, which are strictly 
national in their aim.
Perhaps the most frequently discussed cases concerning German family benefit were the joined 
cases C-245/94 & C-312/94 Hoever & Zachow (for a detailed analysis, sec chapter V, section 1.3). 
When Germany introduced its new social benefit on the child raising allowance, it was not 
considered to be a family benefit within the meaning of 1408. Child benefit meant family benefit, 
and the aim of the child raising allowance was considered to be different, not being primarily to 
support the family, but to make it possible for the parent to stay home with the child during the first 
two years of its life (Eichenhofer 1997, p. 450; Igl 1997, p. 97). Identical benefits w ere adopted in 
other member states during the late 1980s and 1990s, and thus represented a new development in 
the more generous welfare states where an alternative to (or a compensation for the lack of) public 
care was institutionalised (Altmaier 1995, p. 86).333 The Court ruled that the benefit constituted a 
family benefit according to the Regulation and that the benefit was exportable. Furthermore, the 
Court applied the Cabanis-Issarte premise, concluding that the distinction between individual and 
derived rights for the family member did not apply in the case of family benefit. The Hoever & 
Zachow cases are thus another example of the 'ultra partes' effect of a judgement. As likew isc 
demonstrated in the analysis conducted on Denmark, the system of preliminary ruling contains in 
effect binding precedent. Contrary to the argument of Conant. subsequent case-law, referred by 
other member states, indicate that the ruling of the Court established a multilateral effect (Conant
w  For the Danish case, see the discussion in section 2.4 above. For the case of Finland, an identical type of family 
allowance was ruled to be exportable in the recent case of C-333/00 Maaheimo.
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2002, pp. 63-73). In addition, the Hoever & Zachow rulings exemplify how a member state 
subsequently accommodates the individual lawsuit. The Hoever & Zachow case-law rejected the 
way in which national politicians had defined a benefit, and thus impacted on their ability to 
formulate autonomously the conditions and direct the objectives of a social allowance. Furthermore, 
the implementation of the litigation was considered to have a large financial impact due to its dc- 
territorialisation and the extension o f the right to the family members of the migrant worker 
(Interview, German Federal Ministry o f Labour and Social Affairs, 17 September 2001).
Against this background, the German member state should have every reason to evade the 
judgement, to apply it rcstrictively or try to overturn it politically, thus confirming Conanfs 
contained compliance hypothesis, and the assumption of Garrett, Kelcmen and Schultz that the 
more powerful member states will simply not abide by an adverse ruling, but will try to reverse it. 
The German accommodation of the litigation points to how important the time-variable is when 
analysing the institutionalisation process, the limits of European law or, on the contrary, the 
effectiveness thereof. In the short term, German}’ did not comply with the judgement, since it did 
not, by authoritative instruction, implement the decision in national legislation (Becker 2000, p. 14). 
However, the German member state complied in the longer run. By June 2000, the German 
parliament adopted an amendment of the federal law' on the child raising allowance 
(Bundescrziehungsgcsctz), where one aim was to comply with the Community law as stated by the 
Court (Becker 2000, p. 23). The somewhat late German compliance demonstrates that delayed 
compliance is not the same as non-compliance, just as it is not the same as contained compliance. It 
thus affirms the need for a diachronic analysis when studying national impact.
3.5: Exportability Imposed -  Long Term Care Benefits
Long term care represents another, late institutionalisation by the German welfare state, the relation 
of which Community law had to be clarified. The classification of long term care as cither a social 
assistance allowance or social security benefit has proven to be far from obvious, and varies 
between member states according to how the benefit is provided; as benefit in kind, or benefit in 
cash (Schulte 1998b, p. 144). The German Molenaar case, discussed in chapter V section 1.4, laid 
down that, in order to decide whether a benefit is covered by Regulation 1408 and is exportable.
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depends on the characteristics o f the national allowance. In the Molenaar case, the Court ruled that 
the German ‘Pflegegeld' was to be exported according to the Regulation.
How to provide security against the risk of long term nursing care became one of the most debated 
welfare policy issues in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s (Igl & Stadelmann 1998. pp. 37-38). The 
objective behind the adoption of the national policy was to construct a scheme relieving those in 
need of long term care from the social stigma of receiving social assistance. Many different reform 
initiatives were discussed, but finally, in accordance with the general tradition of the social 
insurance welfare state, an insurance-based solution was adopted.
The German legislator had clearly constructed the social scheme so as to avoid the exportability of 
the allowance (Haverkate & Huster 1999, p. 148; Hustcr 1999. p. 12; Fiisscr 1997, p. 32)B4 The 
German government had attempted to pre-empt exportability’ by formulating the benefit as a 
‘benefit in kind-substitute', a ‘Sachleistungssurrogat', thus avoiding the Community waiver of the 
residence clause for benefits in cash (Interview, Deutsche Verbindungsstelle, 18 September 2001; 
Zulccg 1998).
The political reaction in the wake of the Molenaar case was initially that its implementation would 
have a significant financial impact (Haverkate & Huster 1999, p. 157). While the possibility- of 
simply not complying with the decision was debated, the German government finally chose to abide 
by the ruling of the Court (Langer 1999c, p. 54). It later transpired that the financial implication of 
the Molenaar premises proved not to be as extensive as first assumed, since not too many 
beneficiaries of long term care have applied for the allowance abroad (Interv iew. German Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 17 September 2001). Although the initial national 
perceptions of the litigation's financial impact later proved to be overstated, the case was another 
fundamental restriction of the German autonomy to organise a national scheme around the principle 
of territoriality’. It furthermore demonstrates that, although a policy may be constructed in order to 
evade Community obligations, the sustainability’ thereof may equally have to be tested before the 
Court. Pre-emption as a policy response may therefore only hold Community- law in check in the 
short term.
m  The residence clause was set out explicitly in 34.1.1 in Socialgesetzbueh XI.
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3.6: Tow ards an Internal Health Market?
German statutory* health care is supplied to those covered by a health insurance fund, i.e. around 
90% of the population, and usually is delivered as benefits in kind by contracted providers (see 
table 12, in section 2.5 above).
In 1997 those insured under the statutory scheme were given the possibility' to choose 
reimbursement o f their health care serv ice, instead of services supplied as benefits in kind. The 
objective of the policy reform was to make the financing of the system more transparent for the 
patient and give the health insurance fund more influence over quality, cost-containment and 
efficiency (Palm 2000, p. 44).
Germany generally provides its statutory health care within its ow n borders. That means that, as an 
important main principle, the insured person's entitlement to benefits from the health insurance 
fund is suspended when that person stays outside the German territory .335 However, an exception to 
the general principle is made when a particular treatment is only possible abroad.336 The exception 
applies where the treatment is considered medically necessary and cannot be provided in Germany 
(Interview. Deutsche Verbindungsstelle, 18 September 2001; Becker 1998, p. 362; Becker 2000, p. 
15). The German conditions for authorising treatment abroad thus resemble the Danish conditions. 
Furthermore, the provisions of Regulation 1408/71 set aside the German territorial principle, as in 
all other member states.
The German government initially spoke out very strongly against the Decker Kohll judgements. 
The former German Minister of Health. Seehofer, argued quite impetuously in the wake of the 
judgements, saying that the member states had to overturn the rulings by a Treaty amendment and 
that Germany would not comply with the premises of the judgements (Langer 1999c. p. 54; Börsen, 
7. May 1998; Politiken 9. June 1998). The ex-minister found the Dcckcr/Kohll case-law 
revolutionary and argued that if Germany adopted its premises, it would be a long term threat to the 
sustainability of the German health system (Spiegel 17/98, Fokus from 4 May 1998; Schaaf 1999,
m  The territorial principle for German statutory health care is laid down by Sozialgcselzbuch V, § 16 (1) (1) and reads: 
"Der Anspruch auf Leistungen ruht, solange Versicherte 1) sich im Ausland aulhalten, und zwar auch dann, w enn sie 
dort wahrend eines vorübergehenden Aufenthalts erkranken, soweit in diesem Gesetzbuch nichts Abweichendes 
bestimmt ist, (...]".
As laid down in Sozialgesetzbuch V, § 18(1).
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p. 274; Eichenhofer 1999b, p. 114; Eichenhofer 1999c, p. 2; Interview, Deutsche Verbindungsstelle, 
18 September 2001).
This initial outburst appears as a sharp contrast to the subsequent political response. As in Denmark, 
Germany set up a working-group to analyse the implications o f the decisions (Palm 2000, p. 79). 
On the basis o f its report337, the Federal Health Ministry (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit) 
announced, in the beginning of June 1998, that the Decker/Kohll ruling had no effect on the German 
health insurance system (BMG Pressemitteilung 5 June 1998). The government explained its 
dismissal of the impact of the Decker/Kohll ruling on the German health system by referring to 
national institutions in place. According to the German government, the decisions applied only to 
health care systems which provided services through a system of reimbursement such as in 
Luxembourg, Belgium and France (Berg 1999, p. 588; Mrozvnski 1999, p. 222). In other words, the 
German viewpoint was substantiated by reference to its own social insurance system, which 
supplies services as benefits in kind (Kötter 2000, p. 30).
However, a subsequent health policy reform may be interpreted as a defensive reaction to the 
Decker/Kohll case-law (Becker 2000, p. 16). In December 1998, the German Parliament adopted a 
‘solidarity-enforcement-law'338, where the option to choose cost reimbursement instead of benefits 
in kind w as abolished. The option of cost reimbursement adopted in 1997 had thus only survived 
one year. Furthermore, the national policy amendment abandoned the flat-rate reimbursement 
system for dental prostheses and orthodontic treatment and replaced it by providing these sen-ices 
as benefits in kind (Palm 2000, pp. 44-45). This twofold reinforcement of the principle of benefits 
in kind can be seen as an act intended to prevent any relevance of the Decker Kohl! procedure to the 
German health insurance sy stem.
As in Denmark, Germany has not responded to either the Smits/Peerbooms or the Müller-Fcm re van 
Riet rulings by introducing national policy reforms. The national impact of the Smits Peerbooms 
case was rejected and the general reaction to the case-law was, in fact, rather silent compared with
33 "Bericht der gemeinsamen Arbeitsgruppe der Länder Brandenburg, Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Nordrhein- 
Westfalen und des Saarlandes, der Sitzenverbände der Krankenkassen und des Bundesministerium für Gesundheit zu 
den Auswirkungen der Rechtsprechungen des EuGH zur Erstattung von Kosten für Medizinprodukte und Behandlung 
im EU-Ausland durch nationalen Krankenversicherungsträger.
338 GKV-Solidaritätsstarkungsgesetz, 19 December 1998.
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the initial response to the Decker/Kohll rulings (Interview, Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und 
Sozialordnung, 19 September 2001). It was emphasised that that the Smits Peerbooms decision 
justified national authorisation policies and that the free movement of services applied restrictively 
within the policy field of health care (Interview', Deutsche Verbindungsstellc, 18 September 2001).
It remains to be seen how the German government w ill react to the Muller-Faure. van Rict case. The 
German non-compliance with the Decker/Kohll procedure can hardly be maintained now that the 
Court has clarified that it applies in general to the non-hospital provision of health care. Unless a 
collective political stance is taken against this, the German member state will have to allow certain 
health care services to be purchased abroad -  and reimbursed - w ithout prior authorisation, as long 
as these sen ices arc supplied by the national health insurance funds.
3.7: Variations in Domestic Im pacts
German social courts have most actively taken up the invitation to question the scope of 
Community law7 against that of national law. Through preliminary references, German national 
courts have thus enhanced the bilateral as well as the multilateral effect of the supranational 
dimension of social security.
The analysis of the German case does not sustain the theory that the compatibility between the 
insurance-based welfare state and the European coordination system should result in less adaptive 
pressure and less domestic impact. On the contrary, the accessibility and scope of German welfare 
has been addressed much more frequently than Danish social allowances.
As in the analysis of the Danish case, the research on Germany points to the impact of European 
law as being delayed, but which gradually establishing itself over lime. The German case, how ever, 
also exemplifies that implementation -  or the refusal to do so -  is indeed an act of 'governance' and 
not simply ‘management* of supranational impositions. With reference to its national institutions, 
German) has so far refused to implement the Decker Kohll ruling, arguing that it does not apply to 
the health insurance system based on benefits in kind. In sharp contrast with the Danish affirmation 
of the multilateral effect of the ruling. German non-implementation demonstrates that the impact of 
the same cause is far from 'uniform' in practice. However, as the contours of the internal health
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market, precipitated by the ECJ rulings, become more identifiable, Germany may likewise have to 
adjust. Thus the uniformity of Community law, across national variations, will begin to take shape.
4.0: C o n clu d in g  Remarks
The analysis of this chapter has delineated the national response to a dynamic integration process 
and the impact thereof on selected social security institutions of the Danish and German member 
states, and has addressed the research question, ‘with what impact'.
The analytical findings of the Danish case has detailed how impact may be perceived differently 
over time, thus changing the political response to an ongoing integration process. Generally, 
Denmark has responded in defence of the status quo, but the research findings substantiate that the 
isolated position is difficult to maintain in a binding multilateral context. The declared Danish 
intention to commit itself to a parallel agreement regarding third country nationals clearly suggests 
that, even when the decision-making rule is unanimity, and even when a member state is shielded 
behind its exemption, the isolated position is controversial and implies costs. As argued 
theoretically, perceptions and preferences arc dynamic. They arc reluctantly influenced by the 
supranational institutionalisation process itself, which defined and clarifies die Community's aims, 
means and competencies. Such dynamism may, however, only be revealed in the long run, and so 
require a diachronic analytical approach.
Regarding the research question with what impact’, the analysis has found impact on all four 
examined social security institutions, which however vary in extent, form and identifiable points. 
Supranational institutionalisation has impacted both immediately and gradually on the residence- 
based welfare state 's organising principles of social citizenship and territoriality. In this aspect, 
actual impact reflects the identified adaptive pressure. From the outset, Denmark had to abolish its 
principle of social citizenship for 1408*s personal scope, regarding social pensions and. as 
institutionalisation has proceeded, it has become increasingly difficult for it to favour own citizens. 
The same account holds for family benefits. The analysis of family benefits, moreover, demonstrates 
that whereas Denmark initially inclined towards non-compliance or restrictive application, it finally 
chose to comply when faced with the prospect of having a lawsuit against it. The analysis 
conducted on social services substantiates the multilateral effect of judicial decision-making. A
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possible future abolishment of the residence clause in certain Danish social services will indeed 
support the proposition that legal path dependencies constitute a binding precedent, also in the case 
when the member state does not face an individual lawsuit. That finding is furthermore supported 
by the research on health care. The analysis on the institution of health care demonstrates how the 
general premises of judicial decision-making were implemented into national policy, but also that 
the national reinterpretation of such premises conditioned the extent of impact. Furthermore, the 
analysis of health care finds that the litigation of the ECJ beforehand conditioned national policy 
reforms and limited the range of options for its formulation. This finding suggests that gradually, as 
new policies are formulated in accordance with Community obligations, the compatibility’ between 
national and European institutions will increase. This means that ‘adaptive pressure* is reduced, but 
also that the impact of supranational institutionalisation becomes more difficult to identify, as it 
appears more discretely. To identify the effect of one dynamic process on the other sharpens the 
need for the diachronic analysis.
The research findings on ‘with what impact' for the German case demonstrate a very’ different 
national response to supranational institutionalisation. Contrary to what we should expect from the 
apparent compatibility between the principles of the European coordination system and national 
institutions, German social security institutions have faced both adaptive pressure and the impact of 
supranational institutionalisation. The findings on Germany, compared with the Danish case, 
suggest that although a member state faces less adaptive pressure from the outset of a given 
European integration process, the impact of that process may be strong anyway since supranational 
institutionalisation takes shape dynamically, and since contemporary institutions arc not sheer 
typologies but contain different principles and criteria, facing different pressures. Furthermore, the 
German case demonstrates how important the national response is for the effectiveness and reach of 
European law and policy. The impact on German institutions has been much determined by the 
response of German national courts, which have taken a most active part in enhancing the bilateral 
and multilateral effect of Community social security* law. Regarding the four individual social 
security institutions, impact has been identified for at least three of them. The proposal and rejection 
of a German supplementary pension shows how the acquis communautaire influenced the policy 
options considered. The analysis of family benefits demonstrates that delayed compliance with an 
individual lawsuit is not the same as non-compliance or contained compliance. To identify delayed 
compliance repeats the need for a diachronic analy sis so as not to conclude falsely that the
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respective member state has evaded its Community obligations. The examination of the impact on 
long-term care points out that although national policy has been constructed so as to evade its 
Community obligations, such a deliberate attempt may still have to be examined before the Court. 
Pre-emption as a political response may therefore not be a successful strategy in the long run. 
Finally, regarding health care, Germany has so far rejected the impact of judicial decision-making 
on its public scheme. However, as Community law gains precision and effect. Germany may 
equally have to admit to its multilateral effect. Analytical findings, however, points to the fact that 
Germany has considered, at least indirectly, the implications of the Decker-Kohll procedure, which 
is proven by its reinforcement of the health care principle on benefits in kind. Ultimately, such a 
defensive response equally reflects impact.
In sum, the analytical findings of this chapter substantiate the idea that the supranational 
institutionalisation of social security rights has a domestic impact on national welfare institutions. 
There is, however, no straightforward connection or predictable relation between adaptive pressure, 
national response and impact. The extent and manner o f impact is greatly influenced by national 
response, which occurs both politically, administratively and legally. With regard to the perception 
of impact, politics decide the individual bargaining positions. Politics and administration decide 
how supranational decision-making shall be implemented into national legislation, thus, in the short 
run. controlling the effective meaning o f the supranationally generated right. The litigiousness of a 
society and the judicial requests by national courts decide if EU points of law should be referred to 
ECJ and. ultimately, whether the scope of Community law will be enhanced, and enforced on 
national institutions. However, in the longer run, the effectiveness of Community law may increase 
and supranational organisations may question national response, for which reason also domestic 
impact unfolds over time.
These findings refute hypothesis H4 as stated in chapter VI, section 1.2. Supranational 
institutionalisation impacts significantly on the institutions o f both the residence-based and the 
insurance-based welfare state. Although it docs not impact uniformly or constantly, the analytical 
findings suggest that, over time and across institutions, institutionalisation of intra-European social 
security rights causes domestic change and has influenced policy options for both member states. 
Although significant impact on the institutions of the residence-based welfare state has been 
identified, it is not an impact which moves the welfare model in a direction which ultimately
converges with the dominant European social-insurance pattern. At least during the last three 
decades, a convergence effect has not been identifiable. When distinguishing between institutional 
and financial impact, low EU-immigration to Denmark even suggests that it faces a lower financial 
impact of intra-European mobility than Germany does. Then, when addressing hypothesis Hi or H>, 
the research results support neither of the two. National response indeed influences impact, it can, 
however, not neutralise the effects of supranational institutionalisation in the long run. H3 remains 
and is largely confirmed by the research results. Institutionalisation constitutes gradually through a 
two-layered process, where the supranational level causes domestic change, but where national 
implementation is the reactive part of decision-making. In this second layer of institutionalisation, 
member states and societies respond, and their responses feed back into the specific European 
integration process. Through this two layered process, the effective meaning of supranational rights 
is established. As national institutions and responses vary, so also docs the domestic impact. 
However, H3 docs not sufficiently emphasise the fact that the uniformity and intensity of impact is 
likely to increase according to how the efficiency and meaning of Community law also docs. 
According to the analytical results provided by this study. H3 should thus emphasise the time- 
variable stronger.
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion
The study which has been conducted here on the European institutionalisation of social security 
rights has aimed at empirically uncovering; to what extent has the European Union 
institutionalised social security rights; how, and with what impact on national welfare policies? 
Translated theoretically, the research has inquired; to what extent do institutions matter as inputs in 
the European integration process, how do they evolve and with what impact on established national 
institutions?
This thesis has analysed the rather contradictor meeting between, on the one hand, a European 
institution aiming to lift national barriers to the free movement of workers/persons by coordinating 
social responsibilities across national societies, and, on the other hand, national welfare institutions 
demarcated within the traditional borders of the nation-state and with the historical aim of fortifying 
national membership.
In conclusion, the study has found that although welfare policies, formally regarded, are national 
competencies, and although they represent a ‘less likely* case o f integration, the European Union 
has gradually, but extensively, established a supranational social security dimension for those who 
cross borders. Institutionalisation of intra-European social security rights has furthermore added 
substantial rights to the skeleton of European citizenship and has taken initial -  but fundamental -  
steps on the path towards ‘social Europe*. The supranational social security dimension thus 
established, additionally has effects beyond those relatively few persons crossing borders, since it 
has directly prohibited certain principles and criteria for the organisation of welfare, as well as 
having compromised member states' autonomy to formulate their welfare policies. When it comes
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to ‘prohibition', the impact of the supranational social security dimension moves beyond 
‘coordination', and becomes ‘harmonisation', in light of its consequence.
This overall conclusion is based on the aggregate of several detailed analytical findings from the 
diachronic study between To and T2 of Regulation 1408/71 ’s creation, institutionalisation and 
impact on four domestic social security institutions. Considered individually, each analytical 
finding refines and details the general conclusion.
7
1.1: The Analytical Findings o f the  Study
The empirical analysis of the adoption o f Regulation 1408/71 demonstrates that the institution of 
1408 originated as a historical phenomenon and thus out of a previously propitious socio-economic 
situation, where foreign labour was requested and the social allocative questions needed to be 
solved due to a significant increase in migration between the six original member states. Shortly 
after 1408/71 was adopted, the socio-economic context changed fundamentally and member states 
started to close their borders to foreign labour. However, since the states were bound by 
institutionalised obligations, access to foreign labour markets and their social security systems 
remained open for Community w orkers. Against their historical background, creation and very early 
development, the Community institutions on free movement and cross-border social security stand 
out as unique examples of European Regulation.
On the question 'to what extent ' and how the analysis of the subsequent supranational 
institutionalisation has depicted a process whereby an institution was transformed fundamentally 
between T0 and T2, but only through the accumulated effect of very subtle and piecemeal steps of 
integration. Institutionalised through a process in which the insufficiency of existing rules is 
constanti)' pointed out, Regulation 1408 appears in T2 as an institution, w hose principle o f  equal 
treatment and personal scope are close to being extended to all European citizens; w hose material 
scope has been extended and up-dated; and w hose principle o f exportability has been compromised, 
however, being extended beyond original political intentions. Furthermore, judicial activism has 
definitively applied internal market rules to national health care policies, and has unilaterali)' draw n 
up the contours and conditions for an internal health care market. The research on ‘how ' this 
gradual evolution has taken place, has pointed out the abilities of the European Commission and the 
European Court o f  Justice to transform the institution from output to furthering input in the
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subsequent process, thus driving the integrative path towards ‘more Europe". However, the research 
results also demonstrate that the supranational organisations have no autonomous capacity to pursue 
integrative agendas. Their rate o f success ultimately depends on the political response to the 
Commission's proposals and judicial decision-making. Inquiring into ‘how* has equally brought 
both the relations between the Commission and the Council, and that between law and politics, into 
focus.
The analysis on the institutionalisation o f the principle o f  equal treatment and personal scope of 
Regulation 1408 has identified a movement where rights have been gradually decoupled from the 
exercise of economic activity. The insistent and successive actions of the Court and Commission 
have cultivated this movement, which has cither formally been codified by the Council or at least 
indirectly confirmed by the absence of political response. The subtle extension of equal treatment 
and the personal scope stands out as a practical recognition of European citizenship, gradually 
preparing the member states to extend the Regulation to cover all Community nationals. 2004 will 
be the year where intra-European social security rights will finally be formally linked to European 
citizenship and the building of a ‘social Europe*. In the meantime, all the member states, besides 
Denmark, have agreed to extend the Regulation to third country nationals. Although the extension 
appears as a radical break with a traditional communitarian conception of welfare, third country 
nationals still, in general, lack the underlying right of free movement. Therefore, the new adoption 
docs not signify any definite move towards equality regardless of nationality, and a political 
agreement on moral obligations, but rather repeats the complexity of different personal categories. 
To fulfil the Commission's original agenda on third country nationals will require many more 
subtle and preparatory steps and, not least, effective political support.
The research results on the institutionalisation of Regulation 1408's material scope, its principle o f 
exportability\ and the right to health care beyond national borders, demonstrate that the generation 
of supranational rules and rights is a continual process, where clashes between Community law and 
national policies repeatedly produce conflict and clarification. However, as both Community law 
and national social security policies evolve very dynamically, clarification is a temporary state of 
affairs which endures until the established equilibrium is disturbed anew. Analytical findings reflect 
a process much characterised by ambiguity. Whereas the development of 1408's material scope 
confirms the ECJ‘s ability to further integration, despite the in-activism o f the Council, legal
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autonomy is not supported by the research findings on the principle of exportability and health care. 
At least, that is, not on the face of it. The analysis of the institutionalisation of ‘special non- 
contributory* benefits has depicted a process where politics responded to, and overruled, judicial 
activism. Whereas the Court at first appeared receptive and accepting of the political restraints, the 
analysis o f very recent litigation demonstrates that politics has not had the last word, but that the 
Court, on request, reinterprets matters. These reinterpretations are then reasoned against a clarified 
institutional background, where a binding precedent has been established in the meantime. This 
pattern of political overrule which is compromised much later by reoriented judicial rulings, is 
furthermore confirmed by the research results on health care and national authorisation policies. In 
this part of the research, analytical findings also point to a cautious Court, which does not overtly 
set aside political preferences. The initial innovative ruling of the Court was restrained early on by 
the Council and the relation between national authorisation policies and intra-European health care 
seemed to have been clarified for almost two decades. This long-lasting reconciliation was 
considerably disturbed by the Court's landmark rulings in 1998, and by subsequent case-law. 
Between 1998 and 2003, the Court has successively advanced its interpretations, first applying 
internal market rules to the policy field o f health care, then justify ing but compromising, national 
authorisation policies and, most recently, paving the way for an internal health market for non­
hospital care. The line of judgments has carefully compromised national autonomy to decide the 
spatial consumption of health care as well as imposing a certain integration of foreign health supply. 
So far, a collective political voice has only been announced, but not heard. If politics continues to 
absent itself, law will alone respond to the requests of European health consumers and thus decide 
alone on the scope and limits of an internal health market.
The analytical inquiry into 'with what impact' has found that national implementation constitutes 
the second layer o f  institutionalisation. where member states, through their transposition of 
supranational!)’ generated rights and obligations, respond to the European institutionalisation 
process, and thus decide the more immediate impact thereof. Domestic impact is. in part, decided by 
the degree of adaptive pressure exerted by European institutionalisation on national institutions, 
and in part by the national response thereto. The anahtical findings from the comparative study of 
Denmark and Germany have shown how the impacts of the same cause -  be it supranational 
political or judicial decision-making - may vary significantly between two member states and 
therefore do not appear as ‘perfect, universal or constant*. However, as the effectiveness of
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Community law and policy increases over time, the uniformity o f impact may increase as well, 
albeit as far as possible in accordance with the differences of national institutions. The study which 
has been conducted has found that supranational institutionalisation causes domestic institutional 
change for both of the member states which have been studied. However, instead of moving 
domestic institutions towards convergence, two distinct processes of change emerge from the same 
cause. In between supranational institutionalisation and domestic impact, different national 
institutions and national responses constitute explanatory variables, producing different directions 
of change.
Although the analysis of domestic impact has found that the welfare institutions of Denmark and 
Germany face different kinds of adaptive pressure from the European institutionalisation process 
which has been identified, it furthermore has found that the actual impact cannot be deduced only 
from the extent of adaptive pressure on national institutions. In between comes the national 
response, which has a political, administrative and legal dimension. In addition, considered from a 
de facto perspective, Germany has attracted considerably more EU-immigrants than Denmark. 
However, EU-immigration to both countries remains low, which explains why the focus is not on 
the degree of adaptive pressure and impact exercised by actual immigration, but is entirely on the 
effects on an institutional or symbolic level. This distinction is quite seldom emphasised in 
discussions on the welfare consequences of the free movement of persons, especially not when 
arguments have relied on the idea of 'welfare tourism*.
In the Danish case, the analysis substantiates how perceptions o f  impact, and thus preferences, may 
change discretely, but gradually, over time. As supranational institutionalisation has evolved, 
Denmark has reluctantly changed its political response and allowed integration to proceed. The 
analysis has furthermore found an impact for all four selected social security institutions of 
statutory pension, family benefits, social services and public health care. Supranational 
institutionalisation has impacted both immediately and gradually on the residence-based welfare 
state's organising principles o f social citizenship and territoriality. The findings on Germany have 
pointed out that, despite an apparent 'compatibility'' between European and national institutions, 
significant impact of supranational institutionalisation may occur. Impact has thus been identified in 
the context of the debate on a supplementary* pension scheme, for family benefits, for long term care 
as well in a more defensive manner for health care. German national courts have been among the
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most active participators in deciding both the bilateral and multilateral effect of Community law and 
policy. Their legal response has enhanced the impact of supranational institutionalisation in a way 
which differs considerably from the Danish response, where individual lawsuits are lacking. The 
analysis of Denmark, on the other hand, demonstrates that, in the medium or long run, national 
politicians, administrations or social appeal authorities are likely to accept the binding precedent of 
a judicial ruling and implement what it reinterprets as its general premises. These analytical 
findings concerning Denmark thus substantiate the multilateral effect of the ECJ's previous rulings.
By prohibiting discrimination on the grounds o f nationality, the impact of Regulation 1408 comes 
close to harmonising the personal scopes of national social security schemes, since the direct 
favouring of a state's own citizens is prohibited, and is only possible indirectly through the criteria 
of habitual or long-term residence. Although not a general principle, the exportability clause of 
Community law increasingly questions member states' use of territoriality as a means of controlling 
welfare consumption. Whereas the requirement of equal treatment for Community nationals has 
been institutionalised as a general principle in member states' legislation, the principle o f  
exportability today seems to constitute the bone of contention between supranational organisations 
and member states, and between Community law and national policies. The conflict is clearly 
demonstrated by the research findings on ‘special non-contributory* benefits, on family benefits, on 
long term care, on social sendees and on public health care. Furthermore, the research findings 
indicate how national policies, from time to time, have been constructed so as to evade the 
Community obligation of exportability, but have subsequently been brought into line therewith. 
These different modes of impact compromise the social sovereignty of the member state.
The findings of this study question the hypothesis put fonvard by scholars such as Lcibfricd. 
Pierson and Ketscher, which was set up in the introduction of this thesis and as Hj in chapter VI. 
which claims that the European coordination system will encourage politicians to follow the welfare 
program design o f Bismarck. This study's comparison between Denmark and Germany over an 
extensive To and T2 docs not support such a convergence assumption. The findings of my study 
instead suggest that the supranational social security dimension foremost invites politicians to 
reinforce the granting of social sendees as benefits-in-kind, since Community law permits these to 
be tied to the national territory. Thus a primary impact of the coordination system which has been 
institutionalised is that it precludes social sendees being offered as benefit-in-cash, should
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politicians still wish to control welfare consumption within own territory. Ultimately, that has 
ideological consequences for those who aim to make welfare provision something that is decided 
upon by the free choice of the welfare consumer.
1.2: Analytical Findings in Theoretical Perspective
The study that has been conducted has traced the process through which intra European social 
security rights have been institutionalised and the domestic impact thereof. Through a protracted 
process, the bits and pieces of institutional change have gradually integrated the ‘less likely* policy’ 
field of social security'.
From a theoretical perspective, the study has aimed to follow an institution all way through and to 
inquire into its creation, institutionalisation and impact.
When first addressing how the institution was created, the adoption of Regulation 1408 in To, i.e. in 
1971, already had an institutional predecessor and thus originated from an established path 
dependency. When agreed upon in 1971, Regulation 1408/71 was merely a revision of the 
institution adopted back in 1958, which also originated from an inherited institutional context. The 
original commitment of the ECSC and EEC members to open up conditionally their labour markets 
and to grant access to their social security systems mirrored converging national interests in a 
propitious economic situation, as well as reflecting a functional demand for cross-border 
coordination due to increased migration. This commitment thus essentially supports a liberal 
intergovernmentalist theoretical proposition (Moravcsik 1991, 1993; Romero 1993). However, 
when first formulated as a Community objective in the Treaty and in secondary legislation, the 
Commission and the Court stepped in and have, since this early point, contributed most actively to 
the development of intra-European social security rights. When innovated in To - 1971, 1408 was 
not only the output of intergovernmental bargains in the Council, but also the result of the 
Commissions ability to convince the member states that Regulation no. 3 needed fundamental 
revision. The need for revision was substantiated by the early and teleological case-law of the 
Court.
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Before and beyond To, a path dependent process of increasing returns unfolded and through this 
process, the institutionalisation of intra-European social security rights began to take shape. The 
institutionalisation process of Regulation 1408/71 can, to a great extent, be described by the 
theoretical insights provided by Stone Sweet et al. The institution has constantly needed revision or 
up-dating, being definitive at no stage. The dynamics of its institutionalisation has thus been a 
constant revelation or interpretation of the need to rewrite individual provisions or clarify objectives 
and principles (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998; Fligstein & Stone Sweet 2001; Stone Sweet, 
Fligstein & Sandholtz 2001), Through this process of constant revision, the Regulation has been 
extended in scope and substance. Also, the objective which it was originally adopted to achieve has 
changed scope and direction, so that now, it ultimately aims to promote intra-European mobility for 
persons and not only for workers.
However, the findings of the present study do not confirm the Stone Sweet and BruneII proposition 
that a 'virtuous cycle', consisting of transnational exchange, judicial activism and rule-production, 
progressively drives integration forward (Stone Sweet & Bruncll 1998). Apart from the period 
between 1960 and the early 1970s, cross border migration has not corresponded to the 
institutionalisation of intra-European rights, as it has remained relatively low. This finding suggests 
that when first institutionalised, institutionalisation has proceeded in a relatively detached manner 
from the aim it was originally adopted to fulfil, i.e. promoting the free movement of workers. Such 
dctachcdness has been explained by Pierson as the limits of rational institutional design, where the 
discrepancy between the instrument and its overall function may increase over time (Pierson 
2000a). The present study proves that essentially functionality is a matter of interpretation, and that 
different aims may be added over time.
Instead of arguing that Regulation 1408/71 has developed according to 'a life of its own', the 
conducted study has found that the path of institutionalisation depends on those who dynamically 
interpret the meaning, scope and function of the institution. The European Commission and the 
European Court o f Justice have proven to be the supranational organisations behind institutional 
transformation. The historical institutional assumption that 'institutions have a life of their own' 
disregards the fact that institutions cannot change or institutionalise on their own, but depend, at all 
points of change, on the fact that organisations or actors sustain their raison d'être, deduce their 
need for change, and possess the ability to mediate successfully this change. The Commission has
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continuously interpreted and adduced the incompleteness of the Regulation. At the same time, it has 
faced conflicting preferences amongst the member states, which, due to the requirement of 
unanimity, has hampered the adoption of its proposals, but which at other times, has made it 
possible to isolate conflicting positions and gradually prepare member states for eventual adoption. 
Furthermore, the Commission has proved most capable of successfully linking intra-European 
social security to the free movement o f persons, European citizenship and, ultimately, to ‘social 
Europe'. As argued by Pollack, persistency and issue-linking have on this aspect appeared to be the 
Commission's most powerful skills (Pollack 1997; 1998; 2003). The Commission's scope of 
manoeuvre has been much more restrained with regard to third country nationals, and the results of 
a decade of re-proposals and re-negotiations arc more ambiguous. On this issue, the Commission's 
issue-linkage was not institutionalised by primary law, but merely referred to general political 
commitments. The political mandate was thus a more diffuse one. In the end, it was the 
Commission which had to change position and accept the agenda of the small minority. The 
established compromise proves that where political preferences arc very intense, persistency and 
issue-linking have to be combined with pragmatism, for the Commission to get a proposal through.
The role of the European Court o f Justice has proven even more decisive in the institutionalisation 
of intra-European social security rights. The Court has acted when politics has been absent. In 
several incidents, judicial activism has been the precondition for political action. Litigation has 
indeed constituted a key component for the integration of social security rights in the many 
incidents w here teleological interpretation and the establishment of binding precedent have driven 
the process forward. On the face of it, such findings support the proposition of Stone Sweet et al. of 
judicial activity as a key component in the virtuous cycle which drives integration forward (Stone 
Sweet & Brunell 1998; Stone Sweet & Sandholtz 1998; Stone Sweet. Fligstcin & Sandholtz 2001).
However, other research results point to the contrary. By having studied institutional change 
historically, chronologically and systematically, it becomes clear that the different observations 
provided by the same case study may, in fact, support and reject counter-posed theoretical 
propositions. An important part of the institutional path should in fact be described as a path of de­
creasing returns or de-institutionalisation, where the Council has managed to adopt secondary 
legislation to overrule the litigation o f the Court (most notably in the area of "special non­
contributory' benefits and health care). The political sphere has answered back, despite the
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threshold of unanimity which is required in order to do so. Furthermore, all the case-law where the 
Court found national action to be consistent with Community law, refutes the argument that 
litigation necessarily furthers integration. Such findings then support the political power argument 
which is emphasised by Garrett and co-writers, and which argues that integrative dynamics 
ultimately have to be politically supported, since otherwise politics would act to restrain law 
(Garrett 1992; 1995; Garrett, Keleman & Schultz 1998). Garrett et. al., however, fail to explain why 
politics so seldom manage to do so,
My analytical findings suggest that when studying rule-generation from To, over Ti to T:. it 
becomes clear that a specific institutionalisation process is constituted by a lengthy path o f discrete 
changes, where output is continuously re-interpreted. re-negotiated, re-codified and re-clarified. The 
institutionalisation process is in continual repetition between To, Tj, and T2, where feedback effects 
between intergovernmental bargains, supranational mediation and rulings, as well as national 
response, have mutually formulated and reformulated the effective meaning of Regulation 1408/71. 
This repetitive and protracted two-layered process of institutionalisation has been depicted as 
figures 2 and 3 in chapter II.
By tracing the process of institutionalisation over time, the time-variable has proven to be most 
important for the analytical findings. The examination carried out on institutionalisation as a 
process o f interaction between law and politics demonstrates that research results very much 
depend on which period we analyse, and on which responses we include in our analysis. Figure 3 in 
chapter II on "Institutionalisation through the Interaction of Law and Politics* has, on the basis of 
focusing on intra-European social security as a case-study, extended Garrett. Keleman and Schultz's 
examination of 'the stage game*, since their 'legal-politics game*, by and large, only depicts those 
outcomes where politics manage to overturn law (Garrett, Kelemann & Schultz 1998). Figure 3 
considers both the supranational layer of institutionalisation as well as the second layer, where 
national institutions and national responses decide the more immediate impact of supranationally 
generated rights and obligations. Whereas Garrett Keleman and Schultz focus on the different ways 
a litigant government may defy an ECJ ruling, figure 3 furthermore points out how other member 
governments, apart from the litigant, subsequently respond to the litigation and may accept the 
decision (stage 3). Furthermore, the figure emphasises that for every institutionalisation process
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occurring as a result of the interaction between law and politics, there is the stage ‘beyond stage 3’, 
where law or politics may again respond to the previous decision-making of the other branch.
The case-study on European institutionalisation o f social security rights contains findings on the 
various types of responses over different stages. The empirical findings on the two layers of 
institutionalisation demonstrate among other findings;
• How a litigant government reacted by contained compliance to an adverse decision, but later 
responded by policy reform (the initial German reaction after the Hoever c£ Zachow judgement 
on family benefits).
• How a litigant government reacted by non-compliance to an adverse decision, and pressed for 
secondary legislation to overturn the ruling (the French reaction to the Court's rulings on its 
supplementary pension allowance).
• How innovative rulings by the Court have been collectively restrained by the Council (the 
adoption of reg. 1247/92 on ‘special non-contributory' benefits and the adoption o f rcg. 2793/81 
after the Picrik judgements conditioned national authorisation policies on the provision of 
foreign health care).
• How other governments, apart from the litigant government, have denied the impact of judicial 
decision-making beyond the individual lawsuit (the German reaction to the Decker Kohl! 
rulings, and the Danish initial reaction to the Cabanis-lssarte case, as well as its initial reaction 
to the Molenaar case).
• How other governments, apart from the litigant government, have implemented the judicial 
decision-making, thus in effect accepting its status as a binding precedent (the Danish response 
to the Decker'Kohll rulings; the later Danish response to the Molenaar line of case-law 
regarding social services; the later Danish response to the Cabanis-lssarte case regarding the 
rights of the family member).
• How the member governments, after an adverse decision, have codified its general premises in 
secondary legislation (by the adoption of reg. 1606/98 after the Vougioukas case extending the 
Regulation to special schemes for civil servants; by reg. 3427/89 after the Pinna case abolishing 
the French exception on family benefits).
• How the ECJ, in a stage ‘beyond stage 3’, (rc)interprcted secondary legislation which was 
adopted to rein in its previous ruling, as well as reinterpreting its own established legal 
reasoning (as with the Jauch and Leclere judgement which interpreted the national use of the
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special rule as institutionalised by reg. 1247/92; as in the Cabanis-Issarte case, in which the 
Court reconsidered the Kermaschek case-law; as in the Vougioukas case where the Court 
reconsidered the Lohmarm case).
These findings on institutionalisation as determined through the interaction o f  law and politics 
point out that ultimately a legal integrative path has to be politically sustained. Where political 
preferences do not conflict, politics may manage to overturn law. On the face of it, that sustains the 
political power propositions of Garrett, et al. according to which member states ultimately control 
the process. However, the fundamental criticism that can be brought against their theoretical 
interpretations is that they do not sufficiently consider all the failed attempts of political overturn. 
Furthermore, since their theory suggests that the Court will act with caution when the majority of 
member states explicitly express themselves against an integrationist legal deduction, as in the case 
of access to foreign health care, they are unable to explain why the ECJ nevertheless rules against 
such joined preferences (Garrett, Kelcmen & Schultz 1998, pp. 150-151).
Contran- to the political power approach, my research results demonstrate that a legal path 
dependency o f increasing returns is difficult for politics to overturn. The findings point to the 
existence, in practice, of a 'joint decision trap*, whereby member governments do not simply 
mobilise joint action, since they either individually and collectively disagree, interpret principles 
and impact differently and tend to react with certain delay. In the meantime, institutionalisation is 
likely to have moved on and new requests are brought before the Court. To rein in the Court 
demands either a certain promptness or persistency. Both these types of responses arc not easily 
mobilised through collective political action. The analysis o f the national response to, and impact 
of, supranational institutionalisation suggests that in this process of subtle, but continuous, change, 
politics finds its own logic working against it. The institutional and financial impact of judicial 
decision-making may appear with years of delay, at a point of time w here it has become too late for 
politics to mobilise a sufficient degree of support for collective restraint.
What the 'joint decision trap* hampers, may then be compensated for by the member state's 
individual response as suggested by Conant (Scharpf 1988; Conant 2001, 2001b, 2002). While 
Conant criticises the assumption of judicial empow erment for not follow ing legal interpretations 
beyond the Court room, the analysis of the second layer o f institutionalisation in this thesis has
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aimed to research the implementation and impact o f individual rulings, also beyond the litigant 
government. Contran' to the arguments o f Conant, the research has found that judicial decision­
making docs indeed impact on national policies and administrative practices, but not in a uniform, 
immediate or systematic way. Impact may occur with a considerable time-lag. Therefore, the 
Conant argument that the reach of European law outside the courtroom depends on how member 
states accommodate those rights, is a short/medium term consideration. As supranational 
institutionalisation proceeds, the effectiveness and meaning of European law becomes more 
pronounced and more difficult to ignore by national political actors and administrative practice. The 
discrepancy found by Conant between what the ECJ justices and what national actors consider to be 
appropriate practice has, in this study, proven to diminish over time (Conant 2001b, p. 27). Delayed 
compliance is not the same as non-compliance or ‘contained compliance'. In addition, the 
comparative study of Denmark and Germany refutes the proposition that member states need only 
comply with rulings that address them individually. Again as supranational institutionalisation has 
proceeded, as its scope and content has clarified, the binding precedent of previous rulings has 
gradually caused domestic institutional change. As a final point on the work of Conant, the study of 
domestic impact has found that ‘pre-emption’, whereby member states construct domestic policies 
so as to avoid ECJ interference, is unlikely to be a successful political strategy in the long run. As 
the scope, effectiveness and reach o f Community law' increases, deliberate attempts to evade 
Community obligations are likely to be addressed through new requests to the Court.
At the same time as implementation constitutes an act of governance, where national actors do not 
simply neutrally transpose supranational decision-making, as has been argued by Scott among 
others, the margin for more individual interpretations o f the scope and reach of Community law 
must have a short/medium and long term dimension (Dimitrova & Stcucnbcrg 2000, p. 215; Scott 
2000, p. 259). In the short/medium term, implementation may constitute the second stronghold of 
national control. In the long term, contained compliance, restrictive application or pre-emption do 
not appear as sustainable national responses to supranational institutionalisation.
How ever, since all member states face different adaptive pressures from European integration, due 
to different national institutions, and since national responses vary across member states, the impact 
of the same cause is much more likely to unfold as non-systematic and in distinct processes of 
change rather than in converging ones. On the face of it, it may seem that there is no straightforward
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connection between cause and effect as found by Goetz (2001), but, analysed over time, the 
domestic impact of supranational institutionalisation of social security rights becomes identifiable. 
Supranational decision-making impacts on future national welfare policies, just as it has impacted 
on those of the past. As the compatibility between European and national institutions increases, the 
degree of adaptive pressure and identifiable impact diminishes, thus tending to escape our analytical 
and theoretical attention. By formulating a two-step research strategy, and by studying two separate, 
but interlinked and dynamic layers o f  institutionalisation, this thesis has attempted to avoid such an 
"escape’ and instead to map the more discrete, delayed and non-systematic impact of the 
supranational institutionalisation of social security rights.
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335. 17. September 2002, Baumbast, United Kingdom, Case C-413/99,2002 page 1-07091. Art. 19
336. 24 September 2002, Dominguez, Urbano, Cruz & Fernandez, Germanv, Case C-471/99,2002 
page 0000. Art, 6 ,13,77,78,79
337. 3 October 2002, Perez, Spain, Case C-347/00,2002 page 1-08191. Art. 1,45,46
3 3 8 . 7  N o v e m b e r  2002 , M aaheim o, F in la n d , C a se  C -3 3 3 /0 0  p a g e  1 -1 0087 . A r t  4 ,1 0 ,7 3 , 7 5
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Appendix 2: German Preliminary References 
and Infringements Procedures on the Basis of 
Regulation 1408/71 between 1971-2003
1973
1. 1 March 1973, Bentzinger, Germany, Case 73-72,1973 page 0283. Landessozialgericht Baden -  
Württemberg. Art. 14 (1)
2. 11 October 1973, Kunz, Germany, Case 35-73,1973 page 1025. Bimdessozialgcricht. A rt 28
3. 27 November 1973, Vandeweghe, Germany, Case 130-73, 1973 page 1329. Landessozialgericht 
Baden-Württemberg. Art. 1,64,65 & 66
1975
4. 18 Februars 1975, Farrauto, Germany, Case 66-74,1975 page 0157. Bundessozialgcricht Art. 84
(4)
5. 9 July 1975, d’Amico, Germany, Case 20-75,1975 page 0891. Bundcssozialgerichl. Art. 1,45,69 
& 71
6. 30 October 1975, Galati, Germany, Case 33-75,1975 page 1323. Sozialgericht Ausburg. Art. 45
( 1)
7. 20 November 1975, Dorella, Germany, Case 49-75,1975 page 1461. Sozialgericht Ausburg. Art. 
4 6 (2 )& 4 8 (1 )
1976
8. 26 May 1976, Aulich, Germany, Case 103-75,1976 page 0697. Landcssozialgcricht Berlin. 
A rt 4 & 27. Not in favour.
9. 23 November 1976, Kermaschck, Germany, Case 40-76,1976 page 1669. Sozialgericht 
Gelsenkirchen. A rt 1 ,2 ,67 ,68 ,69  & 70. Not in favour.
1977
10. 31 March 1977, Fossi, Germany, Case 79-76,1977 page 0667. Bundcssozialgericht. A rt 3 & 
10. Not in favour.
11. 5 May 1977, Jansen, Germany, Case 104-76, 1977 page 0829. La tides soz ialgo rieht Nordrhein- 
Westfalen. Art. 4 & 10. In favour.
12. 20 October 1977, Giuliani, Germany, Case 32-77,1977 page 1857. Sozialgericht Ausburg.
A rt 10 & 46. Not in favour.
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1978
13 . 16 M a r c h  19 7 8 , L au m an n , G e r m a n y , C a s e  115 /77 , 1978  p a g e  0 8 0 5 . L an d essoz ia lgerich t  
N o r d r h e in -W e stfa le n . A rt. 1 , 2 , 4 , 1 2 , 7 8  & 79 . In  favou r .
14. 12 O c to b e r  1978 , B e lb ou ab , G e r m a n y , C a se  1 0 /7 8 ,1 9 7 8  p a g e  19 1 5 . S oz ia lger ich t  
G e lse n k ir c h e n . A rt. 2 &  9 4 . N o t  in  fa v o u r .
1 9 7 9
15. 2 2  F e b r u a r y  1979, T in clli, G e r m a n y , C a se  1 4 4 /7 8 ,1 9 7 9  p a g e  07 5 7 . L an d essoz ia lgerich t  
B a d e n -W ü rtte m b e rg . A rt. 10  &  8 9 . N o t  in  favour.
16. 20 March 1979, Coccioli, Germany, Case 139/78, 1979 page 0991. Sozialgericht Hildesheim. Art.
69
17. 29 May 1979, Villano, Germany, Joined cases 173 and 174/78, 1979 page 1851. 
Bundessozialgcricht. Art. 61
18. 12 July 1979,Brunori, Germany, Case 266/78, 1979 page 2705. Landessozialgericht Nordrhein- 
Westfalen. Art. 45
1 9 8 0
19. 28 February 1980, Fellinger, Germany, Case 67/79,1980 page 0535. Bundessozialgcricht. Art. 1 
& 71
20. 19 June 1980, Testa, Maggio and Vitale, Germany, Joined cases 41/79, 121/79 and 796/79,1980 
page 1979. Bayerisches Landessozialgericht. Art. 69
21. 26 June 1980, Menzies, Germany, Case 793/79, 1980 page 2085. Bundessozialgcricht. Art. 1 & 46
22. 9 Julv 1980, Gravina and others, Germany, Case 807/79, 1980 page 2205. Sozialgcricht Ausburg. 
Art. 78
23. 8 October 1980, Überschär, Germany, Case 810/79,1980 page 2747. Bundessozialgcricht. Art. 89
1981
2 4 . 2 7  J a n u a r y  1981, V ig ier , G e r m a n y , C a se  7 0 /8 0 ,1 9 8 1  page 0 2 2 9 . B u n d essozia lgcr ich t. A r t. 1, 
4, 5 &  9. N o t  in favour.
2 5 . 19 F e b r u a r y  1981, B eeck , G e r m a n y , C a se  104/80, 1981 p age  0 5 0 3 . S oz ia lger ich t S ch lesw ig . 
A r t  1, 4 , 1 3 ,2 0  & 73. N o t in f a v o u r
1983
26. 15 September 1983, Jerzak, Germany, Case 279/82, 1983 page 2603. Landessozialgericht 
Nordrhein Westfalen. Art. 12,46 & 57 278*
27. 24 November 1983, D'Amario, Germany, Case 320/82,1983 page 3811. Bundessozialgcricht. Ait. 
77,78
1984
28. 13 November 1984, Salzano, Germany, Case 191/83,1984 page 3741. Sozialgericht München.
Art. 73,76
1986
374
29. 23 April 1986, Ferraioli, Germany, Case 153/84,1986 page 1401. Bundessozialgericht. Art. 73,76
30. 12 June 1986, Miethe, Germany, Case 1/85,1986 page 1837. Bundessozialgericht. Art. 1,13,71
1 987
31. 12 March 1987, Rindone, Germany, Case 22/86,1987 page 1339. Bundessozialgericht. Art. 19
32 . 4  J u n e  1 9 8 7 , C am p an a , G er m a n y , C a se  3 7 5 /8 5 ,1 9 8 7  p age  2 3 8 7 . B u n d essozia lger ich t A r t  4,
6 7 . In fa v o u r .
1988
33. 7 June 1988, Roviello, Germany, Case 20/85,1988 page 2805. Bundessozialgericht. N 6
34. 29 June 1988, Rebmann, Germany, Case 58/87,1988 page 3467. Bundessozialgericht. Art. 13,25,
39,71
3 5 . 5 Ju ly  19 8 8 , B o ro n  itz, G erm a n y , C a se  2 1 /8 7 ,1 9 8 8  p a g e  3715. B u n d esso z ia lg er ich t A r t  1 ,2 ,
46 . N o t in  fa vou r .
36. 22 September 1988, Bergemann, Germany, Case 236/87, 1988 page 5125. Landessozialgericht 
Nordrhein Westfalen. Art. 1,67,71
37. 14 December 1988, Ventura, Germany, Case 269/87,1988 page 6411. Bayerisches 
Landessozialgericht. Art. 44 ,48 ,78 ,79
1989
38. 28 February 1989, Schmitt, Gennanv, Case 29/88,1989 page 0581, Sozialgericht Hamburg. Art.
38
39. 18 May 1989, Troiani, Gennanv, Case 368/87,1989 page 1333. Bundessozialgericht. Art. 9
1 9 9 0
40 . 2 2  F eb ru ary  1990, B ro n zin o , G er m a n y , C ase C -2 2 8 /8 8 ,1990 p a g e  1-0531. B ayerisches 
L a n d e sso z ia lg e r ic h t  A rt. 1 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,  73 . In  favour.
41. 22 February 1990, Gatto, Germany, Case C-12/89,1990 page 1-0557. Bundessozialgericht. Art. 1, 
74
42. 4 July 1990, Kracht, Gennanv, Case C-l 17/89,1990 page 1-2781. Bundessozialgericht. Art, 73,76
43. 13 November 1990, Yanoz-Campoy, Germany, Case C-99/89,1990 page 1-4097. Sozialgericht 
Frankfurt am Main. Art. 73, 99
44. 13 November 1990. Reibold. Gennanv, Case C-216/89,1990 page 1—4163, Bundessozialgericht. 
Art. 1,67,71
1991
45. 7 February 1991, Ronleldt, Gennanv, CaseC-227/89,1991 page 1-0323. Sozialaericht Stuttgart. 
Art. 6, 7, 8 ,45 ,46,94
46 . 7  M arch  1991 , M asgio , G erm a n y , C a se  C -1 0 /9 0 ,1991 page 1 -1 119 . B u n d essozia lger ich t A r t  
3. In fa v o u r . 47
47. 11 June 1991, Athanasopoulos. Germany, Case C-251/89,1991 page 1-2797. Sozialaericht 
Nitmberg. Art. 5,77,78, 81,84
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48. 4 October 1991, Paraschi, Germany, Case C-349/87,1991 page 1-4501. Sozialgericht Stuttgart 
Art. 9
1992
49. 19 March 1992, Doriguzzi-Zordanin, Germany, Case C-l 88/90,1992 page 1-2039. Bayerisches 
Landessozialgericht. Art. 78
50 . 3  J u n e  1 9 9 2 , P a le tta , G erm a n y , C a se  C -4 5 /9 0 , 1992 p a g e  1 -3423 . A r b e itsg er ich t L örrach . A r t.  
1, 4. In  favou r .
5 1 .8  July 1992, Knoch, Germany, Case C -l02/91, 1992 page 1-4341. Bundessozialgericht Art. 12 
13,67, 69,71,80
1993
52. 18 February’ 1993, Gobbis, Germany, Case C-218/91,1993 page 1-0701. Bayerisches 
Landessozialgericht A rt 78
5 3 . 2  A u g u s t  1993, G ra n a -N o v o a , G e r m a n y , C a se  C - 2 3 /9 2 ,1993  p a g e  1-4505. 
B u n d esso z ia lg er ich t. A rt. 1 , 3 , 6 , 7 , 8 .  N o t  in favour.
5 4 . 16 D e c e m b e r  1993, L e g u a y e -N ec lsc n , G er m a n y , C ase  C - 2 8 /9 2 ,1 9 9 3  page 1-6857. 
S o z ia lg e r ic h t R eu tlin g en . A r t  3 , 4 , 9 , 1 0 , 1 3 , 4 6 .  N o t in  fa v o u r .
1 9 9 4
55. 2 8  A p r il 1994, H oorn , G erm a n y , C a se  C -3 0 5 /9 2 ,1 9 9 4  p a g e  1 -1 525 . S o z ia lg cr ich t M u n ster . 
A r t  3 , 6 , 7, 8 . N ot in  favou r.
1995
56. 16 February 1995, Andresen GmbH & Co. KG, Germany, Case C-425/93,1995 page 1-0269. 
Schleswig-Holsteinisches Landessozialgcricht. Art. 14
57. 8 June 1995, Delavant, Germany, Case C-451/93,1995 page 1-1545. Landessozialgericht für das 
Saarland. Art. 1,13,19
58. 13 Julv 1995, Perrotta, Germany, Case C-391/93,1995 page 1-2079. Bundessozialgericht. Art. 25, 
69
59. 5 October 1995, Martinez, Germany, Case C-321/93. 1995 page 1-2821. Sozialgericht Nürnberg. 
Art. 73
60. 9 November 1995, Thcvenon, Germany, Case C-475/93, 1995 page 1-3813. Sozialgericht Speyer. 
Art. 6
6 1 .2 3  November 1995, Alonso-Perez, Germany, Case C-394/93,1995 page 1-4101. 
Landessozialgcricht Rheinland-Pfalz. Art. 73,94,99
1 996
6 2 . 28  M a r c h  1996, M o ren o , G er m a n y , C a se  C -2 4 3 /9 4 ,1 9 9 6  p a g e  1 -1 887 . S o z ia lg er ich t S tu ttg a rt. 
A r t  4 , 7 4 . In  favour.
6 3 . 2  M ay  1 9 9 6 , P a le tta , G er m a n y , C a se  C -2 0 6 /9 4 ,1996  p a g e  1 -2357 . B u n d esa rb e itsg er ich t. A r t  
22. In  fa v o u r .
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64. 11 July 1996. Otte, Germany. Case C-25/95, 1996 page 1-3745. Hessischer 
Verwaltungsgerichthof. Art. 4. Not in favour
65. 10 October 1996, Hoever and Zachow, Germany, Joined cases C-245/94 and C-312/94,1996 
page 1-4895. Landessozialgericht Nordrhein Westfalen. A rt 1,4, 67, 68,70, 71, 73. In favour
1997
66. 30 January  1997, Stöber and Pereira, Germany, Joined cases C-4/95 and C-5/95, 1997 page I- 
0511. Landessozialgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen. A rt 1 ,2 ,4 ,73 . In favour.
67. 2 7  February 1997, Moriana, R eyes, V a lle , Ram os, M oscato  and A b ato , Germ any, C ase  C -59 /95 , 
1997 page 1-1071. Sozialgericht N ürnberg. Art. 7 7 ,7 8 ,7 9
68 . 12 June 1997, García, Germany, C ase  C -2 6 6 /9 5 ,1997 p a g e  1-3279. B urulessozialgericht. Art. 1 ,7 3
69 . 2 5  J u n e  19 9 7 , R om ero, G erm any, C a s e  C -1 3 1 /9 6 ,1 9 9 7  page 1 -3659 . B u n d esso z ia lg er ich t. A r t  
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,  5 ,7 8 .  In fa v o u r
1998
70. 5  M arch  19 9 8 , K ulzer, G erm any, C a se  C -1 9 4 /9 6 ,1998  p age 1 -0895 . B u n d e sso z ia lg er ic h t. A rt. 
1 , 2 ,4 , 7 3 ,7 7 .  N ot in fa v o u r
71 . 5  M arch  1998 , M olenaar, G erm a n y , C a se  C -1 6 0 /9 6 ,1 9 9 8  p age 1 -0843 . S o z ia lg e r ic h t  
K a rlsru h e . A r t  4 ,1 9 ,2 5 ,2 8 .  In f a v o u r
72. 7  M ay 19 9 8 , Rodriguez, Germany, C ase  C -1 1 3 /9 6 ,1 9 9 8  page 1 -2461. B undessozia lgericht. Art. 6 , 
1 3 ,7 7 ,7 8 ,7 9
73. 12 May 1998, Sala, Germany, Case C-85/96,1998 page 1-2691, Bayerisches 
Landessozialgericht Art. 1,2,4. In favour.
1999
74. 4 May 1999, Sürül, Germany, Case C-262/96, 1999 page 1-2685. Sozialgericht Aachen. A rt 1,
2.3. In favour.
75. 3 June 1999, Gomez-Rivero, Germany, Case C-211/97, 1999 page 1-3219. Landcssozialgericht 
Niedersachen. A rt 2 ,3,13,16, 73. In favour.
76. 21 September 1999, Kordel and Frankfurter Allianz Versicherungs AG, Germany, Case C-397/96,
1999 page 1-5959. Landgericht Trier. Art. 93
2000
77. 15 June 2000, Schrer, Germany, Case C-302/98,2000 page 1-04585. Bundessozialgericht A rt
1.3, 13, 14, 27,28,33. In favour.
78* 6 July 2000, Movrin, Germany, Case C-73/99,2000 page 1-05625. Sozialgericht M unster. A rt 
1 ,3,10, 27,33. In favour.
79. 21 September 2000, Borawitz, Germany, Case C-124/99,2000 page 1-07293. Sozialgericht 
Münster. A rt 3. In favour.
80. 9 November 2000, Thelen, Germany, Case C-75/99,2000 page 1-09399. Bundessozialgericht Art
6 ,7 ,48 ,51 ,67 ,68 ,69 ,70 ,71
81. 9 November 2000, Plum, Germany, Case C-404/98,2000 page 1-09379. Bundesgerichthof. Art 
13,14, 15, 16, 17
82. 23 November 2000, Elsen, Germany, Case C-135/99,2000 page 1-10409. Bundessozialgericht 
A rt 3 ,10 ,13 . In favour.
2001
83. 8 M arch 2001, Commission v Germany, Case C-68/99, 2001 page 1-01865. A rt 2 ,13,14. Not 
in favour.
84. 11 October 2001, Khalil, Chaaban, Osseili & Addou, Germany, Joined cases C-95/99 to C- 
98/99 and  C-180/99,2001 page 1-07413. Bundessozialgericht. A r t  I, 2,3. Not in favour.
85. 25 October 2001, Ruhr, Germany, Case C-189/00,2001 page 1-08225. Sozialgericht Trier.
A rt 2, 67,68, 69, 70, 71. Not in favour.
2002
86. 24 September 2002, Domínguez, Urbano, Cruz & Fernández, Germany, Case C-471/99,2002 page 
0000. Sozialgericht Nürnberg. Art. 6, 13, 77, 78, 79
378
Appendix 3: Tables A1-A3
T ab le  A l:  P re lim in a ry  References m ade 1961-1998 p r. 1. m illion people in 11 m em ber states 
(L uxem burg  excluded)7
1961-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-98 T o ta l
G erm any 0,37 3,46 4,22 5,65 13,7
France 0,12 1,43 4,8 3,64 9 ,98
N etherlands 1,38 6,75 11,81 10,88 30,81
Italy 0,05 1,46 2,17 6,41 10,09
Belgium 0,98 7,55 13,9 12,16 34,61
UK — 0,33 1,42 2,73 4 ,48
Ire land 1,65 4,13 4,41 10,19
D enm ark - 1,13 4,72 8,87 14,72
Greece 1,93 2,94 4 ,8 6
Spain 0,12 2,83 2 ,95
P ortugal 0,1 2,91 3,01
{ • '•
1 The data on the total number of references are the same as used in table 2, chapter II (Alter 2000, p. 499). The data are 
then divided by the population size of the 11 individual member states. The individual population sizes have been 
informed by the Danish Foreign Ministry' and are the population sizes as of January 2003. That is changes in population 
sizes between 1961-97 are not taken into account.
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T able A 2: P re lim in a ry  R eferences m a d e  1972-2002 concern ing  reg u la tio n  1408/71 p r. 1. m illion people 
in 13 m e m b e r sta tes (Irish  and  P o rtu g u ese  n a tio n a l courts have m ad e  no  references)* 23
1972-81 1982-1991 1992-02 T otal
Germany 0,31 0,28 0,45 1,04
France 0,07 0,24 0,05 0,36
N etherlands 0,88 1,32 1,38 3,58
Italy 0,02 0,05 0,09 0,16
Belgium 2,65 3,92 3,73 10,3
UK 0,12 0,11 0,17 0,4
Denmark 0,19 0.19
Greece 0,09 0,09
Spain 0,17 0,17
L uxem burg 8,67 8,67
Sweeden 0,22 0,22
F inland 0,39 0,39
A ustria 0.74 0.74
T able A 3: In n o v a tio n  o f C ore Social S ecu rity  In s titu tio n  in  W este rn  E u rope3
In d u s tr ia l  A ccident S ickness Pension U nem ploym ent A ll
Emp. Liab. C omp. Subs. Vol. Comp. Subs. Vol. Comp. Subs. Vol. C omp.
A ustria 1887 1888 1906 1920 1920
Belgium 1903 1894 1944 1900 1924 1907 1944 1907
Denmark 1898 1916 1892 1933 1891 1907 1907
F in land 1895 1963 1937 1917 1963
France 1898 1946 1930 1910 1914 1930
Germany 1884 1883 1889 1927 1927
Italy 1898 1886 1928 1898 1919 1919 1919
N etherlands 1901 1913 1913 1916 1949 1916
N orw ay 1894 1909 1936 1906 1938 1936
Sweden 1901 1916 1891 1913 1934 1934
Sw itzerland 1911 1911 1946 1924 1946
UK 1906 1946 1911 1908 1911 1911
2 The data on the total number of references are aggregated from the data in appendix 1 on "Preliminary References and 
Infringements Procedures on the Basis o f Regulation 1408/71 between 1971-2002". Since table 2 concerns preliminary 
references, infringements procedures do not appear in the data. Hie aggregated data are then divided by the population 
size of the 13 individual member states which made preliminary references between 1972 and 2002, i.e. all member 
states excqit Ireland and Portugal. The individual population sizes have been informed by the Danish Foreign Ministry 
and are the population sizes as o f January 2003. That is changes in population sizes between 1972-2002 are not taken 
into account.
3 Sources: Flora & Alber 1981, p. 59, Sonne Noigaard 1999, p. 17. “Emp. Liab." refers to "employers liability". 
"Comp." Refers to compulsory. "Subs. Vol." refers to subsidised voluntary.
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Appendix 4: Amendments of regulation 1408/71 in the  
period 1971 to 2002
Year 1408/71 am en d ed  by regulation Spécifie am endaient
1972 2864/72 of 19. December 1972 Replacement: Art. l.B, art. 9.2, art. 18 tille, art. 18.1, art. 
27, art. 33, art. 37.1, art. 38, art. 38 titlc, art. 45.1, art. 64, 
art. 79,2.
Amendment: Art. 28.2, art, 31, art. 46.1, art. 46.2, art. 
77.2, art. 78.2, annex 3, arinex 5.
Addition: Art. 28.
Compîetion: Art. 19.2.
Délétion. Art. 45.4, art. 79.4
1974 1392/74 of 4. June 1974 Amendment: Art. 14.1 English text, art. 15.3, art. 38.2 
English text, annex 2, annex 3, annex 4, annex 5.
1976 1209/76 of 30. April 1976 Amendment: Annex 1, annex 2, annex 4, annex 5.
1977 2595/77 of 21. November 1977 Replacement: Art. 14.3, art. 21.
Amendment. Art, 40.3 to 40.4, art. 44.2, art. 46.2, annex 2, 
annex 3, annex 5.
Addition: Art. 40.3.
Compîetion: Art. 22.3.
1979 1517/79 of 16. July 1979 Replacement: Art. 17.
Amendment: Art. 13.2, annex 3, annex 5. 
Délétion: Art. 95.
1981 1390/81 of 12. may 1981 Replacement Titlc. art. l.A, art. l.B, art. l.F, art. l.S, art.
9.1, art. 13, art. 14, art. 15.1, art. 17, art. 23.1, art. 23.2, 
art. 34, art. 35.1, art. 39.3, art. 47.1, art. 58.1, art. 58.2, art.
60.1, art. 73. annex 6.
Amendment: Art. l.C, art. l.G, art. l.R, art. l.U, art. 2.1, 
art. 2.2. art. 3.3. art. 7.2, art. 10,2, art. 18.2, art. 19.1, art. 
20.5, art. 21.1, art. 21.2, art. 21.4, art. 22.1, art. 22.3, art. 
22.4. art. 24.1. art. 25.1. art. 25.2. art. 26.1. art. 35.2 to
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35.3, art. 35.3, art. 35.3 to 35.4, art. 37.1, art. 37.2, art.
38.2, art. 40.1, art. 40,2, art. 40,3, art. 40,4, art. 41.1, art.
41.2, art. 44.1, art. 44.2, art. 45.2, art. 45.3 to45.4, art.
46.1, art. 46.2, art. 52, art. 53, art. 54.1, art. 54.2, art. 55.1, 
art. 61.1, art. 62.1, art. 65.1, art. 67.1, art. 67.2, art. 69.1, 
art. 70.1, art. 71.1, art, 72, art. 74.1, art. 74.2, art. 75.1, art.
75.2, art. 78.2, art. 79.1, art. 79.2, art. 79.3. art. 89, art.
93.2, annex 1 to 2, annex 2 to 3, annex 3 to 4, annex 4 to 
5, annex 5 to 6, annex 4.
Addition: Art. 14, art. 35.2, art. 38.3, art. 45.3, art. 45.5, 
art. 45.6, annex 7.
Completion: Art. l.J, annex 2, annex 3.
1981 2793/81 of 17. Septembcr 1981 Amendment: Art. 22.2, annex 3, annex 4, annex 5.
Addition: Art. 93.3.
Completion: Art. 39.
1983 2000/83 of 2. June 1983 Replacement: Art. 61.5.
Amendment: Annex 7.
Addition: Art. 61.6.
Completion: Annex 6.
1983 2001/83 o f 2. June 1983 Replacement: Titlc.
1985 1660/85 of 13. June 1985 Amendment'. Annex 7.
Addition: Annex 6.
1986 3811/86 of 11. Dccember 1986 Replacement: Art. 14.
Amendment: Art. 14, annex 7.
Addition: Art. 14.
1989 1305/89 of 11. May 1989 Replacement: Art. 95
1989 2332/89 of 18. July 1989 Replacement: Art. 57.
Amendment. Art. 7.2, art. 33 to 33.1, art. 60.1, art. 60.2, 
art. 94.8, annex 3, annex 6.
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IAddition-. Art. 9, art. 33.2, art. 85.5. 
Completion: Art. 76, art. 79.3.
1989 3427/89 of 30. October 1989 Replacement: Art. 72, art. 73, art. 74, art. 75, art. 76,94.9, 
chapter 7.
Amendment: Annex 1, annex 2, annex 6.
Deletion: Art. 90, art. 99.
1991 2195/91 of 25. June 1991 Replacement: Art. 17.
Amendment: Art. 12,4, annex 1, annex 4, annex 6. 
Addition: Art. 17, art. 45.8, art. 47.4, art. 72, art. 94.10. 
Completion: Art. 13.2, art. 39.5.
1992 1247/92 of 30. April 1992 Replacement: Art. 5.
Addition: Art. 4.2, art. 10, annex 2. 
Completion: An. l.F, art. l.J, annex2.
1992 1248/92 of 30. April 1992 Replacement: Art. 12.2, art. 37, art. 38, art. 39, art. 40, art. 
41, art. 42, art. 43, art. 44, art. 45, art. 46, art. 47, art. 48, 
art. 49, art. 50, art. 51, art. 94.10, recital 7, annex 4.
Amendment: Annex 6, title 3.
Addition: Art. 95.
Completion: Art. 60.1.
Deletion: Recital 8.
1992 1249/92 of 30. April 1992 Amendment: Art. 94.9, annex 3, annex 6.
Addition: Art. 94.1, art. 94.2, art. 94.3, art. 94.4, art. 94.5, 
art. 94.6, art. 94.7, art. 95.1, art. 95.2, art. 95.3, art. 95.4, 
art. 95.5. art. 95.6, art. 95.7, annex 2.
1993 1945/93 of 30. June 1993 Amendment: Annex 1, annex 2, annex 4, annex 6.
1995 3095/95 of 22. December 1995 Amendment: Art. 86 to 86.1, annex 1, annex 2. 
Addition: Art. 22. art. 25. art. 72. art. 86.2. art. 95.
383
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Completion: Art. 39.6, art. 45.6, annex 3, annex 6.
1995 3096/95 of 22. December 1995 Amendment: Art. l.U, art. 36.1, annex 1, annex 2, annex 
3, annex 4, annex 5, annex 7.
Addition: Art. 22.
Completion: Art. 49.1, annex 2, annex 6.
1996 118/97 of 2. December 1996 Replacement: Title, art. 82.4, art. 88.1. 
Completion: Annex 6.
Deletion: Art. 100.
1997 1290/97 of 27. June 1997 Replacement: Art. 2.3, art. 81.D 
Amendment: Art. l.F, annex 1, annex 2, annex 4. 
Addition: Art. 22, art. 85.3.
Completion: Annex 6.
1998 1223/98 of 4. June 1998 Amendment: Art. 29.1, annex 1, annex 2, annex 3, annex 
4.
Addition: Art. 31, annex 2, annex 6.
1998 1606/98 o f 29. June 1998 Replacement: Art. 13.1, art. 14.1, art. 44.3.
Amendment: Art. l.A. art. 4.4, annex 4.
Addition: Art. l.J, art. 14, art. 43, art. 51, art. 71, art. 79, 
art. 95.
Completion: Art. l.S, art. l.R, annex 6.
Deletion: Art. 2.3.
1999 307/99 o f 8. February 1999 ' Replacement: Art. 2.
Amendment: Art. l.F, art. 1.1, art. l.II, art. 9 German text, 
art. 10.2, art. 35.3.
Addition: Title 3.1.5, title 3.4.5, art. 34, art. 63, art. 66, art. 
76, art. 95.
384
Completion: Art. l.C, annex 6. 
Deletion. Art. 22.
1999 1399/99 of 29. April 1999 Replacement: Art. 44.3, art. 78.1. 
Amendment: Art. 79, annex 2 ,3 ,7 . 
Addition: Art. 78, art. 95. 
Completion: Art. 79, annex 1.4,6.
2001 1386/01 of 5. June 2001 Amendment: Annex 2.4. & 6.
Source: Celex database and Official Journals
Besides the amendments regulation 1408/71 has been presented three times as codified or co-ordinated text:
•  609/80 o f 9. June 1980
•  1210/92 of 10. December 1992
•  118/97 of 1. February 1997
Finally, regulation 1408/71 has been changed 1. January' 1973 due to the Community membership of Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom (Council dir. 101/73) as well as 20. January 1981 due to the Community membership of 
Greece (Council dir. 196/81). Tire two amendments do however not mean substantial regulatoiy change but deals with 
the general adaptations of Community documents by the Community enlargement.
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